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ABSTRACT 
THE PSYCHOTHEOLOGY OF SIN AND SALVATION 
This dissertation, by employing the work of Slavoj Lizek in his 
engagement with the Apostle Paul, argues that Paul, in Romans 6-8, 
understands sin as a lie grounding the Subject outside of Christ and 
salvation as an exposure and displacement of this lie as one is joined 
to the body of Christ. In this understanding salvation may be seen 
primarily in terms of an overcoming of alienation from God, neighbour 
and self through participation in the Trinity (adoption by the Father 
through the Son by means of the Spirit), which stands in contrast to the 
sinful Subject who in his inner alienation and his alienation from God 
and others is oriented by a deceitful death dealing desire that would 
find life in the law rather than in God. The specific theological 
significance of Lizek (along with his predecessors Sigmund Freud and 
Jacques Lacan) is his demonstration of the pervasive and systemic 
nature of this lie (chapter 1) and its description as he finds it in Romans 
7 (chapter 2). The general significance this account might have for 
theology is to frame the concept of sin as a deception (reifying the self) 
with its own logic, dynamic, and structure, similar to the Subject of 
psychoanalysis, and salvation, in turn, can be understood as the place 
and means from which the Subject of sin and its destructive nature are 
understood and displaced by new life in Christ (chapter 3). Sin and 
salvation, under this notion, are not forensic categories but have to do 
with the lived reality of identity, of being either a Subject oriented to 
death or to life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I make the case in this thesis that the work of Slavoj lizek is 
pertinent to theology and specifically to soteriology as his theory 
illuminates the doctrine of sin and indicates a holistic understanding of 
salvation, incorporating the individual and the social, the particular and 
the universal. The understanding of sin which is developed by lizek, in 
conjunction with Freud and Lacan and which he finds in Romans 7 is 
that sin is a deception or a primordial lie which grounds the human 
Subject and it is this necessary lie which is determinative of the 
dynamiCS of the Subject and her world. The question which the work of 
lizek raises and which this thesis seeks to answer is whether or how 
the psychoanalytic Subject, if it is understood as being constituted in 
deception (chapter 1) fits with the sinful Subject of Romans 7 (first as 
argued in lizek's theory which is taken up in chapter 2) and with the 
Subject of Romans 6-8 (from the perspective of biblical scholarship) 
and what implications this would have for the doctrines of sin and 
salvation (as worked out in chapter 3).1 My argument will be that 
lizek's picture of the Subject is analogous to Paul's sinful Subject of 
1 The importance of the topic of Freud's 'death drive' and its possible 
connection to sin presented itself through my encounter, as a missionary in Japan, 
with the work of Takeo Doi, a Japanese psychoanalyst who explains all things 
Japanese in the term amae, which is his version of the work of the death drive. Doi's 
definition of the term and its various developments depend directly on Freud's death 
drive, though he brings his own unique perspective to the interpretation.Takeo Doi, 
The Anatomy of Dependence: The Key Analysis of Japanese Behavior, J. Bester, 
trans.(Tokyo: Kodansha InternationaI1973). Doi's teacher, Heisaku Kosawa, studied 
under Freud but proposed an alternative understanding to the Oedipus conflict called 
the Ajase conflict which turns the focus from the father onto the mother. 
1 
Romans 7:7ff but Paul's description of the Subject 'in Christ' accounts 
for and displaces the sinful Subject. 
The Contribution of Lizek to Theology 
Considering :lizek's atheistic materialism the question arises, 
why read :lizek to help with theology? The value of :lizek for theology 
has to do in part with his direct engagement and challenge to 
modernity (e.g., his interpretation of the Cartesian cogito) and the 
modern notion of the Subject and in part with his exploration and 
development of an understanding of the Subject which is analogous to 
a Pauline understanding (in that the Subject of sin is constituted in a 
lie) which counters this modern delimitation.2 Psychoanalytic theory, in 
the work of Freud and Lacan but most explicitly with Zizek, has taken 
up the theological task of describing and defining the Subject (as :lizek 
maintains and as the first chapter below develops). Though he is in 
dialogue with theology and theologians3 his Lacanian-Marxist 
materialism may not seem to lend itself to being appropriated by 
theology but he defines himself as a Pauline materialist (Reader, ix)4 
and one of his main concerns is to rework traditional notions of 
2 Where the theological tradition prior to Descartes and modernity had fully 
engaged the question of human interiority Charles Taylor traces the reduction of the 
Subject to the categories allowed for within a rational understanding, leaving human 
interiority an unapproachable noumena (Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modem Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 143ft. 
3 See Joshua Delpech-Ramey, 'An Interview with Slavoj 2izek "On Divine 
Self-Limitation and Revolutionary Love"', Journal of Philosophy & Scripture (Volume 1 
Issue 2, Spring 2004). 
4 Due to the frequency of citations the works of Freud, Lacan and 2izek will 
be cited in the text using an abbreviated title and page number. As 2izek describes 
himself, 'if I were asked to provide a one-line description of where I stand, I would 
probably choose the paradoxical self designation of a Paulinian materialist' (Reader, 
ix). 
2 
soteriology.5 He maintains that he is not simply using theology but that 
the specific content of Christianity is necessary to his theory.6 This 
necessary utilization and passage through Christianity is an 
understanding he develops in his early books specifically engaging 
Christian thought (The Fragile Absolute (2000), On Belief (2001), and 
The Puppet and the Dwarf(2003)) but which becomes a part of his 
theory from this period forward? His theory of the Subject in this period 
develops with an interaction with Paul, and, as I demonstrate, can be 
read as an extended and insightful commentary on the place of the 
Subject in Romans chapter 7.8 
5 As he describes it, 'My desperate problem is how to draw, how to extract 
the Christian notion of redemption from this financial transaction logic. This is what 
I'm desperately looking for ... My big obsession with Christianity is that there is 
something extremely precious in this legacy that is being lost today' (Delpech-Ramey, 
'An Interview with Slavoj 2 : i ~ e k k uOn Divine Self-Limitation and Revolutionary Love"', 
5). 
6 As he explains, 'What I find theoretically and politically engaging in the 
religious legacy is not the abstract messianic promise of some redemptive Otherness, 
but, on the contrary, religion in its properly dogmatic and institutional aspect (Reader, 
ix). He explains that the 'radical thought' of Paul and of Christianity is to be found in a 
'specific Christian content' and not by extracting the teaching of Paul from this context 
(Reader. ix). 
7 Prior to his theological turn his early works (The Sublime Object of Ideology 
(1989), For They Know Not What They Do (1991), and Tarrying With the Negative 
(1993» focused on critique of ideology but the problem which provokes his 
theological turn is how to sustain the benefits of this critique or of traversing the 
fantasy without simply falling into another ideology (see Adam Kotsko, tif.ek and 
Theologr (London: T & T Clark, 2008), 72). 
He ties together Paul and Lacan in The Ticklish Subject in a fashion that 
could be taken as a summary of his own work: 'To become a true Christian and 
embrace Love, one should thus "die to the law", to break up the vicious cycle of 
"sinful passions, aroused by the law". As Lacan would have put it, one has to 
undergo the second, symbolic death, which involves the suspension of the big 
Other, the symbolic Law that hitherto dominated and regulated our lives. So the 
crucial point is that we have two "divisions of the subject" which should not be 
confused. On the one hand, we have the division of the subject of the Law between 
his conscious Ego, which adheres to the letter of the Law, and his decentred desire 
which, operating "automatically", against the subject's conscious will, compels him 
to "do what he hates", to transgress the Law and indulge in iIIicitjouissance. On the 
other hand, we have the more radical division between this entire domain of the 
Law/desire, of the prohibition generating its transgression, and the properly 
Christian way of Love which marks a New Beginning, breaking out of the deadlock 
of Law and its transgression' (The Ticklish Subject, 151). 
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If Zizek were only an interpreter of Lacan this would, by itself, be 
a significant contribution to theology9 as Lacan is consciously 
developing his theory in dialogue with Christianity and theology but it is 
Zizek's explicit development of his notion of the Subject through 
interaction with Paul and Romans 7 that makes him so fruitful for 
theological engagement, as I will show.1o In addition, Zizek combines 
Lacanian theory with philosophy (in particular German idealism and 
specifically George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel),11 politics (his reference 
here being devoted almost completely to Karl Marx) and cultural theory 
so as to encompass each of these areas in a theological critique (a 
naming of the idols or a critique of ideology) and dialogue 12 advancing 
the possibility of forming a holistic theology.13 In this understanding the 
9 Tony Myers summarizes the problem anyone faces in studying Lacan and 
maintains Zizek is the primary representative of Lacan in the English-speaking world. 
The publishing history of Lacan's work is mired in controversy, but much of it is only 
available to the Lacanian elite centred around Lacan's son-in-law. That which is 
available very often only attests to some of Lacan's earlier theories- the very ones 
that Zizek decries throughout his work. De facto, therefore, Zizek himself functions 
as a substitute Lacan for much of the English-speaking world (Tony Myers, Slavoj 
Zizek, (London: Routledge, 2003) p. 112). Zizek's approach to Lacan is through the 
teaching of Lacan's son-in-law Jacques-Alain Miller under whom he studied, by whom 
he was psycho-analyzed, and to whom he submitted his research. Zizek makes it 
clear that his understanding of Lacan is through Miller. 'So I must say this quite 
openly that my Lacan is Miller's Lacan. Prior to Miller I didn't really understand 
Lacan' (Conversation with 2.izek, 34). 
10 As I demonstrate in chapter 1, Lacan is already working within a 
theological mindset and framework and Zizek's reading even more explicitly puts 
Lacan into dialogue with theology. 
11 His reading of Hegel is not that Hegelian dialectics is 'a story of 
progressive overcoming' rather 'dialectics is for Hegel a systematic notation of the 
failure of all such attempts -"'absolute knowledge" denotes a subjective position 
which finally accepts 'contradiction' as an internal condition of every identity' (The 
Sublime Object of Ideology, 6). 
12 As I demonstrate below his interaction with Hegel pertains directly to his 
understanding of Paul in the notion of suspending the law and his Marxist notion of 
hope is a derivative from Paul. 
13 Eric 5antner has dubbed the common 'theological' element which exceeds 
philosophy, politics, and culture but which ties them together the 'psychotheology of 
everyday life'. As Santner puts it, 'the human mind includes more reality than it can 
contain' and this surplus or 'too muchness' is determinative of human life (Eric L. 
4 
Subject (whether that of philosophy, politics, or culture) is ultimately a 
repressed/unconscious Subject deceived primarily about the Self (the 
fundamental fantasy) as his own basic dispositional frame is one that 
obscures the 'place' from which he sees.14 This obstacle within the 
Subject, which lizek finds in Paul's description of sin in Romans 7:7ff 
but which his theory as a whole illustrates, is the necessary kernel of 
the real around which the Subject (with the symbolic and imaginary 
registers) is constituted. So it is in and through fantasy or deception 
that the Subject arises and this largely accounts for lizek's dialogue 
with theology but his theory extends this insight to nearly every realm 
of human endeavour. 
Theological Engagements with L.izek 
Theological engagement with Zizek has primarily been limited to 
utilization or deployment of his theory in various ideological critiques, 
criticism of his theology as heterodox, or appreciative comparison of 
his theory with another theology, but there has not been a clear 
delineation as to how lizek's theory as a whole might be appropriated 
into a theological and exegetical understanding which does not also 
accept his materialistic presuppositions or the permanence of the 
Lacanian registers to which he adheres. For example, among those 
who have utilized Zizek for ideological critique is David Fitch, who 
Santner, On the Psycho theology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud and 
Rosenzweig (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 8). 
14 Santner notes one of ~ i z e k ' s s favorite quotes from Hegel to get at this 
understanding: 'The enigmas of the ancient Egyptians were also enigmas for the 
Egyptians themselves' (Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life, 7). 
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appropriates Zizek's theory as a means of critiquing key American 
evangelical beliefs (specifically the doctrines of inerrancy, conversion 
or a 'decision for Christ', and America as a Christian nation) as forms of 
ideology.15 He notes that these three doctrines are thought to be 
pivotal and yet are ultimately empty categories (functioning as master 
signifiers within a Zizekian explanation), indicating the need for an 
evangelical traversing of the fantasy or an examination of how these 
doctrines (as they are taken up by evangelicals) serve to co-opt biblical 
authority, discipleship, and Church life (a life beyond capitalism and 
consumerism).16 Fitch employs Zizek in his critique while recognizing 
that Zizek's ontological commitments limit his usefulness in working out 
an answer to the problems of an evangelical Christianity (to which he is 
committed) but he does not incorporate Zizek into a theological or 
exegetical understanding. Robert Ruehl, in a parallel deployment of 
Zizek's theory critiquing ideology, notes that capitalism has been 
embraced by some Christians as if it were intrinsically Christian and he 
critiques the mix of church, Christianity and capitalism through Zizek's 
theology.17 Creston Davis has likewise found in Zizek a possible 
means of exposing what he describes as theology's 'cosmic false 
consciousness' in that 'twentieth-century theology has hidden 
theology's radical stance from itself in its alignment with 'bourgeois 
15 David E. Fitch, The End of Evangelicalism? Discerning a New Faithfulness 
for Mission: Towards an Evangelical Political Theology (Eugene: Cascade Books, 
2011). 
16 Fitch, The End of Evangelicalism? Discerning a New Faithfulness for 
Mission. 
17 Robert Ruehl, 'Zizek's Communist Theology: A Revolutionary Challenge to 
America's Capitalist God', International Journal of Zizek Studies 5:1 (2011). 
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liberalism' and a 'determinist capitalistic horizon' .18 Davis studied 
under' both Zizek and John Milbank and has perhaps made the 
greatest effort to bring Zizek into dialogue with theology and particularly 
with the theology of Milbank.19 As Davis notes, the common ground 
between Milbank and Zizek is the understanding that Christianity offers 
emancipation from a nihilistic capitalism,2o and as Milbank notes, there 
is the mutual recognition of the universalism of Christianity21 but the 
nature of Christianity (Zizek's dialectic or Milbank's paradox) is up for 
debate. 
18 John Milbank, Slavoj Lizek, Creston Davis, with Catheine Pickstock, Paul's 
New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology (Grand 
Rapids: Brazos Press, 2010), 8. 
19 Davis' effort to bring Lizek and Milbank into dialogue has not been judged 
entirely successful by either Lizek or Milbank as the dialogue has been more like two 
monologues. In The Monstrosity of Christ Lizek wonders if Milbank, in attempting to 
critique his position, forgets that he (Lizek) really is an atheist. He says of Milbank's 
critique that he 'fails to see' God in ordinary life, 'Of course I Mfail to see" this ... 
because, for me, there is no transcendent God-Father who discloses himself to us, 
humans, only in a limited way' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 235). As another example 
Lizek cites Milbank's notion that his (Lizek's) is 'a sad, resigned materialism which 
appears to suppose that matter is quite as boring as the most extreme of idealists 
might suppose' (Lizek, Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ, 240). Lizek counters that 
rather than 'enchanting' the world with spiritual content 'my materialism as it were 
undermines our common notion of external reality' and accepts the religious premise 
that 'commonsense reality is not the true one: what it rejects is the conclusion that, 
therefore, there must be another, Mhigher," suprasensible reality' (Lizek, Milbank, The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 240). As Milbank notes in a follow up article, 'Much of his 
response to me consists in a simple dogmatiC reiteration of the claim that an 
"Hegelian" (Protestant, gnostic and atheist) reading of Christianity is clearly the "true" 
one. None of my Catholic arguments against this conclusion are really dealt with' 
(John Milbank, 'Without Heaven There is only Hell on Earth: 15 Verdicts on Lizek's 
Response' in Political Theology 11.1 (January 18., 2010), 126-135}. Lizek in his own 
follow up article accuses Milbank of not dealing with his objections and concludes 
they are each reduced to r e i t e r a t i n ~ ~ their positions (Slavoj Lizek, 'The Atheist Wager', 
Political Theology 11:1 (January 18 , 2010), 136). There is the tendency to simply 
accuse one another of being dualists. Lizek accuses Milbank of dualism in keeping 
God transcendent and thus removed from the world and simply serving as its 
mysterious background (The Monstrosity of Christ, 248). 
20 Creston Davis, 'Introduction: Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday' in The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 21. 
21 Milbank sees Lizek's recognition of the universalism of Christianity as an 
advance over theologies that would reduce Christianity to one of many language 
games (John Milbank, 'Materialism and Transcendence' in Theology and the Political: 
The New Debate, Creston Davis, John Milbank, and Slavoj Lizek, Eds. (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2005), 400. 
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Among critical examinations of Zizek's theory the most 
prolonged is Milbank's, whose primary criticism is that Zizek's 
dialectics depends upon Hegel's 'myth of negation' and is thus simply 
another mode of Cartesian dualism in which the method is removed 
from the world.22 In Milbank's 'paradoxical reason' the Subject can 
only be understood as a gift unfolding from the plenitude of the 
Trinitarian God and participating in the infinite love of the Trinity (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 184-185). Milbank argues that dialectics makes 
phenomenal reality 'illusory' in that its true essence is nothing. 23 As 
Graham Ward notes being's excess or the void seems to function as a 
pornographic lust in Zizek's theory which is combined with a disdain for 
the material body.24 Though Milbank finds common cause with Zizek in 
critiquing modernity and getting beyond capitalistic nihilism, his is 
primarily a critical engagement with Zizek's theory. 
22 ~ i i e k k replies that the world really is built on negation and so the method is 
true to the world while Milbank is guilty of the real dualism (The Monstrosity of Christ, 
236-238). See Davis, 'Introduction: Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday? Staging 
an Unlikely Debate', 16. 
23 Milbank maintains that 'this is not, as certain "soft" readings of Hegel 
suppose, a matter of mere cognitive illusion. To the contrary: several passages make 
it clear that philosophical scepticism authentically corresponds to the "illusory" 
character of dialectical contradiction itself. The process of real "becoming" (which is 
all that there is for Hegel) is the outworking of the initial contradiction according to 
which abstract original (because univocal) being is identical with its opposite, which is 
nothing (The Monstrosity of Christ, 198). ~ i i e k k counter-accuses Milbank of dualism 
in keeping God transcendent and thus removed from the world and simply serving as 
its mysterious background ( ~ i z e k , , Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ, 248). Cyril 
ORegan dubs The Monstrosity of Christ a 'non-conversation' (Cyril ORegan, 'Ziiek 
and Milbank and the Hegelian Death of God', Modern Theology, 26:2 (April 2010), 
278-286) while Carl Raschke concludes that, though the debate appears to be about 
Christianity, it is really a debate about the role of transcendence and mystery (Carl 
Raschke, 'The Monstrosity of ~ i z e k ' s s Christianity', Journal for Cultural and Religious 
Theory 11:2 (2011), 13-20). 
24 Graham Ward, Cities of God (New York: Routledge, 2000), 169, 274 fn. 32. 
As Conor Cunningham puts it in citing and building on Ward, 'For ~ i z e k k does seem to 
display a lust for the void based on the excremental horror he claims to discern in 
life's excess; the excess which life is' (Conor Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism: 
Philosophies of Nothing and the Difference of Theology (London: Routledge, 2002), 
258). Could it be that this is not simply Lizek's peculiar problem but that Lizek 
articulates a condition and perspective on the order of Paul's sinful Subject? 
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On the other hand, among the appreciative appropriations of 
Zizek's theory, comparing him to other theologians and thinkers, is that 
of Adam Kotsko, who, in an apparent acceptance of Zizek's Pauline 
materialism, has written an appreciative introduction demonstrating 
Zizek's similarity to and theological significance in his advance of the 
'death of God theology' of Thomas Altizer.25 Eric Santner deploys 
Zizek's notion of deception in a theological discussion in which he 
recognizes the key role of fantasy and of traversing the fantasy as a 
specifically theological problem and solution which he finds duplicated 
in the theology of Franz Rosenzweig.26 In Michael Jimenez's 
description Zizek's theology is similar to Karl Barth's in that Barth's 
notion of God's judgment or pronouncement of 'no' (this 'no' or 
judgment being one side of God's relationship to humanity with God's 
25 Kotsko, lizek and Theo/ogy,149ff. Kotsko sees Z i ~ e k k as an advance of 
the 'death of God theology' of Altizer in that Z i ~ e k k goes beyond Altizer's 'tragic' loss of 
God to the comedic turn to the despairing of despair itself (Kotsko, 2izek and 
Theology, 151 ft). Kotsko offers one of the more prolonged explanations of L i ~ e k ' s s
understanding of Romans 7 and Kotsko maintains Zizek will continue to hold 
contradictory positions in regard to Romans 7. Kotsko writes, 'It is clear, on the one 
hand, that Lizek views the Law confronted in Romans 7 as being the normal or 
"pagan" law that generates its own transgression through the obscene superego 
supplement. Strangely, Zizek simultaneously claims that the Jewish Law 'is already 
deprived of its superego supplement, not relying on any obscene support," I.e., the 
Jewish stance toward the law is fundamentally what Paul is after, yet he also follows 
the long-standing tradition of claiming that, nonetheless, the Jewish Law is the main 
target of Paul's critique'(Adam Kotsko, 'Situating L i ~ e k ' s s Paul', Journal of Cultural and 
Religious Theory 9.2 (2008), 51. <http://www.jcrt.org/. Accessed Aug. 16, 2012). 
L i ~ e k k makes a sharp departure from Alain Badiou, who would pit law against grace, 
and death (and death drive) against resurrection (or a Truth-Event), while for 2 : i ~ e k , , in 
reading Romans 7 with Lacan, the problem is not law and death (or the death drive) 
per se but a particular (perverse) orientation to the law. Kotsko likens Lizek's 
understanding to that of the 'new perspective on Paul' in that in Z i ~ e k ' s s reading the 
Jewish law is already free of the perverse (obscene superego supplement) pagan 
understanding and as in the new perspective acts to mediate a Christian identification 
with the law and Judaism (so that Paul is working within Judaism) rather than 
conversion from Judaism to another position (Kotsko, 2izek and Theology, 93ft). 
26 Santner, On the Psycho theology of Everyday Life, 10. Santner reads 
Freud's depiction of psychopathology and death drive as a testament to an excess or 
a 'too muchness' which points to the fact that the human mind 'includes more reality 
that it can contain' (Santner, On the Psycho theology of Everyday Life, 8). 
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'yes' or grace being the other side) like the death drive or negativity 
means that reality (the death drive or God's 'no') cannot be 
encompassed within human understanding. So there is a shared 
critique of ideology in Zizek and Barth and there is an 'overturning of 
the world' in revelation.27 The potential problem in such a comparison, 
as noted by Johannes Hoff, is that if transcendence and revelation are 
functioning in the same way for Barth and Zizek then this is an 
indictment of Barth's formulation of these concepts as they are 
reducible to the Zizekian (atheistic-materialist) notion that God is 
nothing other than revelation.28 Gerald Biesecker-Mast notes how 
Zizek's theory supports Anabaptist notions of subjectivity in the 
concepts of an inherent lack or destitution which is part of the new life 
in Christ instituted in believer's baptism.29 Geoffrey Holsclaw, in 
contrast, holds that baptism as it is portrayed in Romans 6 is not simply 
subjective destitution but consists of a suspension between Christ's 
27 Michael Jimenez, 'Barth and : 2 : i ~ e k : : Dialectical Theologians', International 
Journal of tiiek Studies 6:1 (2012). 
28 The deployment of : 2 : i ~ e k k as a critique of Barth is undertaken in the work 
Johannes Hoff, 'The Rise and Fall of the Kantian Paradigm of Modern Theology', in 
Peter Candler Jr. and Conor Cunningham eds., The Grandeur of Reason: Religion, 
Tradition and Universalism (London: SCM Press, 2010) cited in Jimenez, 'Barth and 
2izek: Dialectical Theologians'. 
29 Biesecker-Mast connects the feelings of spiritual poverty sometimes 
experienced by Anabaptists to : 2 : i ~ e k ' s s notion of destitution experienced in love and 
also notes the similarity between the anabaptist life of separteness to 2 : i ~ e k ' s s picture 
disconnecting from structures of violence within the status quo (Gerald Biesecker-
Mast, 'Slavoj : 2 : i ~ e k , , The Fragile Absolute, And the Anabaptist Subject', Brethren Life 
and Thought 48:3-4 (Sum-Fall 2003), 176-191. In another article Biesecker-Mast 
explains the importance of 2 : i ~ e k k to his own thought: 'What 2 : i ~ e k ' s s work reinforced for 
me is a conviction that I had learned from Anabaptist teaching-the individual is not 
an autonomous entity for whom community is a secondary matter of affiliation. 
Rather, individual self-understanding is given socially amidst the complex field of 
social differences and antagonisms. Subjects are social through and through, in 
other words, and therefore just as divided by antagonism as is the social world' 
(Gerald Biesecker-Mast, 'Three Responses: Psyched over : 2 : i ~ e k , , Disturbed by 
Derrida, and Running from Rorty', Brethren Life and Thought 48:3-4 (Sum-Fall 2003), 
206. 
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death and resurrection in the life of the believer and he maintains that 
:lizek misses this eschatological tension.3D Ola Sigurdson, on the other 
hand, traces the overlap between the biblical concept of hope (with its 
eschatological tension) and :lizek's Marxism as it pertains to offering 
immanent possibilities for revolutionary change.31 In a similar vein, 
Frederiek Depoortere, demonstrates that 'Christian faith seems to be 
used by :lizek as a tool to think the possibility of an anti-capitalistic 
praxis' and community.32 So there is a widespread deployment of 
30 Geoffrey Holsclaw, 'Subjecets Between Death and Resurrection: Badiou, 
Lizek, and st. Paul', in Douglas Harink, ed., Paul, Philosophy, and the Theopolitical 
Vision: Critical Engagements with Agamben, Badiou, Zizek and Others. (Cascade 
Books, 2010), 170-171. 
31 Ola Sigurdson, Theology and Marxism Eagleton and Zizek: A Conspiracy 
of Hope (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Sigurdson demonstrates the overlap 
of theology and political theory (see also Ola Sigurdson, 'Reading Lizek Reading 
Paul', in Reading Romans with Contemporary Philosophers and Theologians, David 
Odell-Scott Ed. (London: T & T Clark, 2007) and Ola Sigurdson, 'Beyond Secularism? 
Towards a post-secular political theology', Modern Theology 26:2 (2010), 177-196. 
32 Frederiek Depoortere, Christ in Postmodern Philosophy: Gianni Vattimo, 
Rene Girard and Slavoj Zizek, (London, New York: T & T Clark, 2008). Depoortere, 
along with several who focus on Lizek's political solutions, questions whether Lizek's 
theory of the sacrifice of love (an ethical sacrifice or a genuine 'act') and sacrifice for 
nothing (or an inauthentic 'act') can be distinguished (Depoortere, Christ in 
Postmodern Philosophy, 133-134). Mathew Sharpe notes that 'The main thrust of 
criticism has focused on the notion of the Act. Lizek has been accused of misreading 
Lacan's understanding of the psychoanalytic Act, and of proposing under its banner a 
normatively empty political decisionism. To show that we can Act is not to speak to 
why we should (Mathew Sharpe, 'Slavoj Zizek (1949 -)' in From Agamben to Zizek: 
Contemporary Critical Theorists, Ed. Jon Simons (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2010), 256. See also Mathew Sharpe and Geoff Boucher, Zizek and Politics 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). Adrian Johnston has perhaps done 
more to answer this criticism than Lizek in his detailed account of political 
transformation. See Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Zizek, and Political 
Transformations:The Cadence of Change (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
2009). Even as sympathetic a critic as Carl Packman maintains Lizek needs to 
distinguish appropriate violence (in the 'act') from its inappropriate form (Carl 
Packman, 'Towards a Violent Absolute: Some Reflection on Zizekian Theology and 
Violence', International Journal of Zizek Studies 3:1 (2009». As Holsclaw puts it, 
Lizek 'forecloses the ability to judge between suicide and martyrdom, leading toward 
a valorization of violence' (Holsclaw, 'Subjecets Between Death and Resurrection: 
Badiou, :2:izek, and St. Paul', 171). Depoortere compares :2:izek's understanding of 
the genesis of sacrifice and violence to Rene Girard's theory and notes that both 
would interpret Christ's sacrifice as a sacrifice of sacrifice (or an end to sacrificial 
violence) but Girard, unlike Lizek, allows for a final defeat of violence in that Christ 
transcends violence. Depoortere, Christ in Postmodern Philosophy, 141-143. 
Depoortere also notes that :2:izek requires the passage through violence and sacrifice 
(Frederiek Depoortere, 'The End of God's Transcendence? On Incarnation in the 
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lizek's theory in limited comparisons and projects. Theological 
treatments of lizek's theory have not attempted the comprehensive 
and specifically exegetical deployment of his theory in connection with 
sin like that which I undertake. 
Marcus Pound's is the most prolonged engagement with Lacan 
and lizek aimed at advancing theology through dialogue with 
psychoanalytic theory. Pound recognizes many of the limitations of 
Lacan (and by extension lizek) and seeks to bring a theological depth 
to his notions of repetition, trauma, lack, the future anterior perspective 
and the real.33 Pound's work is a pioneering effort aimed at introducing 
the Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective into theology, though he 
presumes that salvation will primarily work within the registers as 
Lacan has laid them out. Pound describes Christian salvation and 
Lacanian analysis as having parallel goals and methods and argues 
that lizek is not Christian enough (in that he does not have recourse to 
the transcendent and as a result has a disdain for the material and 
immanent) 34 or Lacanian enough (in that Lacan was on the way to a 
synthesis between theology and psychoanalysis), 35 though he does 
not mean by this that the Lacanian registers are undone or subverted 
Work of Slavoj Zi:lek', Modern Theology, 23:4 (October 2007),518. Marcus Pound 
also notes 2i:lek's similarity to Girard but concludes that violence is necessary and 
inescapable for 2izek but is not for Girard (Marcus Pound, lizek: A (Very) Critical 
Introduction (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008), 46-
48). 
33 Pound's first book is primarily an engagement with Lacan's theory: Marcus 
Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma (London: SCM Press, 2007), 113-
115). His second work is specifically on 2izek and 2izek writes the 'Afterword' 
(Pound, lizek: A (Very) Criticallntrodution). 
34 Pound, lizek, 71. 
35 Pound indicates that Lacan wanted to return to a study of the Bible as 
containing the possibility of an alternative symbolic order (Pound, lizek, 142-143). 
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in Christ. According to Pound, as the death drive incarnate Christ, like 
the analyst, brings the real into the symbolic and produces trauma and 
this trauma provides the power which the Church taps into: 'Jesus 
founds the Church, not by providing an identity to conform to, but by 
clearing a path, creating an opening of interpretive potency, a path the 
way of which cannot be known in advance'.36 In Pound's description, 
Christ's incarnation of the death drive which is re-enacted in the 
Eucharist, 'amounts to a form of analytic intervention which opens the 
historicity of the subject'.37 The trauma of opening the Subject to the 
death drive allows for the Christian reconstitution of the Subject on the 
order of therapy as one traverses the fantasy and from a position of 
subjective destitution a reorientation to the symbolic or law is made 
possible.38 
The line of argument I take departs from other attempts to locate 
Zizek theologically as I argue that the primary significance of Zizek's 
36 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 115. 
37 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 113,159. 
38 Pound leaves the Lacanian notion of the Subject intact, including his 
picture of the real and the death drive. tizek maintains death drive is a radical 
form of evil: 'Evil is another name for the "death drive", for the fixation on some 
Thing that derails our customary life circuit. By way of Evil, man wrests himself 
from animal instinctual rhythm' (Reader, 273). The death drive is the evil which 
precedes and makes possible the 'truth' of the symbolic (See lizek, The Zit.ek 
Reader, 273ft). Lacan describes the death drive as the attempt to go beyond the 
pleasure principle to the realm of excess jouissance , the pure substance of the 
death drive, which he does not hesitate to call evil: 'we cannot avoid the formula 
thatjouissance is evil' (Seminar VII, 184-185). Lacan and tizek have no problem 
equating the passage through evil as a necessary part of therapy but to equate 
Christ with the death drive would be a category mistake in their system as death 
drive arises from a refusal of the body and death and makes its appearance as an 
'undead' force or drive that cannot be stopped. tizek equates the death drive 
with the living dead and a force that is immortal or indestructible (lizek, The Zit.ek 
Reader, 273ft). The question arises, if Pound accepts the registers of the 
Lacanian Subject as the parameters in which salvation works, will his theological 
remedies apply? The registers depend upon the very failure which he describes 
(the structure of a lie), so to relieve this failure would seem to call for more than a 
reconstituted 2:izekian subject. 
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thought for theology is in terms of its implications for the doctrine of sin 
and how his theory can serve in systematizing sin and understanding 
salvation (in part) as a departure from sin.39 Though I critique Lizek, 
the primary point is to incorporate his psychoanalytical insights into 
hamartiology, and the various 'problems' with his theory (it is nihilistic, it 
degrades the body and material reality, it is without true hope or 
therapeutic power) do not take away from reading his theory as 
analogous to Paul's understanding of sin and as an insight into the 
deceptive self-binding nature of sin.40 If his theory is understood as 
both direct insight into the sinful Subject and a worked example of the 
strategies and delimitations available to this failed Subject the 
emphasis does not fall upon showing the impossibilities and 
inconsistencies of his theory (which is not to say this should not be 
done but it is not what I have focused on). My approach also differs 
from Pound's in that I presume the Lacanian registers, constituted as 
they are in deception and fantasy, are not the parameters in which 
salvation occurs (though salvation addresses these parameters); rather 
salvation (as pictured in Romans 6-8) reconstitutes the Subject in such 
39 2:izek locates his theory primarily in Romans 7:7ff which, I argue, is Paul's 
picture of the sinful subject and he acknowledges that sin provides the parameters for 
his own notion of redemption in and through deception. Though the first chapter does 
not directly engage Scripture, I argue that the structure of psychoanalysis fostered by 
Freud and taken up by Lacan and 2:izek is theological in mapping human deception. 
In demonstrating that the whole of their theory works with the notion of deception I 
demonstrate the theological nature of Freud, Lacan, and 2:izek. 
40 In other words, his theory is a worked example, even when it is 
contradictory, of the sin system. 
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a way that being 'in Christ' overcomes the deception and alienation 
inherent and necessary to the Lacanian registers.41 
In broad terms I am using Zizek's theory constructively, as 
Pound and a number of others have done, but in demonstrating that 
Zizek's theory of the Subject can be accounted for in the construct and 
dynamics of a lie (in Freud's, Lacan's and Zizek's own account) and 
locating Zizek's significance in a detailed comparison with Paul's 
understanding of sin in Romans 7 this allows for an incorporation of 
Zizek's theory into direct exegetical and theological insight while 
remaining true to Paul's understanding. Holsclaw, for example, 
initiates a comparison between Zizek and Paul (utilizing Romans 6-8) 
without noting the two different voices or Subjects Paul deploys (the 
sinful Subject of 7:7ff and the Subject 'in Christ' in the surrounding 
passages) so he ends by explaining how Zizek misunderstands Paul 
and fails to note Zizek's insight into the sinful Subject and how this 
Subject stands in contrast to Paul's own picture of the Subject 'in 
Christ' .42 On the other hand, Kotsko offers one of the more detailed 
and accurate readings of Zizek's treatment of Romans 7 but he does 
not take note of Paul's alternative Subject 'in Christ' so it is Zizek's 
41 The paint at which Zitek enters into dialogue with Paul is in Romans 7:7ff 
and, as demonstrated below, the majority of New Testament scholarship interprets 
this section of scripture as written from a non-Christian perspective with the 
surrounding passages in Roman 6-8 describing the alternative of being 'in Christ'. To 
be true to Zitek and to Paul requires then positing two altemative notions of the 
Subject. This allows for Zitek's theory to be deployed as a critique of theology and 
ideology as it provides for a clear dileneation between two notions of the Subject 
within Paul with clearly distinct possibilities. It poses a clear argument against a 
theology that could read Romans 7:7ff as descriptive of the normal Christian life. 
42 Holsclaw assumes that Zitek does not distinguish the law from sin, so he 
reads Zitek as advocating dying to the law (as opposed to full identification with the 
law) (Holsclaw, 'Subjecets Between Death and Resurrection: Badiou, Liiek, and St. 
Paul', 166). 
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interpretation and understanding of the Subject from Romans 7:7ff 
which serves as Kotsko's interpretive frame for Pauline Christianity.43 
My approach, by focusing on the core role of deception in the structure 
of Zizek's theory as it overlaps with Paul's understanding of sin, allows, 
I would claim, for an integration of (nearly) the whole of Zizek's theory 
into understanding Pauline theology without a reduction or distortion in 
understanding Paul. 
Extending lizek's Theological Significance 
Others have drawn on psychoanalytic notions of the Subject to 
advance either a theology primarily geared to secure the individual 
ego-identity44 and utilizing ego-psychology or, as in 'atheology', utilizing 
the notion of a decentred or completely dispersed Subject without 
agency.45 As Pound describes the original use of Lacan in theology, it 
was primarily situated in a line of thinkers extending from Kierkegaard 
to Derrida and it was the orientation from philosophy of differance, 
deferment and absence within the tradition of negative theology that 
43 So Kotsko locates lizek's theological significance in his resemblance to 
Thomas J. J. Altizer and the 'death of God' theology (Kotsko, Lizek and Theology, 
150). 
44 Pound claims that 'most theological engagement with psychoanalysis has . 
. . engaged with ... ego psychology' (Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 
5). He uses the example of Frank Lake as a representative of one who attempted to 
fuse ego psychology with theology. See Frank Lake, Clinical Theology: A Theological 
and Psychiatric Basis to Clinical Pastoral Care (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
1966, referenced in Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 2-5. 
45 Mark C. Taylor's, Erring: A Postmodern Mheo/ogy, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1984) was the first effort to introduce Lacan into the 
American theological context. Pound notes that the volume edited by Edith 
Wyshogrod was the first major set of essays engaging Lacan from a theological 
perspective. See Edith Wyschogrod, D. Crownfield and C. Raschke, eds., Lacan and 
Theological Discourse (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989). The question is if they have 
been true to Lacan. While the Subject is dispersed in Lacanian theory the 
understanding that the Subject per S8 is a fiction seems to confuse human agency 
with the Lacanian registers which Lacan does not do. 
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guided the effort.46 The swing from individualism to the absence of the 
individual in the theological appropriation of psychoanalytic theory may 
simply reflect the tendency within theology, traced by Derek Nelson, to 
opt for either a radical individualism or a corporate and social 
perspective (with individual agency either the sole focal point or as 
absent as it is considered as dispersed and decentred) with neither 
position able to adequately account for the other or for the Subject.47 
My reading of Paul with Lizek dispels the notion of the possibility of an 
isolated ego, as the Subject for Lizek and Paul is the Subject of 
language or law;48 yet for Lizek and Paul there is human agency in the 
deception constituting the Subject in that this deception is ultimately a 
self-deception (subject to exposure in Lizek's traversing the fantasy or 
in Paul's picture of salvation). Christian salvation, as I argue below, is 
not the salvation of isolated egos from the world49 nor is it simply 
transforming the structures of the given categories of the immanent 
46 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 10. 
47 Among Derek Nelson's many examples of this tendency is the 
individualism of Charles Finney who defined sin as the individual choosing to break 
God's law, which fails to take into account that it is only in concrete relations with 
other subjects (in family, church, and state) that one could come to know the law 
(Derek R. Nelson, What's Wrong With Sin: Sin in Individual and Social Perspective 
from Schleiermacher to Theologies of Liberation (London: T & T Clark, 2009), 181). 
Finney's understanding also overlooks the reality that breaking the law has concrete 
effects in the relational spheres in which selfhood is formed (Nelson, What's Wrong 
With Sin, 181). On the other hand, the focus in liberation theology on structural or 
corporate sin tends to blur the difference between human nature and sin and as a 
result the agency behind social structures (the importance of the individual choosing) 
is sometimes lost (Nelson, What's Wrong With Sin, 180-187). 
48 The innovation which Lacan brings to reading Freud is to suggest that the 
subject is not so much the product of biology as language. 2 i ~ e k k and Lacan 
understand the construct and function of language in Subject formation as taking the 
form of a lie. Paul's notion of sin as a deception is analagous to this understanding 
but Paul conceives of a Subject beyond language and law. 
49 The Pauline 'I' or iyw dies or is crucified and the 2 i ~ e k i a n n ego is a fiction. 
The individualist or ego centred perspective with its focus on human interiority 
(whether the will, the heart or the mind) tends to leave out corporate oppression and it 
tends to miss that the individual is shaped by the environment of culture and social 
relations. 
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world (society, economics, politics, or psychoanalysis), rather sin 
understood as self-deceitful perversion of the law and the source of 
oppression is exposed and displaced by the truth of Christ. In this 
understanding sin is explicable (in its immanence) and human agency 
is accounted for in its own subversion, and atonement is not so much 
the repayment of an infinite debt or the relief of social oppression as a 
transformation of the Subject through participation in Trinitarian 
community. 
The Structure of the Thesis 
The first chapter demonstrates that the psychoanalytic 
Subject is constituted in a lie, first with Freud's positing of the death 
instinct in which life (the pleasure principle) is muted by the 
energetics of death, taken up into the Subject as a form of life (The 
Ego and the Id, 46).50 Lacan, who displaces Freud's biological 
explanation with a linguistic explanation, builds on Freud's death 
instinct and extends the work of deception to the constitution of 
each of the registers. The first chapter demonstrates with reference 
to Freud and Lacan and culminating in ~ i z e k k that just as a lie can 
be divided into three parts the psychoanalytic Subject consists of 
that which is negated (Freud's id or Lacan's real and the death 
50 References are to the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
works of Freud, 24 vols. ed. and trans. James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna 
Freud, assisted by Alix Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1974). Frequently 
cited sources will use an abbreviated form of the title while less frequently cited or 
minor sources will use the standard SE (for Standard Edition) and will cite the volume 
and page number. 
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drive), the medium of negation or the substance of the lie (Freud's 
superego or Lacan's symbolic), and the object of the lie (Freud's 
ego or Lacan's imaginary). The vantage which lizek brings to his 
reading of Lacan is that his theory fuses Lacanian theory with 
German Idealism and from this perspective the problems of the 
psyche and its identity become the solutions. The goal is not to 
overcome the gaps but to conceive them as the origin of the 
Subject. 
The second chapter demonstrates that lizek finds each of these 
registers of the psychoanalytic Subject in the Pauline Subject of 
Romans 7. He equates the symbolic with the law and the imaginary 
with Paul's 'I' or tyw and the real with Paul's 'body of death' or 'body of 
sin'. In :lizek's reading of Romans 7:7ff the law which gives rise to 
forbidden desire (lizek's jouissance), in spite of the life that it seemed 
to offer and due to the deception of sin (lizek's fundamental fantasy), 
produces death for the tyw or a life of death described as an agonistic 
struggle (lizek's death drive) in which the self is split against itself and 
sin is in control. In lizek's reading though, he assumes that Paul is not 
simply depicting the problem of sin (or perversion), but from 7:1-6 with 
Paul's illustration of the one who has died to the law, he reads the 
chapter as Paul's equivalent of 'traversing the fantasy' which lizek will 
equate with 'dying to sin' and achieving the hysteric position of 
questioning sin's deception in regard to the law. The perverse relation 
and the transgressive relation to the law are suspended in hysteria and 
this suspension is a particular development :lizek works out 
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(referencing Hegel) in Paul's vocabulary. Though Lizek's theory 
makes the identification of the death drive with sin plausible, he cannot 
presume to completely dispel or do away with the lie of sin, as he is 
rigorously consistent with regard to the necessity of the fundamental 
fantasy. 
The third chapter compares Paul's understanding to Lizek's and 
introduces the Pauline answer to the lie in Romans 6-8. While Lizek's 
understanding allows, at most, for a traversing of the fantasy or a 
partial exposure of the lie I argue that Paul accounts for the lie of sin 
and its displacement with the Subject 'in Christ'. The perspective 
provided in connecting L:izek's theory to Paul's in Romans 6 & 8 is that 
Paul presumes the lie of sin is not a necessity for human subjectivity. 
So while the deception of sin, as depicted by Paul and developed by 
L:izek, is universal in its structure and dynamic (it always works through 
a specific negation with a particular content), it is not universal in the 
sense that it is the only interpretive frame. The Subject of sin is only 
one kind of Subject, but Paul proposes a second Subject; the one who 
is in Christ. Where the first is dependent upon the deception, the 
second need not posit a false depth or transcendence as it is 'driven' 
by the Spirit of life through the Son by the Father. Paul's resolution to 
the fear and frustration of the eyw is life in the Spirit (8:2) experienced 
and conjoined to the categories of hope, adoption as God's children, 
and participation in the Trinity. 
The conclusion argues that if sin is understood as a lie 
grounding the Subject, the exposure of the lie or the dispelling of any 
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notion of mystery connected to sin is integral to salvation and the 
reconstituting of the Subject in Christ. While the lie of sin is mediated 
by the law, new life in the Spirit is not through the law but is a principle 
unto itself, which though it accounts for the law, is beyond the law. The 
significance this account might have for theology is to reframe the 
concept of sin as a deception (reifying the self) with its own logic, 
dynamic, and structure, similar to the Subject of psychoanalysis. 
Salvation, in turn, is the place and means from which the Subject of sin 
and its destructive nature are understood and displaced by new life in 
Christ. Sin and salvation, under this notion, are not forensic categories 
but have to do with the lived reality of identity, of being either a Subject 
oriented to death or to life. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE SUBJECT OF THE LIE 
We arrive at the most concise definition of the subject: the 
subject is an effect that entirely posits its own cause. 
(Metastases of Enjoyment, 37) 
This chapter sets forth Slavoj Zizek's notion of the Subject and 
its origin in the theory of Freud and Lacan in order to introduce into 
the theological discourse which follows (in chapters 2-3) the 
perspective of psychoanalytic theory's understanding of human 
interiority (the conscious and unconscious). In particular it will be 
shown that Zizek's development of the primordial/universal lie as the 
grounding gesture of the Subject (the Subject of the law), found in the 
theory of Freud and Lacan, embraces a holistic insight into the moral 
and epistemological understanding of the Subject that the following 
chapters will connect to Paul's understanding of sin.1 
Why Freud? 
Zizek's primary influence and source is the psychoanalyst 
Jacques Lacan, but Lacan thought of himself only as adhering faithfully 
to Freud. 
1 Access is opened too onto the cultural level as a reflection and symptom 
of the subject. For Lizek the lie - the fantasy formation of the Subject - is at the 
bottom of truth. In this he seems to have followed Hegel who held to the necessity 
of the fall in order to awaken consciousness. See Kevin Hart. The Trespass of the 
Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 8. 
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One never goes beyond Freud ... One uses him. One 
moves around with him. One takes one's bearings from the 
direction he points in. What I am offering you here is an 
attempt to articulate the essence of an experience that has 
been guided by Freud. It is in no wayan effort to measure 
the volume of his contribution or summarize him. (Seminar 
VII,206) 
To understand Lacan, and especially the Lacan of Lizek, it is 
necessary to understand Freud, and in particular the Freud that 
develops from and after Beyond the Pleasure Principle.2 
It is in this period that Freud proposes a dualistic theory of the 
instincts. He had become dissatisfied with the singular emphasis on 
Eros, as it did not ultimately explain the inherent conflict that he had 
encountered in his patients. The monoinstinctual theory he was 
working under, the pleasure principle, was a 'constancy principle' in 
which the dynamic was toward a release of tension and a return to 
equilibrium (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 9). What he discovered in 
his patients in neuroses and dreams was a compulsion to repeat 
traumatic thoughts or images which he could not explain in terms of 
constancy or equilibrium. The idea of the pleasure principle, that 
dreams are wish fulfilments and pleasure is the aim of psychic life, 
simply did not account for what he was encountering in his clinical 
2 Freud captures the characteristic rejection of the death drive from its 
inception: 'I am well aware that the dualistic theory according to which an instinct of 
death or of destruction or aggression claims equal rights as a partner with Eros as 
manifested in the libido, has found little sympathy and has not really been accepted 
even among psychoanalysts' (SEt 23:244). 
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practice. The evidence pointed toward a deep seated conflict that went 
beyond the explanatory power of the pleasure principle. Freud's 
patients seemed bent toward un-pleasure and self-destruction and not 
equilibrium. The compulsion to repeat amounted to an exponential 
build-up of energy. There was also the mysterious problem of 
masochism, in which the pursuit of pleasure and pain are mixed in a 
way that a singular instinct could not explain. 
The pleasure of hurting one's self in a compulsive repetitive 
manner did not fit with his understanding of Eros. While watching his 
grandson one day, he discovered a pattern of behaviour that caused 
him to link all of these elements together into what he would call the 
death drive or the death instinct (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 14ff). 
In a near simultaneous move he posits along with this new dualistic 
account of the instincts a different agency within the ego which he will 
call the 'superego' (The Ego and the Id, 28).3 This would amount not 
only to a new topography of the Subject but a different understanding 
of the energetics at work in the Subject. No longer did Freud see 
mankind as controlled by one goal, rather man seemed bound toward 
death in and through the detour that is life. It was not that death as a 
force overwhelms man, but that man stands opposed to himself and 
brings about his own destruction. He takes death up into himself, all 
3 In Beyond the Pleasure Principle he does not name this agency but he 
lays the groundwork for the splitting of the ego and a division in the pleasure 
principle (see Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 11ft). 
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the time imagining that it is the means to secure or save the self 
(Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 54ff). 
In spite of the importance that Freud came to attach to the 
death drive, the new theory was not embraced, even by his immediate 
followers. Freud complained that his new theory had found 'little 
sympathy and has not really been accepted even among 
psychoanalysts' (SE, 23:244).4 The key exception to this rejection of 
the theory was the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan, who 
founded his own school of therapy, with the death drive and the 
reconfiguration of the human subject it entails at its centre. With Lacan 
the dynamics of the death drive, read through structural linguistics, will 
take the literal form of a lie that kills, but this is already implicit in 
Freud's theory. 
In spite of the perceived difference between Lacan and Freud 
nearly every innovation that Lacan brings to the subject of 
psychoanalysis is first hinted at or worked out by Freud.5 Freud 
establishes the parameters within which Lacan and Lizek will work, and 
Lacan considers himself true to Freud. His seminars demonstrate his 
4The theory, it might be speculated, did not appeal to those who had 
invested their life and career in bringing patients to 'health', but now the very notion 
of what that might be was thrown into question. There were a few exceptions to the 
general rejection of the theory; Etington and Ferenzi accepted the theory and 
Melanie Klein and her school adapted a reworked version of the theory (Richard 
Boothby, Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan's Return to Freud (New 
York, London: Routledge, 1991), 10). 
5 This is true of what is sometimes thought to have been his main 
innovation, 'the mirror stage'. The idea, as will be demonstrated below, is actually 
there in Freud's original text in a footnote. 
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near complete reliance on Freud's original texts and apart from those 
texts would be indecipherable. 
The Hebraic Influence on Freud 
The convergence of Freudian themes with Pauline theology 
traced by Zizek indicates a possible origin of those themes. Freud's 
concern was to translate the human predicament out of its religious-
mythical idiom into the positivistic scientific language of his day. This 
required that imagined external threats be accounted for in terms of 
internal antagonisms and conflicts. 'So Freud already conceived of 
psychoanalysis as a secular form of theology to the extent that both 
playa pivotal role in aligning us within the social space.'6 Harold 
Bloom makes the case that the structure of psychoanalysis in its 
emphasis on the Oedipus Complex 'makes sense only in a Hebraic 
universe of discourse, where authority always resides in figures of the 
individual's past and only rarely survives in the individual proper'? 
Freud posits a rabbinical like 'psychic cosmos ... in which there is 
sense in everything, because everything already is in the past and 
nothing that matters can be utterly new,.8 Eric Santner describes the 
8 Marcus Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma (London: SCM 
Press 2007) pp. 2-3. 
7 Harold Bloom, 'Freud and Beyond', in Ruin the Sacred Truths, Poetry and 
Belief from the Bible to the Present (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 
161. Quoted in Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life, 25. 
8 Bloom, 'Freud and Beyond', 152. Bloom goes on to describe Freud's 
faiilure to properly comprehend Judaism and in this failure he pictures 
psychoanalysis as seeking legitimization in and through the very structures and 
means that block access to life. 
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forces of life acting on the individual as a 'too much ness' or excess that 
he also links to Freud's Jewish heritage. 
Now the very religious tradition in which Freud was raised, his 
protestations of lifelong secularism notwithstanding, is itself in 
some sense structured around an internal excess or tension -
call it the tension of election - and elaborates its particular 
form of ethical orientation to it. For Judaism (as well as for 
Christianity), that is, human life always includes more reality 
than it can contain and this 'too much' bears witness to a 
spiritual and moral calling, a pressure toward self-
transformation, toward 'goodness,.9 
Freud locates the pressure of this 'too much ness', not in the 
transcendent realms described by theological and philosophical 
metaphysics, but 'behind consciousness' in what he describes as his 
'meta psychology' (SE, 1 :274). His description is one in which there is 
a fullness of life that is interrupted by the Subject's setting obstacles in 
the way that cuts him off from this fullness through an investment in its 
opposite. 
The stuff of which the obstacles are made, and the means of 
positing investments in them, in accord with being from 'the people of 
the Book', are ultimately linguistic. It is the 'text' of dreams, the 
symbolism of which they consist, it is the magic power of words in 
religion, it is the conscious and unconscious as a 'mystic writing pad', 
9 Santner, On the Psycho theology of Everyday Life, 8. 
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and it is the power of words to simultaneously conceal and reveal and 
the therapists ability through words to intervene and heal that 
concerns Freud. In short. the structure of the problem and 
intervention into it is on the order of a deception and its exposure, 
which indicates that Freud may have secularized the form and 
structure of themes from Judaism and the Jewish Scriptures. 
Freud's Metapsychology 
Though Freud had coined the term meta psychology as early 
as 1896, his most sustained effort at meta psychology began with the 
writing of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which simultaneously posited 
a different notion of internal energetics and the construct of the 
psyche. The tripartite ego/id/super-ego construct is a direct result of 
his hypothesis concerning the death drive and constitutes the final 
phase of his attempts at a comprehensive explanation of human 
consciousness as the forces of the unconscious influence it. His 
theory is ultimately dependent on his meta psychology, with its theory 
of vital forces and energetics, as it will bridge the gap between his 
theoretical abstraction and lived experience.1o 
There is a bit of an irony in the fact that it is in Freud's attempt to 
give a scientific and biological account of the forces at work in the 
psyche that he is accused of becoming most speculative. In attempting 
to describe the 'semantics of desire' as Paul Ricoeur has put it. he has 
10 Richard Boothby, Freud as Philosopher: Metapsycho/ogy After Lacan 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 3-5. 
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had to translate the material realm of biology into the symbolic realm of 
language. 
Therein lies the deep reason for all the analogies between 
dreams and wit, dreams and works of art, dreams and 
religious 'illusion,' etc. All these 'psychical productions' 
belong to the area of meaning and come under a unified 
question: How do desires achieve speech? How do desires 
make speech fail, and why do they themselves fail to 
speak?11 
The 'theological' tenor of Freudian theory comes to the forefront in 
what Freud determined was its most material ground. The explanation 
of energetics, in attempting to locate the elemental biological forces of 
life and death as they are taken up into the human psyche, takes over 
a theological language in describing a condition in which one is 
oriented to death. Freud came to see death as the negative force 
constraining and blocking access to life and reality through its 
overwhelming presence. While he thought of this in terms of a force of 
nature, his meta psychology attempts an explanation as to how this 
force translates into psychic energy. Death is not merely the end of 
life, but it is a force that is taken up in lived experience in an orientation 
that would ultimately silence the subject. Death is a 'mute energy' that 
silences the 'clamor for life' found in the pleasure principle (The Ego 
and the Id, 46). If the construct of the Subject is on the order of a 
11 Paul Ricoeur. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. 
Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1977).6. 
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deception, the end product of this deception is a silencing of life in and 
through the acceptance of death as a form of life. 
Freud's incorporation of the death drive is the necessary piece 
that had been missing from his theory. It would require him to rework 
his understanding of the relation between the conscious and the 
unconscious as it introduces a different 'economics'. This different 
economy though, enabled him to translate the language of biology into 
that of a sociology of relations in which one party is injured and is 
demanding a payment from a second party. In this economy guilt, or 
the working out of guilt, can be said to be unconscious, and yet the 
evidence that a payment is being made makes itself known in a 
perceptible way. 
But this new discovery, which compels us ... to speak of an 
'unconscious sense of guilt', bewilders us far more than the 
other and sets us fresh problems, especially when we 
gradually come to see that in a great number of neuroses an 
unconscious sense of guilt of the kind plays a decisive 
economic part and puts the most powerful obstacles in the 
way of recovery. (The Ego and the /d, 27) 
In this system of unconscious guilt, a nearly mechanical system is 
posited, as this economics is rooted in the unconscious. The individual 
is subject to a power that is somehow not under her control and yet 
expresses itself in the symbol system of neurotic repetition. She 
participates in the system and provides the dynamics that constitute it, 
but the system engulfs her and she is its product. The ego is subjected 
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to a lying accusation and is made to make retribution to a silent force 
that will not present itself. 
The unconscious nature of the system is one that Freud had 
earlier theorized makes itself known in the contradictory nature of the 
totem and taboos of 'primitive religion'. Religion, in this 
understanding, is the product of an event in the past, which is 
continually repeated in the human psyche. The primal father was 
slain by his sons so that they might gain access to the women he was 
hording and this historical event is memorialized in the totemic religion 
(including animal sacrifice) instituted by the sons. 
The animal struck the sons as a natural and obvious 
substitute for their father; but the treatment of it which they 
found imposed on themselves expressed more than the need 
to exhibit their remorse. They could attempt, in their relation 
to this surrogate father, to allay their burning sense of guilt, to 
bring about a kind of reconciliation with their father. The 
totemic system was, as it were, a covenant with their father, 
in which he promised them everything that a childish 
imagination may expect from a father -protection, care, and 
indulgence -while on their side they undertook to respect his 
life, that is to say, not to repeat the deed which had brought 
destruction on their real father. (Totem and Taboo, 144) 
The ambivalence of the sons toward the father translates into the 
same dynamics memorialized in the Oedipus complex. The nature of 
this ambivalence, either in the religion or in the individual passing 
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through the Oedipus complex, is not available to consciousness 
precisely because its nature as ambivalence (love/hate) becomes a 
structure in the ego. 
They must therefore have an ambivalent attitude toward their 
taboos. In their unconscious they would like nothing more 
than to violate them, but they are afraid to do so; they are 
afraid precisely because they would like to, and the fear is 
stronger than the desire. (Totem and Taboo, 30) 
The taboo is that which is forbidden and in being forbidden there is the 
inclination to transgress. The transgression holds out a 'yes' and a 
'no' in that it establishes the desire that it warns against. The one who 
transgresses the taboo is himself taboo in that the very contagion that 
is held back by being forbidden becomes a temptation. What stands 
behind the taboo is, ironically, celebrated in the totem. The totem 
meal demands that all participate in a re-enactment of a 
transgression, which in its original and real enactment is responsible 
for the group and its structure. After providing supporting 
anthropological evidence Freud speculates as to what event might 
account for both the totem and the taboo: 
One day the brothers who had been driven out came 
together, killed and devoured their father and so made an end 
to the patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do 
and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for 
them individually .... Cannibalistic savages as they were, it 
goes without saying that they devoured their victim as well as 
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killing him. The violent primal father had doubtless been the 
feared and envied model of each one of the company of 
brothers; and in the act of devouring him they accomplished 
their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a 
portion of his strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps 
mankind's earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and 
commemoration of this memorable and criminal deed, which 
was the beginning of so many things -of social organization, 
of moral restrictions and of religion. (Totem and Taboo, 142) 
They hated the father who was the obstacle preventing access to the 
women, but they loved and admired him as their model. The religion 
puts on display the moral contradiction taken up in the psyche with its 
confrontation with the law. What is forbidden by the taboo is the very 
transgression which founds the human community. In the Oedipus 
complex, the totem is the father; but the father's position has been 
taken over by the sons who have consumed him and out of guilt have 
invented a morality founded on paying for the transgression. This 
morality institutes the shift of an outward violence unleashed on the 
father to an inward violence turned on the ego by the superego. The 
turn from aggression to law is not a resolution of the aggression but a 
turning of the aggression on the self. The father, embodied in the law 
or the superego, becomes even stronger in death in that what he had 
attempted to prevent in life, through the enactment of the taboo, he 
accomplishes in death. In the Hegelian understanding worked out 
below, it can be said that the 'work of the negative' is not to be read 
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out of history. 'The ethical history of mankind is not the rationalization 
of utility, but the rationalization of an ambivalent crime, which at the 
same time remains the original wound: this is the meaning of the 
totem meal.'12 
Though Freud is trying to establish an historic and scientific 
basis for his theory through this ethnological account, the question is 
raised as to whether his theory is best served by taking the story as a 
myth or as the truth. Is it the truth or is it a lie, taken as a truth that he 
is positing as the structure of the psyche? Has a crime really taken 
place and is there some punishment that is being worked out in 
mankind's guilty conscience? Or is the guilty conscience the product 
of a false conscience? Is the structure which has resolved the 
Oedipus complex based on reality or is the repressed unconscious 
involved in the deception it is fOisting on the conscious ego? If the 
history is a myth, is the structure that unfolds from it not also a myth? 
Freud seems to want to have it both ways. He is treating the 
formation of the superego as a mythological structure and yet he is 
attempting to found the myth in history. Jacques Lacan does not 
hesitate to refer to the structure of the psyche and its ground as a lie. 
In the end this seems to serve the Freudian picture more accurately, 
as is made most clear in the paradigmatic situation in which Freud 
comes to his notion of the death drive. 
12 Boothby, Freud as Philosopher, 210. 
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The Game of Life 
The child's play in and through which Freud came to his theory 
of the death drive is not only the paradigm in which his theory of the 
death drive took shape, it is by building on this paradigm that Lacan will 
initiate the transformation of Freudian theory. It was watching his 
grandson playing a hide and seek game (symbolizing the absence and 
presence of his mother) that led Freud to his early formulation of the 
death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle: 
The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round 
it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind 
him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he 
did was to hold the reel by the string and very skillfully throw it 
over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into 
it, at the same time uttering his expressive '0-0-0-0' (Freud 
and his daughter conclude the boy is saying 'fort' (gone)). He 
then pulled the reel out of the cot again by the string and 
hailed its reappearance with a joyful 'da' (there). This, then, 
was the complete game -disappearance and return. As a rule 
one only witnessed its first act, which was repeated untiringly 
as a game in itself, though there was no doubt that the 
greater pleasure was attached to the second act. (Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, 15) 
Freud concludes that the constant repetition of the game was 'the 
child's great cultural achievement', the compensation for letting his 
mother go, in that he began to stage the disappearance and return of 
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objects under his control. The game stages and repeats the 
disappearance of the love object and as Freud explains in a footnote 
the child at the same time had discovered how to make himself 
appear and disappear in a mirror (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 15). 
Freud is careful to explain that he is a 'good little boy' who 'did 
not disturb his parents at night' who 'conscientiously obeyed orders' 
and above all he never cried when his mother left him for a few hours 
(Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 14). The instinctual renunciation 
(that, is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had 
made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting is 
compensated for by staging the disappearance and return of the 
objects within his reach. To find his toys he had to first lose them. For 
his mother to return she had to leave. The boy was in a passive 
situation in regard to his mother leaving, but in the game he could take 
on an active role. Freud surmised that 'Throwing away the object so 
that it was "gone" might satisfy an impulse of the child's, which was 
suppressed in his actual life, to revenge himself on his mother for 
going away from him' (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 16). later he 
observed the boy express such revenge in throwing away a toy and 
exclaiming, 'Go to the fwont' (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 16). His 
father was at the front (the front lines of the Great War) so he knew it 
was a bad place to be. That Freud, and perhaps the boy, connects 
being 'gone' with death is made clear in a footnote explaining the early 
death of the boy's mother. 'Now that she was really "gone" ("0-0-0") 
the little boy showed no signs of grief (Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
36 
16).13 He had sent her away many times and so had prepared for her 
death and had even participated in it. Death is the ultimate un-
pleasure that overwhelms and which repetition and play attempt to 
master. It is the final 'fort' for which the game obscured and 
compensated for. 
The child's game or his entry into language occurs as 
compensation for the absence of the mother. The spool can only 
symbolize absence and presence as these are both played out over a 
final or real absence. While the binary of presence and absence 
allows for the two opposing positions in turn, it is actually the silent 
absence of the mother that keeps the game running. 
The Ego and the Id 
Freud adapted the term das Es, which came to be transliterated 
as 'id', to name the register in the human psyche in which the 
unknown and uncontrollable forces and drives, such as the remorse 
passed down from the slaying of the primal father, is taken up into the 
psyche.14 He believed the early development, from out of the id, of 
the superego and ego is available for observation in primitives and the 
very young. He pictured the ego as emerging from and still partially 
situated in the id, and thus the ego is involved in a psychic struggle 
with unconscious forces as it struggles toward consciousness. 
13 This event is recounted in footnote 1 on page 16. 
14 Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis 
(London:Routledge, 1996), p. 79. 
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It is easy to see that the ego is that part of the id which had 
been modified by the direct influence of the external world ... 
. Moreover, the ego seeks to bring the influence of the 
external world to bear upon the id and its tendencies, and 
endeavours to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure 
principle which reigns unrestrictedly in the id. (The Ego and 
the Id, 25) 
Where the id contains the passions and desires of instinct that are a 
product of the working of history and nature, the ego is the emergence 
from out of this raw nature of a consciousness that might be thought to 
transcend or dominate the id. Freud pictures the ego riding the id like 
a rider on a horse. The id is the superior strength and the ego has to 
in some way tap into the strength of the id in order to control it. The 
ego has to channel the power of the id 'transforming the id's will into 
action as if it were its own' (The Ego and the Id, 25). 
The Lying Energetics of the Superego 
Though Freud does not explicitly treat the relation of the 
superego to reality, he states that the 'the super-ego is always close to 
the id and can act as its representative vis-a-vis the ego. It reaches 
deep down into the id and for that reason is farther from 
consciousness than the ego is' (The Ego and the Id, 48-49). Though 
Freud connects the work of the superego to religion and morality, this 
has to be understood in light of the fact that he considers religion an 
illusion and morality a by-product of this same illusion housed in the 
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superego. Freud likens the judgment that the superego passes on the 
ego to religious judgments, as they have sprung from the same seed. 
The religious believer feels his worthlessness, and this is the position 
the ego is put in by the superego. The superego is the origin of all 
man's high ideals, such as the immortal soul and religion, but these 
have been transformed by the superego from 'what belonged to the 
lowest part of the mental life of each of us' (The Ego and the Id, 36). 
The split that has occurred in the ego with the death drive is not 
the product of reality; it is the product of a refusal of reality. As a 
resolution to the problem posed in the Oedipus complex and as with 
the sons of the primal horde, the child is presented with the ambiguity 
of both loving the father and wanting to emulate him, and hating him 
and wanting to displace him. The choice results in a simultaneous 
refusal and acceptance of both sides of the choice. The child will be 
the father, but as the father he will take revenge on the child. The 
ego, after having passed through the Oedipus complex, contains the 
same ambivalence as the totem and the taboo. The superego is the 
reenacted model of the father, which is taken up by the child. He 
takes the taboo or the forbidding presence of the father into himself. 
'We have come upon something in the ego itself which is also 
unconscious, which behaves exactly like the repressed - that is, which 
produces powerful effects without itself being conscious' (The Ego and 
the Id, 17). The patient represses the material by repeating some 
'contemporary reproduction' (a misconstrued memory or event) that 
does not include 'the essential part' from the past (the Oedipus 
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complex and its derivatives). The patient as a result 'mistakes' this 
reproduction for reality in order to 'forget the past' (Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, 18-19). Within the ego there is both the force of 
resistance arising from one part of the ego, and the ego upon which 
this force falls in another part of the ego. There is a force willing 
something be forgotten and that part of the ego which forgets. 
The child faced with the forced choice of both being like the 
father and receiving the prohibition that he cannot be like the father (he 
cannot have the mother) resolves the original desire by taking the 
prohibition of the father into himself and thus becomes the father 
through the prohibition. 
The child's parents, and especially his father, were perceived 
as the obstacle to a realization of his Oedipus wishes; so his 
infantile ego fortified itself for the carrying out of the 
repression by erecting this same obstacle within itself .... 
The super-ego retains the character of the father, while the 
more powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more 
rapidly it succumbed to repression (under the influence of 
authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the 
stricter will be the domination of the super-ego over the ego 
later on - in the form of conscience or perhaps of an 
unconscious sense of guilt. (The Ego and the Id, 34-35) 
The dominant power of the superego that tends to persist through 
adulthood can be assigned to the weakness of the child before the 
father or the original weakness of the ego before the superego. The 
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mature ego/superego relationship tends to memorialize the original 
relationship in a permanent psychic conflict in which the ego is 
alienated and antagonistic towards itself (The £go and the Id, 48-49). 
This conflict is the product of a refusal of the reality and the 
choices the child faces in the oedipal period. 
The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated 
by the Oedipus complex, may, therefore, be taken to be the 
forming of a precipitate in the ego, consisting of these two 
identifications, in some way united with each other. This 
modification of the ego retains the special position; it 
confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego ideal or 
super-ego. (The £go and the Id, 34) 
While the construction of the superego became the psychic 
mechanism to handle ambivalence, like the religion it memorializes, 
the superego is not a function of reality but of the fantasy of the id. To 
succumb to the influence of the superego is to live according to an 
illusion as strong as the illusion of religion, which Freud considered 
the worst kind of illusion. The point of Freudian therapy was to reduce 
the power of the superego over the ego and draw the patient out of 
this punishing illusion toward the reality of the outward world. The 
suffering that Freud encountered in neuroses he chalked up to the 
punishments inflicted by the superego. 
A Painful Self-deception 
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Since the superego suppresses the Oedipus complex, it 
constitutes a corruption of access to memory, but this corruption is 
carried out in and through a punishing sense of guilt, which Freud 
describes as resulting in a 'need for illness' that overrides normal 
narcissism or antagonism towards the analyst (The Ego and the /d, 
49). It is, Freud concludes, a "'moral factor", a sense of guilt, which is 
finding satisfaction in illness and refuses to give up the punishment of 
suffering' (The Ego and the /d, p. 49). Freud does not disassociate the 
patient's will from this system of suffering; rather the energy of the 
system lies in the motive of the patient. The drive is one that the 
patient herself puts into play and yet she does not have access to this 
motive force. The unconscious is a product of the individual's refusal 
to admit into consciousness her own desire or purpose, and so she 
establishes or exerts a psychic force opposed to her own idea. The 
ego exerts the force of resistance to keep certain purposes repressed. 
The ego, which was once identified primarily with consciousness, is 
itself subject to an unconscious dynamic brought into play through its 
own power of repression. The ego is not only split against itself but it is 
split so that it does not have conscious access to itself. 
One of the elements of this memorial is the original ambiguity, 
the love/hate relationship, in the child's attitude toward the father. This 
ambiguity also consists of the child's perception of the father's attitude 
toward him, so that the superego/ego relation retains and reifies this 
original love/hate relation. The superego takes out the aggressive hate 
upon the ego. This is seen most clearly in melancholia, where we 'find 
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that the excessively strong superego which has obtained a hold upon 
consciousness rages against the ego with merciless violence' (The Ego 
and the Id, 53). The punishing presence of the superego makes itself 
felt, through guilt, to the conscious self or to the conscious part of the 
ego, but what remains hidden is the position of desiring to be punished 
on the part of the ego (SE, 19: 166).15 
The desire to be beaten by the father, closely connected as it is 
in moral masochism with the desire to have some passive sexual 
relations with him, provides a clue as to the development of 
conscience. 'Conscience and morality arose through overcoming, 
desexualizing, the Oedipus-complex' (SE, 19: 169). The conscience 
then, is under the control of the masochistic death drive, which Freud, 
in an ironic twist refers to as the 'categorical imperative' (The Ego and 
the Id, 35, 48). 'Kant's categorical imperative is thus the direct heir of 
the Oedipus complex' (SE, 19: 167). The exacting universal law, in 
Freud's estimate, is not a product of a real moral constraint. It is the 
cruel workings of a harsh superego. The imperative under which the 
conscience works cannot be said to be moral, rather this imperative is 
derived from the id. 'From the point of view of instinctual control, of 
morality, it may be said of the id that it is totally non-moral' (The Ego 
and the Id, 54). 
Fleeing the Fear of Death 
15 The reference is from Freud's short article the 'Economic Problem of 
Masochism' . 
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Subjection to the id on one side and the superego on the other, 
accounts for the inherent fear of the ego. Freud describes the ego as 
surrounded by three dangers: 'from the external world, from the libido 
of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego' (The Ego and the Id, 
56). The ego must negotiate the desire of the id and the constraints of 
the world; as a result, the ego 'offers itself ... as a libidinal object to 
the id, and aims at attaching the id's libido to itself (The Ego and the 
Id,56). This means the ego is surrounded by death, and the reality of 
its dissolution. 
Through its work of identification and sublimation it gives the 
death instincts in the id assistance in gaining control over the 
libido, but in so doing it runs the risk of becoming the object of 
the death instincts and of itself perishing. In order to be able 
to help in this way it has had itself to become filled with libido; 
it thus itself becomes the representative of Eros and 
thenceforward desires to live and to be loved. (The Ego and 
the Id, 56) 
The ego is the 'seat of anxiety' as it faces possible annihilation from 
either the libido or the superego (The Ego and the Id, 57). The fear of 
the ego, the 'fear of conscience', is not moral dread of missing the 
good, but a primordial fear connected to the threat of castration. This 
could be summed up as the fear of death if it is understood that death 
per se does not really offer any positive object that might serve as the 
focus of the unconscious. This is an internal fear between the two 
registers of the ego. Or, to put it more precisely, the fear results in a 
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splitting of the ego. On one side the ego rejects any prohibition, and on 
the other and in the same instant, he takes over the fear of that danger 
as a symptom in an attempt to get rid of the fear (SE, 23:275).16 Both 
positions in the dispute are satisfied but this satisfaction is paid for with 
the split and suffering of the ego. It may result, with the ego turning 
itself completely over to the super-ego. The 'ego gives itself up 
because it feels itself hated by the super-ego' or it is put in danger by 
some excessive force and 'lets itself die' (The Ego and the /d, 58). 
Where the original view of aggression had presumed the 
primacy of sadism, Freud now sees that sadism is not necessarily an 
outward directed violence. Aggression is actually directed inward, 
which is to sayan original masochism, or death drive, stands at the 
core of self-relation. 
Following our view of sadism, we should say that the 
destructive component had entrenched itself in the super-ego 
and turned against the ego. What is now holding sway in the 
super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the death instinct, 
and in fact it often enough succeeds in driving the ego into 
death, if the latter does not fend off its tyrant in time by the 
change round into mania. (The Ego and the /d, 53) 
It should not be forgotten that the one sacrificed and the one to whom 
the sacrifice is offered are the same subject, so that salvation is sought 
in and through destruction. 
16 From the short and unfinished article 'Splitting of the Ego in the Defensive 
Process'. 
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The Morality of the Death Drive 
The death drive gives rise to an inherently violent and 
destructive 'morality'. The suppression of instinct gives rise to feelings 
of guilt which result in a pressure toward aggression. This in turn 
gives rise to a heightened moral conscience, which increases the 
internal pressure for aggression. The heightened moral conscience is 
not a product of social life acting on the individual. This moral 
sensitivity arises as part of a relinquishing of gratification in the 
dynamic of the two registers of the ego. This does not give rise to 
morality but its opposite. The 'masochism in him creates a temptation 
to "sinful acts" which must be expiated by the reproaches of the 
sadistic conscience' (SE, 19: 169). The masochist or the moralist is 
put in the position of ruining his own interests or even of destroying 
himself in order to satisfy the superego. The other choice would be to 
turn this aggression outward and destroy a substitute object instead of 
destroying the self. The death drive in either case establishes a 
violent economy of exchange, whether with the self or with the other. 
It is remarkable that the more a man checks his 
aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe - that is 
aggressive - he becomes in his ego ideal ... the more a man 
controls his aggressiveness, the more intense becomes his 
ideal's inclination to aggressiveness against his ego. (The 
Ego and the /d, 54) 
46 
The economy this entails will always demand that a sacrifice be made, 
it is just a matter of which will be sacrificed, the other in the sadistic 
sacrifice of the death drive turned outward or the self (as other) in the 
masochistic and primary form of the death drive. 
Whence the Cure 
In positing the death drive as the ultimate end of man produced 
by a cosmic Thanatos and which is irresistible, in that it will in one way 
or another achieve its aim, Freud raised the question as to the efficacy 
of psychoanalysis. In one of his late papers (1937) Freud wonders if 
analysis is terminable or interminable.17 'Is it possible', he asks, 
'permanently and definitively to resolve an instinctual conflict - that is 
to say, to "tame" the instinctual demand' (SE, 23:225). The 'general 
principles, rules and laws' which are thought to bring order into chaos 
are themselves subject to delusion (SE, 23:228). 'Sometimes one 
feels inclined to doubt whether the dragons of primeval ages are really 
extinct' (SE, 23:229). 
Freud is not unaware that he is pushing the envelope of 
understanding. He refers to his meta psychology as the Witch that 
must be summoned to explain the neuroses he is encountering in the 
clinic. 'Unfortunately', he laments, 'what our Witch reveals is neither 
very clear nor very exact' (SE, 23:225). As the very title of the article 
indicates ('Analysis Terminable and Interminable'), Freud's Witch had 
17 The article is entitled 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'. 
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thrown the basic practice of analysis into question. The death drive 
may constitute a condition that cannot be resolved, so that the notion of 
a definite termination of analysis is open to question. 
Freud has concluded elsewhere, that if the pleasure principle is 
a 'tendency to stability' in its lowering of the stimulus-tension of the 
mind, then the pleasure principle is itself serving the death instinct. He 
adopts the name 'Nirvana principle' to describe the pleasure prinCiple. 
The Nirvana principle, however, originally 'belongs to the death-
instincts' until it 'underwent a modification in the living organism 
through which it became the pleasure-principle' (SE, 19:160). Eros 
may have 'wrested a place for itself from the death instinct, but this 
place seems far from secure. The death drive is so pervasive that 'the 
topographical differentiation between ego and id loses much of its 
value for our investigation' (SE, 23:241). 
It is not clear whether the ego is that 'I' that is to be saved or 
the 'I' that is itself somehow part of the obstruction. He posits a 'primal 
sadism' or masochism in which the death instinct attacks that bit of life 
or libido attached to the ego. But he admits, 'We are without any 
physiological understanding of the ways and means by which this 
taming of the death instinct by the libido may be effected' (SE, 19: 164). 
The death drive can be turned inward or outward - but ultimately the 
super-ego in its sadism and the ego in its masochism conspire to work 
toward the same result (SE, 19:170). In turn, the reality that the ego 
maintained with its orientation to the outside world is thrown into 
question. Freud does not yet explicitly question whether the ego, 
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subject as it is to such plasticity and manipulation, is itself part of the 
fantasy formation he is describing. The splitting of the ego, the positing 
of a false memory in the ego as a resolution to the Oedipus complex, 
and the medium of the energetics in language, are all brought together 
in terms of a game. Lacan is going to reinterpret this structure as part 
of a linguistic construct, but even his questioning of the status of the 
ego was a possibility that Freud points to in the content of its original 
discovery. 
The death and violence of the death drive seem inescapable. 
Lacan and Zizek do not presume to get beyond the death drive, but 
with Lacan's reading of Freud through the lens of structural linguistics, 
meta psychology is no longer rooted in an irresistible biological or 
cosmic force. 
The Significance of Jacques Lacan 
The death drive was perhaps Freud's most daring idea. Though 
obscure in its own right, it brings clarity to otherwise unexplainable 
neurotic and psychotic ailments as it helped explain the elemental 
conflict in the human condition. Nonetheless it has remained Freud's 
least accepted idea from the time he proposed it until the present. The 
exceptional theorist that has given prolonged treatment to the death 
drive is the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. Lacan considered 
that as a true follower of Freud it was impossible to ignore the death 
drive. He insisted that 'To ignore the death instinct in [Freud's] doctrine 
is to misunderstand that doctrine completely' (Ecrits: Selection, 301). 
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In Lacan's opinion the period that begins with Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle is the culmination of his work during a time when he was at 
the height of his powers (Ecrits: Selection, 101). With the entry of this 
second instinct the entire Freudian corpus must be reinterpreted in its 
light. It is this rereading of Freud that Lacan undertakes, setting it at 
the centre of his theory.18 
The platform he used to carry out his interpretation of Freud 
was the public seminars which form the basis of his published works. 
The surviving record of these seminars, which were sometimes 
lectures and sometimes extended discussion, explains in part the 
obscurity of his doctrine. Lacan considered these lectures as only 
cohering in a close reading of the original texts of Freud. 'I must note 
that in order to handle any Freudian concept, reading Freud cannot be 
considered superfluous, even for those concepts that are homonyms of 
current notions' (Ecrits: Selection, 38). He expected seminar 
participants to do their homework by reading Freud, and on that basis 
the discussion would commence. He considered his work as a 
commentary on Freud and not something that would stand alone. This 
helps explain, in particular, why he failed to provide a detailed account 
18 Assigning the death drive such key importance set Lacan over and 
against the accepted understanding of ego psychology as embraced by the 
International Psycho-Analytic Association (IPA). While the IPA draws mainly on the 
structural model set forth in The Ego and the Id, the reading of the standard model is 
that the ego is the centre of personality as it plays the crucial mediating role in the 
three Freudian registers. Elisabeth Roudinesco provides the definitive account of 
Lacan and his peculiar focus and break from ego psychology. See Elisabeth 
Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999 and 
Elisabeth Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan & Co: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 
1925-1985 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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of the death drive in his overall theory, though he insisted it was 
central. 
Freud himself in referring to the centrepiece of his theory as the 
'Witch' does not instil confidence that the death instinct of his 
meta psychology can be fully clarified. Lacan provides even less 
assurance. 
Contrary to the dogmatism that is sometimes imputed to us, 
we know that this system remains open both as a whole and 
in several of its articulations. These gaps seem to focus on 
the enigmatic signification that Freud expressed in the term 
death instinct, which, rather like the figure of the Sphinx, 
reveals the aporia that confronted this great mind in the most 
profound attempt so far made to formulate an experience of 
man in the register of biology (Ecrits, Selection, 8). 
The death drive is observed in the clinical setting through the 
mysterious acts of aggression expressed in masochism, but Lacan's 
point is that psychoanalysis must remain open as to its precise 
articulation. It is after all a pervasive and all-inclusive system which by 
the very nature of its work does not lend itself to a precise formulation. 
As I demonstrate below, Lacan's and tizek's theory depends in part on 
leaving the death drive a mystery which is not open to a precise 
formulation and it is precisely this mystery which I attempt to dispel. 
What Difference Does Lacan Make? 
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Where Freud situated the psyche in biology, Lacan' rereading of 
Freud situates the psyche in human language. He will link the meaning 
of the death drive to the human capacity to refuse death in and through 
language. Where Freud saw death in terms of a biological or even a 
cosmological force, Lacan will demystify the death drive (to an extent), 
by linking it to the logic of a lie. Freud had already indicated the key 
role of the symbols and signs that are found in dreams, fantasies, and 
every day discourse. His understanding was that, unbeknownst to the 
patient, his speech contained the truth, but it was a truth concealed by 
discourse and consciousness. Lacan takes up this notion and posits it 
at the centre of his reformulation: 'The unconscious is structured like a 
language' (Ecrits: Selection, 243). The formula arises from Lacan's 
encounter with the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. 
Saussure analysed language in terms of a holistic structure in which no 
singular positive term can be posited apart from the system, as the 
differences between sounds, words, etc. is the source of meaning. 
'Structure' refers, then, to this system of differences in which no 
singular unit has meaning apart from its contrasting pair within the 
system.19 To say the unconscious is structured like a language is to 
posit the meaning of conscious and unconscious as following this same 
structure of contrasting binary pairs. In this sense the unconscious is 
not a deep structure obscured from view. It is simply the obverse side 
of the signs of language. The unconscious is the place of the 
19 See Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and 
Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 3ff. 
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signifiers. As in one of Lacan's favoured examples, it is like the 
moebius strip. The moebius strip is a single surface twisted and joined 
at the ends, so that it appears to have two sides when it has only one. 
The conscious/unconscious binary is not one of distinct opposites; 
rather they are on a continuum like the moebius strip (Seminar 11,273). 
The unconscious is on display in language on the same surface as 
spoken discourse. 
Lacan connects the death drive to the binary of language in that 
it too follows the structure of the symbolic order. 
The death instinct is only the mask of the symbolic order .... 
The symbolic order is simultaneously non-being and insisting 
to be, that is what Freud has in mind when he talks about the 
death instinct as being what is most fundamental - a symbolic 
order in travail, in the process of becoming, insisting on being 
realized. (Seminar II, 326). 
Language is a dynamic order which means that it does not exist like an 
object. An object endures through time due to its static nature, but 
language does not endure but rather passes away as soon as it arises. 
It has no enduring being. One who is coming to his identity in and 
through language is subject to the fate of language. There is the 
dynamiC of language in the chain of signifiers, but meaning is not found 
in any singular signifier or any moment in time. The play of the 
signifiers along the signifying chain creates this dynamic possibility. A 
Subject put into pursuit of an object, or identity as an object, through 
language is involved in a contradiction. Thus the death instinct, 'the 
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mask of the symbolic order' is this dissonance (Seminar II, 326). The 
compulsion to repeat of the death drive is a product of the attempt to 
establish the self like an object, to repeat the self, in and through a 
medium (the symbolic) that makes this inherently impossible. Where 
Freud grounded the compulsion to repeat in a biological need to return 
to the stable material realm, Lacan explains the compulsion as arising 
from dissonance between the two registers (the imaginary and the 
symbolic). Lacan connects the compulsion to repeat to the 'insistence 
of the signifier' or the 'insistence of the signifying chain' or the 
insistence of the letter.2o As Lacan states it, 'Repetition is 
fundamentally the insistence of speech' (Seminar III, 242). It is in this 
insistence to be through speech that the death drive functions. 
The Intra-dynamic Death Drive 
The primary significance for theology represented by Lacan is 
his understanding of the relationship between the death drive and the 
ego. His notion of the Subject is not the stable and cohesive self 
posited by ego-psychology nor is it Freud's notion that the ego must be 
strengthened against the onslaught of the death drive. In fact he sees 
a more dynamic and all pervasive role for the death drive throughout 
the dynamics of the Subject. 
Just as Freud's trinity of ego/id/superego emerged as he came 
to see the importance of the death drive, Lacan also sees the death 
20 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 22ft. See Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis, 164. 
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drive as central to the imaginary/symbolic and real, ultimately 
connecting the drive to the topography as a whole. Freud's positing of 
the death drive caused him to revise his basic understanding of the 
psyche. The split in the ego bringing about the superego was seen as 
brought on by passage through the Oedipus complex and taking up the 
model of the father into the self in the superego. The superego was 
then the primary location of the punishing death drive. Lacan has 
changed the name of Freud's three registers, and though they continue 
to operate along the picture Freud described, they have a slightly 
different inter-relationship due especially to Lacan's emphasis on the 
role of language. The superego becomes the 'symbolic' in Lacan's 
transformation of Freud's concept. While the symbolic continues as 
the centre of the death drive, on the order of the superego, there is also 
a tighter and necessary relationship between the symbolic, the 
imaginary, and the real (Seminar 1/, 29).21 The imaginary ego or the 
imago is Lacan's version of the ego. The shift in name shades the shift 
in meaning. The ego is no longer the stable centre of the self but is 
that part of the self-understanding fostered by the child first seeing 
itself in the mirror (Seminar IV, 17). Lacan describes it as a 
misrecognition (meconnaissance) but this misrecognition becomes a 
key part of the inner dynamics of the Subject.22 This is a clear 
departure from the ego psychologists and perhaps represents a 
21 Lacan explains that it is not that the symbolic comes from the real but the 
illussion is that the symbolic seems to have sprung from the real (Seminar 11,238). 
22 The misrecognition, Lacan explains, is not ignorance: 'Misrecognition 
represents a certain organisation of affirmations and negations to which the subject 
is attached' (Seminar /, 167). 
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departure from Freud's earlier understanding of the centrality of the 
ego. 
The particular significance of the change in name from ego to 
imaginary is in connection with the death drive, as Lacan has clearly 
made the ego/imago complicit in the death drive. Lacan warns that to 
miss that the imaginary is part of the 'field of effects' of the symbolic is 
a betrayal of Freud (Ecrits: Selection, 64). To project this topography 
as anything other than interdependent is to perhaps miss the point that 
the Subject is dispersed, alienated, and unconscious in and through 
the inter-dynamics of this topography. Where Freud had presumed the 
ego and the sexual drives are opposed to the superego and the death 
drive, Lacan argues that the death drive is part of every drive. While 
'the death instinct is only the mask of the symbolic order' it always 
comes mixed with the erotism of the ego along with the absence of the 
real (Seminar 1/, 326). Death alone is silent, but death borne along by 
life becomes an orientation that explains the Lacanian topography. 
The distinction between the life drive and the death drive is 
true in as much as it manifests two aspects of the drive. But 
this is so only on condition that one sees all the sexual drives 
as articulated at the level of significations in the unconscious, 
in as much as what they bring out is death - death as signifier 
and nothing but signifier, for can it be said that there is a 
being for death. (Seminar XI, 257) 
The death instinct is fundamental as it is mixed with each of the drives 
and it serves both sides of the dialectic between life and death. The 
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symbolic order in its insistence to be, and its lack of being, takes on 
this dynamic only in relation with the real and the imago. The locus of 
the death drive may be with the symbolic, but the symbolic is empty 
apart from the imaginary and the real. 
So the topography worked out by Lacan locates its meaning or 
its existence, not in a duality of drives, but in a fusion or dialectic 
between life and death. Where Freud had pictured life and death as 
part of a cosmic dualism, Lacan sees life and death in the Subject as 
negotiated in and through language. Language creates a 
subject/object pair in which the imago is an object from the perspective 
of the symbolic. Lacan referring to himself in the third person, 
summarizes his work in terms of death and desire: 'Who more 
fearlessly than this clinician, so firmly tied to mundane suffering, has 
questioned life as to its meaning, and not to say that it has none ... but 
to say that is has only one meaning, that in which desire is borne by 
death?' (Ecrits: Selection, 306). Freud's claim had been that 'the aim 
of all life is death' (The Ego and the Id, 38). Lacan has taken this quite 
literally, as he has connected desire itself to death. Freud imagined 
that libido and Eros stood opposed to death, but Lacan breaks down 
the barrier between the two and pictures the death drive as 
fundamental even in Eros. 
'Desire borne by death' accounts for each component of Lacan's 
topography. Libido is 'originally made to pass through an imaginary 
stage' which is the work of the death instinct (Seminar I, 149). The 
symbolic, like the super-ego before it, is masked by the death instinct 
57 
(Seminar 1/, 326). The real is the hole or gap in the symbolic, through 
which the trauma of the death drive makes its appearance (Seminar I, 
66). Lacan will reject Freud's biological grounding of this topography 
and will describe the death drive and Eros as a conflict, not between 
biological life and death, but within the inter-dynamics of the imaginary, 
symbolic and real. Lacan pictures these three registers as structured 
in their inter-dynamics like a lie. The imago of the imaginary is the 
focus or object of the lie, while the symbolic is the substance or 
medium of the lie, and the real is that which is obscured by the lie. In 
Seminar I Lacan refers to language as that which enables the subject 
to ground himself in a lie (Seminar I, 194). This includes Freud's notion 
of lying discourse, but it goes beyond this idea. Lacan's entire 
topography of the subject is constructed along the order of a lie. 
The Imaginary Object of the Lie 
The identification of the self in the mirror, as important as it is in 
formation of identity and the establishment of a distinct self, is 
inherently alienating. The Subject is estranged from the mirror image 
at the same time as she achieves self-representation. This alienation 
is not a mere effect of the imaginary; the imago is alienation in its 
essence.23 As Lacan states it, 'Alienation is the imaginary as such' 
(Seminar 11/, 146). Alienation occurs in the sense that the subject-
object relation is taken up into the self. The imaginary is not cut off 
23 Boothby, Freud as Philosopher, 146. 
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from the symbolic. Language has both a symbolic and an imaginary 
dimension. 'There is something in the symbolic function of human 
discourse that cannot be eliminated, and that is the role played in it by 
the imaginary' (Seminar II, 306). 
Lacan extracts his idea of the imaginary from Freud's description 
of the ego as 'first and foremost a bodily ego, it is not merely a surface 
entity, but is itself the projection of a surface' (The Ego and the Id, 20). 
The ego is a product of identification with the visual image of the body 
in the mirror or with the cohesive image of others. The mirror stage 
coincides with the entry into the symbolic as the two are simultaneously 
engaged when the visual recognition of the child is taken up or noted in 
the symbolic realization of the 'I'. The two positions constitute 
alienation as they exist as two separate orders in the experience of the 
subject. The nature of their dynamic interdependency is indicated in 
Freud's original observation of his grandson's play with the spool. 
It soon turned out ... that during this long period of solitude 
the child had found a method of making himself disappear. 
He had discovered his reflection in a full-length mirror which 
did not quite reach to the ground, so that by crouching down 
he could make his mirror-image 'gone'. (Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, 14) 
The child has learned that his own image, like the mother whom he 
came to cause to symbolically appear and disappear, is subject to the 
binary of absence and presence set up in the game. The mirror image 
presents a full presence that can be made to appear and disappear at 
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will. He recognizes himself in the visual image, and yet that image is 
separate from him and not one that he has in his immediate 
experience. That is he does not experience himself as cohering like 
the image in the mirror; his is an experience of dissonance and 
disconnectedness (Seminar I, 79). 
The function of the 'I' or the 'I' in the mirror arises as the child 
identifies himself with his image. 
It suffices to understand the mirror stage in this context as an 
identification, in the full sense analysis gives to the term: 
namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject 
when he assumes ... an image the little man is at the infans 
stage thus seems to me to manifest in an exemplary ... 
situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is preCipitated in a 
primordial form. (Ecrits: A Selection, 4) 
The transformation is the positing of the image of 'I' so that the ego as 
object is conceived. Transference, in the analytic situation, has to do 
with an inter-subjective relationship established between the analyst 
and patient. In the mirror stage a new inter-subjective relationship has 
been established. The mirror image does not stand apart from the 
symbolic matrix; in fact it completes it or acts as its supplement. The 
mirror alone does not constitute the ego, but the child's positing of its 
identity as an 'I' as gained through the mirror. The symbolic and the 
imaginary constitute the matrix in which the 'I' arises. If mother didn't 
occasionally leave, or if all one had was the overwhelming spectral 
presence, the'!, could not arise. 
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Lacan first understood the mirror stage, as its name indicates, as 
a temporary stage that occurs at a specific time. He comes to see it 
though, not as a stage but as a permanent structure. The ego results 
from identifying with his specular image and this sets up the dynamics 
of the imaginary. In the mirror stage there is the 'jubilant assumption of 
his specular image' since there is the sense of mastery that is not yet 
available through direct control of his body (Ecrits: Selection, 4). The 
body image has cohesiveness the child feels is missing within himself. 
What I have called the mirror stage is interesting in that it 
manifests the affective dynamism by which the subject 
originally identifies himself with the visual Gestalt of his own 
body: in relation to the still very profound lack of coordination 
of his own motility, it represents an ideal unity, a salutary 
imago; it is invested with all the original distress resulting from 
the child's intra-organic and relational discordance during the 
first six months, when he bears the signs, neurological and 
humoral, of a physiological natal prematuration. (Ecrits: 
Selection, 21) 
What the child experiences internally, is very different from what he 
sees in the mirror. He is still restricted by a lack of coordination, and 
feelings of discordance, and yet the mirror image hangs together quite 
nicely. The ego as bodily or object ego is a misrecognition that Lacan 
describes as 'frustration in its essence' (Ecrits: Selection, 46). The 
frustration of the imago is of not having achieved itself. The mirror 
image that produces the primordial 'I' is not an image that one can 
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inhabit. It is an object that has all the characteristics of an object; it is 
static, distant and cohesive. The ego as an object refuses the 
dynamics of temporality and change. The Subject knows itself as a 
unity but it is a virtual unity from which he at the same time feels 
partially alienated (Seminar II, 50). The Neurosis and aggression that 
arise in the human condition can be traced, according to Lacan, to this 
key stage. 
Thus the ego can be said to have a paranoiac structure (Ecrits: 
Selection, 22). 'The ego is structured exactly like a symptom. At the 
heart of the Subject, it is only a privileged symptom, the human 
symptom par excellence, the mental illness of man' (Seminar I, 16). 
The imago prevents entry into life and constitutes a certain 'stuckness', 
in the same way that neurosis is an obstacle that cannot be by-passed. 
The symptoms of neurosis are, in fact, manifestations of the primordial 
problem. The ego presents itself in and through a variety of symptoms, 
each one of which, whether sadistic or masochistic, constitute the 
original symptom. There is a primal aggression emanating from the 
ego which might be said to constitute the ego. 
Freud had pictured a primary narcissism in which there is an 
investment of libido in the ego, that is, the ego is taken as an object of 
desire. Lacan's imaginary can be equated to this primary narcissism. 
Just as the myth of Narcissus is about trying to achieve the image 
reflected in the water, Lacan's imaginary register or mirror stage is 
linked then, both with Freud's primary narcissism and with the myth of 
Narcissus. As in the myth there is an erotic element or an element of 
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desire, since the subject is attracted to his image. There is also an 
aggressive element as the wholeness and coherence of the specular 
image contrasts with the feeling of physical disunity. Lacan puts 
particular emphasis on this move as it marks the birth of the ego as a 
product of the specular image but also as an investment of desire 
(Seminar 111,92).24 The false nature of the mirror stage is like that in 
the myth. The visual Gestalt forms the primary love object as libido is 
invested in what is simply a spectral image. 
It is this erotic relation, in which the human individual fixes 
upon himself an image that alienates him from himself, that 
are to be found the energy and the form on which this 
organization of the passions that he will call his ego is based. 
(Ecrits: Selection, 21) 
The imago in the mirror sets up a gap in which the ultimate desire is an 
exponential desire for the self. Lacan likens the course of these 
passions to the life of the slave 'whose response to the frustration of 
his labour is a desire for death' (Ecrits: Selection, 46). No matter what 
his accomplishments, no matter what changes the individual may 
undergo in the course of his life, the ego is this inert presence left 
untouched by life experiences. 
Just as in Hegel's master/slave analogy the slave is put into the 
position of carrying out all the work. The Subject/slave expends his 
life's efforts and invests in a self-relationship which by its very nature 
24 See Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 120. 
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will not change. The more he works, the more he reinforces the 
bondage. In Hegel's dialectic it is the slave who has the possibility of 
undoing the relationship. For the subject the possibility of change lies 
outside the ego. The ego is not subject to growth and change as it is 
an object fixed as part of a formal structure. 'I am nothing of what 
happens to me. You are nothing of value' (Ecrits: Selection, 22). The 
effort expended in establishing the self, leaves the imago, that 
primordial static image, untouched. The specular image serves to 
freeze the imago so that life's experiences leave it untouched. The 
fixed nature of the ego refuses not only temporality but the instinctual 
impulses that come with natural growth. The mirror stage inaugurates 
a 'primordial jealousy' in which desire is an unsettled lack, longing for a 
being or cohesiveness that is present in others but missing in the self. 
The ego of the imaginary 'turns the I into that apparatus for which every 
instinctual thrust constitutes a danger, even though it should 
correspond to a natural maturation' (Ecrits: Selection, 6). As a result 
libido is put into the service of aggression and drives, which threaten 
the bounded structure of the ego. Each 'great instinctual 
metamorphosis in the life of the individual will once again challenge its 
delimitation' (Ecrits: Selection, 22). The movement and maturation that 
are a natural part of life threaten to expose the imago to a change 
which would constitute its demise. 
The point of Lacanian analysis is not to strengthen the ego or 
the image of the imaginary, as the ego is the obstruction to growth and 
the normal dynamics of desire. Over and against those who take the 
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ego to be the 'ally' of the analyst or those that presume the ego needs 
strengthening Lacan says, 
it is very difficult to define the ego as an autonomous function, 
while at the same time continuing to regard it as master of 
errors, the seat of illusions, the locus of a passion proper to it, 
one which leads essentially to misunderstanding 
[meconnaissance] ... misunderstanding is precisely its 
function. (Seminar I, 62-63) 
The ego, far from being an individualistic being or entity unto itself, is a 
false notion; generating the lie that it is an actually existing thing. The 
ego is the resistance that disturbs and blocks the analytic situation. 
The threat of exposure leads to its aggression. It is as likely to express 
itself in an aggression for the analyst, as it is a masochistic self-
relation. 
Nor is it by chance that, from the moment that the dialectical 
progress begins to approach the questioning of the intentions 
of the ego in our subjects, the phantasy of the analyst's death 
- often felt in the form of fear or even of anxiety - never fails 
to be produced. (Ecrits: Selection, 109) 
As the ego, the symptom itself, comes to be exposed for what it is, fear 
and aggression arise at the threat of being undone. Lacan likens the 
alienation that the ego establishes in the Subject to Hegel's 
master/slave dialectic. The Subject's labour - his striving in analysis or 
in life to establish himself 'eludes him, for he himself "is not in it"' 
(Ecrits: Selection, 109). The slave can come to himself only through 
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the master's death, as that is the moment in which he will begin to live, 
'but in the meantime he identifies himself with the master as dead, and 
as a result of this he is himself already dead' (Ecrits: Selection, 109). 
In the dialectic of the slave and master, the slave equates freedom with 
the master's death, so that the dead master becomes the sole object, 
and in this focus the slave has missed the point that his own focus is 
his true master. The focus on the ego as object is the investment of life 
in a fruitless situation. The focus of Narcissus must be shifted off the 
reflected image to the real dynamics of the Subject. 
To strengthen the ego would amount to strengthening the lie 
that is destroying the Subject or that is preventing the Subject from 
coming into being. There is a life and death struggle taking place in the 
Subject and it is the imaginary self-relation that initiates the Subject into 
a false being that is a pact with death. 
The Symbolic Substance of the Lie 
If the ego is the object of the lie, the symbolic is its substance. It 
is only the medium of language that allows for lying, and the subject is 
itself a product, not just of language but of a lie. In Seminar I Lacan 
equates the existence of the Subject with his ability to lie. The 
speaking Subject imagines some Other which underlies and posits his 
being as it is expressed in language, when the reality is a complete 
absence or lack, covered by the symbolic substance (Seminar /, 194). 
The ability of the child to arrive at the 'I' as it points in the mirror 
illustrates the split Subject of the symbolic. With Freud's grandson it 
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was language that enabled him to look in the mirror and recognize 
himself. The self-reflexive capacity of language is the true substance 
or medium of the imaginary capacity to recognize the visual self. 
Just as the primal father was at one and the same time 
representative of law and its transgression, the law here is split or 
splitting: there is the Subject of the enunciation (the Subject speaking) 
and the Subject of the statement (the words spoken). The Subject who 
speaks or the Subject of the enunciation is not accessible through 
language as he is in that place from which language arises. In turn the 
object of the spoken sentence cannot be the location of the Subject as 
this is merely an object (Seminar XI, 211). 'As soon as we turn things 
into nouns, we presuppose a substance, and ... we just don't have 
that many substances' (Seminar XX, 21). So where is the substantial 
dimension? Lacan concludes it is dispersed between 'the thinking 
substance and extended substance' (Seminar XX, 21). He turns the 
question back to the spoken, maintaining that substance is a notion 
that arises as part of the spoken word. The proper question might be 
where is the Subject? 
The unconscious structured like a language, it should be 
realized that this formulation totally changes the function of 
the subject as existing. The subject is not the one (ce/ui) who 
thinks. The subject is precisely the one we encourage not to 
say it at all ... (Seminar XX, 22) 
'The unconscious structured like a language' reflects Lacan's 
incorporation of Saussure for whom language (langue) is structure per 
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se. Lacan departs from Saussure's concept that the basic unit of 
language is the sign. Lacan holds that the basic unit is the signifier. 
So the unconscious is a structure of signifiers (Seminar XI, 20).25 The 
signifier is the phonological element of language or the basic image of 
the sound and not the sound itself. Lacan defines it as 'that which 
represents a subject for another signifier, in opposition to the sign 
which represents for someone' (Seminar /1,207). No signifier can 
signify the Subject as the Subject exists as a consequence of the chain 
of signifiers dispersed between their basic element in the unconscious 
as pure signifiers and in the conscious self as signs. 
As in analysis the Subject is always presumed incapable of 
telling the truth about his symptoms. The analysand does not present 
himself directly but through uttering 'stupidities'. 'For it is with those 
stupidities that we do analysis, and that we enter into the new subject -
that of the unconscious' (Seminar XX, 22). The Subject is an effect of 
language, spoken rather than speaking and spoken by language. But 
this effect is only indirectly presented in speaking. To say it more 
precisely, the speaking Subject is a cover for the one not speaking: 'he 
is distinct from what he says' for one simple reason - he can lie 
(Seminar /, 194). 'Well, the dimension of the speaking subject, of the 
speaking subject qua deceiver, is what Freud uncovered for us in the 
unconscious' (Seminar /, 194). The lying Subject is not the conscious 
Subject as it is itself a product of a deception that is beneath his words. 
25 Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 97. 
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The lying Subject or the deceiver stands behind the conscious spoken 
presentation of the self. The Subject is shaped by a deception or is 
deceived in its essence. 
Lacan contrasts this Subject of the lie with the Subject as it is 
posited in science. The Subject in science is held in consciousness. 'It 
is whoever possesses the system of science that sustains the 
dimension of the subject. He is the subject, in so far as he is the 
reflection, the mirror, the support of the objectal world' (Seminar I. 194). 
The scientist encompasses his science in his consciousness so that 
the entire dimension of the Subject is a possession of the scientist. He 
can know it and look at it directly as in a mirror. The Subject of the 
unconscious makes his appearance only in deception. 
In contrast, Freud shows us that in the human subject there is 
something which speaks. which speaks in the full sense of 
the word, that is to say something which knowingly lies, and 
without the contribution of consciousness. That restores - in 
the obvious, strict, experimental sense of the term - the 
dimension of the subject. (Seminar I, 194) 
The Subject is structured like language in the unconscious and the 
nature of this structure is a lie. Lacan is using the term 'lie' to describe 
the topology of the Subject. For instance, as with the moebius strip 
there is a singular surface with the appearance of two sides. A lie 
consists of a singular element but one can stand in relation to the lie 
either in terms of believing and inhabiting it or in terms of telling it. 
Normally we would not connect these two positions. Lacan's claim is 
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that it is a singular surface. The one telling and the one believing the 
lie are not separate, but the possibility for this self deception requires 
that there be a separation into three registers. The unconscious is, 
however, itself subject to deception, so that it cannot be said to contain 
some pure version of the truth.26 Since the Subject is deceived per se 
(in her entirety), truth is inscribed in the deception. In analysis lies 
reveal the truth so the truth coheres as an element of the lie (Seminar /, 
273).27 The registers function like a lie in that the conscious speaking 
self is speaking from the other side of this lie. The lie has been foisted 
onto the Subject and the spoken position presumes the truth of the lie. 
The unconscious is the point from which the lie proceeds: it is the point 
of deception, and in this is the true Subject as opposed to the ego or 
the object of speech. 
By the same token, this dimension is no longer confused with 
the ego. The ego is deprived of its absolute position in the 
subject. The ego acquires the status of a mirage, as the 
residue, it is only one element in the objectal relations of the 
subject. (Seminar /, 194) 
Freud's observation of his grandchild playing with the spool 
illustrates the ego position. The game is a fictional alternative to 
having and being with the mother. It is a game played out in frustration 
as the mother is gone, and the game is built upon her absence. More 
26 This double negation of the lie is an especially difficult concept which 
L:ifek takes up in his discussion of Hegel which is unfolded below. 
27 In analysis when the analysand begins to lie this indicates the truth is 
nearby as the truth attempts to hide 'taking flight in deception' (Seminar 1.273). 
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than that, it wills her absence, as is illustrated in the child wishing his 
father would go to the front lines of the war as he throws his toys under 
the bed. As Lacan describes it, entry into the symbolic does not relieve 
destructive desire but it confounds it: 'it raises his desire to a second 
power' (Seminar I, 173). The game displaces the mother and 
compensates for the reality of her absence by producing the symbolic 
'unreality' of the game. In Lacan's reading of the game the privation of 
having lost the mother becomes the space in which the symbolic is 
born so that the symbolic is a space of privation. 
We can now thereby grasp that the subject does not just 
master his privation in assuming it ... but he also raises his 
desire to a second power. For his action destroys the object 
that it causes to appear and disappear in the provocation ... 
in the anticipating provocation of its absence and presence. It 
thus renders negative the field of forces of desire, in order to 
become its own object for itself. (Seminar I, 173) 
Just as the spool in the game represents the power to symbolize the 
mother, in and through displacing her, so too the Subject is displaced 
by the ego as it is born into the game of language. The binary fort/da, 
along with the binaries that make up the phonemes and structure of 
language, have become the means of entering and controlling reality. 
The presence/absence of the game is played out over a real absence. 
Lacan concludes that 'primal masochism' should be located around this 
initial negation, 'around this original murder of the thing' (Seminar I, 
173). The murder of the thing amounts to the trade off of entry into the 
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symbolic. Words and symbols, the spool for the child in Freud's story, 
replace objects or the mother. The dynamic of the Subject as she is 
given over to language sets up an aggressive element directed at one's 
own image. This masochism is located at the juncture between the 
imaginary and the symbolic and is the determinate factor in the 
imaginary/symbolic dyad. It is not that one agency is pitted against the 
other, but rather, antagonism is at the origin of the imaginary and 
symbolic. The murder of the thing has produced a split resulting in 
these two registers. Giving up mother or the object for language 
creates the binary pair that is inherent in the construct of language. 
The child only takes on a separate identity as it distances or 
distinguishes itself from the mother and this comes about through the 
power of the symbolic, but one overwhelming presence is seemingly 
traded for another. 
Symbols in fact envelop the life of man in a network so total 
that they join together, before he comes into the world those 
who are going to engender him 'by flesh and blood'; so total 
that they give the words that will make him faithful or 
renegade, the law of the acts that will follow him right to the 
very place where he is not yet and even beyond his death. 
(Ecrits: Selection, 74) 
The web of language is woven so tightly that not even flesh and blood 
can withstand it. It directs the Subject in all of his paths - having 
determined prior to his entry into the world the ruts that will direct him. 
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The symbolic is not a singular agency within the Subject; just the 
opposite, the Subject 'is spoken' in and through a lie. 
The Real as the Power of Negation 
If the ego is the object of the lie and the symbolic its substance, 
the real can be said to be that which the lie negates or that which 
cannot appear as part of the symbolic. The obverse of this is that the 
real has itself been invested with the negative power to disturb the 
symbolic, and this is the power of the death drive. The real is, then, 
Lacan's transformed understanding of the id. As with Freud's id, basic 
drives and compulsions arise from the real. Unlike Freud, Lacan will 
connect each of these drives, including the primary drive of the death 
instinct, not to biology, but to the effect of language. 
In the final phase of Lacan's teaching, the phase with which 
Lizek is most concerned, the accent falls upon the real as the 
impossible kernel at the centre of the symbolic. As Lizek describes it, 
this centre poses the possibility of total effacement and of death 
(Sublime Object, 132). The real is the productive/destructive centre, 
the force of gravity exercised through the death drive. 
In a lie, there is the object or point of the lie, the lie itself, and 
what the lie negates. The real is the negative force that underlies the 
object (imaginary) and its substance (symbolic). The real is that 
inaccessible register around which language revolves and yet which it 
cannot pierce. Or conversely, the real is the hole or gap in the 
symbolic and trauma marks the appearance of the real like a rip in the 
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fabric of the self. The appearance of the real constitutes trauma 
precisely because it is 'unassimilable' (Seminar XI, 55). Its very nature 
as a resistance to symbolization connects the real to the compulsion to 
repeat, which is the force of the death instinct. In the seminar of 1954-
5 Lacan argues that the death drive is the fundamental tendency of the 
symbolic order to produce repetition (Seminar II, 326).28 Lacan refers 
to it as the 'automaton', a machine like force behind destructive 
compulsions. 
The real is beyond the automaton, the return, the coming 
back, the insistence of the signs .... 'The real is that which 
always lies behind the automaton, and it is quite obvious, 
throughout Freud's research, that it is this that is the object of 
concern. (Seminar XI, 54) 
The something beyond the pleasure principle acts as an 'insistence' 
expressed in repetition (automatisme de repetition) which first led 
Freud to his formulation of the death drive (Seminar II, 61). The 
content of the repetition is secondary to the repetition itself.29 The 
repetition is destructive by virtue of its existence. The resistance posed 
by the real within the symbolic, acts as the negative force beneath the 
compulsion to repeat. 
28 There is, as Boothby describes it, an agency of death in the signifier 
( B o o t h b ~ ~ Freud as Philosopher, 154). 
9 Freud's grandson's repetitive game with the spool was matched in 
Freud's observations in the clinic with the repetition of dreams, repulsive images, or 
compulsinve actions. 
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Unlike the machines found in factories, which repeat in order to 
produce something, the repetition compulsion aims at another kind of 
production. 
What is this insistence on the part of the subject to 
reproduce? Reproduce what? Is it in his behaviour? Is it in 
his fantasies? Is it in his character? Is it even in his ego? All 
kinds of things, from entirely different registers, can be used 
as material and as elements in this reproduction. (Seminar II, 
63). 
The compilision to repeat can be said to pervade the Subject, but each 
of the potential products shares the same orbit around the real. The 
power of the real, expressed in repetition is, as opposed to pleasure, 
the power of 'unpleasure and suffering and ... it always returns' 
(Seminar II, 64-65). 
The real is the 'residual' to language but it is a residual power in 
its absolute resistance to symbolization; that is, it is a power of 
resistance. The real does not take part in the binary of language, or in 
the presence/absence of language, as the real is the abyss or the zero 
(Seminar //,313). Symbolic features are dependent on presence and 
absence. The two sounds for example that Freud's grandson made 
O/A are a pair of sounds modulated on presence and absence (Ecrits: 
Selection, 65). The sounds correspond to the presence and absence 
of the spool. Words, always then, are 'a presence made of absence' 
(Ecrits: Selection 65). There 'is no absence in the real' as the real is 
the obverse side of the symbolic (Seminar II, 313). There is no 
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possibility of a symbolic absence/presence binary in the real. The real 
does not partake of the symbolic game and yet this game is only 
possible over the abyss of the real. The child has rid himself of the 
suffering presence/absence of the mother through the game with the 
spool. But the game does not offer anything other than the symbol, 
which has its meaning in and through the negation of the mother. 
The real is inaccessible not only as a singular negation; the 
negation is itself negated (Seminar I, 67). The lie of the subject cannot 
be gotten at as it is buried under a supposed truth. It consists of a two-
fold deception. Mother is banished and the game has displaced her. 
The real is at the centre of the unreal manifestations found in neurosis 
and hallucination and the unreal character of these delusions point to a 
displacement of reality. 'In the end, doesn't the feeling of the real 
reach its high point in the pressing manifestation of an unreal, 
hallucinatory reality' (Seminar I, 66-67)? The fantasies and false 
memories that plague the neurotic do not have a self-evident 
explanation but they point to the powerful underlying force of the real. 
The real harbours an anxiety that is impenetrable to the symbolic 
as the symbolic constitutes a substitution which harbours the real. 
Hence there's an anxiety-provoking apparition of an image 
which summarizes what we can call the revelation of that 
which is least penetrable in the real, of the real lacking any 
possible mediation, of the ultimate real, of the essential object 
which isn't an object any longer, but this something faced with 
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which all words cease and all categories fail, the object of 
anxiety par excellence. (Seminar II, 164) 
The presentation of the real in some positive form, some object or 
person, is the object of fear only in that what is presented is the radical 
negativity at the heart of the Subject. The real Thing (Das Ding) may 
make its appearance in many forms, but as Lacan notes it isn't an 
object any longer. The Thing is entirely outside of language and 
outside of the unconscious so that it is impossible to imagine it 
(Seminar VII, 125). The Thing is that unknowable element, beyond 
symbolization, which like Kant's noumena is beyond phenomena and 
yet the centre of phenomenological reality.3D It is perhaps, simply the 
raw presentation of total destruction of the symbolic order. Death per 
se, or biological death, is handled within the symbolic order so death is 
just passage to another world of symbolic meaning. In the death drive 
it is the destruction of even this order that threatens. 
The Real of God 
The most frightening thing, the thing that represents this total 
destruction and is inclusive of both evil and suffering (lema/) is God, or 
at least the father as good father. This God or this father, however, is 
one who is dead, and so is the embodiment of the radical negativity of 
the real. It is his death that orders everything. 'His attributes are those 
of a thought which regulates the order of the real' (Seminar VII, 180). 
30 L i ~ e k k will take up a discussion of the Thing in light of German idealism 
and bring an element of depth and clarity to the concept. 
77 
The real doesn't exist in the sense of taking place in reality but it 
exercises its power in and through the Order of existence. So God is 
perhaps the ultimate representative of the real, in that all of existence is 
ordered by him and yet he does not exist. 
The dynamic of the Subject, like the religion he practices, is one 
which in the face of a lack of being, is seeking to fill this lack with 
absolute Being. The religionist is just a picture of every man in his 
pursuit of a lost being. So Lacan is, in the first instance, critical of 
religion as it would seek to bring absolute being and meaning into a 
Subject lacking in being. Religion in all its forms, like the Subject 
herself, is an attempt to avoid the lack of being (Seminar VII, 130). The 
inevitable triumph of religion over psychoanalysis is, in Lacan's view, 
simply a sign of the pursuit of an absolute Being that would drown the 
world in meaning by closing the chain of signification.31 Religion, in 
other words, offers the solace of a final being on the order of the 
imaginary. There is the possibility of total unity, and a sense of having 
become identical with the imaginary image. What Lacan would offer is 
discontinuity - an interruption of the real - and a continual dynamic 
pursuit of meaning. Religion, on the other hand, would perform the 
trick of the fundamental fantasy, of bringing the signifier and the 
signified into absolute harmony so that there is no more movement 
along the signifying chain. This closure is not a resolution, but a form 
31 William Richardson, '''Like Straw": Religion and Psychoanalysis', The 
Letter: Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis 11,1-15, quoted in Marcus Pound, 
Theology Psychoanalysis and Trauma, p. 9. 
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of neurosis, which would seem to put Lacan in the Freudian anti-
religious camp. Lacan however brings a more nuanced reading of 
reality into play. As Marcus Pound puts it, 'while Lacan reduces 
religion to language, he also raises language to the level of religion' 
and so 'his work allows for a shared and creative engagement in the 
symbolic structures that govern human relations,.32 Language need 
not be thought of as a limited and determined engagement with reality, 
as all of reality is structured like a language. So language need not 
hinder entry into reality. 
The rewriting of Freud from the perspective of structural 
linguistics gives his critique of religion an anti-metaphysical thrust. 
The philosophers can speculate all they want on the Being in 
whom act and knowledge are one, the religious tradition is not 
misled: only that which can be articulated by means of a 
revelation has the right to be recognized as one or more 
divine persons. (Seminar VII, 31) 
To posit God apart from revelation, in his estimation, is to confuse the 
'Subject' of psychoanalysis, caught up in the dimension of the signifier, 
with the God of revelation. This Subject and this God are subject to 
deconstruction. They are subject to death and they are in the service 
of a 'will to power'. The God of the philosophers represents the failed 
32 Marcus Pound, Theology Psychoanalysis and Trauma, p. 9. 
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tradition in which the depth of desire is ceded for a middle path, which 
Lacan connects to Aristotelian ethics. 
In the end the order of things on which it claims to be founded 
is the order of power, of a human -far too human - power ... 
. Aristotle's morality is wholly founded on an order that is no 
doubt a tidied-up, ideal order. . .. His morality is the morality 
of the master, created for the virtues of the master and linked 
to the order of powers. (Seminar VII, 314-315) 
The unmoved mover of Aristotle or the God of the philosophers is 
linked to an ideal order - an order of the powers. This sort of order 
does not allow one to act in conformity with desire; rather it demands 
conformity to the desire of the master. He says this is Alexander's or 
Hitler's desire which says: 'Let it be clear to everyone that this is on no 
account the moment to express the least surge of desire' (Seminar VII, 
315). The essential thing is to keep on working, just keep on working 
for the master. 
The Lie of Sin 
Lacan is not unaware that the order he is describing, from the 
perspective of Christianity, can be summed up as sin. 'The father, the 
name-of-the-father, sustains the structure of the law - but the 
inheritance of the father is that which Kierkegaard designates for us, 
namely, his sin' (Seminar XI, 34). By identifying the inheritance of the 
father with sin Lacan is suggesting that the dynamic of the three 
registers, as they are a product of passage through the Oedipus 
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complex, could be understood as parallel to the biblical notion of sin 
(an idea which Lacan does not develop but which Zizek will address). 
The Subject of the lie, in and through the symbolic, has been cast into 
pursuit of an impossible object. He is lost to himself through the 
objectifying effects of language. The compulsion that drives him and 
orders his existence arises from within him and yet is somehow out of 
his reach. The organizing principle of human life is a pervasive 'dumb 
reality' that 'commands and regulates' our lives by alienating and 
removing the individual from reality (Seminar VII, 55). The lack in 
human life becomes the power that controls and orders his life. 
Zizek, in focusing on what he calls the Lacan of the 'third period' 
during which time Lacan turned his focus to the real of experience, 
poses the possibility of a way through the Lacanian notion of sin (The 
Sublime Object, 133). Zizek will turn Lacan, in his interpretation of 
Lacan's theory, more towards a theological and practical resolution to 
the predicament he describes.33 It is Kierkegaard's nemesis, Hegel, 
that Lizek sees as offering a way out of the sin system which Lacan 
links to Kierkegaard. The primary way in which he will come to this 
understanding of Lacan is by reading Lacan through Hegel and Hegel 
through Lacan. 
33 :2:izek, as opposed to the a/theological Lacan of Mark Taylor, recognizes 
that mere acceptance of the death drive is not the only option. See Taylor, Erring, 
which may represent the first attempt to introduce both Jacques Oerrida and Lacan 
into the American theological context. 
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Zizek's Subject of the Lie as Seen through Kant, Schelling and 
Descartes 
:lizek's reading of Lacan through German idealism and his 
reading of German idealism through Lacan, translates the problems of 
Lacan's three registers and his subject of the lie into the philosophical 
language of dialectical materialism. The result of this reading is not 
only a different perspective on Lacan's view of the human 
predicament, but a different perspective is brought also to the 
proposal for the way out. In one of his sustained engagements of the 
human predicament in light of German idealism, The Parallax View, 
Zizek describes the gap within thought and being in a series of 
systems notable for their irresolvable difference.34 The gap that exists 
between the conscious and unconscious is one that repeats itself in a 
series that :lizek maintains constitutes human reality. The goal is not 
to overcome the gap but to conceive it in its 'becoming' (Parallax, 6). 
His earlier work on Friedrich Schelling reads the gap back into God 
and offers an insight into the origins of the human Subject. 
In his work on Schelling, :lizek connects the death drive to what 
he calls the 'primordial lie' in which absolutely nothing transforms itself 
into the Creator God. The significance of this account is not that it 
tells how God came onto the scene; rather it demonstrates the 
34 There is the gap between the individidual and the social, the ontological 
gap between the ontic and the transcendental-ontological, there is the wave-particle 
duality of quantum physics, and the gap between the face and the skull in 
neurobiology, and the gap which is the real (Parallax, 6-7). 
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absolute, nihilistic nature of the primordial lie. 35 It constitutes a direct 
translation of Lacan's three registers into a philosophical framework. 
In Schelling's mythological portrayal the drive accounts for every 
beginning including the beginning of God. What Schelling is 
attempting to account for, in his rather tortured and obscure writings, 
is the tension between the 'ground' of God's being and that being 
itself, and since it is this tension between ground and existence that is 
definitive of the death drive, Lizek's use of Schelling can be 
understood as illustrative of the death drive. Schelling provides a 
retrospective understanding of the origin of all things from one who is 
caught in the death drive. God, like man, is faced with a forced choice 
(in the retrospective view) of choosing predication and action or 
literally nothing at all. Mankind likewise, is forced to choose between 
language, the social network, or a form of non-existence. But the 
'ground' of choice, or that from which being, predication, or language 
arises is the madness, the pure drives (Schelling's rotary motion of 
repetition of nothing) or the absolute nothing, which continues as the 
threatening ground of every predication. The beginning of God or the 
being of God arises from a continually obscured ground (the death 
drive by definition) of madness or nothing. This ground must in some 
way always be present and yet at the same time obscured and 
covered over. 'This is the only way the beginning, the beginning that 
does not cease to be one; the truly eternal beginning is possible. For 
35:2:ifek refers to the "primordial lie" in many places but his most sustained 
explanation is in the opening pages of The Indivisible Remainder. 
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here also it holds that the beginning should not know itself. Once 
done, the deed is eternally done' (Die Weltalter Fragmente, 183-
184).36 
The ultimate antagonism is between eternity (the eternal rotary 
motion of the drives - in which God Himself has not emerged or 
begun) and the singularity of the act ('in the beginning God created'). 
The passage from nothing (the eternal nothing without beginning or 
end) to something (the beginning of God) is an act that is eternally 
repeated in the passage from eternity to time. In other words, 
everything, including God ultimately arises from and tends toward this 
absolute nothing. In eternity there is a pure Nothingness, which 
'enjoys its own nonbeing' (Indivisible Remainder, 23). This Nothing 
which is without predicate or content is in a state of absolute freedom 
in that all things are still possible. An absolutely free subject can have 
no determinate content (it must ultimately be nothing). Eternity holds 
out absolute freedom the 'pure enjoyment, of an unassertive, neutral 
Will which wants nothing' but this Will 'actualizes itself in the guise of a 
Will which actively, effectively, wants this "nothing" - that is, the 
annihilation of every positive, determinate content' (Indivisible 
Remainder,23). The formal conversion of nothing into an actively 
sought after 'nothing' accounts for the absolute 'ground' of God's 
coming to himself ... the blissful peace of primordial freedom thus 
changes into pure contraction, into the vortex of 'divine madness' 
36 Quoted in Lizek, The Indivisible Remainder, p. 21. 
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which threatens to swallow everything, into the highest affirmation of 
God's egotism which tolerates nothing outside itself (Indivisible 
Remainder, 23). 
The death drive works through a time loop in which an original 
actually nonexistent state is posited: 'a pure gaze prior to one's own 
conception' or in the case of God a 'pure gaze which finds enjoyment 
in contemplating its own non being' (Indivisible Remainder, 22). 'Isn't 
this', asks Zizek, 'a fantasy formation at its purest' (Indivisible 
Remainder, 22). The death drive then, functions as the primary part of 
what Zizek calls the primordial lie: 'the phantasmic construction by 
means of which we endeavor to conceal the inconsistency of the 
symbolic order in which we dwell' (Indivisible Remainder, 1). The 
absolute subject, which is the product of this lying construct, in the 
manner of Schelling's God, serves as its own ground ('I am my own 
father') and posits for itself an absolute freedom. It is at this point that 
Zizek sees a convergence between German Idealism, Freudian 
psychoanalysis, and the Cartesian cog ito: 
This basic insight of Schelling whereby, prior to assertion as 
the medium of rational Word, the subject is the pure 'night of 
the Self,' the 'infinite lack of being', the violent gesture of 
contraction that negates every being outside itself, also forms 
the core of Hegel's notion of madness: when Hegel 
determines madness as withdrawal from the actual world. the 
closing of the soul into itself. its 'contraction' .... Was this 
withdrawal into itself not accomplished by Descartes in his 
85 
universal doubt and reduction of the cog ito ... which ... 
involves a passage through the moment of radical madness? 
... That is to say, the withdrawal into self, the cutting off of 
the links to the Umwelt, is followed by the construction of a 
symbolic universe that the subject projects onto reality as a 
kind of substitute-formation destined to recompense us for the 
loss of the immediate, presymbolic real. (The Abyss of 
Freedom, 8-9) 
Schelling's God read into the Cartesian cogito gets at the madness of a 
self-positing or self-grounding subject. The point Lizek is making in 
regards to the cogito is not that it is false in terms of some 
philosophical understanding. The point is that Descartes' cogito 
articulates the Lacanian notion of the human disease. 
Descartes' isolation of himself in the 'heated room' and reduction 
of the real world to a category of doubt and his reconstruction of that 
world, up to and including God follows the path of the Freudian notion 
of paranoia which by definition is the 'attempt to cure the subject of the 
disintegration of his universe' (The Abyss of Freedom, a-g). The point 
is not that Descartes was a paranoiac, but that his passage into 
isolation and potential madness retraces the course of the human 
psyche. The passage into subjectivity (fallen subjectivity?) involves the 
'ontological necessity of "madness" ... the mad gesture of radical 
withdrawal from reality that opens up the space for its symbolic 
(re)constitution' (The Abyss of Freedom, 8-9). To maintain that the 
product of thought is objectively true, or to fuse thought and being, 
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involves a form of madness that is at once so universal so as to be 
nearly inaccessible. 
If, therefore, in this precise sense, as Lacan put it, normalcy 
itself is a mode, a subspecies of psychosis, that is, if the 
difference between 'normalcy' and madness is inherent to 
madness, in what does then this difference between the 'mad' 
(paranoiac) construction and the 'normal' (social construction 
of) reality consist? Is 'normalcy' ultimately not merely a more 
'mediated' form of madness? Or, as Schelling put it, is 
normal Reason not merely 'regulated madness?' (The Abyss 
of Freedom, 10) 
The normal world constituted in the symbolic is suspended over a 
world of madness. The occasional trauma or rip in the symbolic is not 
a failure to align oneself with reality; rather reality is showing through 
the traumatic rip. The Subject is put into the position of grounding 
himself, but that ground is constructed in and through a deception. 
Lizek refers to this construct as part of a universal or primordial lie and 
it is in and through this lie that he accounts for the 
conscious/unconscious structure of the Subject. The unconscious is 
not primarily the drives; rather it is made of that which the 'fantasmatic 
foundation of his or her being' must necessarily obscure and hide, 
which he says, is the real itself (The Fragile Absolute, 70).37 Part of 
37 2:ifek provides a definition of the real, which gets at the fact that the real 
is itself something obscured by its own appearance. 'In other words, the Real 
persists as that failure or inconsistency of reality which has to be filled in with 
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the content of the real, or that which is by definition unconscious, 
consists of the basic 'human project' or the 'founding gesture' of the 
conscious subject. 
... what is truly 'unconscious' in man is not the immediate 
opposite of consciousness, the obscure and confused 
'irrational' vortex of drives, but the very founding gesture of 
consciousness, the act of decision by means of which I 
'choose myself, that is, combine this multitude of drives into 
the unity of my Self. The 'Unconscious' is not the passive 
stuff of inert drives to be used by the creative 'synthetic' 
activity of the conscious ego; The 'Unconscious' in its most 
radical dimension is, rather, the highest Deed of my 
self-positing, or - to resort to later 'existentialist terms - the 
choice of my fundamental 'project' which, in order to remain 
operative, must be repressed, kept unconscious, out of the 
light of day. (The Fragile Absolute, 72) 
appearance. Appearance is not secondary; rather, it emerges through the space of 
that which is missing from reality' (L:i:lek& Daly, Conversations with tiiek, p. 95). 
Again the ambiguity of the concept of the real and death drive are, as L:i:lek sees it, 
inherent to what the concepts name. Along this line he sights Jonathan Lear's 
critique of Freud, who (Freud) 'takes himself to be naming a real thing in the world 
but he is in fact injecting an enigmatiC term into our discourse. There is no naming, 
for nothing has genuinely been isolated for him to name. His hope is to provide an 
explanation, in fact all we have is the illusion of one' (Jonathan Lear, 'Give Dora a 
Break! A Tale of Eros and Emotional Disruption', in Erotickon: Essays on Eros, 
Ancient and Modern, ed. Shadi Bartsch and Thoman Bartscherer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), cited in L:i:lek, The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 
71). Lear also makes this same case in Happiness, Death, and the Remainder of 
Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) p. 85. L:i:lek's point is to 
embrace this enigmatic nature of the real. 'The Real is thus simultaneously the 
Thing to which direct access is not possible and the obstacle that prevents this 
direct access; the Thing that eludes our grasp and the distorting screen that makes 
us miss the Thing. More precisely, the Real is ultimately the very shift of 
perspective from the first standpont to the second' (L:i:lek, The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, p. 77). 
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The child seeing its reflection in the mirror arrives at the symbolic 'I' 
but the 'I' that is posited is the coherent 'I' of the mirror stage. In 
choosing the self as object, the multitude of drives are made to cohere 
in an imaginary ego. 'I' becomes the human project par excellence -
but the self- positing nature of this 'I' must be obscured. The act of 
choosing must itself be repressed as the human project would be 
exposed. 
What is ultimately obscured in this founding gesture is not 
merely the act of choosing but the unconscious Subject of this choice-
or the Subject of the death drive. 
My contention is that the Freudian death drive ... is precisely 
his name for this 'transformation of the being of man in the 
sense of derangement of his position among beings', for this 
mysterious/monstrous in-between which is no longer the Real 
of prehuman nature, of the worldless enclosure of natural 
entities, and not yet the horizon of Clearing and what comes 
forth within it, articulated in speech as the 'house of Being', as 
Heidegger put it in his Letter on Humanism, but, rather, the 
'deranged'/twisted withdrawn foundation of the horizon of 
Clearing itself. (The Fragile Absolute, 82) 
Heidegger's turn to the traumatic clearing, which opened the door to 
his participation in National Socialism, and his picture of being in the 
'house of language', mark the difference between the real and the 
symbolic. The former is the domain of the death drive (Heidegger's 
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entry into the Nazi Party), and the latter is the symbolic (the humane). 
The two are interlocked as they are both part of the primordial lie. 
Lizek goes on to link the fundamental 'derangement' of the 
subject of the death drive to the 'primordial lie' of the 'fundamental 
fantasy'. 
And one is tempted to take even a step further along these 
lines, taking the word 'derangement' quite literally: what, from 
the psychoanalytic perspective, is the very basic form of 
human 'derangement'? Is it not the so-called 'fundamental 
fantasy', the proton pseudos, 'primordial lie', older than truth 
itself, this absolutely idiosyncratic pathological scenario which 
sustains our being-in-the world, our dwelling within the 
symbolic universe, and which, in order to be operative, has to 
remain 'primordially repressed'. (They Know Not, 197) 
The fundamental fantasy provides the subject with the illusion of a 
consistent core. It is a defensive response to repressed trauma, and it 
is in turn repressed. Schelling's entire work can be read as a 
fundamental fantasy in the sense that it seeks to present the 
impossible time loop of being present at God's conception of himself. 
Zizek identifies this as one of the marks of the fundamental fantasy. 
The basic paradox of the psychoanalytic notion of fantasy 
consists in a kind of time loop -the 'original fantasy' is always 
the fantasy of origins - that is to say, the elementary skeleton 
of the fantasy-scene is for the subject to be present as a pure 
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gaze before its own conception or, more precisely, at the very 
act of its conception. (They Know Not, 197) 
The primordial lie or fantasy grounds the Subject in an 
immortal/timeless space. The Subject is one of pure spirit, inhabiting 
the body only as a spirit or soul. The body is the mechanism that 
houses the real kernel of the pure gaze looking out thruogh material 
eyes. The lie though, cannot be sustained and the Subject fails. The 
Subject is ultimately a repressed/unconscious Subject deceived 
primarily about the Self. Man's basic dispositional frame as a Subject 
of the death drive is one that obscures the 'place' from which he sees. 
In Tarrying with the Negative Zizek begins his reading of the lie 
from the opposite direction. Instead of the cosmic lie posited as part 
of the Cartesian Subject, the Cartesian Subject is pictured as the 
origin of the great chain of being. He takes as his point of departure 
the Kantian critique of Descartes, which reduces the transcendental 
Subject to an empty X or nothing. What Descartes succeeds in 
hiding, and what Kant brings out, is how ascertaining absolute 
certainty (and implicitly the absolute self) entails positing a causal 
chain involving all of reality which must necessarily posit the self as 
standing outside this reality. If the eye of self takes in all that is, which 
Descartes' argument does, up to and including God, the place from 
which the self is looking is exempted from the horizon of reality. The 
same goes for the self that thinks itself (the first self - the observer) is 
excluded from the second self - the object observed. Descartes 
presumes that in '''I think" we get hold of a positive phenomenal entity, 
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res cogitans ... which thinks and is transparent to itself in its capacity 
to think' (Tarrying with the Negative, 13). But thought does not render 
self present and self transparent the 'thing' which thinks. 'What is lost 
thereby is the topological discord between the form "I think" and the 
substance which thinks' (Tarrying with the Negative, 13). Kant 
exposes the Cartesian subject as nothing more than a 'vanishing 
mediator'; a logical construct that in positing its own absoluteness 
necessarily falls beyond experiential reality. Any predicate, or as 
Lacan puts it, any enunciation of the subject, cannot be that which 
predicates or the subject which enunciates (Tarrying with the 
Negative, 13). 
What Zizek brings out of his own Cartesian meditations is not 
ultimately philosophical but analytical, in that he links the moves of the 
cogito to the neuroses and psychoses that result from trying to fuse 
thought and being. In turn, hysteria or obsessional neurosis 
constitutes a philosophical-like attitude towards thought and reality. 
Thus psychoanalytic terms have direct application to particular 
philosophical systems. 
Now we can perhaps understand why, for Lacan, Hegel is 
'the most sublime of all hysterics': the elementary dialectical 
inversion consists precisely in such a reversal of 
transcendence into immanence that characterizes hysterical 
theatre - the mystery of an enigmatic apparition is to be 
sought not beyond its appearance but in the very appearance 
of mystery. (They Know Not, 107) 
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The hysteric position, as outlined below, is to be able to take both 
positions - that of the subject of the enunciation and the object of the 
enunciation. Hegelian philosophy occupies both perspectives, while 
the Cartesian subject is stuck in a singular perspective. The Cartesian 
subject displays the problems of a" Subjects. The Subject who 
coincides entirely with itself is not really a Subject, but once she 
becomes a Subject she no longer coincides with herself and can only 
speak of herself as an object. So the Subject arrives on the scene 
missing something and the various neuroses and psychoses display 
different means of dealing with this absence or loss. The symptom, 
however, that is displayed in mental sickness and philosophy consists 
of the same cause; the desire to fuse thought and being. The self is at 
stake in the attempted fusion of thought and being and the inevitable 
failure results in neurosis and psychosis (to say nothing of theology 
and philosophy). 
Zizek illustrates the impossibility of arriving at the self through 
the cogito with his interpretation of Ridley Scott's movie Blade Runner, 
in which the Daryl Hannah character repeats the cogito in an attempt 
to prove her humanity. The problem is that she is a replicant whose 
memory and thought are artificially produced by her manufacturer, the 
Tyrell Corporation. In attempting to prove her humanity to herself the 
very proof she relies on is an artefact of her software. The question 
Zizek raises is, 'Where is the cogito, the point of my self-
consciousness, when everything that I actually am is an artefact - not 
only my body, my eyes, but even my most intimate memories and 
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fantasies' (Tarrying with the Negative, 40). The symbolic order 
creates the same distance between this I that would constitute itself 
ontologically by appealing to a system that stands outside the self and 
which has no ontological status. The content and substance of this 
system cannot be identical with or coincide with an absolute I; rather it 
is the equivalent of the relation of replicant memories and thought to 
the self-conscious I doing the thinking. 'Everything that 1 positively 
am, every enunciated content I can point at and say "that's me", is not 
I; I am only the void that remains, the empty distance toward every 
content' (Tarrying with the Negative, 40). In Lacanian terms the 
subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated are 
distinct. There is a gap which separates the two and which renders 
the former at once inaccessible and impossible. 
Through this I or he or it (the thing) which thinks, nothing 
further is represented than a transcendental subject of the 
thoughts = x. It is known only through the thoughts which are 
its predicates, and of it, apart from them, we cannot have any 
concept whatsoever. (Tarrying with the Negative, 40)38 
38 L:iiek makes the following comment on this passage relating it back to 
the problem that Kant faced: 'And my - Hegelian- point here that 'I think' stands in 
exactly the same relationship to the Thing-in-itself: it designates a hole, a gap, in it 
and as such it opens up, within the domain of Things which only "truly exist" (Le., 
which exist in themselves as opposed to a mere phenomenal experience. In other 
words, through the ul think", the Thing-in-itself is as it were split and becomes 
inaccessible to itself in the guise of phenomena. This is the question Kant does not 
ask: how does the transcendental fact of pure apperception, the ul think", concern 
Things-in-themselves? The truly Hegelian problem is not to penetrate from the 
phenomenal surface into Things-in-themselves, but to explain how, within Things, 
something akin to phenomena eQuid have emerged' (Tarrying with the Negative, 
40). 
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The self that would predicate its absolute existence renders itself an 
inaccessible void. There is no content to the thing, which thinks other 
than the power of predication. 'I am conscious of myself only insofar 
as I am out of reach to myself qua the real kernel of my being ("I or he 
or it (the thing) which thinks")' (Tarrying with the Negative, 40). 
Self-consciousness involves an inherent decentring more radical 
than subject -object opposition, as this decentring is what constitutes 
the Subject as such. The split between the thinking thing and the 'I' 
that is thought represents the absolute divide or gap (which is the 
motivating force behind the drive to fuse thought and being). The 
compulsion (or root desire) that surrounds this construct (the 
compulsion to repeat) is aimed ultimately at repeating the self (at 
making the self repeatable) and the construct, as a whole, is nothing 
other than that brought about by the death drive. The Subject 'gets 
nothing in exchange for everything' as it 'passes into nothing other 
than an empty container' (Tarrying with the Negative, 40). 
Why HegeJ? 
Zizek's unique understanding of Lacan is brought about through 
fusing Lacan with George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel's philosophy 
describing the emergence of consciousness, spirit, or mind out of 
unconsciousness and death, does not turn from negation or presume 
to fill it in. In Zizek's reading this constitutes the way through the 
Lacanian sin system. Hegel uses this negation in an energetics that 
duplicates Lacan, and this is taken up in Zizek's rereading (apres coup) 
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of Lacan. Hegel's philosophy does not turn from the predicament 
encountered in psychoanalysis, but it is precisely this predicament from 
and in which he works. 
The Hegelian dialectic is not an epistemological program aimed 
at attaining a philosophical truth. It is a dialectic grounded in an 
ontology and orientation that revolves around death and negation. It is 
a description of the emergence of the conscious ('spiritual') self from 
the abyss of the unconscious. Death though, is the engine that keeps 
the move toward self-conscious realization running. Life and death are 
not irreconcilable opposites, but are two sides - the two sides, in the 
dialectic of human consciousness. The natural tendency though is to 
close the eyes to the true nature of the Subject. As Zizek puts it in the 
title of one of his books, echoing Hegel, what is needed is to 'tarry with 
the negative'. 
Hegel's pronouncement of the death of God, unlike the atheistic 
denial of God, does not presume to pass over the negation of the 
unconscious. Just the opposite, the death of God in Christ points to 
the absolute mediation of negation as it is experienced in death. Even 
God must die in Christ. The death and resurrection are traditionally co-
opted into a Chalcedonian distinction in the God/man, which in turn 
testifies to the split in the human condition between the body and the 
immortal soul. Jesus often simply serves as another evidence that 
death is not important in light of innate immortality. The death of God 
in Christ makes of death an absolute that would undermine any onto-
theological epistemological approach to truth. His dialectic is not 
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between two separate ontological categories. He undermines this 
traditional dualism between heaven and earth or the future versus the 
present. 
For Hegel, death constitutes an internal and determinate 
negation rather than a sudden disruptive event that strikes 
from without. Death is a necessary and inseparable aspect of 
Spirit, an analogue of the very negativity that drives the 
dialectic onward and leads to the culminating experience of 
absolute knowing at the conclusion of the Phenomenology. 39 
Hegel poses the possibility of being an atheist in the Lacanian sense. 
Hegel's Christ does not pass over the real but is an incarnation of the 
impossible real. 
The death of the divine Man, as death is abstract negativity, 
the immediate result of the movement which ends only in 
natural universality. Death loses this natural meaning in 
spiritual self-consciousness, i.e. it comes to be its just stated 
Notion; death becomes transfigured from its immediate 
meaning, viz. the non-being of this particular individual, into 
the universality of the Spirit who dwells in His community, 
dies in it every day, and is daily resurrected. 
(Phenomenology, 475) 
While it might be said that Hegel's philosophy anticipates Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, in Zizek's rereading of Lacan through Hegel it seems 
39 Sean Ireton, An Ontological Study of Death: From Hegel to Heidegger 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2007), 62. 
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that Lacan has simply articulated and built upon the Hegelian notion of 
unconsciousness as the unconscious fear of death. 
The bondsman's fear of his master poses the possibility in 
Hegel's estimate of addressing and facing the true fear. Though 
'servitude is not yet aware that this truth is implicit in it' the slave 
relationship contains 'within itself this truth of pure negativity and 
being-for-self (Phenomenology, 117). The slave, as opposed to the 
master, is presented with an object (the master) that embodies the 
reality of a fear, which is so pervasive that it might otherwise control 
his life out of reach of his recognition. 'For this consciousness has 
been fearful, not of this or that particular thing or just at odd moments, 
but its whole being has been seized with dread; for it has experienced 
the fear of death, the absolute Lord' (Phenomenology, 117). 
The lord's embodiment of death presents the possibility that the 
servant will realize that this fear of the master arises from a more 
profound and all pervasive fear. There is the possibility of coming to an 
authentic realization of 'pure-being-for-self in which the controlling fear 
in one's life is exposed. 
In that experience it has been quite unmoved, has trembled in 
every failure of its being, and everything solid and stable has 
been shaken to its foundations. But this pure universal 
moment, the absolute melting-away of everything stable, is 
the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute 
negativity, pure being-for-self, which consequently is implicit 
in this consciousness. (Phenomenology, 117) 
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In the face of an authentic fear of death, that is naming the fear for 
what it is, the stable order of the world in its inauthentic form melts 
away. The bondsman is enabled through the realization of the nature 
of this fear to come to a proper self-consciousness. The unconscious 
fear had produced a world subject to liquefication [FlOsigwerden].4o 
This world in which the slave had total dependence on the master is 
undone when the slave recognizes that this structure is secondary in 
comparison to the reality of death. Death or negativity is the 'principle 
of motion' or the negative 'moving principle' (Phenomenology, 21). It is 
not that this negation lies outside of the self, as in the form of the lord. 
Hegel says, 'the negative is the self (Phenomenology, 21). The 
negative is not a disruption that comes upon the self, 'although this 
negative appears at first as a disparity between the "I" and its object, it 
is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself 
(Phenomenology, 21). The disparity in object relations, such as the 
disparity with the master is, in reality, a self-disparity. As Lacan states 
it in his discussion of the master/slave dialectic: 'There is no subject 
without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject, and it is in this 
alienation, in this fundamental division, that the dialectic of the subject 
is established' (Seminar XI, 221). In Lacan's reading, the dialectic puts 
on display the primary problem with the Subject. 
Where Hegel sees the possibility of working through the dialectic 
and arriving at a synthesis, Lacan concludes there really is no 
40 Liquefication is Sean Ireton's translation, An Ontological Study of Death: 
From Hegel to Heidegger, p. 53. 
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successful synthesis. The supposed perspective of absolute 
knowledge 'never leads us to anything that may, in any way, illustrate 
the Hegelian vision of successive syntheses, nothing that provides 
even so much as a hint of the moment that Hegel in some obscure way 
links to this stage' (Seminar XI, 221). In Lacan's view Hegel is an 
idealist and has not grounded his system in material reality, particularly 
the material reality of language. Hegel is, simply another Cartesian 
philosopher. 'I should indicate here where the Hegelian lure proceeds 
from. It is included in the approach of the Cartesian I think, in which I 
designated the inaugural point that introduces the vel of alienation' 
(Seminar XI, 221). 
Zizek's HegelianlLacanian LacanianlHegelian Theology 
Zizek's employment of Hegel has resulted in a Hegelian 
understanding of Lacan and a Lacanian understanding of Hegel. His 
reading of Hegel is not that Hegelian dialectics is 'a story of 
progressive overcoming' rather dialectics is for Hegel a systematic 
notation of the failure of all such attempts; 'absolute knowledge' 
denotes a subjective position which finally accepts 'contradiction' as an 
internal condition of every identity (The Sublime Object, 6). The point 
has been made that psychoanalytic discourse is theological in that it 
addresses the Subject as the Subject of the lie. Zizek's employment of 
Hegel demonstrates the obverse of the same point. Hegel, who 
counted himself a theologian, might be said to anticipate 
psychoanalysis. Properly stated, Hegel, in making a departure from a 
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purely onto-theological understanding, makes a return to theology that 
in many of its themes reflects a biblical understanding which 
psychoanalysis will also address. 
Zizek's point of departure with Hegel, repeated in many of his 
works, consists of two key passages which, he suggests, mark Hegel 
as a philosopher of the real.41 
The human being is this night, this empty nothing that 
contains everything in its simplicity - an unending wealth of 
many representations, images, of which none belongs to him 
- or which are not present. This night, the interior of nature, 
that exists here - pure self- in phantasmagorical 
representations, is night all around it, in which here shoots a 
bloody head - there another white ghastly apparition, 
suddenly here before it, and just so disappears. One catches 
sight of this night when one looks human beings in the eye -
into a night that becomes awful.42 
This 'night of the world' describes, according to Zizek, the 'pure self -
'in which dismembered and disconnected phantasmagorical 
representations appear and vanish, (it) is the most elementary 
41lizek's interest in German idealism is not exclusive to Hegel. For example 
see F.W.J. Von Schelling, The Abyss of Freedom: Ages of the World (Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press, 2000) in which lizek writes an introductory article, 
and The Indivisible Remainder - An Essay on Schelling and Related Matters 
(London: Verso, 1996). 
42 G W.F. Hegel, 'Jenaer Realphilosophie', in Fruhe politische Systeme 
(Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1974) p. 204; translation quoted, from Donald Phillip Verene, 
Hegel's Recollection (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1977) pp. 18-19, quoted in lizek, 
The Ticklish Subject, pp. 29-30. 
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manifestation of the power of negativity' (The Ticklish Subject, 29-30). 
The second quote ties this power of negativity directly to death. 
The activity of dissolution is the power and work of the 
Understanding, the most astonishing and mightiest of powers, 
or rather the absolute power ... this is the tremendous power 
of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure '1'. 
Death, if that is what we want to call this nonactuality, is of all 
things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead 
requires the greatest strength ... Spirit is this power ... 
looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This 
tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it 
into being. This power is identical with what we earlier called 
the Subject. (Phenomenology, 18-19) 
These two passages, both designating the Subject, represent for Zizek 
two approaches to one and the same Subject. While they seem to 
speak of opposite phenomena: the first of the pre-rational/prediscursive 
confused immersion in the purely subjective interior; the second of the 
abstract discursive activity of Understanding, which decomposes every 
'depth' of organic unity into detached elements, they are to be read 
together. Both refer to the 'mightiest of powers', the power of 
disrupting the unity of the Real, violently installing the domain of 
membra disjecta, of phenomena in the most radical sense of the term 
(The Ticklish Subject, 31). Both passages get at the 'pre-synthetic 
imagination' in both its destructive power and through this destructive 
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tearing apart the 'synthetic imagination' (the integrated Subject) is 
'woven'.43 
While lizek does not deny that Hegel might be called an 
idealist, he raises this notion a notch so that it reverses on itself: 
'Hegel's thesis that "subject is not a substance" has thus to be taken 
quite literally ... subject is appearance itself, brought to its self-
reflection: it is something that exists only insofar as it appears to itself 
(Parallax View, 206). The Hegelian dialectic transforms the notion that 
the Subject can be reduced to the ideal or the symbolic, to the notion 
that the ideal or the Subject has no determinate bounds and this 
realization constitutes it as Subject and is the constitution of reality. 
lizek's rereading of Lacan through Hegel (apres-coup) takes its 
sharpest turn at this Hegelian intersection. But even his rereading is 
based on a close reading of a particular description of Hegel in Lacan. 
'Where is one to place [knowledge] in the [discourse of the analyst]? 
In the place which, in the discourse of the Master, Hegel, the most 
sublime of hysterics, designates as that of truth' (Seminar XVII, 38).44 
Lacan comes to define hysteria not in terms of particular symptoms 
but in terms of structure. He regards hysteria as one of the two key 
43The death drive is both the motive force behind the synthesis and the 
threat that this weave - the warp and woof of the imagination - will unravel. There 
is a certain ambiguity or subtleness in 2:izek's picture of the death drive that is 
often missed by theorists such as Richard Boothby. In 2:izek's estimation Boothby, 
by missing the dual role pictured above simply turns the death drive into its 
oppossite. The elegance of Boothby's theory turns on interpreting the death-drive 
as its very opposite: as the return of the life-force, of the part of the Id excluded by 
the imposition of the petrified mask of the ego. Thus, what reemerges in the 
Udeath-drive" is ultimately life itself, and the fact that the ego perceives this return 
as a death threat precisely confirms the ego's perverted "repressive" character' 
(2:izek, Tarrying with the Negative, p. 179). 
44 Cited in and translated by Sarah Kay, titek, p. 22. 
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forms of neurosis.45 The neurotic structure is itself structured like a 
question: there is the question (structure) of obsessional neurosis 
concerning the Subject's existence; and the hysteric's question about 
the place from which he speaks, as either the subject or object of 
enunciation. The Subject who is speaking, the one making the 
enunciation does not appear in the speaking, so this is the Subject of 
the unconscious. The source of speech is not the ego; language 
comes from the Other. The statement itself, or the object position is 
the conscious dimension. Lacan illustrates the two positions through 
the statement 'I am lying'. The formal structure of the Subject is 
brought out in the paradoxical nature of any reply. If one replies to the 
statement, 'You are telling the truth in saying that you are lying', the 
paradox presents itself. The Subject position split between the two 
registers is exposed in 'I am lying' as 'the I of the enunciation is not 
the same as the I of the statement' (Seminar XI, 139). 
In Zizek's view, this remark of Lacan's is the key to 
understanding Hegel. Hegel's hysteric structure is not a disability but 
an ability to see from two perspectives. The Hegelian dialectic is not 
about bringing two objective points together. The dialectic is about 
arriving at the truth of the Subject split between the conscious and 
unconscious. The slave has the opportunity to realize, by turning into 
himself, that slavery arises from within himself. Zizek sees Hegel's 
significance for psychoanalysis then, in his taking account of this 
45 Dylan Evans, An IntroductoryDictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, pp. 
78-79. 
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reflexive structure. For Hege\ "'se\f-consciousness" in its abstract 
definition stands for a purely non-psychological self-reflexive ploy of 
registering (re-marking) one's own position, of reflexively "taking into 
account" what one is doing' (Parallax View, 65). Zizek illustrates the 
point with a parallel to Lacan's 'I am lying'. He describes the unwitting 
portrayal of guilt that occurs in some compulsive act. Though 'I 
consciously deluded myself that' had the right to do it', this lie is 
portrayed in some "mysterious and meaningless" act' (Parallax View, 
66). Unconscious guilt surfaces and it apparently has been registered 
in some Other who is 'taking note'. Zizek's point is not to in some way 
account for this other as part of consciousness but to affirm that 
consciousness arises from the unconscious. Zizek's claim is that 
Hegel too is not attempting to enclose reality in some holistic system. 
The system of Hegel is rather to take account of the Other of 
unconscious as inherent to the system itself. He is not opposing 
Kant's phenomenallnoumenal take on reality nor is he attempting to fill 
the gap between perception and reality. 'We do not pass from Kant to 
Hegel by filling out the empty place of the Thing ... by affirming this 
void as such, in its priority to any positive entity that strives to fill it out 
(Tarrying with the Negative, 39). 
According to Zizek, Hegel is not attempting to achieve some 
absolute truth that would encompass all knowledge; rather he is 
acknowledging the truth of a lack in reality. In Zizek's understanding, 
'the Hegelian notion of "reality" as something which exists only in so 
far as idea is not full actualized, fulfilled: the very existence of (the 
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"hard", "external") reality bears witness to the fact that Idea remains 
caught in a deadlock' (Indivisible Remainder, 110). The attempt to 
escape the deadlock accounts for much of Western philosophy, as 
well as the neuroticism of the death instinct. :lizek suggests another 
route. Instead of attempting to overcome, fill in, or get at the gap in 
reality, and thus give way to the compulsion to repeat of the death 
drive, one should accept the gap as the place in reality from which the 
Subject is a participant. The point is not to reduce reality to reason or 
to posit a reason that can embrace all of reality. The two have to be 
posited as a dialectic in which reason and reality are open. 
The theological import of this (worked out in the next chapter) in 
:lizek's understanding is to be found in the move from the legal, 
symbolic, totalizing religion characterized by Judaism to a Christianity, 
which suspends the law through the death of Christ. The Hegelian 
notion of the 'death of God' in Christ amounts to the death of the 
'transcendent Beyond' and the opening of reality from within 
(Metastases of Enjoyment, 39). The Hegelian 'reconciliation is the 
'redoubling of the gap or antagonism' as the gap that separates 
opposites 'is posited as inherent to one of the terms' (Parallax View, 
106). So in the case of Christianity 'the gap that separates God from 
man is transposed into God himself, so 'the properly dialectical trick 
here is that the very feature which appeared to separate me from God 
turns out to unite me with God' (Parallax View, 106). In the 
Hegelian/Lacanian notion of dialectic, Judaism and Christianity posit 
the gap either as a gap between man and God or as within God, 
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respectively. Judaism posits the gap between God and man, as God 
stands outside the Law in that he cannot be properly represented 
within it. The holy of holies, the empty room, is isolated and separated 
from everyone by a series of walls emphasizing God's absolute 
transcendence to the Law. God is the Other, outside of the symbolic, 
and yet the one who holds the symbolic together. In Christianity there 
is an overcoming of the law, or an overcoming of metaphysics as 
Christ's death suspends the symbolic order and institutes the religion of 
love and Liiek demonstrates this primarily through his reading of 
Romans 7; the subject of the next chapter.46 
46 Pound, lizek, 108. Though Lizek continues to mine the New Testament, 
and in particular Paul, his Hegelian/Lacanian reading revolves around a Hegelian 
understanding of the Trinity in terms of a thesis/antithesis/synthesis. There is the 
suspension of the Other (thesis) in the death of God (antithesis). The Holy Spirit is 
'then posited as a symbolic, de-substantialized fiction' which exists in and through 
the 'work of each and all' (synthesis) (Metastases of Enjoyment, 42). The 
incarnation is a repetition of the fall, with a Hegelian twist. It repeats with a 
difference (Aufhebung). For Lizek the Fall and its sublation (Aufhebung) are the 
necessary precursors to Christ's redemption. If there had been 'no sin and no law, 
there would also have been no love' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, p. 87). 
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CHAPTER 2 
SIN DECEIVED ME 
The first chapter of this thesis set forth Zizek's notion of the 
death drive as founded in a primordial lie (the psychology of nihilism) 
and this chapter will connect this understanding to lizek's exposition of 
Romans 7. In Romans 7:7ff the law which gives rise to forbidden 
desire, in spite of the life that it seemed to offer and due to the 
deception of sin, produces death for the lyw or a life of death 
described as an agonistic struggle in which the self is split against itself 
and sin is in control. Paul sums this up as the 'body of death' (7:24) or 
'the law of sin and death' (8:2). The law of sin and death described by 
Paul is the structuring principle of the Subject in which life is controlled 
by an orientation to death (a primordial deception and a destructive 
drive). In his reading of Romans 7 lizek, following Lacan, interprets 
the law of sin and death as a picture of the Subject living under the 
control of the death drive. lizek finds each of the Lacanian registers in 
Paul's depiction of the Subject: he equates the law with the symbolic, 
the lyw or 'I' with the imaginary or the ego, the deception as the 
fundamental fantasy, and the orientation to death as the work of the 
real. In Lizek's reading though, he assumes that Paul is not simply 
depicting the problem, but from 7: 1-6 with Paul's illustration of the one 
who has died to the law, he reads the chapter as Paul's equivalent of 
'traversing the fantasy' which he will equate with 'dying to sin'. To 
depict the origin of the Subject with its entry into life under the law is 
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already to have passed beyond an unquestioning subjection to the law 
of sin and death (perversion) to the opening of a new possibility to 
reconstitute the Subject (hysteria). 
This chapter follows Zizek's examination of the steps in Paul's 
argument, beginning in 7:7ff, and then returns to the material of 7:1-6, 
which Zizek reads as setting the stage for the rest of the chapter. 
According to Zizek, in 7:7ff Paul is exposing the perverse 
understanding behind sin from the position of the Christian (or the 
hysteric) who has achieved this understanding from 'dying with Christ' 
as portrayed in 7:1-6. 
Zizek's 'Discovery' of His Theory in Romans 7 
Both Lacan and Zizek consider the material of Romans 7 an 
adequate foundation to illustrate much of their theory of the human 
Subject, hence Zizek's self-description as a 'Pauline materialist' 
(Reader, ix).1 In this he is following Lacan who identifies his theory of 
the three registers and their inter-working with Paul's description of the 
'I"s first encounter with the law and sinful desire. Lacan writes his 
theory of the death drive into Romans 7:7ff by taking Paul's 'sin' and 
exchanging it for the 'Thing'. 'Is the Law the Thing? Certainly not! Yet 
I can only know of the Thing by means of the Law' (Seminar VII, 83-84). 
The 'Thing' names the void of the real around which the imaginary 
1 Lizek works this out in 'The Politics of Truth, or, Alain Badiou as a Reader of 
5t. Paul', The Ticklish Subject. 143-4. For Lacan's exposition of Roman's 7 see 
Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. (London: Routledge, 1992) 83-84. 
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(Paul's 'I') and the symbolic (the law) orbit. According to Lacan and 
Zizek, in this passage Paul names each of Lacan's three registers and 
describes their interrelationship in such a way that both consider their 
theory a commentary on this passage. While neither bothers to layout 
a detailed analysis of this interconnection, the following aims to make 
explicit how Zizek's theory can be read as a prolonged exposition of 
Paul's picture of sin -a transgressive relationship to the law -and of the 
possibility of suspending this relationship. 
The Lying Scene of Sin and Death in Romans 7:7ff 
Zizek's reading of Paul is primarily carried out in conjunction 
with his interaction with Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben and Eric 
Santner.2 If one were to form a timeline of his theological thought it 
would begin with The Ticklish Subject in which he discusses his 
understanding of Paul as compared and contrasted with Badiou's Saint 
Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. While his position in regard to 
Badiou is clear, his position in regard to Paul will continue to develop 
through his reading and interaction with Santner and Agamben spelled 
out in The Monstrosity of Christ, The Puppet and the Dwarf and 
anticipated in The Fragile Absolute and On Belief. 3 It is in The Puppet 
and the Dwarf that he takes up a specific focus on Christianity and Paul 
2 The major influences on his theory are Lacan and Hegel. 
3 The primary texts 2izek will reference are Santner, On the Psychotheology 
of Everyday Life, and Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A Commentary on 
the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005). His interaction with Santner, though less sustained, Is key to his shift in 
understanding the unique nature of the Jewish Law. 
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and delineates a more fully developed reading of Romans 7.4 The 
evolution of his thought as he interacts with Agamben and Santner is 
toward a more nuanced reading of the Jewish law and Paul's 
interpretation of it so that he distinguishes two approaches to the law in 
Romans 7. However, even in The Ticklish Subject, in contrast to 
Badiou, he understands Paul to be describing a two-fold orientation to 
death in which the fundamental fantasy remains unchallenged (in 
perversion) or in which there is a traversing of the fantasy (as in 
hysteria). The section below will first focus on Lizek's interaction with 
Alain Badiou in the Ticklish Subject with the goal of laying out the 
basics of this two-fold orientation and the following sections will trace 
the evolution of his thought as a result of his interaction with Santner 
and Agamben. 
Perversion and Hysteria -Is the Law Sin? 
Though Lizek, in The Ticklish Subject, is primarily focused on 
Badiou and does not work out a consistent understanding of Paul, he 
nonetheless lays the groundwork for the development of his 
understanding of Romans 7:7ff. He will come to see Paul as 
4 As Adam Kotsko summarizes it L:izek will continue to hold contradictory 
positions in regard to Romans 7. See Adam Kotsko, 'Situating L : i ~ e k ' s s Paul'. Kotsko 
writes, 'It is clear, on the one hand, that L:izek views the Law confronted in Romans 7 
as being the normal or "pagan" law that generates its own transgression through the 
obscene superego supplement. Strangely, L:izek simultaneously claims that the 
Jewish Law "is already deprived of its superego supplement, not relying on any 
obscene support," i.e., the Jewish stance toward the law is fundamentally what Paul 
is after, yet he also follows the long-standing tradition of claiming that, nonetheless, 
the Jewish Law is "the main target of Paul's critique",' Kotsko's conclusion will not be 
the one drawn here, namely; that Paul is referencing the pagan law in Romans 7. 
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developing an understanding consistent with his own view of the 
Subject as the Subject relates to the law. In The Ticklish Subject he 
initiates the direction in which his theory will develop in subsequent 
work. His development of the notion of perversion as being that which 
Paul is resisting though, is not yet accompanied by the full 
development of the counter proposal of hysteria.5 His complete 
development of these two structures in relation to Paul will evolve, but 
already in The Ticklish Subject there are enough indicators of the full 
commentary that it provides the foundation of his approach to Romans 
7, which he will continue to develop. The focus in this section, 
following this development, will be on perversion and will provide only 
an initial introduction to the possibilities of hysteria in his understanding. 
The original question that Paul raises in Romans 7:7 has to do 
with confusing or equating law and sin. 'Is the law sin (Rom. 7:7b)?, 
Lacan poses the question as, 'Is the Law the Thing?' (Seminar III, 83). 
Taking into account that, for Lacan, law equals the symbolic and the 
Thing represents the real, it could as well be read as, 'Is the symbolic 
the real?' The answer is, in both instances, 'Certainly not!' (Rom.7:7). 
To confuse or to fuse law and sin is to fuse the desire of the symbolic 
order with the desire for death under the guise of attaining life.6 It is to 
5 Hysteria as the counter to perversion is valorised in L : i ~ e k k and perhaps is as 
close as he comes to the notion of salvation. The hysteric, in lacan's explanation, 
questions the symbolic (Seminar III, 170-175). L : i ~ e k k equates hysteria with 'failed 
interpellation' (For They Know Not, 101). He particularly likes lacan's notion that 
Hegel is 'the most sublime of hysterics' (Seminar XVII, 38). 
61t is this confusion that L : i ~ e k k accuses Alain Badiou of generating. Where 
Badiou would have Paul equate sin and law L : i ~ e k k is working out a two-fold approach 
or orientation to the law. 
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remove the possibility of a desire or of a law or symbolic that is not 
controlled by a morbid desire, which Zizek equates with perversion? 
Quoting Romans 7:7-14 Zizek concludes that these verses stand in 
contrast to the perverse understanding of the law. Perversion in Lacan 
and Zizek is a disavowal of castration or a disavowal of anything 
lacking, and the pervert takes it upon himself to complete or cover up 
what is lacking (Seminar IV, 192-193). The pervert seeks to 
completely establish the law through a transgressive relationship to the 
law -sinning so as to increase grace or merging law and sin into two 
sides of the same coin with each side dependent upon the other.8 As 
Zizek explains, 
This passage, of course, must be seen in its context: in the 
whole of this part of the Epistle, the problem 8t Paul struggles 
with is how to avoid the trap of perversion, that is, of a Law 
that generates its transgression, since it needs it in order to 
assert itself as Law. (Ticklish Subject, 148)9 
Where for Badiou it is the law per se which provokes desire and death, 
Zizek depicts Paul as struggling with and departing from a perverse 
understanding of the law and posing a hysteric or feminine orientation 
7 l i ~ e k , , unlike Badiou, will distinguish between the death drive and a 
straightforward desire for death. For Badiou, death drive, law and sin are all caught 
in a morbid desire for death. See Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of 
Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 86 ft 
and lizek, The Ticklish Subject, 145ft. 
8 Perversion seeks to complete or establish the Law, while the feminine 
position identifies with the lack in the Law. 
9 So Paul is posing both the perverse reading and demonstrating in his 
questions the hysteric structure. 
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to law.1o Paul, as opposed to the perverse understanding which 
refuses all doubts or questions about the law, takes the position of the 
hysteric and poses a series of seemingly unanswerable questions 
(7:7ff). The hysteric or feminine structure gets at the delimitation or the 
exception which serves as subjective ground of the law. Where the 
pervert closes off any question as to the desire of the Other or of the 
law, the hysteric questions the very structure of desire: 'Am I a man or 
a woman?' or 'What is a woman (Seminar III, 170-175)?' Or as in the 
implied question in Romans 7: 15 - 'Why do I do what I do not want to 
do?' In the hysteric structure desire, as desire of the Other, is subject 
to exposure.11 Hysteric questioning, as opposed to unquestioning 
perversion, might serve as the sight of a possible break, and through 
traversing the fantasy there is the possibility of modifying one's 
subjective stance.12 The hysteric is precisely the one who is in the 
position that Paul is describing, of discovering that the Other is an 
impostor and that it is not the law but sinful desire that is at work.13 
The pervert on the other hand closes off the question of the nature or 
source of desire by equating it with the law. 
According to Zizek, Paul, in raising the question 'Is the Law sin?' 
is referring back to an understanding he has already described when 
10 This reading is true to l i ~ e k k but as indicated is not spelled out in the 
Ticklish Subject. lizek sees Paul as going beyond the perverse position to the 
position of the hysteric. 
11 Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 78-79. 
12 See Kotsko, 'Situating lizek's Paul', 80-81. Lacan's point in regard to 
t r a v e r s i n ~ ~ the fantasy is worked out in Seminar XI, 273f. 
1 See l i ~ e k , , For they Know Not, 101,156. For a succinct explanation see 
Sarah Kay, Zizek: A Critical Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003) 164. 
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he first raises the question 'Is the Law Sin?,14 Zizek points to Romans 
3:5-8 as an example of this notion of law that generates its own 
transgression. 'This "Let us do evil so that good may come [from it]" is 
the most succinct definition of the short circuit of the perverse position' 
(Ticklish Subject, 148). And 'St Paul's entire effort is to break out of 
this vicious cycle in which the prohibitive law and its transgression 
generate and support each other' (Ticklish Subject, 149). 
It is originally Lacan's point that perversion does not refer so 
much to abnormal sexual practices as to a structure in which the 
Subject sides with the law in the attempt to escape its punishing effect 
and to partake of its surplus enjoyment (Ticklish Subject, 247-251). 
Beneath the denial of castration, Lacan posits the denial of death; both 
denials constitute a refusal of life's contingent and dependent condition. 
The pervert essentially is refusing the difference between the sexes 
and serves as a stand-in to provide phallic enjoyment to the Subject 
behind the law. In denying castration, a secondary denial beneath 
which is the disavowal of death, the pervert denies the mother's lack of 
the phallus (sexual difference), or he denies any enjoyment or Subject 
position other than that of servant to the law or superego (Seminar IV, 
194). 
There is a denial of sexual difference and of death in what Zizek 
describes as giving oneself completely over to the symbolic without 
regard for finitude and mortality: '[P]erversion can be seen as a 
14 In fact Paul raises this same question at least three times in Romans 6-7 
alone (6:1, 15; 7:7). 
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defence against the motif of "death and sexuality", against the threat of 
mortality as well as the contingent imposition of sexual difference' 
(Reader, 117). The pervert lives in a fantasy world, which Lizek likens 
to that of cartoons in which one can 'survive any catastrophe' and 
human sexuality is reduced to a game. 'As such, the pervert's universe 
is the universe of pure symbolic order, of the signifier's game running 
its course, unencumbered by the Real of human finitude' (Reader, 117). 
The pervert in identifying sin with the law and in denying death and 
sexuality cannot raise the question of Rom. 7:7 but presumes that the 
law is sin and that he has access to the power of the law through sin. 
While Paul, in Zizek's view, demonstrates how this perverse position 
arises, he is able to do this only because he is no longer deceived as to 
the source of his desire. 
Forbidden Desire - You Shall Not Covet 
Though Lizek and Lacan pose a more nuanced view of desire, 
they are in large measure in agreement with 8adiou as to the desire 
which Paul describes as being provoked by the law. 'Sin is the life of 
desire as autonomy, as automatism. ,15 Sin is the repetition of desire, 
which due to its compulsive autonomy Paul describes as a force unto 
itself. In his commentary on Romans 7:7-23, Lizek follows Giorgio 
Agamben's understanding that Paul is fusing sin and the law in his 
formula 'You shall not covet'. As Agamben notes, Paul offers such a 
15 Badiou, Saint Paul, 79. 
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drastic abbreviation of the original Mosaic commandment that it 
'renders the commandment unobservable and equally impossible to 
formulate,.16 Instead of describing, along with Moses, which particular 
objects are not to be desired (the neighbour's woman, house, slave, 
mule, etc.) Paul says, 'Do not desire' (Romans 7:7). 'The law here is 
no longer ento/e, a norm that clearly prescribes or prohibits something 
("Do not desire" is not a commandment); instead, the law is only the 
knowledge of guilt. .. :17 As Badiou describes it, 'law is what, by 
designating its object, delivers desire to its repetitive autonomy:18 In 
this instance though, the only object named is desire itself, which gets 
at the self-binding nature of the death drive. Desire folds in upon itself 
and the compulsion to repeat is born, as in Paul's picture, death and 
sin are pictured as animating the Subject. 
And I was alive apart from the law once: but when the 
commandment came, sin revived, and I died; and the 
commandment, which was unto life, this I found to be unto 
death: for sin, finding occasion, through the commandment 
beguiled me, and through it slew me. . .. So now it is no 
more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. (Romans 7:9-
11,17)19 
16 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 10S. 
17 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 10S. 
18 8adiou, Saint Paul, 79. 
19 Unless indicated otherwise all SCripture quotations will come from the 
American Standard Version. 
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The Subject has ironically become one who is animated by a force for 
death. 'The law gives life to death' and 'death of life is the Self (in the 
position of the dead). The life of death is sin.'2o 
Lacan calls this desire which is a force for death jouissance. 
One's orientation to death, which may manifest itself in several key 
ways, is the role of jouissance or Lacan's notion of finding a pleasure 
that exceeds the bounds of the pleasure principle in painful pleasure or 
a pleasurable suffering (Seminar VII, 184). Jouissance names the 
desire to break through the pleasure principle towards the Thing that 
holds out an excess of pleasure. Thus Lacan links it directly to the 
death drive and 'the path towards death' (Seminar XVII, 17}.21 
Where the neurotic aims atjouissance by a simultaneous 
acknowledgement of the law and the attempt to snatch back from the 
Other part of the stolen jouissance, 'the pervert directly elevates the 
enjoying big Other into the agency of the Law' (Reader, 117). In the 
pervert's perspective, pleasure is denied by the agency of the law 
because this Other itself wants all the pleasure. The pervert seeks to 
establish and integrate himself into the law by providing this 
transgressive pleasure to the agent behind the law - the big Other. 'A 
pervert fully acknowledges the obscene underside of the Law, since he 
gains satisfaction from the very obscenity of the gesture of installing 
the rule of Law - that is, out of "castration'" (Reader, 117). 
20 Badiou, Saint Paul, 83. 
21 Quoted in Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 92. 
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For example, the exhibitionist puts himself on display so as to 
become the instrument of the Other's pleasure and finds his enjoyment 
in being reduced to an object of pleasure (Ecrits, 320). The implicit 
claim is that there is pleasure to be had; there is an unlimited, infinite 
Thing whose power can be established and tapped by servicing it. In 
lizek's description, 'for the pervert, the object of his desire is Law itself 
- the Law is the Ideal he longs for, he wants to be fully acknowledged 
by the Law, integrated into its functioning' (Reader, 117). 
Lizek takes up Lacan's illustration of jouissance, employing 
Kant's example of the man given the choice of committing adultery if he 
knew he would suffer capital punishment as a result. Kant presumes 
that the building of a gallows outside the door where the girl of his 
dreams awaits would be enough to dissuade him.22 Lizek, following 
Lacan, notes, in contrast to Kant, that many Subjects 'can only enjoy a 
night of passion fully if some form of "gallows" is threatening him' 
(Reader, 289). Lacan's original point was to make a distinction 
between jouissance and that pleasure to be had under Freud's 
pleasure principle. Where the pleasure principle can be quite sensible 
and a delimitation of pleasure, jouissance is beyond the pleasure 
principle on the side of the death drive. 
The death drive is not so much a conscious embrace of death, 
as it might appear in the example from Kant, as an attempt at an 
eternalizing repetition of the same. It is a repetitive attempt to attain 
22 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck 
(New York, Macmillan, 1993).30, quoted in The Lizek Reader, 288. 
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the satisfaction or enjoyment which can only be achieved with 'the 
disappearance of this life' and 'a return to the inanimate' (Seminar XVII, 
51 ).23 The enjoyment held out in the death-for-sex scenario of Kant is 
precisely the requirement of jouissance, in which absolute enjoyment 
would achieve a final and full return to perceived plenitude through an 
ecstasy so extreme it involves dissolution of the Subject (a return to the 
inanimate). There is a desire that works against life in its attempt to 
secure a fullness of being.24 
Jouissance is, then, the pure substance of the death drive, 
which Lacan does not hesitate to call evil: 'we cannot avoid the formula 
thatjouissance is evil' (Seminar VI/, 184-185).25 The suffering and pain 
thatjouissance calls for is a masochistic evil, but as Lacan makes clear 
it is the pain and suffering of the neighbour that is required as well: 'it is 
suffering because it involves suffering for my neighbour '(Seminar VII, 
184). He quotes from Freud to make the point: 
Man tries to satisfy his need for aggression at the expense of 
his neighbour, to exploit his work without compensation, to 
use him sexually without his consent, to appropriate his 
23 Quoted in Adrian Johnston, Time Driven: Metapsychology and the Splitting 
of the Drive, (Evanston Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2005), 237-238. 
24 The logic of sacrifice explains why one might give up his life for an evening 
of pleasure. The point is not the pleasure - but the absolute requirement of sacrifice 
succeeds in covering the nonexistence of the symbolic Other. • Sacrifice is a 
guarantee that "the Other exists": that there is an Other who can be appeased by 
means of the sacrifice' (Enjoy Your Symptom, 56). 
25The quotation also reads: 'Those who like fairy stories turn a deaf ear to talk 
of man's innate tendencies to "evil, aggression, destruction, and thus also to cruelty' 
(SE XXI, iii)' (Seminar VII, 185). 
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goods, to humiliate him, to inflict suffering on him, to torture 
and kill him. (SE XXI, iii)26 
Lacan explains thatjouissance is the marker of evil and 'Freud's use of 
the good can be summed up in the notion that it keeps us a long way 
from our jouissance' (Seminar VII, 185). Lacan and Zizek go on to 
question the possibility of love of neighbour in such a context and both 
Ricoeur and Milbank wonder how pleasure and desire are to be 
distinguished fromjouissance on this understanding.27 In the Lacanian 
universe it becomes questionable if the woman of Romans 7: 1-3 can 
have desire and love for her husband since jouissance pervades desire. 
Though Lacan's picture of desire and jouissance are sometimes 
pitted against one another, his descriptions of the two elements 
converge and explain the other. 28 In Lacan's formula, 'Desire is a 
relation of being to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly 
speaking' (Seminar 11,223). The screen of the law seems to hide a 
fullness of being (the Thing of the real) that is only accessible by 
penetrating the screen and obtaining the fullness the Subject of the law 
26 Quoted in Seminar VII, 185. 
27 Ricoeur questions the independence of the pleasure principle from the 
death drive: 'If pleasure expresses a reduction of tension, and if the death instinct 
marks a return of living matter to the inorganic, it must be said that pleasure and 
death are both on the same side' (Ricoeur, Freud & Philosophy, 319). See The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 120ft. 
28 Nestor Braunstein distinguishes desire and jouissance as is indicated in 
the title of his article 'Desire and Jouissance in the Teachings of Lacan' in The 
Cambridge Companion to Lacan, Ed. Jean-Michel Rabate (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 102-115. Just as Freud, through the Nirvana Principle, came 
to the realization that the death drive makes its appearance through Eros Lacan saw 
the death drive as pervasive (Seminar XI, 257) - and so the neat distinction 
Braunstein draws between desire and jouissance is not entirely convincing. While a 
distinction might be made there seems to be a convergence between desire and 
jouissance. 
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is holding out. As Zizek explains it, 'What we experience as "reality" 
discloses itself against the background of the lack, of the absence of it, 
of the Thing, of the mythical object whose encounter would bring about 
the full satisfaction of the drive' (Tarrying with the Negative, 37). 
Lacan describes this drive toward satisfaction as an attempt to 
achieve unity or oneness with the self through the Other. 'Love is 
impotent, though mutual, because it is not aware that it is but the desire 
to be One, which leads us to the impossibility of establishing the 
relationship between "them two" ... them-two sexes' (Seminar XX, 
6).29 He describes jouissance as the drive to become one through two 
- which is why he dismisses the sexual part of the sexual relation.3o 
There is no real relation and the erotic aspect is not integrated into the 
desire.31 This sort of 'love, in its essence, is narcissistic, and reveals 
that the substance of what is supposedly object-like ... sustains desire 
through its lack of satisfaction (insatisfaction), and even its 
29 Lacan's description here sounds very much like Freud's Nirvana Principle 
(SE, 18:55-56), which describes a striving toward a release of tension and a return to 
a unified Oneness that Freud concludes is a fusion of the death drive and the 
pleasure principle (SE 19:160). Lacan concludes that the death drive is not a 
separate drive 'The distinction between the life drive and the death drive is true in as 
much as it manifests two aspects of the drive' (Seminar XI, 257). 
30 Here, over and against Braunstein, Lacan discusses the lack of the other in 
the same breath as he talks of jouissance. Braunstein's oppositional definition 
between jouissance and desire provides a bridge to their convergence: 'Jouissance is 
the dimension discovered by the analytiC experience that confronts desire as its 
opposite pole. If desire is fundamentally lack, lack in being, jouissance is positivity, it 
is a "something" lived by a body when pleasure stops being pleasure' (Braunstein, 
'Desire and Jouissance in the Teachings of Lacan', 104). Jouissance might be 
described as the positive experience of an absence - making absence substitute for 
a positive experience. Agamben describes this as Aristotle's notion of privation: 
'privation still implies a reference to the being or form deprived which manifests itself 
through its lack' (Agamben, The Time That Remains, 102). 
31 In Freud the death drive stands over and against the Pleasure Principle so 
the erotic is lacking in the death drive - even though it may fuse with Eros (SE XXI, 
120). The question that remains to be answered is if Lacan and : 2 : i ~ e k k leave any role 
for the reality of the erotic and if good and bad desire can be distinguished. 
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impossibility' (Seminar XX, 6). The Other holds forth the (im)possibility 
of the Thing, creating the conditions for ajouissance, a desire that is at 
once impossible and beyond satisfaction. This impossible desire and 
loss (or lack of being) cannot be resolved through a corporeal coupling 
as it is a loss constituted in the symbolic (the 'enunciable' in Lacan's 
explanation) (Seminar XX, 7). It is a loss that escapes or is beyond 
enunciation (the law). 
Zizek does not presume that Paul is offering a resolution to this 
covetous desire, but by questioning it and demonstrating the agonistic 
struggle it institutes Paul is describing the founding and necessary 
elements of the Subject. To resolve the struggle, making the two one, 
would mean a loss of the Subject. As Zizek explains it, what is being 
described is not functioning at an epistemological level but at the level 
of desire. It is only experienced as epistemological when the limit of 
the law is thought to hide something of substance. The Kantian error is 
to miss the point that finitude creates the appearance of an infinite 
beyond (the noumenal behind the phenomenal). 'The limit 
ontologically precedes its beyond' or the law precedes the illusion of a 
transgressive fullness beyond (Tarrying with the Negative, 37}.32 
According to Zizek, the illusion is necessary, but as with Paul, it is 
subject to questioning. 
32Lacan illustrates jouissance with reference to Zeno's paradox of Achilles 
and the tortoise and the ever receding finish line: 'It is quite clear that Achilles can 
only pass the tortoise - he cannot catch up with it. He only catches up with it at 
infinity (infinitude)' (Seminar XX, 8). 
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The problem the pervert faces and which his perversion 
positively answers is that the law 'is not fully established' and is thus 
his lost object of desire (Reader, 118). In Zizek's estimation, Romans 
7 deals with this ambiguity; where Paul would maintain it (the ambiguity 
and question), the pervert would close off any question. Where the 
hysteric relationship to the Other is one of an open question, the 
pervert presumes to immediately know what the Other wants.33 For the 
pervert there is no question and there is no suspension of knowledge.34 
The law and the symbolic rule and the pervert effectively enacts this 
rule and this universe within himself by becoming the servant of the law 
(Reader, 117). 
In following the progression of Zizek's commentary of Romans 
7:7, he accounts then, for the perverse position as involving a fusion of 
sin and the law which results in the perverse desire of the death drive 
Uouissance). This structure, identifying sin and the law, is founded on 
the fundamental fantasy which Zizek finds in Paul's description of the 
deception of sin (the subject of the section below). 
The Fundamental Fantasy -Sin Deceived Me 
The key element of the Subject exposed by the perverse 
structure, but which is not exclusive to this structure, is the fundamental 
fantasy or the primordial lie which serves to ground the Subject. As the 
first chapter of this thesis indicated, the fundamental fantasy describes 
33 Kotsko, 'Situating ~ i z e k ' s s Paul', 46. 
34 Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 140. 
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the dynamic of the interworking of the three registers of the Subject 
and, as demonstrated below, for Zizek it is also the primordial 
deception that stands at the head of Romans 7:7 and culminates in 
Romans 7:11 and following. 'For sin, seizing the opportunity afforded 
by the commandment, deceived me, and through the commandment 
put me to death' (Romans 7: 11 ).35 Zizek sees the fundamental fantasy 
as the point of departure but also the orienting factor in the structure of 
the Subject. There is the perverse relation to this deception, but there 
is also the departure from this perverse relation which he will connect 
to Romans 7. His primary dialogue partner in The Ticklish Subject, 
Badiou reads Romans 7 as dealing with the issue of how to break with 
the law and death drive and sees truth as an event totally cut off from 
these negative elements.36 Zizek's counter to this is to set forth a 
reading in which Paul distinguishes two orientations, both of which 
operate under the law and death drive but one of which is completely 
subject to deception (the pervert) and the other which is not unaware of 
this deception (the hysteric). The perverse orientation is one that lines 
up more with Badiou's understanding of the law, but in Zizek's estimate 
the issue is a reorientation to the law and death drive, which he will 
work out as part of the hysteric structure. 
35 New International Version. 
36 Badiou, Saint Paul, 6 - describes his understanding of Paul's theology as 
an attempt 'To sharply separate each truth procedure from the cultural "historicity 
wherein opinion presumes to dissolve it ... .' 2izek would counter this understanding 
that historicism is only escapable in that which exceeds the historical; namely the 
rotary motion of the drives (The Abyss of Freedom, 37). 
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Zizek illustrates what he calls the 'perverse access to Being' 
using Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, from a section entitled 'Of 
the Wise Adaptation of Man's Cognitive Faculties to his Practical 
Vocation'. The wisdom and practicality refer to Kant's implicit 
realization that coming too close to the Other would entail complete 
loss of freedom and total servitude. What would happen if one 
presumed to have total access to the noumenal domain (the sort 
entailed in the perverse structure)? 'The conduct of man ... would be 
changed into mere mechanism, where as in a puppet show, everything 
would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the figures. 037 
Kant's description not only articulates the perverse position of 
presuming to know and be controlled by full exposure to the Other, it 
also exposes the 'fundamental fantasy' or as Zizek calls it in this 
instance, the 'Kantian fundamental fantasy'. The perverse position 
puts on display this necessary element behind human subjectivity per 
se. The human Subject, in the Lacanian understanding, has created its 
agency out of a presumed access to Being. 
The fundamental fantasy maintains the notion of a free agent 
only with the positing of this other scene where Being cannot be 
approached too closely. 'No wonder, then, that the fundamental 
fantasy is passive, "masochistic", reducing me to an object acted on by 
others: it is as if only the experience of the utmost pain can guarantee 
the subject access to Being' (Reader, 119). In the perverse structure, 
37 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 152-153, quoted in The 2.izek Reader, 
119. 
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giving oneself over to passive, puppet like acts of perverse suffering 
taps into Being. The perverse structure posits an excess of pleasure 
that can only be obtained beyond the symbolic in acts of masochism or 
sadomasochism. It is this excess that structures the Subject's relation 
to the law or the symbolic. Kant's noumenon posits the fantasmatic 
support of the symbolic. To penetrate this 'mystery' is not to expose 
some hidden meaning, rather it is to expose the fact that the Subject is 
structured around an absence, and the reification of this absence in the 
fundamental fantasy marks the origin and core of the Subject. It is not 
the noumenal real that harbours danger for the Subject; it is the 
exposure of this fundamental fantasy that threatens the consistency of 
the existence of the Subject (Reader, 119). 
Paul, in the Lacanian understanding Zizek is developing, is at 
once acknowledging the perverse position and going beyond it in 
describing how sin and the law have become fused in and through a 
deception (the fundamental fantasy). The explanation for this fusion 
has to do with the primordial deception that both Paul and Lacan see 
as the founding gesture of the fallen Subject. 
Once I was alive apart from law; but when the commandment 
came, sin sprang to life and I died. I found that the very 
commandment that was intended to bring life actually brought 
death. For sin, seizing the opportunity afforded by the 
commandment, deceived me, and through the commandment 
put me to death. (Rom. 7:9-11) 
In Lacan's rewriting of the passage this becomes, 
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But when the commandment appeared, the Thing flared up, 
returned once again, and I met my death. And for me the 
commandment that was supposed to lead to life turned out to 
lead to death, for the Thing found a way and thanks to the 
commandment seduced me; through it I came to desire death. 
(Seminar VII, 83-84)38 
In Lacan's explanation, he raises the question, which Zizek repeats, as 
to whether the dialectic between law and desire is definitive of 
psychoanalysis.39 The answer being worked out, Paul's 'Certainly not!', 
recognizes the perverse structure but in recognizing it is going beyond 
it. The structure and failure of the perverse Subject stand on one side 
of this 'Certainly not!' but Romans 7:7ff and psychoanalysis articulate a 
position that goes beyond it. The pervert directly desires death or 
presumes to enact the law through its transgression and in the process 
has become the unquestioning subject of a deception. In Zizek's 
understanding, Paul and psychoanalysis will question the lie, if not 
exactly expose it. 
It is not that Paul, in lizek's estimation, is aiming at some truth 
beyond the primordial lie, as if uncovering this lie will reveal the truth; 
rather by reaching a level of awareness of the proton pseudos (the 
fundamental lie) and death drive there is the possibility of re-founding 
38 Lizek quotes this passage in The Ticklish Subject, 152-153. 
39 As Zizek puts it, "The crucial thing here Is .. .for Lacan, there is 'a way of 
discovering the relationship to das Ding somewhere beyond the Law' - the whole 
point of the ethics of psychoanalysis is to formulate the possibility of a relationship 
that avoids the pitfalls of the superego inculpation that accounts for the 'morbid' 
enjoyment of sin ..... (The Ticklish Subject, 153). The quote from Lacan is from 
Seminar VII, 84. 
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the Subject or bringing about a radical possibility on the order of love.4o 
It is uncovering this dynamic and living within it that is opened by the 
hysteric structure, which gets at the dynamic possibility for change. 
Where the pervert is reduced to the compulsion to repeat, the hysteric 
structure is valorised by Zizek as it holds open the possibility of 
founding a new mode of subjectivity with the capacity to love.41 This 
love is not merely a 'narcissistic screen obfuscating the truth of desire, 
but the way to "gentrify" and come to terms with the traumatic drive' 
(Ticklish Subject, 162). Death drive and negativity are not, then, the 
problem but are part of the solution.42 Likewise, truth, in Zizek's 
understanding, is not a dissolution of deception, as truth inheres in the 
deception and is manipulated through the death drive and traversing 
the fantasy (as explained below). 
The Question of Truth in Romans 7:7-23 
Zizek's difference with 8adiou concerning the connection 
between death (drive) and resurrection can be reduced to the singular 
issue of the nature of truth. For 8adiou the Subject of the law is split 
between life and death and the Truth-Event or resurrection is a 
40 Again. this is not a possibility completely worked out until the writing of The 
Puppet and the Dwarf. In regard to the nature of the Truth-Event Z i ~ e k k pits Lacan 
against Badiou and Paul (Ticklish Subject. 153). But it is precisely on this point that 
his understanding of Paul will evolve. 
41 The hysteric position is one that questions the Law or the symbolic and 
opens the possibility of an alternative subjective position, the feminine, which is not 
accounted for by the Law. The hysteric structure then involves the possibility of a 
break and of a traversing of the fantasy (Ticklish Subject. 154). See : £ : i ~ e k . . How to 
Read Lacan. 35-36. 
42Adam Kotsko. 'Situating : £ : i ~ e k ' s s Paul', 47. 
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complete departure from this dialectic. As lizek states it, Badiou 
'radically dissociates Death and Resurrection: they are not the same, 
they are not even dialectically interconnected. . . . The Truth-Event is 
simply a radically New Beginning' (Ticklish Subject, 146). As a result, 
where Badiou contrasts Romans 7:7-23 with Romans 6 and 8, lizek's 
focus is on the dynamics presented within Romans 7 in which he finds 
both the death drive and a resolution to sin or perversion. 
The point for lizek is not to escape the law or death drive or to 
in some way found a Subject beyond the law. 'But St Paul's entire 
effort is to break out of this vicious cycle in which the prohibitive law 
and its transgression generate and support each other' (Ticklish 
Subject, 149). The solution which lizek will propose is not an abolition 
or departure from law and death drive on the order of Badiou. In his 
estimate this is to remain 'constrained to the field of knowledge, unable 
to approach the properly positive dimension of Truth-processes' 
(Ticklish Subject, 162). For liiek and Lacan 'a Truth- Event can 
operate only against the background of the traumatic encounter with 
the undead/monstrous Thing' (Ticklish Subject, 162). Psychoanalysis 
does not presume to synthesize or posit a 'new harmony' or 'a new 
Truth-Event' (Ticklish Subject, 153). It 'merely wipes the slate clean for 
one' (Ticklish Subject, 153).43 
43 While Zizek argues that both Paul and psychoanalysis share the goal of 
escaping perversion with its 'superego inculpation that accounts for the "morbid" 
enjoyment of sin', he assumes that Paul and Badiou both make the same mistake 
with regard to the death drive and the Law (Ticklish Subject, 153). 'It would therefore 
be tempting to risk a Badiouian-Pauline reading of the end of psychoanalysis, 
determining it as a New Beginning, a symbolic 'rebirth' - the radical restructuring of 
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The Lacanian claim is that the negative gesture of 'wiping the 
slate clean' is '''sutured'' with the arrival of a new Truth-Event' (Ticklish 
Subject, 154). Death drive and negativity stand as the ground 
functioning as the condition of any identification with a Cause (Ticklish 
Subject, 154). For Badiou truth is direct identification with an Event, so 
that the truth is sui generis and disconnected from the law and death. 
Zizek counters this with the understanding that 'one cannot directly 
have faith in a Truth-Event; every such Event ultimately remains a 
semblance obfuscating a preceding Void whose Freudian name is 
death drive' (Ticklish Subject, 154). 
So in regard to Romans 7:7-23 the key issue is the role of the 
death drive and its relationship to truth, which in turn raises the 
question as to how an authentic Truth-Event is to be distinguished from 
the inauthentic sort. For Badiou the death drive and perversion amount 
to the same thing, so that truth is necessarily a departure from the 
death drive. Zizek maintains that accounting for the death drive makes 
the difference between the possibility of authenticity and total cultural 
relativism. The 'difference lies in the fact that in a Truth-Event the void 
of the death drive, of radical negativity, a gap that momentarily 
suspends the Order of Being, continues to resonate' (Ticklish Subject, 
the analysand's subjectivity in such a way that the vicious cycle of the superego is 
suspended, left behind ... Lacan's way is not that of St Paul or Badiou: 
psychoanalysis is not 'psychosynthesis'; it does not already posit a 'new harmony', a 
new Truth-Event; it - as it were - merely wipes the slate clean for one' (Ticklish 
Subject, 153). This is a position that L i ~ e k k will abandon and which even in the 
Ticklish Subject is not entirely consistent, as he also distinguishes Paul's and 
Badiou's position. 
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162-163). In Lacanian psychoanalysis the standard for truthfulness 
has to do with confronting the fundamental fantasy. Only in traversing 
the fantasy does one arrive at the limit experience of destitution and 
exposure of the incompleteness or inherent contradiction of the law. 
For Zizek the death drive and its attendant categories can be 
tapped as a source to unplug from perversion and to come to an 
understanding of Being as sustained in and through the negation of the 
Subject. The encounter with the death drive is a 'limit-experience' 
which 'is the irreducible/constitutive condition of the (im) possibility of 
the creative act of embracing a Truth-Event: it opens up and sustains 
the space for the Truth-Event, yet its excess always threatens to 
undermine it' (Ticklish Subject, 161). Behind the good, the true and the 
beautiful is the constitutive background of the death drive - 'the Void 
that sustains the place in which one can formulate symbolic fictions 
that we call "truths'" (Ticklish Subject, 161). As the next section 
demonstrates, this means that the means of manipulating the truth is 
through tapping into the underlying ground of the death drive and 
approaching the void of deception in which the symbolic truth is 
grounded. The death of Christ and dying with Christ provides access 
to this deception undergirding the truth. 
Reading Romans 7 in Light of Christ's Cry of Dereliction and the 
Subject of Nothing 
The approach of Badiou and Zizek to Romans 7 reflects their 
divergent understandings of the meaning of the death of Christ. Where 
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for Badiou Christ's death simply prepares the site for the Truth-Event 
while it is the resurrection which constitutes the Event in a sui generis 
fashion, for Zizek the death of Christ is central. He repeatedly refers to 
Christ's cry of dereliction: 'My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken 
me?' (Mark 15:34/Matt. 27:46).44 As Marcus Pound summarizes 
it, 'Christ was the first to "end metaphysics", signalled by both his cry of 
abandonment and his ultimate death .. :45 As Zizek puts it, 'In 
Lacanian terms, we are dealing with the suspension of the big Other, 
which guarantees the subject's access to reality: in the experience of 
the death of God, we stumble upon the fact that "the big Other doesn't 
exist'" (Metastases of Enjoyment, 42). This is a conclusion he arrives 
at prior to writing Ticklish Subject and which he will continue to mine. 
In describing the death of Christ, Zizek equates life and death: 
'Life and death here are not polar opposites, contrasts, within the same 
global Whole (field of reality), but the same thing viewed from a global 
perspective' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 292). He concludes, 'the 
(temporal) death of Christ is his very (eternal) life "in becoming'" (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 292). Death and life are not in some sort of 
'pseudo-dialectic relation as utter loss/negation (death) and its reversal 
into absolute life' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 292). The death of Christ 
is the founding of the community of the Spirit and this community is his 
resurrection. 'That is to say that Christ's death, in the Hegelian reading, 
44 See On Belief, 106-151; The Puppet and the Dwarf, 171 .. The Parallax 
View, 106; For They Know Not What They Do, fiii. 
45 Pound, Zizek, 26. 
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is the disappearance of disappearance. It is in itself already what 
becomes for itself the new community:46 Though this is a theme he 
works out subsequent to the Ticklish Subject, his early work seems to 
have anticipated the direction and departure he will later make. 
Christ's death reveals the psychoanalytic ground; the Freudian 
moment of madness which Schelling anticipates and which Zizek 
comes to understand Paul to describe in Romans 7. Radical negativity, 
the death of Christ or death drive, is the constitutive moment of the 
event which serves as the ground of a Subject no longer constrained 
by law or ideology (the significance of the resurrection Event). 
Resurrection can be identified with death as they both amount to the 
destruction of one's symbolic supports and the emergence of a new 
form of subjectivity.47 The feminine, hysteric position from which Paul 
writes, describes the necessary passage through negativity and death 
drive as this is the road trod by Christ himself. 
Zizek concludes that Lacan and his own theological position, as 
opposed to Badiou, would tend to favour death over resurrection as 
death 'is the "wiping the slate clean" that opens up the domain of the 
symbolic New Beginning, of the emergence of the 'New Harmony' 
sustained by a newly emerged Master-Signifier' (Ticklish Subject, 154). 
Without traversing the fundamental fantasy and submitting to 'symbolic 
death' there is not the possibility of bringing about a real change or 
46 Lizek, 'On Divine Self-Limitation and Revolutionary Love'. 
47 Pound, lizek, 82 
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modification in the structure of the Subject.48 Zizek recognizes that his 
notion of the need for subjective destitution and negativity lines up with 
his version of Luther's statement that 'man is the excrement that fell out 
of God's anus' (Ticklish Subject, 157). In Luther's terms, Badiou can 
be counted as a 'theologian of glory' while Zizek in this instance would 
count himself a good Lutheran 'theologian of the cross'.49 
Zizek goes on to describe the process of subjective destitution 
experienced by Oedipus, who at the end of his life at Colon nus, finally 
arrives at the truth of his humanity: 'Am I to be counted as something 
[according to some readings: as a man] only now, when I am reduced 
to nothing [when I am no longer human]?' (Ticklish Subject, 156). 
Zizek concludes that the matrix of subjectivity is such that 'you 
become "something" (you are counted as a subject) only after going 
through the zero-point, after being deprived of all the pathological 
features that support your identity' (Ticklish Subject, 156-157). The 
subjective destitution of traversing the fantasy reduces the Subject to 
'nothing' yet this 'Nothingness counted as Something' is the most 
concise formula of the Lacanian (barred or split) Subject (Ticklish 
Subject, 157). The Subject is split and the Subject of the unconscious 
(the thinking Thing of the cogito) which escapes any enunciated 
content can only emerge at the level of enunciation as he is 'reduced to 
48 See Boothby, Freud as Philosopher, 275-276 -on the description of 
'traversing the fantasy'. Kotsko concludes that Badiou can be equated to a 
'theologian of glory' while Lacan is a good Lutheran 'theologian of the cross'. In Adam 
Kotsko, lizek and Theology, (London & New York: T & T Clark, 2008) 81. 
49 Kotsko, lizek, 81. Later Badiou will be characterized as a good Lutheran 
in separating Law and grace. 
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the "almost-nothing" of disposable excrement at the level of the 
enunciated content' (Ticklish Subject, 157). (:Zizek will return to this 
point and connect it to Paul in The Puppet and the Dwarf.) The death 
drive for Lizek is necessarily at the foundation of subjectivity and its 
reconstitution, as it is in and through the death drive that 'Nothingness 
is counted as Something' which gives rise to the Subject (Ticklish 
Subject, 157).50 
This is the significance of Schelling's account of the rise of the 
first Subject in which Lizek has a sustained interest. God, in the first 
instance is a pure Nothingness that 'Rejoices in its non-being'; in the 
second instance this 'neutral will that wants nothing actualizes itself in 
the guise of a Will that actively, effectively, wants this "nothing" (The 
Abyss of Freedom, 16). In the introduction to The Abyss of Freedom 
Lizek touches upon several characteristic themes of his work, linking 
this passage with the Hegelian and Cartesian 'moment of radical 
madness' and also with the feminine Subject (The Abyss of Freedom, 
6). The 'conceiving Ground' is the 'feminine foundation of the male 
Word' so 'that subjectivity is, in its most basic dimension, in an unheard 
of way, "feminine'" (The Abyss of Freedom, 7-8). 
Schelling's radical negativity, which serves as the Ground of 
Existence, anticipates the Freudian death drive but it points back to the 
emergence of the Word in John 1. Lizek ties Schelling's description of 
50 As he says in this passage 'Nothingness counted as Something is the most 
concise formula of the Lacanian "barred" subject (s)' (Ticklish Subject, 157). The 
possibility of the subject arising is only through the passage into language which 
necessarily creates the barred or divided Subject. 
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the founding moment of the Subject to the beginning described in John, 
and notes that prior to this beginning is that from which the Word arose, 
'the psychotic universe of blind drives' (The Abyss of Freedom, 14). 
The Word or the Logos 'can emerge only from the experience of this 
abyss' (Reader, 253). All creation and every Subject, whether human 
or divine, must make the passage through madness and death drive to 
achieve subjectivity.51 It 'is not possible to pass directly from the 
"animal soul" ... to "normal" subjectivity dwelling in its symbolic 
universe' without the space of 'the mad gesture of radical withdrawal 
that opens up the space for its symbolic reconstitution' (Reader, 254). 
Madness and death drive serve as the constitutive moment of the 
Subject and its entrance into symbolization and law. 
In terms of Christ's cry of dereliction it can be seen as a 
repetition of God's own self-abandonment which results in creation and 
at the same time it is the dereliction felt by every Subject.52 All 'reality 
involves a fundamental antagonism' and it is precisely in and through 
this antagonism that the Subject arises (The Abyss of Freedom, 17). 
'Upon experiencing itself as negative and destructive, the Will opposes 
itself to itself in the guise of its own inherent counterpole' (The Abyss of 
Freedom, 16). This antagonistic feminine Ground seems to be 
51 Pound, lizek, 30. 
52 Pound, lizek, 31. 
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precisely what is touched upon in the hysteric questioning of Romans 
7:7ff?53 
The difference between Zizek and 8adiou seems to come down 
then, to two contrasting anthropologies. Where Badiou 'dismisses the 
topic of human finitude', Lacan's notion of the Subject 'can emerge only 
within the horizon of human finitude' (Ticklish Subject, 163). Every 
Subject including the divine Subject has its Ground outside of itself in 
negation or Nothing. Zizek suggests that 8adiou's dismissal of the 
death drive amounts to a reversion to 'non-thought' - 'to a naive 
traditional ... opposition of two orders' (Ticklish Subject, 163). Zizek 
maintains 'human beings can participate in the Truth-Event' only as the 
'unique relationship to ... finitude and the possibility of death' is 
opened up (Ticklish Subject, 163). 
Though Zizek does not exactly arrive at a biblical anthropology, 
with his understanding of the role of the orientation to death, his theory 
serves to explain how immortality is grasped at in and through death 
and finiteness (in the fundamental fantasy). Paul, in voicing the 
questions of the hysteric, is avoiding the trap of perversion (the grab for 
immortality) in that the existence or completeness of the Other of the 
law is under question in Romans 7. This dissolves the issue of 
avoiding mortality through identification with the Other and what it 
wants -the constitutive question in transgression and perversion. The 
Other does not know what it wants and there is no positive content to 
53 This is Kotsko's initial reading of the implication of Zizek's theory. Kotsko, 
'Situating Zizek's Paul', 47. 
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live up to, and mortality and death must be accounted for. The 
'obscene superego supplement', which grounds this transgressive 
approach to the law, is undone and the slate is wiped clean for an 
authentic Truth-Event. 54 
Up to this point I have traced Zizek's reading of Romans 7:7ff 
and I have shown that Zizek finds in Paul's logical progression his own 
theory of how law and sin are fused in the Subject. This fusion gives 
rise to a death dealing desire which is founded in the fundamental 
deception which imagines a direct access to being. In Zizek's 
understanding, the division within the Subject giving rise to desire and 
the agonistic struggle (to become one with being or the law) is not a lie 
to be exposed but a necessary deception giving rise to the symbolic. 
In Zizek's reading, the subjective destitution of the death of Christ and 
Paul's agonistic struggle and questioning are a means of manipulating 
this 'truth' (wiping the slate clean) so as to reconstitute the Subject. 
The next section turns to Zizek's examination of Rom. 7: 1-6 to 
demonstrate two orientations to the law (the masculine and the 
feminine) and how 'dying with Christ' gives rise to the (hysteric or 
feminine) realization of 7:7ff.55 The argument follows Zizek's 
explanation of 7:1-6 as it unfolds in Paul's explanation, beginning with 
the illustration in 7:1-4 and dealing in turn with the case of the woman 
whose husband is either dead or alive in 7: 1-3, and then turning to the 
54 Kotsko, 'Situating 2izek's Paul', 47. 
55 His interaction here is primarily with Agamben. 
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comparison of the Christian to the dead husband as one who has died 
in Christ in 7:4-6. 
Romans 7:1-4 Sex and Death with the Universal Subject? 
The large measure of convergence around Paul between :Lizek, 
Badiou, and Agamben has to do with the project of re-founding the 
theory of the Subject.56 The primary problem, as each sees it in 
agreement with Paul, is the relation between the Subject and law. Is 
the identity of the Subject tied to the contingencies of legal 
circumstance (gender, ethnicity, marital status, sinner, etc.) or does 
identity float free of these particulars? Is Pauline Christianity 
advocating the notion that the Christian Subject (being no longer Jew 
nor Greek, male nor female, slave nor free) is free of these 
contingencies, and so as Subject inhabits the world but is not of the 
world? Or are these differences in fact constitutive of the Subject so 
that human subjectivity is bound to historical contingencies? Is identity 
through difference or is it immune to difference?57 The way in which 
this problem interacts with the categories of life and death and human 
knowledge, has caused each of them to focus on Paul's resolution to 
the problem in Romans 7. 
:Lizek introduces his examination of Romans 7: 1-4 in The 
Monstrosity of Christ by characterizing Paul's approach as 'this 
56 Santner is aiming at a similar goal with less emphasis on the particulars of 
Paul. 
57 The primary substance of the Subject is, of course, life and death, and the 
manner in which these two relate to one another is ultimately determinative of how 
the above questions are answered. 
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strangely sexualized comparison of the believer delivered from the Law 
with an adulteress who, after her husband dies is free to consort with 
her lover' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 273). Paul's sexual metaphor 
depends upon a tradition in which 'knowing' is a term for sexual 
intercourse. Adam's knowing of Eve and knowing good and evil speak 
of two realms of knowledge that in some way have come into conflict. 
In verse 7 of this chapter Paul introduces what many take to be the 
Garden scene in which the realms of desire, subjectivity, and 
knowledge overlap. 58 The knowledge-is-sex metaphor is linked to an 
understanding in which knowing and being overlap and yet in which 
they have been disrupted by death and a death-dealing knowledge.59 
Sex and death, then, serve to mark two identities under the law and 
under Christ. L:izek, who fuses human sexuality and subjectivity, finds 
in Paul's illustration two possibilities, masculine and feminine, for 
human identity. 
Within Paul's illustration (from Romans 7:1-4), L:izek works out 
the transition from Judaism to Christianity, or what he refers to as a 
transition from law to love.so In the process he describes the attempt at 
universality founded on a perverse notion of exception and begins to 
trace how Christianity breaks free from this obscene superego 
supplement in a suspension (Paul's word Karl]PYfJral in 7:2, 6) of the 
law which also marks an excess. The masculine structure in Paul's 
58 For example, James D. G. Dunn, Word Biblical Commentary: Romans 1-8 
Volume 38A, (Dallas: Word Books Publisher, 1988), 357ft. 
59 See Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ, 123. 
80 He deals with this particular text in The Monstrosity of Christ, 273ft. but the 
parallel concepts are developed in The Puppet and the Dwarf. 
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illustration is ironically represented by the woman (pointing to the fact 
that what is being described is an orientation to the law or the symbolic 
and is not determined according to gender) and the feminine structure 
is represented by the husband. The woman who would consort with 
another man introduces, though, two possible orientations: the 
common masculine antagonism toward the law and the distinctive 
Jewish ambiguity toward the law. 
Are you unaware, brothers (for I am speaking to people who 
know the law), that the law has jurisdiction over one as long 
as one lives? Thus a married woman is bound by law to her 
living husband; but if her husband dies, she is released from 
the law in respect to her husband. Consequently, while her 
husband is alive she will be called an adulteress if she 
consorts with another man. But if her husband dies she is 
free from that law, and she is not an adulteress if she 
consorts with another man.61 
The woman who would consort with another man poses the ambiguity 
of being a Subject under the law. The point that Lizek draws and 
builds on with the illustration is that the singular act (the woman's 
consorting with another man) can be construed as either sin or love. 
The same woman doing the same thing can either be an adulteress or 
61 :£:izek quotes the passage in The Monstrosity of Christ, 273. He does not 
indicate whether the translation is his own. 
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a good wife.62 There is no way to distinguish the two couples law/sin 
and law/love in terms of their content: 'the difference between the two 
couples (Law/sin and Law/love) is not substantial, but purely formal: we 
are dealing with the same content in two modalities' (The Monstrosity 
of Christ, 272). 
So for Lizek the crucial issue is not the act, but how it is 
construed or the 'modality' and orientation under which it occurs. Until 
the state of the husband is known, or the modality under which the 
woman is constituted as Subject is known, the nature of the consorting 
cannot be known. The force of the law, the force of the symbolic, or 
the orientation to the death drive and the fundamental fantasy are 
represented by the condition of the husband.53 The identity of the 
woman, adulteress or not, is contingent upon an element or force that 
is at once beyond her and yet definitive of her. Her knowing, as in 
'knowing' another man, is determinative of her identity -consorting with 
another man mayor may not fall under the force of the law. A living 
husband represents a law in force and a transgressive consorting, 
while a dead husband represents a law without force -though in 
Lizek's theory this does not necessarily constitute successful 
62 The one possibility that is not presented in this original scene is that the 
woman loves her husband and identifies with him, so it is not clear that this is a live 
option in the illustration. 
63 As Dunn points out the same woman doing the same act can be judged 
either an adulteress or a good wife. It is not the woman's act itself but the state of the 
husband or the force of the law and its relationship to death that is being examined. 
'There is a death which liberates from the lordship of sin (6:9-10, 18); so there is a 
death which liberates from the lordship of the law' (Dunn, Romans 1-8,368). 
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consorting.64 The key in the opening verses is the fact that the law in 
the form of the (living/dead) husband takes precedent over the living 
woman.65 The law is constituted and has its power as long as the 
woman remains outside of it. Her objective position or place outside of 
the law creates the force of the law.66 The problem which this raises, 
examined in the next section, is how to coordinate sin and law or how 
to differentiate sin and love. 
Masculinity - The Woman that has a Husband is Bound by Law to the 
Husband 
The woman's relationship to her husband is the prototypical 
social obligation, marriage being the foundation of the family and of 
society, but it is also the prototypical love relationship. The problem 
occurs when these two are pitted against one another; when 'social life 
appears to me as dominated by an externally imposed Law in which I 
am unable to recognize myself ... precisely insofar as I continue to 
cling to the immediacy of love that feels threatened by the rule of Law' 
64 The possibility of there being a sexual relationship - of bringing together 
the physical act with love is ruled out by Lacan's famous 'There's no such thing as a 
sexual relationship' (Seminar XX, 12, 34). The question is whether 2 : i ~ e k k escapes 
this formula. Milbank will answer that he decisively does not (The Monstrosity of 
Christ, 122). The irony being, that for all his fascination with the pornographic, he 
seems to fall into what Con or Cunningham describes as the resentiment [sic] of a 
disappointed nihilism which is 'the fruit of the castration complex' (Cunningham, 
GenealoJ!,y of Nihilism), 257). 
Judaism allowed for remarriage after the death of the husband indicating a 
possible suspension of the Law. In Roman law, which may be the standard outside of 
Judaism, a woman was not freed from her husband by his death As Dunn states it, 
'she was obliged to mourn his death and to remain unmarried for twelve months; 
otherwise she would forfeit everything which had come to her from her first husband.' 
In Dunn, Romans 1-8, 360. 
66See Cunningham, 'Lacan and Creation from No One', 86. 
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(The Puppet and the Dwarf, 117). The law can only be said to 'bind' 
when desire is in some way curtailed by the law. Love, understood as 
synonymous to this sort of desire, an element deep within the self 
which only refers to the self, can only experience the regulation of law 
as an imposition on the true nature of the self. The woman whose 
husband is alive, but who has fallen in love with another man, 
experiences the law as that which opposes her love. In fact, her love 
(her enjoyment or jouissance) is here synonymous with sin (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 273). Her notion that she is loved by her consort 
is, in turn, to imagine that deep within her is 'some precious treasure 
that can only be loved, and cannot be submitted to the rule of Law' 
(The Puppet and the Dwarf, 117).67 
In Ziiek's logic of the exception (masculine sexuation), her 'love' 
is a symptom of the prohibition and the prohibition has its force only in 
the exception.s8 The exception, in Ziiek's view could be seen as 
creating the rule. As in Kafka's short story The Trial, Josef K. 
discovers that the elaborate system of the law which bars him from 
entering a certain door is actually built by himself for himself (Reader, 
45). The law is a construct erected by and for those who stand outside 
of it. If the woman in Paul's illustration were to love her husband and 
not consort with other men, and if this were the universal case, the law 
67 This precious treasure is, according to Lacan, nothing other than the ego. 
'It is one's own ego that one loves in love, one's own ego made real on the imaginary 
level' (Seminar I, 142). 
68 The ego as the love object clarifies how the prohibition and the exception 
come together to constitute identity. The ego is that which is constituted beyond the 
Law or the symbolic in the imaginary. 
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would 'disintegrate'. The law functions in this sense like a 
psychoanalytic symptom: 'A symptom ... is an element that ... must 
remain an exception, that is, the point of suspension of the universal 
principle: if the universal principle were to apply also to this point, the 
universal system itself would disintegrate' (The Universal Exception, 
171).69 
The woman, as the one who is subject to the law, represents an 
orientation of inherent transgression: 'the subject is actually "in" (caught 
in the web of) power only and precisely in so far as he does not fully 
identify with it but maintains a kind of distance towards it' (The Fragile 
Absolute 148).1° The dynamic of sin is an identity caught up in a web 
which tightens its grip the more it is resisted. In Liiek's description of 
the couplet law/sin, the law is a transcendent 'foreign' force that serves 
to oppress what is perceived as the love relationship (The Monstrosity 
of Christ, 271 ).71 The law becomes an obstacle to be overcome in 
order for love to be possible. 
Lizek's point is that this sort of love is not agape love but rather 
a form of love or enjoyment ljouissance) in which the obstacle 
constitutes the (lost) love.72 The woman's living husband is a 
69 See the glossary to L:izek, The Universal Exception, 341, in which this 
argument is summed up. 
70 Italics in the original. 
71 L:izek works out the same problem in identical language in The Puppet and 
the Dwarf. 117 f. The difference is that in The Monstrosity of Christ he preserves the 
term 'love' for the couple Lawllove. 
72 This section will continue to explore and define Lacan's notion of 
jouissance, which L:izek usually translates enjoyment - but in fact here (The 
Monstrosity of Christ) he simply sticks with jouissance. Agape love in L:izek's 
description is not more real than this jouissance. It may simply be a love that 
comprehends its constitution in and through destitution. 
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necessary part of this sort of consorting, as he is the obstacle that 
makes the sexual relationship with the 'other,.73 This construct is 
synonymous with sin: '''Sin'' is the very intimate resistant core on 
account of which the subject experiences its relationship to the Law as 
one of subjection, it is that on account of which the Law has to appear 
to the subject as a foreign power crushing the subject' (The Monstrosity 
of Christ, 271). The Subject is attached to a 'pathological agalma deep 
within itself and it is attachment to this supposed exception or 
remainder that gives the law the spectre of an oppressive foreign force 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 271). There is a resistant core, a hold-out 
or remainder on the part of the Subject: 'the notion that there is deep 
inside it some precious treasure which can only be loved and cannot 
be submitted to the rule of Law' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 271). The 
deception or illusion that sin works is to construe the law as a closure 
of identity which by its very nature - its absoluteness - excludes love.74 
Sin mediates the law as a power over and against love.75 
73 That is the 'other' is only 'other' due to the living husband. If the husband 
is dead this supposed 'other' is simply the woman's husband. 
74 For Lacan it is perhaps impossible to distinguish the deception or delusion 
of the Law from the deception of love. Love is an imaginary phenomenon (Seminar I, 
142) that is evoked through a lack brought on by entry into the symbolic. 'As a 
specular mirage, love is essentially deception' (Seminar 11.268). 
75 Freud's original point with the superego is that the supposed ethic invoked 
by the superego is not moral but immoral. The 'love' that one might obtain in and 
through this structure is, as well, tainted. In Paul Ricoeur's succinct description of 
Freudian morality in and through the Oedipus complex: 'The meaning of the Oedipus 
complex, deciphered in the semitransparency of dreams and the neuroses, solidifies 
into a real equivalence: the totem is the father; the father was killed and eaten; the 
brothers never got over their remorse for the deed; to reconcile themselves with their 
father and with themselves, they invented morality' (Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 
208). Love and morality under the superego notion of the Law is ambivalent in regard 
to the one loved. 'Lacan ... lays great emphasis on the intimate connection between 
love and AGGRESSIVITY; the presence of one necessarily implies the presence of 
the other' (Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 103). 
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In summary, 'the tension between the All (the universal Law) 
and its constitutive exception, i.e., "sin" is the very exception which 
sustains the Law' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 271). This logic of 
exception follows Freud's notion of the primal father who is the 
exception that grounds the rule.76 The logic of exception also 
describes the masculine formula of sexuation in terms of castration: 'all 
men are castrated, but there is one exception that proves the rule'.77 
The husband of Romans 7 and the primal father killed by his sons in 
order to gain access to the women, stand in a parallel relationship.78 
The law does not apply or there is a failure of interpellation in a 
particular instance and yet it is from this place of failure or exception 
that the law is enacted.79 The point is not that the exception can be 
done away with and universality achieved. The reifying effects of the 
exception are the substance of the symbolic and hence of the Subject. 
It is from the seeming failure of interpellation or the failure of 
universality to account for the exception that the totalizing symbolic 
takes hold. From one perspective it can be said 'that the subject never 
76 In the original tribe the strongest male or the father took possession of all 
the women and thus prevented sexual promiscuity. The primal father's exception to 
the Law was the means by which the Law was enforced (SE, 13:125). 
77 Pound, lizek, 106. 
78 In both instances what is ultimately being described is the manner in which 
culture itself functions. 'What we call "culture" is therefore, in its very ontological 
status, the reign of the dead over life. i.e., the form in which the "death drive" 
assumes positive existence' (Enjoy Your Symptom. 54). 
79 l i ~ e k k provides several examples of the same logic: Western societies' use 
of torture in the fight on the war on terror; the United States support of a permanent 
war crimes tribunal and yet its opposition to being included within its jurisdiction; and 
the demand by wealthy countries that the Third World enact trade reforms while 
remaining unwilling to subject themselves to those same reforms (The Universal 
Exception. 269-270). In the glossary to The Universal Exception, 341, these 
examples and others are included. 
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fully recognizes itself in the interpellative call ... and this resistance to 
interpellation (to the symbolic identity provided by interpellation) is the 
subject' (The Indivisible Remainder, 165}.80 The woman consorting 
with her lover only understands herself over and against the law, while 
she may imagine her relationship to her lover in some way pre-exists 
her relationship to the law. 'Is not this hysterical distance towards 
interpellation ... the very form of ideological misrecognition? Is not 
this apparent failure of interpellation ... the ultimate proof of its 
success . .. that is to say, of the fact that the "effect-of-subject" really 
took place' (The Indivisible Remainder, 166}?81 Ideological 
interpellation, from the Subject's perspective, might appear to be 
relieved or in some way mitigated if the Subject simply maintains a 
cynical distance toward the interpellating power. The woman in Paul's 
illustration might say to herself, 'I know the law says not to consort, but 
the law does not account for my true self. Hegel's Beautiful Soul 
maintains a cynical, passive distance toward power, but this is 
precisely the power of interpellation doing its work (Reader, 229-230, 
264). 
Zizek does not mean that the Subject is any more lacking in 
reality than anything else; rather the very nature of reality is one in 
which the Subject is constituted in and through difference. The 
'convergence of the two incompatible dimensions (the Real and the 
80 i i ~ e k k is here presenting an Althusserian argument, which is not so much 
wrong as incomplete (see his footnote 86, in The Indivisible Remainder, 185). 
81 Italics in the original 
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Symbolic) is sustained by their very divergence, i.e., difference is 
constitutive of what it differentiates' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 275).82 
The failure or incomplete understanding of the law, as Paul recounts it 
in verses 1-3, is not a failure of the Subject but is an incomplete 
understanding of this necessary difference constituting the nature of 
the Subject (which is brought out in verse 4). As Lizek explains it to 
Milbank, there is a failure of the 'notion' of the function of the symbolic 
or the Law in its relation to the real. The Subject of the law is 
constituted in and through two 'incompatible dimensions'; the 'real' of 
love Uouissance) and the symbolic or the law. There is no dualism of 
an inward love and an outward oppressive law, rather there is a gap 
constituted by two intersecting dimensions which is constitutive of the 
Subject (The Monstrosity of Christ, 274-275). 
It is the very gap which separates/integrates the symbolic and 
the real that is constitutive of the symbolic and jouissance: 'the 
Symbolic arises through the gap that separates it from full jouissance, 
and this jouissance itself is a spectre produced by the gaps and holes 
in the Symbolic' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 274). The disappearance 
of the gap between the two domains, or the resolution of their 
82 In the dialogue with Milbank which makes up The Monstrosity of Christ, 
L:izek claims that Milbank misses this point, presuming that the subject constituted in 
the dialectic is in some way a contradiction that cannot be there: ' ... dialectics 
declares that an existing contradiction, because it is a contradiction, must be 
destroyed even though it exists'. L : i ~ e k k counters with two points: 'First, since, for 
Hegel, the failure of empirical reality to fit its notion is always also an indication of the 
failure of this notion itself .. .' and 'Second, for Hegel, the "resolution" of a 
contradiction is not simply the abolition of difference, but its full admission: in 
dialectical "reconciliation", difference is not erased, but admitted as such' (The 
MonstroSity of Christ, 274). 
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incongruence, would entail the disappearance of the two domains 
themselves: 'when our psyche can directly act upon external physical 
reality, we not only no longer have a soul, we also lose a body as "our 
own", as separate from external objects'(The Monstrosity of Christ, 
276). The masculine Subject depends upon the gap in his primary 
identity, so that there is a necessary incongruence between thought 
and action, intent and will (as in Rom.7:7ff). 
In summary of the key part of the argument so far: the woman in 
Paul's illustration represents the choices available under the masculine 
orientation to the law; whether her husband is dead or alive defines her 
and seems to represent every alternative, and yet in either condition 
she experiences an antagonism between herself or her true desire 
Uouissance) and the law. The following section examines Zizek's 
understanding of Paul's resolution to this predicament in the feminine 
orientation to the law. 
Hysteric Subjectivity: You Were Made Dead to the Law to be Joined to 
Another 
Where the masculine Subject experiences the law as a foreign 
crushing power, the feminine Subject constitutes itself as 'not all' in 
regard to the law. Where the masculine form is one in which the law is 
omnipotent and omniscient the feminine position posits an 
incompleteness or lack in the law. Where the masculine form might be 
associated with onto-theology and transcendence (the transcendent 
exception proves the rule), the feminine form questions the Other in its 
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transcendence and might be associated with a radical immanence 
such as atheism or materialism.83 
The feminine Subject identifies with and accepts the 
incompleteness of the law or the symbolic and in doing so escapes its 
alienating effect.84 In regard to Paul's understanding, it might be said 
that he finds something prior to and after the law, which throws the law 
into a different perspective. To achieve this shift in perspective Paul, 
without transition, moves the subject position from the living woman (in 
Lacan's masculine formation) to the dead husband (the feminine 
formation). He is, after all, the only one who has died, and with verse 4 
Paul's discourse takes the perspective previously reserved for the dead 
husband. 
So, my brothers, you also died to the law through the body of 
Christ, that you might belong to another, to him who was 
raised from the dead, in order that we might bear fruit to God. 
(Romans 7:4)85 
The dead husband had represented the force of the law, and now it is 
within that place from which this force was exercised that Paul places 
his readers. It is not that the feminine realizes a power lacking in the 
masculine, it is the realization of and identification with the 
disempowerment or suspension of the law (a question now serves in 
place of its answer). Paul had described the law in the instance of the 
83 Pound, lizek, 109-110. 
84 The pervert refuses the Law's incompleteness and attempts to fill the void 
rather than inhabit it. 
85 From the New International Version. The New International Version, not 
always known for its accuracy renders this particular text in an accessible manner. 
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dead husband as being rendered inoperative (KaTl7PYIJTGI, in verse 2). 
It is not that the law is 'abolished' (as KaTrJPYIJTaI is sometimes 
translated), as it still applies, but the manner in which it applies is to 
specify its own suspended force. The word Paul employs and as seen 
below, for which he develops his own technical meaning, is the perfect 
passive indicative of KaTapYEw, 'to make void'. 
As A. T. Robertson describes Paul's illustration, the husband 
stands for a void created by and in the law.86 The husband, 
representing lizek's feminine form, stands in the void. It is not that the 
void stands outside of the law, rather it is a space created within the 
law's own taking place. The law's capacity for suspension and 
application marks the contours, the 'space' or void, from which the law 
proceeds. In the case of a king or dictator who institutes the laws and 
whose very word is the law, his own relationship to the law is marked 
by the power of suspension; the place from which the law originates is 
marked by its disapplication.87 
Language functions like law in Lacanian theory so that 
language can be said to be sexed according to how one fits in regard 
to its positive (applied) and negative (disapplied) force. The woman in 
Paul's illustration is in the masculine position because she falls under 
the force of the law and can be said to relate to the law in the way in 
which a subject relates to a king. According to lizek, 'the "masculine" 
86 A.T., Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, (Oak Harbor: 
Logos Research Systems, 1997) on Rom. 7:2. 
87 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 104, traces this understanding - which 
has its parallel in the concept that the place of love is where the Law originates. 
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universe involves the universal network of causes and effects founded 
in an exception (the "free" subject which theoretically grasps its object, 
the causal universe of the Newtonian physics)' (Tarrying with the 
Negative, 58). A philosophy or science built on the masculine 
Subject's knowledge will attempt to say it all. The woman is completely 
defined (adulteress or not), by the state of the husband representing 
the force of the law. Her position is one that can be fully articulated (it 
is conscious, enunciated, etc.) while the state of her dead husband is 
not itself subject to this enunciated content, but is in fact the one who 
determines its content, though only in its disapplication (the pure 
potential of a question). As Lacan puts it, women are the 'open-set' 
(Seminar XX, 9-10). This feminine construct, whether scientific or 
philosophical, is built on a subjectivity that is unbounded and open, as 
opposed to the closed masculine Newtonian universe. The dead 
husband doesn't have anything to say, but his silence marks a 
suspension or positive void. 
Hegel specifies the nature of this void (the background of 
Lacan's feminine sexuation) in his Phenomenology in deploying 
Luther's translation of Paul's KaTfJPYfJTa/ in his key term Aufhebung.88 
Hegel is describing the manner in which the occurrence of language 
88 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 99. Though it is impossible to trace 
the exact genealogy of these concepts as they unfold through Paul, Luther, and 
Hegel to Lacan, Lacan's borrowings from Hegel are clear. Lacan attended the 
lectures of Alexandre Kojeve the (Russian/French interpreter of Hegel) in 1933-1939, 
which Evans notes, has an immense influence on his work. See Evans, Dictionary of 
Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 144-145. The correspondence at this point between 
Lacan's theory of sexuation and Hegel's writing on Aufhebung seems to indicate a 
clear line of influence. 
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creates a negative 'space' on which all the positive elements of 
language depend. For example, the simple term 'This' can only have a 
positive reference against the background of everything else which is 
'not This'. 'The This is, therefore, established as not This, or as 
something superseded (aufgehoben); and hence not as nothing, but as 
a determinate Nothing, the Nothing of a content, viz. of the This.'89 A 
child who continually pointed at things with 'This' as his first word and 
posed as a question, is in danger of never learning another word or of 
never having his question definitively answered. Everything is 
potentially This, but if there is no not This, the word is without content.90 
With not This the sense-element is still present, but not as an 
immediate reference or as the single item that is 'meant', but as the 
universal background which gives meaning to a particular reference. 
According to Hegel (KaTIJPYIJTGI) Aufhebung has a twofold meaning 
'which we have seen in the negative: it is at once a negating and a 
preserving. Our Nothing, as the Nothing of the This, preserves its 
immediacy and is itself sensuous, but it is a universal immediacy.'91 
Hegel's point, taken up by Lacan, is that the feminine universal is the 
89 G. W. F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 68. Quoted in Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: the 
Place of Negativity, Trans. Karen Pinkus, Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), 14-15. 
90 The reference is to the author's son who seemed to have gotten stuck on 
This. 
91 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 68. 
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negative background which serves to give positive content (the 
supposed masculine universality) its possibility.92 
Lacan, though, along with the linguistics current to his time, 
transformed a discussion of Being into a discussion of the function of 
language and its relation to psychoanalysis. Where Hegel might in 
some way imagine himself to be dealing directly with ultimate reality 
(Spirit), Lacan's induction into linguistics through the work of Ferdinand 
de Saussure and Roman Jakobson means that the two realms in which 
he is working, linguistics and psychoanalysis, do not necessarily 
converge directly onto any ontological ground or necessity.93 In Zizek's 
depiction of Lacan's theory, 'sexuality is the effect on the living being of 
the impasses which emerge when it gets entangled in the symbolic 
order' (Tarrying with the Negative, 56). The feminine and masculine do 
not describe gender so much as positions taken within the formation of 
the symbolic. Where the Hegelian discussion took place in the register 
of the philosophical, the linguistics of Jakobson offers a 
linguistic/symbolic explanation to the philosophical quest for being.94 
Hegel's This and not This is a discussion that may simply point to the 
92 Lizek's rediscovery of the Hegel behind Lacan affirms a direct lineage. The 
feminist reaction to Lacan's feminine structure (being classed with the negative or 
not-all), may have missed Hegel's point that negation precedes the various attempts 
at a positive masculine universal. On the other hand, Lacan reversed himself, and 
this seems to have created some confusion. This along with his formula striking out 
woman tended to not endear him to some feminists. See Pound, tizek, 111 ff. 
93 The point here is not to definitively say that Hegel's Spirit is God or not, but 
simply to point out that psychoanalysis nuances this quite differently in its notion of a 
primordial fantasy. 
94 See Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 465 -'Absolute Being that is not 
grasped as Spirit is merely the abstract void, just as Spirit that is not grasped as this 
movement is only an empty word.' Lacan's notion of full and empty speech reflects 
his adaption of this understanding (see Tarrying with the Negative, 94). 
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functioning of language and linguistic shifters (terms like this, I, now, 
here), which rely upon the context in which they are spoken. 
Agamben describes the shift between Hegel and Lacan as the 
transition from metaphysics to linguistics. 'The dimension of meaning 
of the word "being", whose eternal quest and eternal loss ... constitute 
the history of metaphysics, coincides with the taking place of language' 
and it is only 'because language permits a reference to its own 
instance through shifters' that 'something like being and the world are 
open to speculation,.95 Where Hegel was not unaware of the logical 
implications of being a speaker of a language, he still tied this logic to a 
metaphysical understanding. Both Hegel and Lacan trace the passage 
from immediate sense experience into the realm of language in and 
through shifters, but for Hegel this is a necessary moment in the 
movement of Spirit, as is the passage through negativity, while for 
Lacan and Lizek there is a certain ambiguity as to the ontological 
status of the symbolic and of this passage in its relationship to death.96 
Where Freud grounded his understanding of the Subject in biology, 
Lacan cuts any ties to a material ontology by claiming that what Freud 
said was true, but he was really talking about language. As a result the 
Subject is abstracted from any necessary connection outside of itself. 
95 Agamben, Language and Death, 25-26. 
96 As Adrian Johnston spells it out, 2ifek's philosophical ambitions are not 
focused on ontology but freedom. He concludes his book on 2ifek's ontology with a 
quote from tizek! The Movie on the question 'What is philosophy?': 'philosophy is a 
very modest discipline. Philosophy asks a different question, the true philosophy: 
How does a philosopher approach the problem of freedom?' (Adrian Johnston, 
tizek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of Subjectivity, (Evanston 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008), 286). 
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Lacan's interest in the shifter 'I' illustrates the point of what Zizek 
calls this 'ontological scandal' (Tarrying with the Negative, 61). Lacan 
takes a special interest in the shifter 'I' as it is employed by Rene 
Descartes (and Paul in Romans), and his examination of the 'I' 
becomes one of his final forms for describing the difference between 
masculine and feminine. In an early formula of sexuation Lacan poses 
the masculine and feminine as expressing themselves on each side of 
the cogito: the masculine was pictured as a choice of being, 'I am'; 
while the feminine was the choice of thought, 'I think,.97 The 'I am' in 
Descartes and traditional metaphysics seemed to fulfill the potential of 
'I think', so that the masculine would seem to be the fulfillment of the 
feminine. Thus woman as not-all was thought, particularly by Lacan's 
feminist critics (and not without some justification), to picture woman as 
a sort of truncated man (Tarrying with the Negative, 58). The shift that 
intervenes involves the reversal of Paul's KaTf'JPVf'JTGI and Hegel's 
Aufhebung in which an unfulfilled potential does not so much constitute 
a lack as it does an intervention into a masculine construct. 
As with Paul's illustration, identification with the law or the 
symbolic disrupts or suspends the force of the law so as to attain a new 
form of subjectivity. The masculine side of the cogito chooses being (I 
am) 'yet what it gets is being which is merely thought, not real being ... 
it gets fantasy-being, the being of a "person," the being in "reality" 
97 Lacan's formulas of sexuation describe sexual difference through symbolic 
equations. See Seminar XX, 78. 
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whose frame is structured by fantasy' (Tarrying with the Negative, 61). 
The linguistic shifter This depends on its negative form not This, and 
this negative form provides a kind of plenitude or resource which 
language is dependent upon; so too I think and I am demonstrate and 
depend upon the reflexive power of language to posit thought as a 
mode of being. I am has no more ontological reality than not This, yet 
where I am was pictured as an ontology it seemed to offer access to 
being. Where the linguistic shifter, in its positive form, depends upon 
the negative place of language, the psychoanalytic fantasy (primordial 
lie), posits a place of fullness and plenitude in the place of death. The 
letter (of the law) which seems to contain life simply deals in death. 
The feminine construct 'chooses thought, the pure "I think", yet 
what it gets is thought bereft of any further predicates, thought which 
coincides with pure being, or more precisely, the hyperbolic point which 
is neither thought nor being' (Tarrying with the Negative, 61-62). Lizek 
pictures the feminine as an exposure of death in a gaze that 
encounters the fundamental fantasy, and this encounter challenges the 
very core of the Subject. 
In Romans 7:4 this is described as the place of the dead 
husband, but this is immediately translated into an identity with the 
death of Christ. What Lizek offers seems to be simply an identity with 
death. The death of Christ is not specific to Lizek's description of the 
feminine; rather death itself is what makes the dead husband special. 
Lizek illustrates the point with E. A. Poe's 'The facts in the Case of M. 
Valdemar': 'When Valdemar, for a brief moment awakened from the 
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sleep of death, utters the "impossible" statement "I am dead!", his 
body ... changes into "a nearly liquid mass of loathsome -of 
detestable putrescence' (Tarrying with the Negative, 61). There occurs 
what Zizek describes as an impossible gaze that arrives at the notion 'I 
am dead!': 'the pure-impossible fantasy-gaze by way of which I 
observe my own nonbeing' (Tarrying with the Negative, 6). The title of 
Zizek's book - Tarrying with the Negative -indicates the goal and cure 
as Hegel posed it: 
Death, if that is what we want to call this non-actuality, is of all 
things the most dreadful, and to hold fast what is dead 
requires the greatest strength .... This tarrying with the 
negative is the magical power that converts it into being, this 
power is identical with what we earlier called the Subject.98 
To tarry with the negative is to traverse the fantasy and to encounter 
the empty X or the place of death, which is synonymous with the place 
of inscription of identity. True identity is not in and through the 
predicates of the law or the symbolic but it is to pass into that which 
seems to be either a surplus or a suspension (KaTl7PV17TaJ) in which 
identity is recognized in the void. 
So both Hegel and Paul, in Lizek's view, are able to describe the 
formation of the Subject through taking up death, or in Paul's terms 
'dying with Christ'. In death the predicates of the law no longer apply, 
so that by tarrying in the realm of negation there is the possibility of 
98 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 19. 
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reconstituting the Subject in the feminine orientation. Zizek's point is 
that Hegel's 'subject is substance' coincides with Paul's 'dying in Christ' 
in that both turn to death, to the desubstantialized realm, in which no 
predicate will hold (For They Know Not What They Do, 36-37). The 
problem, which the next section explores, is the exact nature of this 
desubstantialized realm of the exception in Zizek's theory. 
Romans 7:6 - The Exception 
Zizek's interaction with Agamben has resulted in his most 
prolonged focus on the specifics of how the law can, in Agamben's 
words, be 'Simultaneously suspended and fulfilled' through an 
understanding of the exception.99 Paul's point, according to Zizek, is 
that one can escape the dilemma of a mutually implied law and 
transgression and 'belong to another' only by realizing that love is not 
mediated by the law but involves full identification with the law (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 273). Here is the explanation of how Christianity 
fulfilled the law: 'not by supplementing it with the dimension of love, but 
by fully realizing the Law itself - from this perspective, the problem with 
Judaism is not that it is "too legal," but that it is not "Iegal" enough' (The 
Puppet and the Dwarf, 117). This identification with the law, in and 
through love, constitutes salvation in Christianity, according to Zizek. 
99 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 104. 
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One question that this section raises has to do with the status and 
content of this 'love' to which lizek assigns key importance.1oo 
According to lizek, the way in which one fully identifies with the 
law is not through a transgressive attempt to get beyond it but with a 
full identity with it in and through an acknowledgment of a certain lack 
or suspension (in verse 6, dying to or release - KarTJPyf]efJI.J£v - from 
the law). The 'normal' order is already one which is built upon a 
perverse relation to the law 'because this order already implies and 
relies on its own transgression, so the way to truly subvert it is to stick 
to its letter and ignore its obscene transgression' (The Monstrosity of 
Christ, 281). 
As demonstrated above, Paul makes the point that the law is 
suspended (Verse 2 - Karf]PYTJTa/) in the case of the dead husband, 
and this location of the exception serves to locate the place in which 
the law is pure potential. The power and the potential of the law can be 
suspended or have its exception in death and so it is here that the 
inside and the outside of the law fold into a singular threshold. As 
Agamben describes it, 'in the state of exception law suspends its own 
application in order to ground its enforcement,.101 'Dying to the law' 
does not entail escape from the law but full identification with the law 
itself in its potential to 'ground' the fruit of love in the work of the Spirit. 
Paul writes, 
100 Agamben accuses Adorno of reducing redemption to a 'point of view' 
(Agamben, The Time That Remains, 38). This sort of fiction seems to plague both 
Agamben and L i ~ e k . . Milbank is suspicious that 2 : i ~ e k k is guilty of his own form of 
Gnosticism (The Monstrosity of Christ, 18). 
101 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 133. 
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Wherefore, my brethren, ye also were made dead to the law 
through the body of Christ; that ye should be joined to another, 
even to him who was raised from the dead, that we might 
bring forth fruit unto God. For when we were in the flesh, the 
sinful passions, which were through the law, wrought in our 
members to bring forth fruit unto death. But now we have 
been discharged from the law, having died to that wherein we 
were held; so that we serve in newness of the spirit, and not 
in old ness of the letter. (Romans 7:4-6) 
To reiterate, the subject of Paul's illustration has been the woman, 
while the only one who has died is the husband. In verse 4 Paul shifts 
the perspective to the one who has died (that of the husband). It is the 
nature of this discharge, release or suspension (Kar'7PYrJe'7J1£v), as 
Paul works it out in verse 6 that is under contention between Agamben 
and Zizek. Zizek seems to accept the basic scheme of Agamben's 
interpretation, but he would transpose it into a psychoanalytic 
understanding in which it is not simply the law per se that is left 
inoperative, but the obscene superego supplement to the law.102 This 
problem is specifically addressed in the following section. 
There is no Big Other - Discharged from the Law, having Died 
102 On the surface this may appear a minor point of difference but what is at 
stake, as will be suggested below, may be two versions of ultimate reality. See 
Kotsko, 'Situating Zitek's Paul', 48. 
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The corrective which Zizek brings to Agamben's 
interpretation is to suggest that this state of suspension has a particular 
identity that is to be distinguished from a mere 'formal gesture of 
distance' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 112). Certainly it enacts 'the 
disavowal of the symbolic realm itself: I use symbolic obligations, but I 
am not performatively bound by them' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 112). 
Beyond this, though, is :Lizek's specific point that this exception 
suspends the superego supplement to the law. The being 'put to 
death' or realizing the negative or destitute place of the Subject 
involves recognition of the reifying effects of the obscene libidinal 
investment in the law. 
The anti-ideological gesture par excellence is therefore the 
act of 'subjective destitution' by means of which I renounce 
the treasure in myself and fully admit my dependence on the 
externality of symbolic apparatuses - fully assume the fact 
that my very self-experience of a subject who was already 
here prior to the external process of interpellation is a 
retroactive misrecognition brought about by that very process 
of interpellation ... (The Indivisible Remainder, 166) 
Traversing the fantasy and submitting to the effect of symbolic lack or 
of 'subjective destitution' constitutes the goal in analysis (and the 
presumed point of Christian salvation or of dying in Christ for Lizek). 
There is a full realization and acceptance of the fact that 'the subject 
prior to interpellation-subjectivization is not this imaginary phantasmatic 
depth which allegedly precedes the process of interpellation but the 
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very void which remains once the phantasmatic space is emptied of its 
content' (The Indivisible Remainder, 166-167). Those who have died 
with Christ have escaped the failed process of interpellation through a 
return to the void or empty place which interpellation fills out (The 
Indivisible Remainder, 167). 
Those who 'were made dead to the law through the body of 
Christ' no longer serve the letter of the law as they have dispelled the 
fantasy of this failed interpellation. This suspension is not a neutral or 
merely formal gesture but 'an engaged position of struggle' aimed at 
'the performative force of the "normal" ideological interpellation that 
compels us to accept our determinate place within the sociosymbolic 
edifice' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 112). The excess 'which 
addresses us' in Christianity and Judaism is not 'the excessive 
superego injunction' (an interpellation that depends upon failure) but 
'the Law beyond every measure' -the Law of love (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 112-114). 
Law will lose its 'alienated' character of an external force brutally 
imposing itself on the Subject the moment the Subject renounces its 
own desire for completeness (with its passage through destitution and 
forsaking attachment to the pathological agalma deep within itself) by 
putting this form of subjectivity to death in Christ (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 117). As the next section explains, this move is the critical 
distinction found in love. 
The Critical Difference between Sin and Love - We Serve in Newness 
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For Zizek the distinction within KaT'7Pvf/8'7J1E:v is the first step and 
this must immediately be linked to love. Where Agamben seems to 
allow Christianity only a formal difference from Judaism, Zizek 
suggests that there is a specific and unique element in Christian love. 
'It is only Christianity which properly completes the Law by, in effect, 
getting rid of the undead remainder -and, of course, this completion is 
the Law's self-sublation, its transmutation into Love' (The Monstrosity 
of Christ, 296). He suggests that the exception of Romans (the self-
sublation or 'death in Christ') should not be read in isolation from I 
Corinthians 13 (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 114). 
Though Agamben also appeals to I Corinthians 13, he 
understands it in conjunction with faith and not as adding any positive 
content to Romans 7:6. I Corinthians 13, according to Agamben, 
assigns the characteristics it does to love -without envy, boasting, 
selfishness -precisely because it is not contingent upon anything but 
itself.103 'When the apostle uses this verb (for example, in the 
expression gnosis katargesthetai; I Cor. 13:8), what he is actually 
referring to in katargesis is not the destruction of being (aphanisis tes 
ousias), but the progression toward a better state:104 This 
incompleteness or inoperative state within knowledge makes room for 
103 Agamben assigns the same sort of neutrality to love that he does to faith. 
'Love has no reason, and this is why, in Paul, it is tightly interwoven with faith' 
(Agamben, The Time That Remains, 128). Love cannot be reduced to a reason or 
appeal to certain qualities in the beloved. One does not love because of certain 
qualities, though qualities such as beauty or blandness may be attached to the 
beloved. 'Love does not allow for copulative predication, it never has a quality or an 
essence as its object' (Agamben, The Time That Remains, 128). 
104 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 98. 
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a perfect love, and yet Agamben does not draw this explicit conclusion. 
He does not link KaTf]pyfJef]J.1£V with any specific content such as love. 
Zizek, in contrast, suggests a distinction can be made between the law, 
love and its superego supplement and he links KaTf]pyfJef]J.1£V in I 
Corinthians 13:8 directly to love (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 110).105 
Paul says that without love 'I would be nothing'. The obverse is not 
that with love 'I am something', but 'in love, I am a/so nothing, but, as it 
were a Nothing humbly aware of itself and 'made rich through the very 
awareness of its lack' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 115). Lizek 
illustrates the point with reference to the formula of feminine sexuation. 
Just as woman represents the incompleteness of the phallic structure, 
so too, love is feminine in its structure of acceding to destitution or 
being 'not-all' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 115). Paul's struggle takes 
on a particular shape as a clear cleavage is made between the 
'difference which separates the excess of the Law itself from the Love 
beyond the Law' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 110). By locating and 
reducing the difference within the Subject between the superego 
supplement and agape, Zizek pictures something more than a 'formal 
gesture of distance'; something like war (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 
112-113). 
Love, freed of pathological constraints - of the pathological 
notion of 'some precious treasure that can only be loved', is no longer 
mediated or constrained by sin (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 117). As 
105 Love is itself without a discernible content or connectedness beyond itself 
(Agamben, The Time That Remains, 99). 
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Zizek sums it up, 'the problem ... is not how we are to supplement 
Law with true love ... , but, on the contrary, how we are to accomplish 
the Law by getting rid of the pathological stain of love' (The Puppet and 
the Dwarf, 117). The pathological sort of love is mediated by the law 
and stands in a dialectical relationship to the law on the same order as 
sin. Just as there is no real gap between law and sin - 'their truth is 
their mutual implication or confusion' - so too pathological love falls 
under the law (The Monstrosity of Christ, 272). Instead of seeing love 
as a supplement or alternative exception to the law, Lizek proposes a 
different formula: 'love is Law itself extracted from its mediation by sin' 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 272). Love, in this formula, still takes the 
form of an excess, but it is an exception true to the law and not an 
exception on the order of sin. 
This background explains Lizek's comments surrounding 
Romans 7:1-6. 'In this precise sense, there is no need for a further 
"synthesis" between Law and love: paradoxically, their "synthesis" 
already is the very experience of their radical split' (The Monstrosity of 
Christ,273). While this realization requires a complete shift in 
perspective, this shift in no way entails a displacement of the basic 
structure of the exception. It is not that this structure or its content is to 
be displaced by love, rather love is to displace sin and this is the real 
potential/excess of the law. '[T]he difference between the two couples 
(Law/sin and Law/love) is not substantial, but purely formal: we are 
dealing with the same content in its two modalities' (The Monstrosity of 
Christ, 272). The state of exception (verses 4 and 6), in which the law 
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is no longer in force, has become the point from which the law, love 
and sin are thrown into a completely different perspective. As 
explained in the following section, this remainder or exception 
constitutes the 'ground for the community of love or the 'newness of the 
Spirit in which we serve' which is the summation and conclusion of 
Lizek's and Paul's argument. 
Salvation in Death - We Serve in Newness of the Spirit 
So there are two forms of exception; the masculinelphallic sort 
of exception in which there is a tension between the All (the universal 
law) and its constitutive exception (the point of the exception being to 
constitute or establish the law), and this constitutes sin; then there is 
love, which involves the paradox of the non-all (the law is not complete 
-the big Other does not exist) of the feminine, and this constitutes the 
Spirit (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 116). The Christian community, in 
its true form, achieves the feminine stance of a love of non-all. This 
love is synonymous with the gift of the Spirit 'so that we serve in 
newness of the spirit and not in old ness of the letter' (Rom. 7:6). With 
Christ, this love 'articulates itself as the stance of total immersion in the 
Law' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 116). The law, in which one is 
immersed, is of course, the non-existent law -'the big Other [that] 
doesn't exist' (The Metastases of Enjoyment, 42). 
'The "Holy Spirit" is the community deprived of its support in 
the big Other' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 171). The Church is the 
Holy Spirit and the resurrection precisely in that the letter of the law has 
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been put to death in the body of Christ. 'Christ is resurrected in us, the 
collective of believers, and his tortured dead body remains forever as 
its material remainder' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 287). God is made 
alive in the Church and this is the resurrection of love: 'No one has 
seen God at any time; if we love one another, God abides in us, and 
His love is perfected in us' (I John 4:12). The true miracle of 
Christianity 'is not the dead Christ walking around, but the love in the 
collective of believers' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 291). This collective 
love is the Spirit, but of course it is a spirit attained through dissolution 
of the very notion of Spirit. 
Zizek contrasts his understanding with Lacan's position, in which 
'the Holy Spirit stands for the symbolic order as that which cancels (or 
rather, suspends) the entire domain of "life"' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 
296). Zizek suggests this is an inaccurate picture of both Judaism and 
Christianity. In his estimate the death of Christ and the coming of the 
Holy Spirit is an exposure of the fundamental fantasy structuring the 
Subject. Christianity makes possible a true atheism in which the death 
of Christ constitutes the death of the big Other. The true 
accomplishment of the Holy Spirit is an atheism which can say, not 
simply '''I don't believe", but "I no longer have to rely on a big Other 
who believes for me" -the true formula of atheism is "there is no big 
Other'" (The Monstrosity of Christ, 297). What this means in practical 
terms is that Christianity functions in the same way as psychoanalysis 
in that it brings about a shift in the Subject by exposing the non-existent 
Other. With the end of analysis there is a 'dissolution of transference' -
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which is to say the analyst has played the role of Christ as a 'self-
undermining big Other' .106 
The Peculiar Nihilism of Zitek 
The demonstration above of the manner in which Zizek can 
locate his theory in Romans 7 indicates that he is working within a 
broad Pauline understanding. However, where Paul depends 
specifically on the suspension of the law enacted in the death of Christ, 
Zizek's theory depends upon death as suspension, as opposed to the 
specific 'death of Christ'. As John Milbank notes, Christ is not just an 
exception (homo sacer), but the exception to the exception, in that as 
the God-man he fully experiences separation from God so as to bridge 
and close the gap.107 Where Zizek holds that the crucifixion and 
resurrection amount to the same thing (The Monstrosity of Christ, 287), 
Paul's message is that the death of Jesus must be understood along 
with the fact that 'he has been raised from the dead in order that we 
may bear fruit for God' (Rom. 7:4). Where Paul concentrates on the 
distinctive power of Christ's death to rescue from death (7:4, 6), Zizek 
pictures the death of the distinctive identity of Christ as death's salvific 
power: 'this is why his death is so shattering, an ontological (not only 
ethical) scandal' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 285). Even God, as shown 
in Christ, cannot survive death and the obliterating power of death 
brings the destruction of even the one presumed to represent absolute 
106 Kotsko, Zizek, 98. 
107 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 82. 
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symbolic difference. According to Zizek, Christ's death enacts at a 
'performative' level (as opposed to a mere propositional level) the 
possibility to traverse the fantasy and to found a new form of humanity' 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 285). Paul's new humanity, however, is not 
marked merely by subjective destitution but by the possibility of being 
joined to or belonging to another (7:4). In Paul's imagery Christ makes 
relationship possible as through Christ the alienated relationship 
(perhaps in accord with Zizek's understanding of no possibility of 
relationship) has been transformed into unity and belonging ('you have 
died to the law through the body of Christ, so that you may belong to 
another' - 7:4) (the subject of the next chapter). 
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CHAPTER 3 
LIFE BEYOND THE LIE OF THE DEATH DRIVE THROUGH 
BAPTISM 
Where the first chapter of this thesis sets forth Freud, Lacan, 
and lizek's notion of the death drive as founded in a primordial lie (the 
psychology of nihilism) and the second chapter connects this 
understanding with lizek's exposition of Romans 7, this chapter will 
examine Romans 6 - 8 as an intervention in lizek's reading of Paul on 
the dynamics of death. Romans 7 serves lizek in his articulation of 
how law (language) is the structuring principle of the Subject; Paul's 
conception of sin and the sinful Subject is built upon a very specific 
deception, and this account is very similar to that of lizek in broad 
outline. However, what lizek misconstrues and in part misses is 
Paul's picture of Christ's alternative to the law accessed through his 
death and resurrection; an alternative opened to all through baptism. 
In Romans 7:7ff sin is depicted as a singular structure described as a 
living death, while Romans 6 offers a counterpoint in baptism into 
Christ's death - a death to live by as outlined in Romans 8. The former 
describes life as controlled by an orientation to death (a primordial 
deception and a destructive drive), while the latter describes death as a 
passage into resurrection life. The proposal set forth in this chapter is 
that death-in-life is an orientation that describes one form of the human 
Subject, and the alternative of Romans 6 and 8, life-in-death or the 
death to live by, amounts to an alternative constitution of the Subject 
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which can be traced in Romans 6 and 8 employing lizek's interpretive 
strategy and Lacanian categories. 
Thus while lizek's analysis of the death drive allows for a 
reorientation to (or within) death, the Christian belief in Christ's death 
and resurrection calls for an attempt to both think through and beyond 
lizek's materialist reading of Paul. So there is the necessity to think 
against lizek. Even in this 'thinking against' though, lizek will prove a 
helpful antagonist in bringing clarity to the departure that belief in Christ 
entails (a departure and contrast which Paul sets up between Romans 
7 and 8). 
We need to keep in mind key differences between lizekian 
discourse and Pauline theology so as to keep the implication and 
application of his theory in proper perspective. lizek's atheistic 
materialism means that even when he is employing Pauline language 
he is construing its function within his materialistic worldview built on 
the primacy of finitude. Sin and death and salvation work within lizek's 
materialistic interpretive frame within an ontological finitude, so that 
death (in the death drive and the real) marks the limit and potential of 
his explanation of the Subject. In lizek's discourse, the language of 
salvation will still be working within the same parameters of possibility 
as sin and death.1 The challenge, then, is to articulate Paul's 
understanding of the Christian Subject over and against lizek's 
1 Lizek's work is largely aimed at overcoming false notions of the infinite 
posited in God, the Law or the Other. The positing of this bad infinite (superego) 
gives rise to a living death. The infinite, in this sense is a negation of the finite and 
material, so to negate this negation (in his Hegelian terms) will bring a return of the 
world. The question is if this double negation brings a return of the world or whether 
it constitutes an absolutizing of negation. See Milbank's discussion on this in the 
Monstrosity of Christ, 212. 
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interpretation of the Subject of Romans 7:14ff. On the other hand, the 
psychoanalytic discourse of Lizek and Lacan, despite its difference 
from theology, can illuminate theological discourse. 
To meet the goal of staging a dialogue between Lizek and Paul 
the organization of this chapter follows a three step process: First, I will 
explicate Lizek's own reading of Paul in Romans 6-8 (primarily 6:2, 10; 
7:7ff; and 8:2) establishing the set of equivalences he makes between 
Pauline categories and his own. Next I offer a reading of Paul 
(focusing on 6:2, 10; 7:7-24) in Pauline terms within his historical 
context. Third I offer (in dealing with chapter 8) a Pauline reading of 
Paul in Zizek's terms, which makes closer use of attention to Paul's 
articulation of his categories to go beyond or correct Lizek. 
In broad terms there is correspondence between Lizek and 
Paul in their description of the predicament of the human situation 
(primarily Romans 7), while the contrast drawn between Paul and Lizek 
does not simply stage an artificial dialogue but supports a dialogue 
within Paul (between Romans 7 and 8). 
Dying with Christ in Zizek 
This section, under the four headings extracted from Romans, 
introduces a Lizekian reading of a portion of Romans 6 and 8 in which 
he builds on and expands his reading of Romans 7. While his theory 
has been introduced in the previous chapter, this section attempts to 
determine where and how his basic terms (e.g., death drive, superego, 
real, traversing the fantasy etc.) fit in his reading of Paul. Lizek 
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provides a direct correlation of most of his terms with that of Paul; 
though where he does not offer a direct reading it is fairly clear where 
his vocabulary fits into this reading.2 
The Law of Sin and Death 
:lizek's discussion of Paul focuses most intensely on Romans 7, 
but he locates much of the rest of his reading in the immediate 
chapters surrounding 7 in chapter 5-6 and 8. Paul sums up the 
account of sin, death and the law in these chapters in the phrase 'the 
law of sin and death' in 8:2. This section explores the connection :lizek 
makes between sin and the 'death drive' to sin and explains how it 
functions in regard to the law in his theory. 
:lizek links sin directly to the death drive, which he describes as 
that lure or excess which draws humans out of or beyond life into 
death.3 'Sin', he explains, 'is the excess which burdened the human 
race' (On Belief, 105). The excess is what 'pushes man to continuing 
renovation, since he never can fully integrate this excess into his life 
process' (On Belief, 105). It is what pushed the original humans out of 
the Garden in what is called 'Original sin' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 
22) and it is this 'infinite craving of Nothing for Something' which 
describes 'the ontological condition of all subjects' (Reader, 135). This 
formula already contains the delusion or lure of the death drive in that 
2 2 : i ~ e k k does not provide a reading of the real in regard to Paul's 'body of sin' 
but as demonstrated below this is implicit in his reading of Paul. 
3 Lacan linked the compulsion to repeat of the death drive to sin. 'Sin is from 
then on present as the third term, and it is no longer following the path of 
reminiscence, but rather is following that of repetition, that man finds his way ... so you 
see the meaning of man's need for repetition. It's all to do with the intrusion of the 
symbolic order' (Seminar //,87-88). 
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the Something is not itself over and against the Nothing; rather it is 
'Something which gives body to the Nothing' (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 23). This excess Something giving rise to desire is not 
something which exists, as desire is related to that which does not exist 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 298) 
The passage through sin or death drive opens up nature so that 
sin is a passage from na'ive existence to existence within the realm of 
knowledge or the symbolic. 'Original Sin itself, the abyssal disturbance 
of primeval Peace' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 24) creates a wound or 
cut in nature which constitutes human subjectivity. Into the realm of 
immediate sense experience and 'natural' animal copulating a gap has 
been introduced through death drive or sin which constitutes the 
Subject. Sin, in this understanding, is not something which Adam or 
anyone 'falls into', as if they were fully functioning Subjects prior to the 
event; rather sin is the passage into human subjectivity. 
As in the Garden what creates the possibility for the opening of 
sin is created through the prohibition. 'Law generates sin and feeds 
on it', but to presume that 'God gave Law to men in order to make 
them conscious of their sin, even to make them sin all the more, and 
thus make them aware of their need for salvation ... does this 
reading not involve a strangely perverse notion of God?' (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 272-273). The formal condition for subjectivity 
is to be found in the positing of the symbolic/law and transgressive 
desire (death drive) which are each connected with sin, but when it is 
understood these are necessary elements to the human Subject, sin 
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and salvation can be seen, not as two separate moves, but as 
simultaneous (The Monstrosity of Christ, 273). 
Prior to the fall humans are pictured as existing in harmony 
with nature and obeying their natural drives. With the fall a sense of 
disharmony and of shame have 'entered in', but the split evoked by 
shame and disharmony creates the realization of a possible 
synthesis. The synthesis cannot precede differentiation if synthesis is 
to even be posed as a possibility. The gap separating man from 
nature, from himself and from God is precisely the gap in which he is 
constituted. The dream of closing the gap between the real and the 
symbolic is to miss the fact that they are constituted through the gap 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 275). This is the pervert's dream which 
Paul states in various formulas in chapters 6-7.4 The pervert 
relinquishes himself to this force and the 'Self is ultimately 
experienced as "dead"' (Ticklish Subject, 149). The 'life-impulse, my 
desire, appears to me as a foreign automatism that persists in 
following its path independently of my conscious Will and intentions' 
(Ticklish Subject, 149). Identity is not with the impulse to life but with 
the 'excess' force of sin. By offering the self as an instrument of this 
force there is the perception of tapping directly into the power behind 
the law (or grace). That is, from within the economy of the law (the 
law of sin and death), the excessive superego injunctions (giving rise 
.. Paul raises a similar question in 6:1 to that in 7:7, which ~ i f e k k connects with 
the position of the pervert: 'What shall we say then? Are we to continue in sin that 
grace may abound?' This 'continuing in sin' describes a relinquishing of human 
agency to sin or the death drive so that grace might be enacted. This is the problem 
~ i f e k k locates in chapter 7; 'It is not I, the subject, who transgresses the Law, it is non-
subjectivized ·Sin" itself (Ticklish Subject. 149). 
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to perverse questions such as, 'Are we to continue in sin that grace 
may abound' (Rom. 6:1)) 'no longer imposes specific, determinate, 
prohibitions and! or injunctions ... but just reverberates as an empty 
tautological Prohibition: don't . . .' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 104). 
This absolute law requires infinite payment and even this infinite 
payment does not satisfy the continual pressure of the law's 
demands. 'Christ's death cannot but appear as the ultimate assertion 
of the Law, as the elevation of the Law into an unconditional 
superego agency which burdens us, its subjects, and with a debt we 
will never be able to repay' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 103). 
It is this perverse superego pressure, equated with the law, 
which Lizek describes as connected to the reversal of the law's 
commands into acts of disobedience (equating the law with sin and 
sinning that grace may abound). As Freud described it the 
"masochism in him creates a temptation to 'sinful acts' which must be 
expiated by the reproaches of the sadistic conscience" (The 
Economic Problem in Masochism, 266). Instead of precise 
prohibitions not to kill or steal, 'the true superego injunction is just the 
truncated "You shall not!" -do what? (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 
105).5 The superego splits the commandment into the prohibition 
'You shall not!' and the obscene injunction 'Kill!' (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 105). The 'You shall not!' with its infinite weight raises the 
question 'I shall not -what? I have no idea what is being demanded 
of me! Che vuoi?' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 105). Under this 
5 As argued below Paul seems to purposefully foreshorten the command from 
the Decalogue to make transgression inherent with the encounter with the law. 
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pressure to do something but not being sure what, '''1'11 just explode, 
and start killing!" Thus killing is the desperate response to the 
impenetrable abstract superego prohibition' (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 105). Giving in to the obscene superego demand gives rise to 
a sacrificial economy continually aimed at meeting the all-consuming 
desire of the Law or the Other who stands behind the law. 
Beginning with Freud the death drive was considered to do its 
work through delusion and the goal of therapy was to expose the 
illusion.6 This perhaps explains the heavy emphasis in Zizek's 
theology upon the role of revelation. If sin and the death drive are 
equated then sin functions as a delusion, the resolution for which is 
exposure in revelation. Zizek's reading of the significance of the 
death of Christ is focused on his death as revelation (The Puppet and 
the Dwarf, 127). Specifically what is revealed in Christ is the death 
dealing orientation to the law through the coordinate of the obscene 
superego supplement to the law. 'Since the function of the obscene 
superego supplement of the (divine) Law is to mask this impotence of 
the big Other, and since Christianity reveals this impotence ... 
Christianity is the religion of Revelation: everything is revealed in it' 
(The Puppet and the Dwarf, 127). The death of Christ is the exposure 
of the obscene superego economy of sacrifice (death drive), or to 
state it in Pauline terms the exposure of the deception of sin in regard 
to the law which killed me (Rom. 7: 11). Where Christ, in a sacrificial 
6 Since the super-ego suppresses the Oedipus complex. it constitutes a 
corruption of access to memory. and this corruption is carried out in and through a 
punishing sense of guilt. The ego and the superego describe how the self becomes 
inaccessible to the self through a delusion (The Ego and the Id, 50). 
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understanding, might be seen as representing this Other, in lizek's 
theology Christ's death directly addresses the problem of a Subject 
caught up in the delusion or fantasy of a big Other (Did somebody 
Say Totalitarianism, 49-50). 
The impetus behind his project, which he translates into his 
reading of Paul, is the exposure of the workings of the death drive 
and the fundamental fantasy. The fundamental fantasy posits the 
notion of an access to Being (the drive of the real) through the law 
(the symbolic) which gives rise to the imaginary. The Subject is 
structured around an absence, and the reification of this absence in 
the fundamental fantasy marks the origin and core of the Subject. It 
is not the supposed noumenal real that harbours danger for the 
Subject; it is the exposure of this fundamental fantasy that threatens 
the consistency of the existence of the Subject: 'the moment the 
subject comes too close to this fantasmatic core, it loses the 
consistency of its existence'(Reader, 119). The death drive operates 
under the cover of this 'primordial lie' destined to deceive the Subject 
by providing the fantasmatic foundation of his or her being (The 
Fragile Absolute, 70). The self-positing and self-grounding Subject is 
dependent on the primordial repression, as beneath the fantasy of an 
access to Being lies the real or the death drive (The Fragile Absolute, 
72). The death drive is not itself involved in either truth or lies but 
precedes the place of the truth (the symbolic) as an untruth or the 
place of concealment and mystery (The Fragile Absolute, 80). 
Obscuring the untruth of the death drive is the 'fundamental fantasy' 
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the 'primordial lie', 'older than truth itself as it 'sustains our being-in-
the-world, our dwelling within the symbolic universe, and which, in 
order to be operative, has to remain "primordially repressed'" (The 
Fragile Absolute, 82-83).7 Revelation in this framework is the most 
powerful of forces as it unleashes the creative power of death drive 
grounding the Subject. 
The Body of Sin 
The specific way in which this relates to Romans is that Lizek 
sees this process, following Freud and Lacan, as arising around the 
real of the body. Though the real is in many ways his most 
impenetrable category it is founded on what is most concrete in his 
theory - the mortal body. The 'treasure within' or the 'soul' or 
'substance' that is attached to the body amounts to a departure from 
the body. The original sacrificial relation is established within the 
Subject (with passage through the mirror stage) between the imaginary 
(the ego or 'I') and the symbolic (the superego) which establishes the 
alienated distance from the real of the body. The passage is from 
being a body to establishing a symbolic distance from the body (and 
having a body): 'the body exists in the order of having -/ am not my 
body, / have it' (Organs without Bodies, 121). Self-consciousness 
arises simultaneously with the realization and refusal of the body and 
its mortal contingencies (sexuality/castration) so that the Subject arises 
7 The lie of the death drive sets up the necessary coordinates of identity by 
providing transcendence (God, the Other, etc.) in a materialist universe. L:ifek will in 
no way presume to get rid of this necessary coordinate. 
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over and against the real of the body.8 The symbolic or the soul 'has to 
be paid for by the death, murder even, of its empirical bearer' (The 
Lizek Reader, vii). 
Zizek describes the process as giving rise to two bodies. That 
body which one might think can be reduced to the biological dimension 
is refused: the 'subject turns away from her biological body in disgust, 
unable to accept that she "is" her body' (Organs without Bodies, 93).9 
Since 'the body refuses to obey the soul and starts to speak on its own, 
in the symptoms in which the subject's soul cannot recognize itself she 
rejects the body (Organs without Bodies, 93). But this body that is 
rejected cannot be equated with the biological body as the body has 
already been overlaid with the symbolic 'forcefully distorting its normal 
functioning' (Organs without Bodies, 93). So there is the biological 
body and this second body: 
the body that is the proper object of psychoanalysis, the body 
as the inconsistent composite of erogenous zones, the body 
as the surface of the inscription of the traces of traumas and 
excessive enjoyments, the body through which the 
unconscious speaks. (Organs without Bodies, 93) 
It is this second body, and not the physical or biological body per se, 
which the Subject struggles against and which makes up unconscious 
8 The Phallus as the signifier of castration 'is the signifier, organ or both of 
desexualization itself. of the "impossible" passage of "body" into symbolic "thought". 
the signifier that sustains the neutral surface of "asexual" sense' (Organs without 
Bodies, 90). 
9 Elsewhere he describes the relation between the symbolic and Real: 'The 
impossibility of the Real refers to the failure of its symbolization: the Real is the virtual 
hard core around which these symbolizations fluctuate; these symbolizations are 
always and by definition provisory and unstable, the only "certainty· is that of the void 
of the Real which they (presup) pose' (Living in the End Times, 107). 
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experience constituting desire. The biological body with its biological 
interests (well-being, survival, reproduction) is not at the center of the 
human subject but the true 'interior' is this second body. When 'we 
penetrate the subject's innermost sanctum, the very core of its 
Unconscious, what we find there is the pure surface of a fantasmatic 
screen' (Organs without Bodies, 93). Zizek describes the rise of this 
screen of the fundamental fantasy as an attempt to 'outpass myself into 
death' (Tarrying with the Negative, 76). One hastens to assume death 
in the form of the letter or symbolic ('potentially my epitaph') in order to 
avoid it (Tarrying with the Negative, 76). 
In the mirror stage it is the image of the body and the body's 
coherence which acts as an 'orthopedic complement' of feelings and 
experience arising from the body (Seminar 11/, 95). As Zizek describes 
it the entry into the symbolic is the passage from being a body to 
establishing a symbolic distance from the body (Organs without 
Bodies, 121). Self-consciousness arises simultaneously with the 
realization and refusal of the body and its mortal contingencies 
(sexuality/castration) so that the Subject arises over and against the 
real of the body. As Lacan pictures it, 'The being of language is the 
non-being of objects' (Ecrits: Selection, 263).10 The particular object 
which language negates is the body. As Zizek describes, the 
antagonistic dialectic between the imaginary and symbolic (or the ego 
and superego) takes place through the displacement of the physical 
body (Organs without Bodies, 93). As Pound puts it in regard to 
10 Quoted in Boothby. Freud as Philosopher, 155. 
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Zizek's theory, 'there is no materiality, only the negativity of the real, 
i.e., the body present only in its absence, and which over and against 
stands the symbolic,.11 In this precise sense one can say that fantasy, 
in its most basic dimension, implies the choice of thought at the 
expense of being: in fantasy, I find myself reduced to the evanescent 
point of a thought contemplating the course of events during my 
absence ... (Tarrying with the Negative, 64). 
Death becomes an experience which the body undergoes but 
which is witnessed ('experienced') by the fantasy gaze. Lizek 
illustrates the fantasy gaze with It's a Wonderful Life in which the 
Jimmy Stewart character observes his hometown from the 
perspective of one who has died or who was never born (Tarrying 
with the Negative, 63). Death is avoided by presuming a position of 
total objectivity verging on absence. 'Cogito designates this very 
point at which the "I" loses its support in the symbolic network of 
tradition and thus, in a sense which is far from metaphorical, ceases 
to exist' (Tarrying with the Negative, 64). By identifying with absence 
(death) or with an empty signifier, death is forestalled at the expense 
of life. 
So the body in its biological and mortal function is not available 
in the symbolic realm of identity. The body of this symbolic identity 
displaces the flesh and blood reality of the mortal body as identity in 
the symbolic realm depends upon the gap between the physical body 
and symbolic identity. Lizek's linking of the death drive with the real 
11 Pound, lizek, 69. 
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of the body points to the necessity that the biological body serve as 
the marker of absence. Absence and negation (absenting and 
negating the body) is the dynamic of repression giving the symbolic 
its 'life' .12 Paul's 'body of death' (7:24), it will be argued below, is the 
formula in which he sums up the dynamic of sin described from 7:7ff, 
which means that Paul's understanding is also of a split in the 'I' in 
which the body takes on an alien relation as it is animated by sin. 
The identity of the 'I' under the law in Paul's description and Zizek's 
relation to the real of the body under the symbolic describe the same 
basic construct. 
Dying To Sin 
This section and the next trace Zizek's understanding of Paul's 
notion of 'dying to sin in Christ' or the meaning of the death of Christ 
for one who would follow him. The next section extends this notion 
into Zizek's more all encompassing framework of salvation which he 
links to baptism. 
If sin names the gap, Zizek maintains, salvation cannot be its 
closure or its dissolution. The resolution of the gap of sin is not 
through an abolition of difference but through its full admission (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 274). The resolution of 'dying to sin' as it is 
found in Romans 6, under this view, cannot be read as dOing away 
with the element which is synonymous with sin (the death drive); 
12 The passive absence and negation is the symbolic experience of a force 
that seems to arise from outside the self from the absenting and negating actions of 
the death drive of the real - which is the subject, but the unapproachable aspect of 
the subject from the symbolic. 
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rather salvation will involve full identity with this surplus - which is 
what Christ does in his death. Christ identifies himself completely 
with the wound of sin and death and this is the paradox of salvation: 
'getting rid of the wound, healing it, is ultimately the same as fully and 
directly identifying with it - this is the ambiguity inscribed into the 
figure of Christ' {On Belief, 104}. Christ incarnates the surplus {God 
in the flesh} and his death is 'the obliteration of this excess' {On 
Belief, 105}. The excess might take the form of any superego 
supplement to human subjectivity, but God is the ultimate excess. 
Christ's embodiment and death gets rid of the excess for all who 
follow him. So where the Fall is the story 'of how the human animal 
contracted the excess of Life ... Christ then freely assumes, 
contracts onto himself, the excess {"Sin"} which burdened the human 
race' {On Belief, 105}. 
In his discussion of Romans 5-6, Lizek addresses the meaning 
of the death of Christ for the Christian. The wrong understanding, in 
Lizek's view is the sacrificial reading, which simply reinforces the 
excess (sin, death drive) as it is apprehended through the deception 
of the fundamental fantasy (the primordial deception giving coherence 
to the subject).13 The Subject arises from the self-negating activity of 
sacrifice {castration} and sacrifice is a guarantee that 'the Other 
exists': that there is an Other who can be appeased by means of the 
13 The sacrificial economy can be said to be wrong only in a relative sense as 
it is like the castration complex itself a necessary stage or foundation (The Puppet 
and the Dwarf, 103). 
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sacrifice' (Enjoy Your Symptom, 56).14 To read the sacrifice of Christ 
within this economy is to reinforce the sinful subject.15 He says, 
'people are freed from sin, not by Christ's death as such, but by 
sharing in Christ's death, by dying to sin, to the way of flesh' (The 
Puppet and the Dwarf, 102). In Zizek's explanation of the 
alternatives, one can either take up the subject position of Christ and 
'die to' the identity found in Adam (the subject of the superego}-
having the faith of Christ (ridding one's self of the superego 
supplement to the Law) or one can have faith in Christ and in his 
propitiating sacrifice (reinforcing the superego) (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 102-103).16 Where faith in Christ has to do with faith in the 
propitiating power of Christ's payment for sin (we can trust in Christ 
who has paid the penalty), the faith of Christ calls for imitating Christ's 
faith (walking as he walked and living as he lived) and this constitutes 
a kind of deliverance as 'people are freed from sin not by Christ's 
death as such, but by sharing in Christ's death, by dying to sin, to the 
way of the flesh' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 102).17 
Baptized Into His Death 
14 The sacrificial economy arises as part of the operation of entry into 
language and 'instillation of the symbolic function'. See Pound, t.i2ek, 45. 
15 2 : i ~ e k ' s s critique of the sacrificial economy recognizes a perversity in regard 
to the law which, it will be argued below, Paul also rejects. 
16 2iiek poses both possibilities but suggests the faith in Christ has more to 
do with the faith Christ possesses (as the one who believes on our behalf) than it 
does with belief in the divinity and particular power of Christ. This comes closest to 
option 2 above but 2 : i ~ e k k seeks to trace this shift in purely psychoanalytic and not 
sacramental terms. 
17 One realizes lack or subjective destitution in traversing the fantasy and this 
is the realization taken up in Christ. 
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The key metaphor of Romans 6 occurs at the beginning of the 
chapter in verse 3, where Paul raises the question regarding baptism, 
'Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ 
Jesus were baptized into his death?,18 This question serves to initiate 
and organize the discussion of Chapter 6. With his discussion of 
baptism, Zizek incorporates 'death to sin' (traversing the fantasy), but 
he also sees baptism as the final stage in his theology as it is the point 
of initiation into the community of the Holy Spirit. 
Lizek uses the imagery of baptism to make his point that the 
'relationship between Death and Life in the figure of Christ. .. is the 
same thing viewed from a different global perspective' (The Monstrosity 
of Christ, 292). The death of Christ is eternal life 'in becoming' (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 292). Baptism fuses the death of Christ with 
eternal life so that the two are embraced together, not in the sense that 
one succeeds the other, but because the death of Christ is the eternal 
life he offers. Death, in this sense is not aufgehoben or suspended in 
life; rather the two are one and the same (The Monstrosity of Christ, 
292). The eternal life fostered through the death of Christ is the 
community which can merge in a new sort of human bond called Holy 
Spirit. Baptism is inclusive then of 'dying to sin' and of the specific new 
community that forms as a result. 
Those baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death, 
and this death displaces and counters the death drive of the 
transgressive relation to the Law. In 'imitatio Christi, we REPEAT 
18 English Standard Version. Rom. 6:3. 
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Christ's gesture of freely assuming the excess of Life, instead of 
projecting/displacing it onto some figure of the Other' (On Belief, 105). 
As :lizek notes in regard to psychoanalysis, but an understanding 
which he extends to Paul, is that neither 'remain within the confines of 
the 'morbid' masochistic obsession with death' (The Ticklish Subject, 
152). The death of Christ directly addresses 'the perverse 
intermingling of Life and Death which characterizes the dialectics of 
prohibitory Law that generates the desire for transgression' (The 
Ticklish Subject, 152). In :lizek's description of the death drive, it is by 
definition an 'enigmatic signifier' holding out the false promise of a 
'beyond' or a substantialized notion of death per se (On Belief, 100-
101). Christ's death is a negation of this understanding in that he 
passes through death. This process of undergoing subjective 
destitution, summed up in Lacan's phrase 'traversing the fantasy', 
involves a reorientation to the law through death-like realization.19 
Baptism, like the death of Christ, brings life and death into their 
properly 'parallactic' relationship of being 'one and the same event' 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 292). 
The superego is the point at which the death drive is articulated 
and the death of Christ, for :lizek, reveals the lack of 'substance' or the 
void (the reality of the Other or of God) behind the message.20 As 
representative of the exposure of the superego two results surface: 
19 This may refer to the dereliction and death of Christ or of his follower in 
i d e n t i f y i n ~ ~ with him. Or it may simply refer to the realization that there is no Other. 
2 The lack of substance is of course what serves in place of substance in 
2 i ~ e k ' s s theory. Milbank captures this point: 'For the L a c a n i a n / 2 i ~ e k i a n n "Real" is less 
a creative force (natural or cultural) than it is the inte"uptus of the absolutely negative 
which sacrificially refuses the "All" in the name of nothing, yet brings about the short-
circuitings and the switches' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 121). 
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where the obscene superego gives rise to the economy of absolute 
sacrifice, Christ turns the message around to say, 'I don't want 
anything from you!'; and second, 'this gift of no requirements will 
require your very soul' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 170). The Subject 
is so drastically reoriented through identifying with the death of Christ 
that this constitutes a new form of the Subject. 'Here enters the "good 
news" of Christianity: the miracle of faith is that it IS possible to 
traverse the fantasy, to undo the founding decision, to start one's life all 
over again, from the zero point - in short to change eternity itself (On 
Belief, 148).21 Christ suspends this circular logic in which the Subject 
is attempting to ground himself and exposes the fantasy of this 
supposed substantial ground -a ground that exacts the payment of a 
living death (Did somebody Say Totalitarianism, 49-50). 
Zizek's formula 'Crucifixion is Resurrection' contains the cure; 
'one has only to include oneself in the picture' (The Monstrosity of 
Christ, 291). As Conor Cunningham has restated the formula, 'I am not 
alive therefore I cannot die' and this constitutes a kind of eternallife.22 
The resurrection of Christ has to be understood as a resurrection which 
takes place in the follower of Christ and the way in which it is made a 
reality is through the move of subjective destitution. Those united with 
him in a death like his, crucified with Christ, shall certainly be united 
with him in a resurrection like his.23 'When the believers gather, 
21 Emphasis in the original. 
22 Relayed in conversation. 
23 See Romans 6:5 & 8 
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mourning Christ's death, their shared spirit is the resurrected Christ' 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 291 }.24 
In this instance love is not beyond the Law; they have passed 
through death (symbolic destitution) and mourning and have shared 
the death of the one who embodies the Law. The true Pauline 
Christian communities (found today in radical political groups rather 
than churches) 'assume all the consequences of what Lacan called the 
nonexistence of the big Other, and it is only Christianity that opens up 
the space for thinking this nonexistence, insofar as it is the religion of a 
God who dies' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 287). Zizek's atheistic 
theology shares the conservative theological perspective that the 
specific work of Christ is necessary for 'salvation'. It is Christ alone 
that reveals the nonexistence of God, not through a symbolic gesture, 
but at the level of the real, opening up, as a result, new forms of human 
community built on an alternative subjectivity. 
The Law of Sin and Death 
The remainder of this chapter examines Paul's understanding of 
sin and how Christ's death addresses and resolves the problem of sin 
in the life of the believer in Romans 6-8 and it compares this 
understanding to that of Zizek. The meaning of sin as it occurs in 7:7ff 
and the meaning of 'death to sin' in 6:2, 10 is the primary focus, with a 
concluding section on the displacement of 'the law of sin and death' 
24 2 : i ~ e k k illustrates the community of the Holy Spirit with the song about the 
union organizer 'Joe Hill' who is pictured in the song as living on, though killed by the 
authorities, in the trade union. 'The immortal dimension in man, that in man for what 
"takes more than guns to kill," the Spirit, is what went on to organize itself (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 268-269). 
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with 'the law of the Spirit' in 8:2ff. I will begin by showing that lizek's 
and Paul's analysis of the problem coincides on key points (Le., the 
antagonistic self-relation under the law due to a deceptive desire which 
is oriented to death). Paul sums up this universal problem as 'the body 
of death' or 'the body of sin', and this is analogous in its key elements 
with lizek's notion of the Subject of the death drive. 
The author makes no claim to be a New Testament specialist so 
this section will follow scholarly consensus for the most part. Where 
there is departure from the majority opinion there will still be appeal to 
and support from New Testament specialists. 
The Context of Romans 
In order to make the point that Zizek's reading of Paul on sin 
and death is close to Paul's own understanding in Romans 6-8, we 
need first to locate those chapters in their context in the letter. This 
opening section shows how the theme of sin and death which is 
overcome in Christ (as found in chapters 6-8), fits in with the main 
thrust of the argument of the letter establishing the universal nature of 
the gospel. 
The letter makes sense if we posit a conflict between Jewish 
and Gentile Christians within the Christian community in Rome which 
Paul is seeking to resolve by showing the differences of these two 
groups are resolved within a universal understanding. The date of 
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Romans can be tied to somewhere between 52-59 A.D.,25 in the period 
subsequent to Claudius decree of expulsion (49 A.D.) which seems to 
have been a result of the disputes arising among the Jews with the 
preaching of the Gospel in Rome.26 The Church in Rome may have 
been started by Jews from Rome present on the day of Pentecost, as 
the Jewish community in Rome maintained close ties to Jerusalem 
(paying the Temple tax, and making pilgrimages to Jerusalem), which 
would also account for a Church that was originally meeting in the 
synagogues and perhaps causing the conflict giving rise to the 
expulsion.27 According to Stuhlmacher, the churches were forced into 
meeting in homes and during the absence of the Jews and the move to 
Gentile house churches (as evidenced in chapter 16) Jewish food 
restrictions and other Jewish practices were phased OUt.28 With the 
death of Claudius and the beginning of the reign of Nero (54 A.D.) the 
25 In 15: 19ff Paul informs them that his work in the east is finished and he 
plans to go to Spain. He describes taking up an offering to take to Jerusalem which 
puts him in the midst of his third missionary Journey (Acts 20). He mentions Achaia 
and Macedonia but makes no mention of Galatia and Asia which may be the latest 
churches he has visited on his way to Jerusalem. This may place him in Corinth 
where the accession of Gallio as proconsul (51 A.D.) provides a time marker. Paul is 
brought before Gallio in 51 or 52. For these reasons Schreiner locates him in 
Corinth, writing at the earliest in 54 A.D (Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 1998), 4). Dodd using the same logic dates the letter at 
late as 59 (C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: Collins/Fontana 
Books, 1959), 18-19). Barrett places the date between January and March of 55 (C. 
K. Barrett, Epistle to the Romans (London: A & C Black Publishers Ltd, 1957).4-5). 
Stuhlmacher dates the return of the exiled Jews to 56 and sets this as the time of the 
writing (Peter Stuhlmacher. Paul's Letter to the Romans: A Commentary, trans. Scott 
J. Hafemann (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994),8). 
26 The decree affected Jewish Christians as it is due to this decree that Aquila 
and Priscilla are in Corinth (Acts 18:2). Stuhlmacher describes this result along with 
the decree against any public gathering of a political nature since the murder of 
Caesar in 44, which would have included the perception of public Church gatherings 
considering the recent expulsion due to the agitator 'Chrestus' the historian 
Suetonius's apparently mistaken name for Christ (Stuhlmacher, Paul's Letter to the 
Romans2 6-7). 
7 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1993),29. 
28 Stuhlmacher, Paul's Letter to the Romans, 7. 
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Jewish Christians returned to Rome in large numbers to find the 
Church was less accommodating to Jewish practices and that there 
was no chance of being accepted back into the Jewish community. 
They had to adjust to a church that had become Gentile in its practices 
and the Gentile house churches had to adjust to the Jewish presence 
in this new circumstance (see chapter 14).29 As Ziesler notes this may 
have been the clear breaking point of the Church from the Jewish 
community so that Paul's letter is acting to mediate the transition, 
arguing for toleration of but also liberation from Jewish practices.3D 
Paul writes then, to answer arguments that may have arisen 
about the role of the Jewish law and practices in salvation and to act as 
mediator in the transition of this key Church into a status distinct from 
Judaism. Theologically he will demonstrate that the purpose of the law 
is fulfilled in Christ and this purpose is inclusive of a mind-set, ethic and 
life-style (pleasing to God - 8:8) which the law alone was powerless to 
deliver. The Mosaic law only accentuated the need for the enabling 
power of the law of life in the Spirit. The theological argument and the 
social development converge in the theme of universality as this new 
community will no longer bear the marks of exclusive rituals and 
practices as it will embody the reality of a new form of humanity 'in 
Christ'. 
29 Fitzmyer notes that by this time the Jewish Christians would not have been 
welcomed back into the Jewish community so that they would have had to 
congregate in house churches (Fitzmyer, Romans, 33). 
30 John Ziesler, Paul's Letter to the Romans (London: SCM Press, 2003),14-
15. Stuhlmacher offers a slightly different reading of the situation, suggesting that 
Paul is afraid that his Jewish Christian opponents are turning the Romans against his 
Gospel prior to his arrival so he is writing to answer their slanderous accusation and 
to inform them of his true intentions (Stuhlmacher, Paul's Letter to the Romans, 6. 
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To understand the contribution of chapters 6-8 to the letter, we 
need to grasp the larger argument to which they belong. The thrust of 
that argument concerns the continuity of salvation-history or how God 
has been and is now making people right in the face of death.31 Paul 
seeks to show the relationship between law and gospel, between 
Jewish and Gentile believers, and between Israel and the Church so as 
to make his case that the gospel is universal.32 Under the opening 
statement (1 :16-17) Paul pronounces his theme33 of 'the righteousness 
of God', echoing several Old Testament passages which call for God to 
make things right in the face of shame and death.34 God's faithfulness 
to his covenant promise (universal salvation) is upheld in Christ who is 
accomplishing what the Old Testament people and prophets longed 
for.35 The inclusion of the Gentiles on the basis of faith in Christ is not 
contrary to this faithfulness but is the fulfilment of God's universal 
promise to Abraham. The true intent of JUdaism and the law was, up 
31 D. A. Carson, New Bible Commentary: 21st century edition (4th ed.). 
(Leicester, England; Downers Grove, ilL, USA: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994). 
'Introduction' 
32 Carson, New Bible Commentary, 'Introduction' 
33 Most scholars agree that this functions much like a thesis to which the 
various parts of the letter relate. Cranfield heads his commentary of verses 16b-17 
'The Theme of the epistle is stated' (Cranfield, Romans. 87. Barrett concludes about 
verses 16-17, 'Most commentators recognize in them the Mtext" of the epistle: it is not 
wrong to see in them a summary of Paul's theology as a whole' (Barrett, The Epistle 
to the Romans, 27). As James Dunn puts it, 'These two verses are the launching pad 
and provide the primary thrust and direction of the letter' (James D. G. Dunn, Word 
Biblical Commentary: Romans 1-8, (Dallas: Word Books, 1988),46). 
34 According to Hays the themes of shame and righteousness are paired in 
the Old Testament passages Paul is echoing. The language of shame (aischynein 
and kataischynein) appears together in the lament Psalms with Paul's terminology of 
righteousness (Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul «New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1989),36-37). 
35 God's righteousness as revealed in Christ fulfils the universality he began 
to work out in Israel. "The Lord has made his salvation known and revealed his 
righteousness to the nations" (Ps. 98:2). 
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to and including living true to the law, to be found in Christ (8:3_4).36 
The antagonism between Jews and Gentiles is set in the framework of 
a more fundamental problem and answer; the reign of death in both 
Jews and Gentiles overcome in Christ. Those who are baptized into 
Christ die to sin and conquer death (6:1-6) and become true children of 
God who are able to meet the obligations of covenant relationship 
(8:2ff). Chapters 6-8 clinch the argument that all are alike under the 
law and sin and all are made right (righteous) in relation to Christ. 
The letter's theme of righteousness, according to Dunn, is best 
understood from its Hebrew background in which it is a relational 
concept, rather than its Greek form and setting in which it has the idea 
of a standard against which the individual is measured.37 From this 
background it is understood that God's faithfulness to his covenant with 
Israel (the law) or his saving action for Israel is his righteousness. 38 
36 There are also those who are either Jewish Christians who are opponents 
of Paul or potential opponents that Paul warns they should have nothing to do with. 
Some are already slandering him in Rome (Rom.3:8) and he warns them to have 
nothing to do with such people in 16:17-18. Stuhlmacher imagines an organized 
campaign against Paul, under the auspices of James, and Paul is trying to squelch 
this opposition so as not to lose Rome as his staging ground for the mission into 
Spain (Stuhlmacher, Paul's Letter to the Romans, 6). Fitzmyer explains that 'Paul is 
hardly implying that such persons were among Roman Christians' rather, 'Paul's 
statement undoubtedly reflects rather some past experience of Paul' (Fitzmyer, 
Romans,34). Stuhlmacher sees the opposition against Paul as under the auspices 
of James and that subsequent to the conference in Jerusalem his opponents 
considered that they had the upper hand (Stuhlmacher, Paul's Letter to the Romans, 
6). Fitzmyer questions whether these were Jewish Christian opponents of Paul as 
Acts 28:21 indicates that they had received no letter about Paul and that no one from 
Jerusalem had spoken evil of Paul (Fitzmyer, Romans, 33). Moo thinks that rumours 
of Paul's stance on the Law had given him a reputation as being 'anti-law' and 
perhaps even 'anti-Jewish' (accounting for some accusing him of saying, 'Let us do 
evil that good may come'), so he must defuse these rumours and defuse any 
potential hostility toward him they might have caused (Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to 
the Romans, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1996),21). 
37 Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 341. 
38 The 'new perspective' stemming originally from the work of E. P. Sanders 
has rejected Lutheran or Bultmannian notions that the law and Judaism were 
defective. So in interpreting righteousness in Philippians 3:9 Sanders maintains that 
the only thing wrong with the righteousness by the law is that it is not based on faith 
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His reckoning and making righteous are part of his initiative to call 
(Israel originally) into and to sustain a covenant (relationship) marked 
by the law. Paul's contrasting of works of the law with faith (Rom. 3:20, 
28), in this light, has to do with the difference between the two 
covenants; between covenant faithfulness marked in the first instance 
by remaining true to the distinctive markers of Judaism, whereas 
justification by faith removed the restriction of the covenant to Israel so 
as to embrace both Jews and Gentiles in a universal salvation.39 God 
is faithful to his covenant with Israel (chapter 4) but through Israel 
comes the universal covenant with 'all who believe' (1 :16; 3:22; 4:11; 
10:4), both Jew and Gentile.4o 
Having set chapters 6-8 within the overall theme of the letter 
the broad outline of the argument needs to be shown as it unfolds from 
chapters 1-5 to see Paul's line of argument up to chapter 6. According 
to Keck Paul's Gospel in Romans 'deals decisively with the human 
condition' (sin and death), as otherwise 'there would be little reason to 
announce to Gentiles what the God worshiped by Jews has achieved 
in Christ' .41 The argument from 1: 18-3:20 demonstrates the depth and 
in Christ. Paul, in this view, is not saying that the law taught that salvation is through 
works; salvation is always by grace, whether under the law or under Christ. The law 
marked the covenant relationship with God, which Sanders calls 'covenantal nomism' 
and the danger was that Jews would imagine righteousness is through nationalistic 
markers such as circumcision and the food laws. See E. P. Sanders, Paul, the Law 
and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983). Veronica Koperski. 
What Are They Saying About Paul and the Law (New York: Paulist Press, 2001). 
Michael Bird, The Saving Righteousness of God: Studies on Paul, Justification and 
the New Perspective (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007). Dunn, 
Romans 1-8, Ixiii - Ixxii. 
39 Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 354ft. 
40 Paul and l i ~ e k k both describe sin or the relationship to the law as 
alienation, but it is only Paul who speaks of reconciliation or restoration of 
relationship. 
41 Leander E. Keck, Abingdon New Testament Commentaries: Romans, 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 33. 
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breadth of the sin problem. He seeks to answer the question of why 
God needed to reveal his saving righteousness in Christ and why 
people can only experience it by faith. The answers are found in Paul's 
contention that 'all are under sin' (3:9)-'helpless captives to the deadly 
rule of sin'.42 Paul eliminates any grounds for exclusiveness in either 
his Jewish or Gentile readers. In a catena of quotes (from the law) 
which apply in their original context to Jews and sometimes to their 
enemies, Paul weaves together a picture of sin in which the organs of 
speech, due to taking up a lie, function as a grave and entrap and 
poison, leading to bloodshed and violence (3:10-18).43 The lie of sin 
deals in death even among those who have been entrusted with the 
oracles of God (3:2). The law has its purpose which Paul has just 
demonstrated; 'through the Law comes the knowledge of sin' (3:20). 
This is not a bragging right but a cause for silent humility. 'Now we 
know that whatever the Law says, it speaks to those who are under the 
Law, so that every mouth may be closed and all the world may become 
accountable to God' (3: 19). All have fallen short of God and all are in 
need of redemption from the lie of sin. 
The promise which counters this death dealing lie is received by 
one whose journey into death is definitive of resurrection faith (4:24). 
The manner of redemption has to do with the reorientation of faith 
42 Carson, New Bible Commentary, Rom. 1:18-4:25. 
43 Nothing, or emptiness, seem to have been taken up into the organs of 
speech, to become there a grave or a sarcophagus. Throughout the list the organs of 
speech deal in death. -Their throats are open graves; their tongues practice deceit" 
(3: 13 quoting Ps. 5:9). David, in this Psalm compares two kinds of speech, as they 
orient one, either to God's presence or his absence. Lacan pictures speech in a 
similar way. See Jacques Lacan, -Le symbo/ique, l'imaginaire et Ie reel, " In Des 
noms-dupere. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 42-43. 
Quoted in Adrian Johnston, lizek's Ontology: A Transcendental Materialist Theory of 
Subjectivity (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009), 50. 
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which turns from those who would trust in human language (Sabel in 
Gen. 11) to the one who trusts in the promise of God's word (Gen. 12). 
In chapter 4 with the father of the Jews but also the father of faith 
(Abraham), Paul defines faith with the key element of trust in God's 
promise in the face of death (resurrection faith or death acceptance as 
opposed to death resistance, 4:24-25).44 The specific problem of the 
reign of death through sin (with the dependence of sin on death) is 
undone in the faith which overcomes the fear and threat of death 
(being about a hundred years old and Sarah's womb being dead 
(4:19» by trusting God for life 'though he were as good as dead' 
(4:19).45 The argument seems to purposefully reference the events 
prior to the giving of the covenant of circumcision so as to convince the 
Jewish Christians of the priority of faith over the law. For we say, 
'FAITH WAS CREDITED TO ABRAHAM AS RIGHTEOUSNESS' (4:9). It was 
credited 'Not while circumcised, but while uncircumcised' (4:10). 
Chapter 5 caps his argument against Jewish distinctiveness and 
the universal nature of the gospel, maintaining that Jews and Gentiles 
are rendered identical in their relationship in Adam. 'Nevertheless 
44 In the words of William Frazier, 'What he endured was linked organically 
with the inherent demands of faith, on the one hand, and the bondage of sin, on the 
other .... There is ... an exact equation in the text between Abraham's belief and 
his readiness to accept death. The one is realized in and through the other ... the 
point is not that Abraham accepted death and thereby demonstrated his faith. 
Rather, his death acceptance was his faith' (William B. Frazier, "Where Mission 
Begins: A Foundational Probe" in International Bulletin of Missionary Research 
vo1.11, no. 4 October 1987,149). The bondage of sin, as portrayed in the passages 
Paul has taken up invariably portrays this 'organic link' between death resistance or a 
covenant with death and sin. Faith then, as death acceptance, involves the exposure 
of this lie. It requires reversing course, not in fear or an attempt to negotiate the 
problem but with the full assurance this is the course travelled by Christ. 
45 The death drive as formulated by Freud and Lacan fits this theological 
understanding in that death resistance presumes an immortality which is to be gained 
through a masochistic self destruction. Abraham's and Christ's death acceptance 
exposes the lie in a life style of faithful death acceptance - which Paul describes as 
resurrection faith (Rom. 4:24-25). 
200 
death reigned from Adam until Moses' (5:14), Adam however, is 'a type 
of Him who was to come' (5:14).46 The reign of death introduced by 
Adam gives way to the universal reign of life through Christ (5:17). 
According to Fitzmyer, from chapter 5, with the shift to the focus on 
Adam, the 'effects of Adam and what he did to the human race' and the 
effects of the Christ-event on humanity are compared and explained.47 
As Shreiner states it, 'Adam and Christ are the two most influential 
individuals in human history, and believers can take confidence 
because they belong to the one who has overturned all that Adam 
introduced into the world'. 48 Where Adam inaugurates death Christ 
ushers in life, and where Adam began a race of sinners Christ makes a 
righteous humanity. Paul takes note of the law of Moses in verse 14 
but only as a marker of the reign of death which extends in both 
directions so that Jews and Gentiles are no different in that death rules 
all. (The argument of the following sections is that it is still Adam as a 
type of everyman which Paul is describing in Romans 7:7ff.) 
Chapters 6-8 deliver the details of Paul's argument as to how 
the reign of death is overcome in the life of the individual. As Fitzmyer 
writes, 'Through baptism, they are identified with Christ's death and 
46 As Eckart Reinmuth notes, Adam is representative for Paul of the reason 
Christ came. (Reinmuth,'Allegorical Reading and Intertextuality', 56). Reinmuth 
finds reference to Adam woven into most every section of Romans dealing with the 
sins of humans (1 :19ff, 3:23, 5:12ff, 7:7-11, 8:18ff). In 1 :18-3:20, Paul shows to what 
extent all are at fault, and 3:23 ( m i V T C ~ ~ yap ;'J.lapTOV Ka} UGTCpOOVTaI T " ' ~ ~ 66{/K TOO 
8£00) is the allusion to the fall of all in the one, so that in the actions of each the loss 
of the glory of God is manifest (Eckart Reinmuth, 'Allegorical Reading and 
Intertextuality: Abbreviations of the Adam Story in Paul (Romans 1 :18-28)' in Reading 
the Bible Intertextually, Richard B. Hays, Stefan Alkier, Leroy A. Huizenga, eds. 
(Waco: Baylor University Press, 2009), 56). 
47 Fitzmyer, Romans, 405. 
48 Shreiner, Romans, 282. 
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resurrection, and their very being or "self' is transformed,.49 Where 
chapter 5 expresses redemption in two universal types, chapter 6-8 
explains what this universality looks like in terms of individual identity 
and the dynamics of human interiority. Chapters 6-8 is not a change of 
subject from the universal reign of sin and death overcome in Christ; 
rather it is a picture of the particular in light of the universal 
predicament and its resolution. Paul explains how God is 'making 
things right' (transforming human beings into the likeness of Christ) in 
regard to the human plight of sin and death. Death reigns no more as 
the author of life extends life through Christ so as to defeat the 
orientation to death inherent in sin. The theme of these chapters is 
captured in the summation and conclusion in 8:2: 'For the law of the 
Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of 
death.' 
The Agonistic 'I' of Romans 7:7-25 
Having located Romans 6-8 in the context of the letter, we can 
now compare Paul's analysis of the human condition with Zizek's. 
Chapter 7 is the primary focus of Zizek's commentary and it offers the 
most detailed analysis of the dynamics of individual identity under the 
law of sin and death, so it is the logical starting point in analyzing the 
problem of sin and its resolution. Here I will argue that lizek's 
exegesis of Paul is largely correct when dealing with the description of 
sin in 7:7ff and this will set up the comparison and contrast with lizek's 
49 Fitzmyer, Romans, 429. 
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understanding of Paul's resolution to the problem in chapters 6 and 8. 
This and the following two sections break down the dynamic which 
Paul is unfolding in Romans 7:7ff so as to identify who the 'I' is and the 
nature of his problem and it makes the case that Zizek is correct to 
locate his understanding of the subject with Romans 7. The agonistic 
struggle with desire, the law and deception, it is argued, fit the 
Lacanian identity. I need first to show that when Paul says 'I' in 
Romans 7, he means the universal 'I', including Jews and Gentiles and 
himself. The introductory argument of this section, in agreement with 
Zizek, is that the form of Romans 7 (from the perspective of 'I') is a 
universal construct (Adam or everyman) which is determinative of 
human identity. I will also argue against Lizek that Romans 7:7ff does 
not describe the identity of a Christian50 (which Lizek equates with the 
hysteric) but that rather it describes the identity of the non-Christian 
from the perspective of Christianity. Paul is describing the death 
50 As Fitzmyer points out, many Christians may find their experience reflected 
here but two very different conditions are being described in chapters 7-8; being 
outside of Christ or being in Christ. Paul is not primarily concerned to reflect on 
psychology or experience but on the ontological reality of this difference. Those that 
interpret 7:7ff as a description of the Christian Paul 'tend to make of Paul a young 
Luther' (Fitzmyer, Romans, 464-465). Krister Stendahl, for example, holds that the 
introspective conscience introduces a contrast between Law and faith which is to 
read Luther back into Paul. As Stendahl describes it, Paul was not plagued with an 
introspective conscience on the order of Luther or Augustine, but is primarily 
concerned to argue for the holiness of the Law in 7:7ff and to make an absolute 
distinction between Law and sin (Krister Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976),92-93). While Stendahl may be correct that 
Paul is not primarily drawing conclusions from his conscience, this conclusion does 
not exclude the possibility that sin and salvation have affected his conscience and 
that this effect is not excluded in the description of 7:7ff. Stendahl (by arguing that 
the focus is on the Law and not on sin), ironically, provides supporting evidence for a 
position such as John Murray's, which he is attempting to refute. Murray and 
Stendahl are arguing for a continuity between Law and faith from very different 
perspectives (for Murray conversion brings on a heightened sensitivity to the Law), 
yet they both argue that Paul's primary subject is in regard to Law. See John Murray, 
The New International Commentary on the New Testament: The Epistle to the 
Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1968), 254, and Krister Stendahl, 
Paul Among Jews and Gentiles (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976),92-93. 
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dealing nature of a sinful identity along the lines which Zizek reads him, 
except he is not offering a solution by describing the problem.51 
Paul views humanity through Jewish-Christian eyes in historical 
and corporate terms (without Christ and in Christ),52 but this view does 
not obstruct the individual and the psychotogical; rather it accounts for 
it53 as in the case of Paul himself. 54 The reality of the individual is 
understood in light of the experience55 or identity of corporate humanity 
(unregenerate humanity) in Adam56 and in Israel. By describing his 
51 lizek's logic is correct from his perspective in that being able to name and 
describe the problem of deception means the problem is solved - which is the first 
step in therapy. From a Christian perspective describing the deception is not enough, 
and this ability is explained on the basis of chapter 8 and not chapter 7. 
52 Fitzmyer, Romans, 465. 
53 The argument is that Paul could not describe the experience of his pre-
Christian life while he was in the midst of the struggle which he only gains a 
perspective on from being in Christ. The argument that Paul is referencing his 
Christian life is that prior to becoming a Christian he does not speak of a struggle with 
sin nor of a failure with regard to the Law. In Phil. 3:4-6 and Gal. 1 :13-14 he 
expresses a confident superiority in his Law keeping and his blamelessness. See W. 
G. KOmmel, Romer 7 und dal Bild des Menschen in Neuen Testament: Zwei Studien 
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1974), 117, cited in Schreiner, Romans, 365. In Murray's 
description Paul's conversion may have brought on a heightened sensitivity to sin and 
a full appreciation of the Spiritual nature of the Law. Murray makes the point that 
Paul's use of the term 'spiritual' in verse 14 must have reference to the Holy Spirit so 
that there is a continuity between verses 14-25 and the description of life in the Spirit 
in chapter 8 (Murray, The Epistle to the Romans, 254-259). 
54 As Schreiner maintains if the 'I' refers to every person, 'then Paul must be 
included in the "I" since he is part of the human race' (Schreiner, Romans, 364). 
KOmmel would remove the personal and existential element as he maintains the 'I' 
refers to every person in general but cannot be said to apply to the particular 
individual Paul. See KOmmel, Romer 7 und dal Bild des Menschen in Neuen 
Testament, 118-132, cited in Schreiner, Romans, 365. As Dunn points out, it is a 
logical fallacy to maintain that 'I' refers to every person in general but excludes Paul. 
See Dunn, 'Rom. 7, 14-25 in the Theology of Paul', Theo/ogische Zeitschrift 31, 257-
273. Referenced in Schreiner, Romans, 364. 
55 Gerd Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology, trans. John 
Galvin (Edinburgh: T. & T Clark Publishers, Ltd., 1994), 178. Theissen maintains that 
while Paul may be alluding to his own background and that his experience provides 
the depth of understanding but his experience per se is not the necessary point of 
departure. 
56 James Dunn notes that of the 64 references to Adam in the Pauline letters, 
three-fourths appear in Romans and 41 of the 48 occurrences occur in 5: 12-8:3. 
James Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Edinburgh: T& T Clark, 1998), 111. 
Dunn devotes several sections of his book demonstrating the references to Adam -
see 79-101. 
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pre-Christian life57 from the perspective afforded in Christ ,58 wherein 
he can separate sin and the law, Paul establishes the holiness of the 
law.59 In Zizekian terms, he separates the law from its obscene 
superego supplement (the supplement assuming transgression and 
punishment). The pervert, who represents the first step in the 
formation of the subject, fuses sin and law and effectively enacts the 
law by becoming its masochistic servant (Reader, 117). According to 
Zizek's reading, Paul's relationship to the law is an open question in 
which he stages the passage from perversion to hysteria (in which law 
is suspended or separated from sin, guilt and punishment through 
questioning). 60 
57 Several positions overlap, as Paul could be speaking of himself and his 
experience as a boy but he could also be describing the universal experience 
contained in Adam. Fitzmyer concludes that Paul is talking simultaneously about 
Jews and Gentiles, or unregenerate humanity faced with the law -but as seen by a 
Christian. He decisively dismisses the notion that Paul is speaking of a Christian 
perspective or the experience of a Christian. He contrasts what he calls 'an 
individual, psychological level' with 'a historical and corporate pOint of view' and he 
suggests that it is this latter point of view that best describes Paul's perspective 
(Fitzmyer, Romans, 465). 
58 The most radical division as to the identity of the 'I' is between those who 
identify the 'I' as Paul's description of the Christian life (in verses 14-25) and those 
who maintain he is speaking of a pre-Christian condition. Fitzmyer includes 
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Barth, and Packer among those who 
hold that Paul is speaking as a Christian. See Fitzmyer, Romans, 464. Packer 
claims this position is 'beyond dispute' (J.1. Packer, 'The "Wretched Man" Revisited: 
Another Look at Romans 7:14-25'. In Romans and the People of God: Essays in 
Honor of Gordon D. Fee on the Occasion of His 65th Birthday, edited by Sven K. 
Soderlund and N. T. Wright (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999),73). The majority of 
commentators (see below) hold to some version of non-Christian identity for the '1'. 
59 As Schreiner says, 'the goodness of the law ... is inextricably linked with the 
wickedness of sin' in the theme of 7:7ff (Schreiner, Romans, 358). Where the Law 
reigns sin abounds, so that deliverance from Sin will mean the enactment of a 
different Law (Rom. 8:2). Paul's 'blamelessness' as a Jew (Phil. 3:4-6) is not an 
argument that he was sinless or unconscious of sin but coincides with the 
understanding that he was the worst of sinners and yet unaware of it. See Schreiner, 
Romans 365. 
60 See Ticklish Subject, 148. 
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For Paul, Adamic humanity and those in Christ are two 
alternative identities (the only two possibilities), 61 and they are 
ontological poles apart in regard to life, death and righteousness.62 
Jew and Gentile are not distinguished as to their plight in Adam; they 
belong to one form of fallen, deceived humanity.63 The nature of the 
61 Stuhlmacher, Paul's Letter to the Romans, 115. Stuhlmacher maintains 
that the majority consensus is to see the 'I' as Adam or universal experience. To 
describe this as an experience is not to say that it is only an experience and not 
reflective of an ontological reality, nor is it a claim that this experience is a conscious 
experience. The point being that the experience is recognized for what it is only 
within a Christian perspective. T. L. Carter concludes that 'Romans 7:7-12 is a 
retelling of the story of the Fall with the tyw cast in the role of Adam and sin fulfilling 
the role of the serpent' (T. L. Carter, Paul and the Power of Sin: Redefining 'Beyond 
the Pale' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 186). James Dunn traces 
Paul's references to Adam and Genesis 1-3 in Romans and concludes that these 
verses in Genesis and discussion surrounding them in Jewish literature serve as a 
key part of Paul's resources in developing his own understanding of sin. Dunn finds 
reference to Adam in Romans 1:18-32; 3:23; 5:12-21; 7:7-13; and 8:19-22. Dunn 
traces reference to Adam and discussion of him in post-biblical Jewish tradition and 
concludes, 'It should be evident from all this that Paul was entering into an already 
well-developed debate and that his own views were not uninfluenced by its earlier 
participants' (Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 90). He argues that Genesis 3 
is referenced in chapter 7 as demonstrated in the manner in which Paul's key points 
are developed along the following lines in tandem with Genesis 3 in 7:7-11: an initial 
stage of innocence in which sin is disempowered (Gen. 2:7; Rom. 7:9); the 
prohibition of desire (Gen. 2:17; Rom. 7:7); the prohibition as giving rise to desire 
(Gen. 3:6; Rom. 7:8) sin personified as a power or force (Gen. 3:1-4; Rom. 7:17); the 
force of sin works through deception (Gen. 3:4; Rom. 7:11,17); the deception and its 
result are focused on death (Gen. 3:4,19; Rom. 7:8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 24); the woman's 
and Paul's complaint - 'the serpenUsin deceived me' (Gen. 3:13; Rom. 7:11); all held 
together in the 'I' as an 'existential self- identification with Adam, adam' (Dunn, The 
T h e o l o g ~ ~ of Paul the Apostle, 99). 
2 Paul's understanding is not that of the Reformation notion that one is 'both 
justified and a sinner'. In Paul's understanding, Christians are not 'reckoned 
righteous' apart from being made right (or being brought into a right relationship with 
God, self, and others through following Christ). See J. Christian Beker, Paul the 
Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980) 
216. 
63 His point is not that the Jewish Law creates an alternative or a third sort of 
person (Gentile, Christian and Jew), but rather he seems to be arguing that the 
Jewish and Gentile type of person constitutes a singular form that can be summed up 
under Adam (so that the Jewish encounter with the Decalogue also faUs under 
Adam's encounter with God's prohibition). The 'I' is carnal and sold under sin (7:14) 
and this work of death is still at work in the 'I' (past tense 7:7-13 and present tense 
7:14ff). The 'I' of 7:7ff can be read as applying to Adam, to Paul, and to everyman as 
Paul, it is argued below, is fusing a reading of the Decalogue with Genesis 3 so as to 
describe a universal condition. 
206 
deception and the nature of sin render the Jew and Gentile equally 
oppressed by a sinful orientation to the law.54 
In Romans 7, then, Paul recounts the experience of fallen 
humanity in the first person 'J' or lyw (first introduced in 7:9). The lyw 
or 'J' arises, according to Theissen, originally with a lack of self-
consciousness and a growing cognitive awareness. As he points out, 
there are no cognitive verbs in 7:8-11, indicating that these events do 
not take place consciously.65 The lyw makes its appearance in 
conjunction with a transgressive relationship to the law, which accounts 
for its sudden appearance in Romans 7 (and its repetition over 20 
times in the following verses) and Genesis 3 and its complete 
disappearance in Romans 8. Bornkamm's point that 'Only under the 
law of sin and death does man really become an "1"',66 can be taken as 
a literal description of Romans 7 and the Genesis account.67 The 
speaking Subject of the passage has no 'I' prior to the advent of sin.68 
64 If Paul is simultaneously referencing Genesis 2-3 and the Decalogue the 
notion that that his reference to v6j.Joc; can be identified as either the Mosaic Law or 
'the law of sin and death' in 7:7ft becomes moot. This in not to diminish the 
importance of the Law nor is it to be mistaken as antinomianism (Paul's continual 
concern in this section); rather it is to acknowledge that sin is the primary agent 
determining perception of v6j.JoC;. As John Bertone points out, the 'distinction 
(between 'the law of sin and death' and the Mosaic Law) is arbitrary when viewed 
from the perspective that Paul is describing a pre-Christ situation throughout 7:7-24' 
(John A. Bertone, The Law of the Spirit': Experience of the Spirit and displacement of 
the Law in Romans 8:1-16 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005), 180). 
65 Theissen works out in some detail the growing consciousness or cognitive 
awareness of Romans 7. In verses 14-18 however, the verbs indicate a conscious 
recognition or insight which is missing from the earlier verses (Theissen, 
Psychol'li'ical Aspects of Pauline Theology, 231-232). 
GOnther Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience, (London: SCM Press, 
2011), 94. Bomkamm is following the Genesis text closely but it is not clear that he is 
here describing the reality of the text. 
67 The Cartesian cogito functions for Lizek as the universal formula for the 
split within the 'I'. Zitek in Tarrying with the Negative provides his most prolonged 
analysis of the cogito. See the first two chapters, 9-80. 
68 Hugh C. White, Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 126ft. In the same way, in Lizek, 
there is no 'I' prior to the Fall and the death drive. 
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We may infer that this subject has created an alternative form of 
subjectivity through transgressing the law, something on the order of 
lizek's understanding. 
This corresponds with Genesis 3 when Adam, in confrontation 
with God, after the Fall, first speaks it and repeats it in four consecutive 
bursts; 'I heard the sound of You in the garden, and I was afraid 
because I was naked; so I hid myself (Gen. 3:10). If Paul in Romans 
7:7ff is giving voice to the adam of 5:12ffthen the 'I' is necessary to his 
presentation as the introduction of the lyw reflects the loss and death 
of the self.59 In a parallel text, Paul speaks of the death of this'\' with 
no apparent harm to himself but as his salvation: 'For through the Law 
I died to the Law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with 
Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but Christ lives in me' (Gal. 2:19-
20). The 'I' that can be crucified or put to death in baptism is 
presumably a construct of sin and a Subject of the law and is not the 
individual in his true essence. At the head of the chapter Paul has 
explained that this Subject of the law is expendable: 'Therefore, my 
brethren, you also were made to die to the Law through the body of 
Christ, so that you might be joined to another, to Him who was raised 
from the dead' (Rom. 7:4). 
Paul describes a split within the 'I' with one half of the lyw pitted 
against the other in a struggle in which human agency is entirely 
relinquished to sin: 'So now, no longer am I the one doing it, but sin 
which dwells in me' (Rom. 7: 17). Bultmann draws out the idea that the 
69 See Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience, 94. 
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split or antagonism in the 'I' is so severe that one becomes objectified 
or split within, so that this 'other' alien self is apparently expendable as 
it is a construct of alienation?O For Bultmann, Paul's notion of flesh 
(aap() represents this second self in its objectification. The flesh is 'a 
power that lays claim to him and determines him' to such an extent that 
one's will (located in awpa) is relinquished to this seemingly alien 
force?1 The problem with Bultmann's analysis, according to 5tendahl, 
is the presumption that Paul's problem is synonymous with the 
Lutheran or Western problem of an introspective conscience.72 
However, if it is understood that Paul is describing his pre-Christian 
self, then his insight is in regards to an ontological condition (dead in 
sin) he faced before the law, the experience of which he was not 
conscious of when it applied to him. 50 5tendahl may be correct that it 
is hard to gauge how Paul subjectively experienced the power of sin in 
his life.73 Paul is not primarily concerned to describe an 'experience' 
but a failed identity with a failed ontology (given over to death). So his 
is not primarily a psychological or experiential account but an 
ontological description, but this ontology is connected to his 
apprehension and experience of himself. So to speak of Paul's 
70 Rudolf Karl Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament: Volume I, trans. 
Kendrick Grobel (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 199. Bultmann introduces 
Paul's notion of flesh (CTap{) as representing this second self in its objectification. 
Stendahl maintains that Paul's primary concern is to defend the goodness of the law 
and to distinguish it from the work of sin 'in such a way that not only the law but the 
will and mind of man are declared good and are found to be on the side of God'. 
Stendahl does not take into account that Paul may have acquired the ability to 
distinguish between sin and the law only as a Christian. Stendahl's criticism can, in 
part, be countered with the understanding that Bultmann's description fits not only a 
psychological but an ontological or objective condition. See Krister Stendahl, Paul 
Among Jews and Gentiles (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 87ft. 
71 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament: Volume I, 201 
72 Krister Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles, 87ft. 
73 Krister Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles, 87ft. 
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'experience' is not to suggest that he is primarily focusing on 
experience to the exclusion of an ontological order, rather it presumes 
that there is an ontology giving rise to this experience. This objectified 
alienated other is not the object of salvation but is the lure or by-
product of death dealing deception. In salvation the 'I' is not rescued or 
brought to maturity but disappears. This tyw is not subject to growth 
and change as it is an object fixed as part of a formal structure under 
the law?4 It is apparently synonymous with the 'body of death', the 
phrase in verse 24 which Dunn maintains sums up the dynamic Paul 
has described and from which he seeks rescue.7S It is the obstruction 
to growth and the subject/object (the two tyw's) of sinful desire. The 
tyw of 7:7ff is part of a dynamic of deception, subject to dissolution in 
the death to sin and the rescue of chapter 8 in which it is absent. 
Paul's picture of the tyw as the peculiar Subject which arises 
with subjection to the law, fits Freud's original formulation, in which he 
'discovers' the egol superego split at the same time as the death drive. 
He pictured the ego as emerging from and still partially situated in the 
id, and thus the ego is involved in a psychic struggle (The Ego and the 
Id, 18-19), which Lacan describes as a struggle for existence as it 
74 As Bornkamm states it, 'Here one could appropriately say that whoever 
makes the law itself sin simultaneously also makes sin a "law". That is, he makes it a 
fate unfolding in a consistent way, for which no one is any longer responsible' 
(Gunther Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1969), 
89). If 5:12 and 7:7ff are read together, the implication is that the fate of humankind 
has unfolded in a predictable pattern which repeats itself in Adam's progeny. As 
Ernst Kasemann describes it, 'Every person after Adam is entangled in the fate of the 
protoplast. The fate of every person is anticipated in that of Adam' (Ernst Kasemann, 
Commentary on Romans, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1980). 197). 
75 As Dunn explains, 'The words here simply sum up these earlier 
descriptions of the interplay of sin, death, and the law in a single forceful phrase' 
(Dunn, Romans 1-8,419). 
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never achieves full reality. It is a construct or a fiction (imaginary): 
'Alienation is the imaginary as such' (Seminar III, 146). Paul's 
description gets at the emergence of the iyw in its alienation from the 
law and the split within the self. In Lacan's explanation, alienation 
occurs in the sense that the subject - object relation is taken up into 
the self. Thus the ego can be said to have a paranoiac structure 
(Ecrits: Selection, 22). According to Paul, control does not exist in 
either the 'I' of the law or its other. There is an inherent incapacity built 
into the structure of the ego, 'like a privileged symptom ... the mental 
illness of man' (Seminar I, 16). As Zizek describes, it is 'the human 
project par excellence' - but the self- positing nature of this 'I' must be 
obscured as 'the normal world' constituted in the symbolic/imaginary 
relationship is suspended over pure death drive (The Fragile Absolute, 
72). As Lacan describes in concord with Paul, the ego or 'I' is a being 
for death (Seminar XI, 257). 
Forbidden Desire - You Shall Not Covet 
Paul in Rom. 7:7, according to Lizek, is at once acknowledging 
the perverse position and going beyond it in describing how sin and the 
law have become fused in an obscene desire. 76 The problem 5t Paul 
struggles with, according to Zizek, is how to avoid the trap of 
76 As was worked out in the 2nd chapter, L:izek maintains 'human beings can 
participate in the Truth-Event' only as the 'unique relationship to ... finitude and the 
possibility of death' is opened up (Ticklish Subject, 163). Paul, in voicing the 
questions of the hysteric, is avoiding the trap of perversion (the grab for immortality) 
in that the existence or completeness of the Other of the Law is under question in 
Romans 7. This dissolves the issue of avoiding mortality through identification with 
the Other and what it wants -the constitutive question in transgression and 
perversion. 
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perversion, that is, of a Law that generates its transgression (Ticklish 
Subject, 148). An examination of the text indicates that Paul does 
indeed present a sinful perspective on the law which generates 
transgression (and transgressive desire), but he presents no way out of 
this bind until chapter 8. The problem is worse than Zizek imagines 
and the solution will require divine intervention. 
The prohibition of desire mentioned in 7:7 or the command not 
to covet seems to allude to the 10th commandment of the Decalogue, 
but the question is why Paul shortens it so that the objects of desire 
named in the Law are absent?77 The original commandment has a 
fairly exhaustive list of things that are not to be desired, but desire itself 
is not forbidden. 'You shall not covet your neighbor's house; you shall 
not covet your neighbor's wife or his male servant or his female servant 
or his ox or his donkey or anything that belongs to your neighbor' 
(Exodus 20: 17). Controlling desire for the items on the list seems like a 
possibility, but to 'cease desiring' poses the problem of whether one is 
to desire to cease desiring? Bornkamm proposes that Paul formulates 
verse 7 in such a way that both the prohibition in the Garden and the 
Law of Sinai are referenced and that this ambiguity, purposeful on 
Paul's part, also creates the ambiguity of the command of 'forbidden 
desire'.78 Whether or not Paul is attempting to capture the urge to 
77 Kasemann takes it as a secondary reference to the 10lh commandment as 
he sees the passage as following the Genesis account. He maintains Paul followed a 
branch of exegesis in which Adam was the prototypical recipient of the Law and was 
linked materially to Moses. 'According to this tradition Adam received the whole law 
with the commandment which he was given' (Kasemann, Commentary on Romans, 
196). 
78 Bornkamm proposes that Paul formulates both verse 7 and 10 in this so 
that both the prohibition in the Garden and the Law of Sinai are referenced in both 
verses. Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience, 89ft. Desire without an object is such 
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transgress in the formula, the work of sin through desire is the problem 
evoked in the encounter with the law. The case will be made in this 
section that this forbidden desire displays a key part in the logic of sin 
that Paul is explicating. 
In its immediate context, the verse describes the fusion of 
knowing sin with the simultaneous knowledge of the Law, so it may be 
significant that Paul shortens the verse, given that there is no law 
prohibiting desire.79 Paul is showing how the law mediates sin but is 
also showing that the law can be extracted from sin with which it is 
confused. If 'I"s experience of sin is a distorted perception of the law, 
then the problem is not with the law but with this distortion of it by sin. 
The shorter version lends itself to being more readily applied to two 
alternative distortions of the law, in pursuit of either good (zeal for the 
law) or evil (transgressive desire).8o Gaining life through the 
commandment is thought by some commentators to be an alternative 
a pervasive category that the question arises if the attempt to obey the command. in 
the manner Paul has formulated it. is already breaking it? It creates a double bind on 
the order of a command not to think of pink elephants. The command generates 
what it forbids. Paul's formula folds infinitely into itself as desire is kept alive through 
its being forbidden. What is desired in forbidden desire can only be desire itself-
which by definition can never obtain itself as object. Sinful desire seeks only more 
desire. and the self. subject to the reign of this desire is put into pursuit of itself. 
79 As both Agamben and Jewett note. there is no prohibition of desire in the 
Law. though this prohibition may accurately reference the Decalogue as it is taken up 
in Jewish tradition. see Agamben. The Time That Remains. 108 and Robert Jewett. 
Romans: A Commentary (Minneapolis: Fortress Press. 2007). 449. Moo notes that 
the practice of referencing the prohibition of desire as a 'representative summation of 
the Mosaic law' has Jewish antecedents (Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 435). He 
doesn't take from this notion though that desire may not be the object of the 
prohibition; rather he notes that, as with the book of James, 'they tended to view 
"coveting" as the root of all sins'(Moo. The Epistle to the Romans. 435, see Jas. 
1 :15). While this may be. James does not equate desire directly with sin or directly to 
a prohibition. While there may have been precedent for this abbreviated version of 
the commandment that does not speak to the point as to why Paul would employ it in 
an argument this tightly woven. 
80 Jewett notes that it is not desire that is forbidden. 'but coveting what 
belongs to others' (Jewett. Romans. 449). 
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orientation to establishing the self through transgressing the law. 81 
Where the law becomes the primary focus, displacing God and 
forgetting sin, this may already reflect a distortion of desire.82 
Scholars are divided on whether the forbidden desire has a 
double reference to Genesis 3 and the 10th commandment, and it is 
precisely this ambiguity that Dunn thinks Paul is creating in his 
forbidden desire, so that both Jews and Gentiles are addressed in the 
universal experience. 83 
According to N.T. Wright, who sees the reference of verse 7 to 
the 10th commandment, law or Torah does not relieve sin in Paul's 
reading, but due to sin functions like the prohibition in Genesis, which 
is not the problem of the law or the prohibition but of the misdirection 
produced by sin. In Wright's explanation, Exodus is in the background 
throughout the chapter as Paul's description clarifies, in his defence of 
the law, how sin has been mediated by the law and demonstrates that 
this is a failure of its intent.84 Though Wright does not see it as the 
81 Kasemann, Romans, 198. Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience, 90. 
Dunn, Romans, 384, 400. Wright indicates this reading is incorrect and that it is to 
confuse Paul's statements here with 9:30-10:4 where he does think the sin is that 
Israel has sought to establish its own righteousness (Wright, Romans, 554) 
82 Desire can express itself as a desire to keep the law just as much as to 
break it, as in the zeal for one's own righteousness (Rom. 10:3). See Bornkamm, 
Early Christian Experience, 90. 
83 This abbreviated form, in Dunn's view, lends support to the notion that 
there is a double reference to the prohibition in the Garden and the 10th 
commandment (Romans 1-8). 
84 N.T. Wright works this out in his commentary on Romans accounting for 
Paul's nuance. 'Within the overarching theme of assurance, the central character in 
the story of 7:1-8:11 is of course Torah. This is Paul's classic defense of Torah 
against all the charges that might be and perhaps were being, laid against it. Torah, 
he insists, is holy just and good; it is not responsible for sin or for death .... Having said 
all that...Torah is by itself weak.' N.T. Wright, 'The Letter to the Romans: 
Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections' in The New Interpreter's Bible: A 
Commentary in Twelve Volumes: Volume X, Marion l. Sards, William l. Lane, 
Thomas G. Long, James Earl Massey Gail R. O'Day eds., (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press,2002)p.586. 
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subject in Romans 7, he notes that due to sin the Jews attempted to 
establish their own righteousness through the law and failed to 
combine it with faith (10:3ff).85 Paul's argument throughout the letter is 
that the law is not an end in itself; at its origin is the faith and example 
of Abraham and at its end is the fulfillment of Christ. Law alone, apart 
from this faith, is void and nullifies the promise (4:14).86 Forbidden 
desire may similarly isolate the letter of the law from its intent, voiding 
the law through the nullity of sin. Sinful desire is life emptying, and 
reduces the law, voided of its context and purpose, to a means to 
obtain its own fulfilment. There is no faith in 7:7ff but only law and sin, 
which demonstrates Paul's earlier point that a law whose origin and 
end is not in faith, acts to nullify and void its true purpose. The law is 
holy just and good (7:12), so what is the problem? Sin is the problem, 
as it would distort the meaning and purpose of the law.87 
The reading of forbidden desire following Genesis 3 is not 
without its zeal for the law, but the law which Adam and Eve seek to 
establish is not God's; they seek to transgress God's law and enact a 
law which is their own.88 The desire is for the tree of knowledge of 
85 He maintains the episode with Aaron and the golden calf is the immediate 
reference and connects this with 1 O:3ff where Paul describes the Jewish failure. 
Wright maintains the Torah did promise life but sin intervened (Wright, Romans, 563). 
86 In chapter 4 he has already demonstrated how a misreading could 
mistakenly focus on the law as the source of righteousness, rather than on God and 
his promise, which Abraham believed and so was counted righteous prior to the law 
(4:1-13). To imagine that the law itself is the promised life and righteousness misses 
the point of Abraham's resurrection faith, who even though he was as good as dead 
(4:19), trusted God would give him enduring life through a son. 
87 In Wright's picture law mediated sin to Israel 'recapitulating' what it did to 
Adam (Wright, Romans, 562). 
88 As Heinrich Schlier notes, 'Freedom from sin is necessarily freedom from 
man's physical desire for life, for himself. This desire is unleashed by the Law' 
(Heinrich Schlier, Vol. 2: Theological dictionary of the New Testament. (G. Kittel, G. 
W. Bromiley & G. Friedrich, Ed., 1964),497) 
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good and evil or for an ethic/righteousness that is 'one's own,.89 Far 
from drawing one closer to life and to God this law, put into place 
subsequent to sin (Rom. 7:23), displaces God.9o Apart from God man 
can now know good and evil (as the identity of each is in its difference 
from the other).91 The good can be known through the evil and the evil 
through the good, but the problem is that the contrasting pairs depend 
upon one another. The good cannot stand alone as it needs the evil as 
its point of reference. There cannot be an absolute incomparable 
difference or there would be no point of comparison. So the evil must 
inhere in the good and the good in the evil so that the binary pair is 
interdependent and bound together. To enact this law is not only to 
have rejected the prohibition from God but it is to put into playa law 
which is transgressive (death dealing) in the keeping. The good and 
evil are necessary to one another, so that one side of the pair is in the 
service of the other. Doing evil is a means of establishing the good, 
and doing the good is realized only in its identity with evil - 'evil is 
present in me, the one who wants to do good' (7:21). Where the law is 
sin (7:7), sin will establish the law - 'the law of sin' (7:23). One who 
embodies this law is split in an agonizing struggle of law keeping and 
89 The prohibition called him to have life, not through self, but through God. 
As it is dominated by sin, by the self-will of being, the encounter with the law 
becomes a summons to autonomous existence. The Law brings out the sin in 
experience of existence (Schlier, Vol. 2: Theological dictionary of the New Testament, 
497). 
90 The status of this second law as it relates to Torah is debated; with Wright 
and Dunn presuming it is still Torah but Torah perverted by sin. Ziesler, Fitzmyer, 
Cranfield, Kasemann, & Moo argue that this is a completely separate entity from 
God's law. Wright is attempting to find Exodus throughout this part of Romans and 
argues this law of sin is still Torah (Wright, Romans, 570-571). The majority dismiss 
this as unlikely. See Dunn, Romans 1-8,395; Ziesler, Paul's Letter to the Romans, 
196; Fitzmyer, Romans, 476; Cranfield, Romans 1-8, 364; Kasemann, Romans, 205; 
Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 462ft. 
91 As Wright puts it, there is a double sided law and a double sided 'I' (Wright, 
Romans, 562). 
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transgression: 'For the good that I want, I do not do, but I practice the 
very evil that I do not want' (7:19).92 The system is closed (isolated 
from God and his purposes), in that it refers only to itself and depends 
only on the self who possesses it.93 Paul poses this law as a separate 
entity or 'another law waging war against the law of my mind' (7:21). 
This is no longer God's law, which Paul locates in the mind and which 
is spiritual (7:14), but is 'the law of sin that dwells in my members' 
(7:23).94 The law which 'dwells ... in my flesh (7:18) or 'in my 
members' (7:23), seems to have its origin in multiplied desire (7:8) 
causing 'I' to do the very thing he hates (7:15) by subverting the will 
(7:18) 50 that the entire dynamic can be attributed to sin (7:20) or the 
law of sin (7:23). Where the law of the mind, by definition, is open to 
articulation, mental agreement (7:16) and delight (7:22), the law of sin 
works in silence (it can be seen at work in the members of the body 
(7:23)); through negation (resisting and subverting the will (7:15) and 
producing death (7:13)). It is a law which is not open to knowledge as 
'I' does not know what he is doing (7: 15). 
92 The body of death under the law is then, witnessed in Paul's agonizing 
struggle. The striving to keep the law or to throw off the shackles of the law is already 
death. As Shier states, 'Sin carries death within it. Death is present as that wherein it 
"lives· and therefore as that wherein its "life" is known (Rom. 5:21). Death is its 
power. Living by death (Rom. 6:23), in separation from God, it promotes its life by 
death (1 Cor. 15:56; R. 5: 12)' (Schlier, Vol. 2: Theological dictionary of the New 
Testament, 497). 
93 The system is turned inward in two senses: it refers only to its own 
categories and these categories exist in the 'I'. According to Bultmann, 'This inner 
dividedness means that man himself destroys his true self. In his self-reliant will to be 
himself, a will that comes to light in 'desire' at the encounter with the 'commandment', 
he loses his self and 'sin' becomes the active subject within him (Rom. 7:9) 
(Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Volume I, 245) .. 
94 Moo goes into helpful detail as to how and why 'the law of the mind' should 
be equated with God's law and the law of the flesh has to do with the other law (Moo, 
The Epistle to the Romans, 463465. 
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The alternative is to know God, who is unadulterated goodness. 
As Bonhoeffer puts it, 'Man at his origin knows only one thing: God. It 
is only in the unity of his knowledge of God that he knows of other men 
of things, and of himself.'95 The knowledge of good and evil is an 
alternative knowing and an alternative being to knowing God and being 
known by Him. 'Instead of knowing himself in the origin of God, he 
must now know himself as an origin,.96 The desire behind this ethic is 
to 'be like God' through knowing good and evil, and thus no longer 
dependent upon God for either life or right understanding. The serpent 
promises that there is not death (Gen. 3:4) but more abundant life, on 
the order of being like God (Gen. 3:5). The command, subverted by 
sinful desire, produces the very thing it forbids. In this way 'the self-
the "I" -dies' and this death is a natural fruit or outcome of its desire.97 
Agamben's reading of 7:7, which Zizek follows, maintains, 'The 
law here is no longer ento/e, a norm that clearly prescribes or prohibits 
something; instead the law is only the knowledge of guilt'.98 In 
Agamben's account, Paul's struggle in Romans 7:15-19 'is a perfectly 
clear reading of the agonizing condition of a man faced with a law that 
has become entirely unobservable, and, as such, only functions as a 
universal principle of imputation,.99 Zizek does not specify verse 7, but 
maintains that 'according to Saint Paul, the Law itself generates the 
95 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Neville Horton Smith (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1995),21. 
96 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 22. 
97 In this way 'the self- the "I" -dies' and this death is a natural fruit or 
outcome of the goal of the striving (Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 
Volume I, 245, 247). 
98 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 10S. Jewett, Romans, 449. 
99 Agamben, The Time That Remains, 10S. 
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desire to violate it' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 104), it 
'generates/solicits its own transgression' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 
113). The intervention of the superego, in his example, takes the 
command 'You shall not kill!' and truncates it to 'You shall not!' The 
'kill', set off from the prohibition, becomes the injunction to 'Kill!' (The 
Puppet and the Dwarf, 104-105). The 'hermeneutical' procedure of 
isolating the letter of the law creates a frontier or 'coast-like' condition 
between the real (with the obscene superego) and the symbolic and 
out of this tension jouissance or forbidden desire arises. The letter and 
jouissance describe the form and substance of life under the 
compulsion to repeat - the letter being that which 'returns and repeats 
itself100 in the life force of desire. In lizek's understanding, apart from 
desire for self or the compulsion to obtain the self there is no self. 
What seems evident is that lizek's theory does not deal with Paul's 
notion of law as Torah but the law of sin and death (and his primary 
problem is to extract love from this law). He knowingly and necessarily 
commits the fallacy which Paul is writing to overcome, of equating the 
law of sin with the law of God.101 
For lizek, Paul's questioning of the relationship between sin and 
the law does not mean that there is an original separation (between the 
obscene superego and law) but rather, the separation is created by a 
necessary passage through sin and perversion. It is the perverse 
position to reify the law or Other that provides the background against 
which hysteric questioning can begin. According to Lizek, Paul, in 
100 Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 100. 
101 He understands this is his project for, as an atheist, the law of God is 
nonexistent except as a category under the law of sin and death. 
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raising the question 'Is the Law sin?' (7:7) is referring back to an 
understanding he has already described (in 3:5-8) when he first raises 
the question.102 'This "Let us do evil so that good may come [from it]" 
is the most succinct definition of the short circuit of the perverse 
position' (Ticklish Subject, 148). The Subject sides with the law in the 
attempt to escape its punishing effect and to partake of its surplus 
enjoyment of forbidden desire (Ticklish Subject, 247-251). The pervert 
presumes to enact the law through its transgression and in the process 
has become the unquestioning subject of a law which requires 
transgression to complete it or enact it. 
Though there is not a direct correspondence, in terms of 
Genesis 3, the pervert has believed the serpent's lie that God-like 
existence is to be had through breaking God's law and eating of the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil. He would establish this binary 
law - doing evil that the good may come - within himself. Lizek 
describes it as giving oneself completely over to the symbolic without 
regard for finitude and mortality (Reader, 117), which in terms of 
Genesis is to have embraced the lie 'You shall not die' (Gen. 3:4). 'As 
such, the pervert's universe is the universe of pure symbolic order, of 
the signifier's game running its course, unencumbered by the Real of 
human finitude' (Reader, 117).103 
102 In fact Paul raises this same question at least three times in Romans 6-7 
alone (6:13 15; 7:7). 
10 Paul, in voicing the questions of the hysteric, is avoiding the trap of 
perversion (the grab for immortality) in that the existence or completeness of the 
Other of the Law is under question in Romans 7. This dissolves the issue of avoiding 
mortality through identification with the Other and what it wants -the constitutive 
question in transgression and perversion. The Other does not know what it wants 
and there is no positive content to live up to, and mortality and death must be 
accounted for. The 'obscene superego supplement', which grounds this 
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The problem is 'how to pass from this superego hyperbole of the 
Law to love proper' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 107). The Pauline 
project, in lizek's reading, is to suspend the 'obscene unwritten 
underside' of the law and to enact love (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 
113). Yet, for lizek, there is not a means of getting at this excess 
apart from the forbidden desire of jouissance, as recognition of excess 
opens the way to the dimension beyond the law and this beyond can 
be transformed into 'love beyond the Law' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 
114). 
For Paul, the law of God can be extracted from the law of sin 
without passage through sin, because the original intent of the law was 
to preserve a relationship with God, which precedes and exceeds the 
law. Sin and the law need one another in lizek's theory, while for Paul 
the law may mediate sin but sin does not mediate love.104 
The Lie of Sin 
The explanation for the confusion between sin and the law is the 
primordial deception related in Romans 7:10-11. Zizek sees the 
fundamental fantasy as the point of departure but also the orienting 
factor (for each of the three registers) in the structure of the Subject. 
transgressive approach to the law, is undone and the slate is wiped clean for an 
authentic Truth-Event. 
104 Part of the problem with Lizek's analysis is that he presumes Paul is 
opposed to the Jewish law and does not recognize 'it is already a law deprived of its 
superego supplement, not relying on any obscene support' (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 113). Paul is, of course, defending the law and maintains that transgression of 
the law is due to sin, so that while sin may be mediated by law, law is not dependent 
on sin or the law of sin. 
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Connected with the above argument, that Paul in his text is 
fusing experience of the 10th commandment with the prohibition in 
Genesis, the argument here is that he is continuing to follow both 
accounts in verses 10-11: 'The very commandment that promised life 
proved to be death to me. For sin, seizing an opportunity through the 
commandment, deceived me and through it killed me' (Rom. 7:10-
11).105 Paul is continuing to describe how sin distorts the law in its 
relation to the sinful self. The 'command which promised life' (vs. 10) 
serves as an explanation for the content of the deception connected 
with sin. Dunn maintains that life is not to be had in the law (due to 
sin), while Bornkamm thinks this positing of life directly in the law is the 
deception which sin works. 106 The nature of the promise held out by 
the law is itself the question posed in Paul's formula.107 What is certain 
is that Sin finds its deceptive opportunity (7:11) in the command which 
promised life (7: 1 0). The exact meaning of iVTOAI] Ij £ i ~ ~ (wrjv is 
ambiguous, as witnessed in the variety of interpretations of the verse, 
but this ambiguity seems to function in the same way as that of 
'forbidden desire' .108 The perception that iVTOAfJ ~ ~ £ i ~ ~ (wlW is the 
105 English Standard Version. 
106 Dunn, Romans, 383. There is a bit of ambiguity in Dunn's explanation, but 
the conclusion he comes to is that after sin, life is not to be found in the law, though 
this was the original purpose of law. Bomkamm argues that in fusing the texts, Paul 
is reading the prohibition (access to life) into the law; and he is doing so with enough 
ambiguity that the nature of the promise held out by the law is itself the question 
posed in Paul's formula (Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience, 90). 
107 Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience, 90. 
108 According to Barrett's reasoning the commandment not to eat of the tree 
of the knowledge of good and evil came with continual access to the tree of life so 
that the commandment brought life (Barrett, The Epistle to the Romans, 144). 
Contrary to this, Ziesler notes the emphasis in Genesis falls on the prohibition, and it 
is Satan and not God who holds out the promise of God-like life by breaking the 
prohibition. Ziesler concludes that the promise of life in the command does not fit the 
Genesis account: 'It is hard to detect any such promise in Gen. 2:16ff, where there is 
only the threat of death if the command is disobeyed' (Ziesler, Paul's Letter to the 
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promise of life in the law, is skewed by sin so as to remove the 
necessity of God as the giver of life. According to Dunn, to still 
imagine, after sin, that life is in the law, reflects a common Jewish 
misconception.109 He raises the possibility that the law contains life; 
'Does Paul mean that the commandment was intended to bring about 
life, to lead to life (NEB, NJB), that is, a life not yet possessed ... ?110 
Such a reading, he maintains, does not fit with Paul's understanding of 
the law as stated elsewhere but reflects a misreading which Paul is 
repudiating. 111 What is not to be missed he concludes, 'is the implied 
sharp reverse to and rebuttal of the traditional Jewish assumption that 
the law/commandment promoted life'.112 The correct nuance is to 
understand that the law keeps one in a life giving relationship with God, 
but it is this relationship to God (and not with the law or the negative 
prohibition of Genesis) that is the true source of life.113 As in Harrison's 
reading, the law is a step removed from life as it is 'to promote 
observance that would lead to divine blessing and consequent human 
happiness,.114 
Wright, who is arguing for the priority of Exodus, nonetheless 
finds in verse 11 a simultaneous reference to the serpent's deception 
Romans, 187}. He concludes, 'If Paul is fusing the Genesis story with the Law-giving 
on Sinai, then here the emphasis is strongly on Sinai, not the Garden (Ziesler, Paul's 
Letter to the Romans, 187). 
109 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 384. Wright concludes, 'Torah intended to give life .. 
. but because of sin all it could give was death' (Wright, Romans, 563). 
110 Dunn, Romans 1-8,384. 
111 He notes this would not agree with Gal. 3:21. Dunn, Romans 1-8, 384. 
112 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 384. 
113 The prohibition not to eat did not itself contain life but served as a 
temptation (through the Serpent) as an alternative sort of life to that which God 
provided. 
114 Everett F. Harrison, Expositors Bible Commentary: Romans through 
Galatians (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976), 80. Italics added. 
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which was repeated with the giving of the law, maintaining the sin of 
Eden is repeated at Sinai.115 The logical sequence of verses 10-11 is 
that of Genesis 3: the prohibition posed the possibility of life; sin or the 
serpent deceived me; and 'I' died.116 The prohibition or law is itself the 
indicator (the opportunity- cJ(POPJ.1'W- the base of operations) that 
something more (life beyond God) is available - it points out the 
opportunity for life and knowledge. 117 'You shall not die' (Gen. 3:4) 
indicates God is the liar and the prohibition a cover warding man away 
from enjoying the privileges of God. The serpent's lie (3:4) negates 
death but then the negation is negated under a supposed truth (3:5). 
In Paul's version, according to Kasemann, the lie is embraced under 
the presumption that life is to be had in the law (7:10) through spiritual 
aChievement.118 Death denied presents itself only under the positive 
promise of a more abundant life - in a life that is somehow lacking. 
The deception of the serpent introduces a perceived lack or absence in 
knowledge and life, and with this lack illicit desire arises.119 
Subsequent to the transgression lack or death cannot be avoided, even 
through the law.12o The deceptive desire of verse 7 which would 
confuse sin and the law and the deception that life is in the law (10-11 ) 
115 Wright, Romans, 563. Harrison reproduces Bornkamm's notion that sin 
promises life as a perverSion or deception in regard to the commandment (Harrison, 
Romans 81). 
116 See Dunn, Romans, 383-384. 
117 In Genesis the prohibition (from the sinful perspective) was hiding the 
opportunity for true knowledge and God-like life. God is perceived as perverse in 
hiding what he has behind the prohibition. 
118 As KEisemann puts it, the nature of the deception is that 'the law was 
misunderstood as a demand for achievement. In this perversion, however, the law 
brings death' (Ktlsemann, Commentary on Romans, 198). 
119 The prohibition, under the prompting of the serpent is made to seem 
capricious and a screen or lie hiding the truth ('Is it all the trees?' 'Did he really say?' 
(Gen.3:VJ· 
1 After sin 'life in the law' cannot mean what it meant to Adam. There is no 
life giving power in the law due to sin. See Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 438. 
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pictures the 'I' in terms of a lack of life, and the law is desired to satisfy 
or provide life in place of death and dissatisfaction. The turn to the law 
for life culminates in the dead '" (7: 11), which is telling this story 
(indicating this is the living dead of an enduring dynamic). 121 Paul 
describes the move as setting 'I' upon a course of life that is a living 
death: 'sin became alive and I died' (7:9); 'it was sin ... effecting my 
death' (7:13); 'Who will set me free from the body of this death?' 122 
(7:24). The lack in human life (death) becomes the power that controls 
and orders his life. The compulsion that drives him and orders his 
existence arises from within him and yet is somehow out of his reach-
'I am no longer the one doing it' (7:20). Sin through the deception is 
the productive/destructive centre, the force of gravity, exercised 
through death. 
If Paul is staging the sequence of events and their content 
giving rise to the tyw then two ingredients are necessary: the law or 
commandment and the deception. Dunn maintains that the 'word 
"deceived" characterizes the Pauline understanding of sin's role in the 
fall of man'.123 If verse 7 and 11 are read together the desire of 7 is 
defined by the deception of 11, or the desire itself could be said to be 
the deception. In Bultmann's reading desire contains the lure or 
121 As Bornkamm concludes, 'In the kindling of desire, that is, of my urge for 
life, the fate of death is sealed for me' in that life is sought through the law 
(Bomkamm, Early Christian Experience, 90.) 
122 As Bomkamm describes, the alien force personified in sin acts almost as 
another subject in the duel with the 'I' (Bornkamm, Early Christian Experience, 90). 
123 Dunn, Romans, 384. According to Dunn the 'I' of 7:11 is actually that of 
the woman who now characterizes Paul's description of sin's work in deception. He 
cites Paul's repeated use of the word in II Cor. 11:3 and I Tim. 2:14 - 'the serpent 
deceived [ t ~ r J 1 T a T r J a £ v ] ] Eve' 
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deception that life is promised in the commandment.124 'Sin's "deceit" 
consists in deluding man to think that if he follows his "desire" he will 
gain life whereas he only acquires death.'125 
Desire is the force of sin as it takes control: 'sin, taking 
opportunity through the commandment, produced in me coveting of 
every kind' (7:8). The desire for life indicates its absence, and the bind 
of pursuing it in the law, like that of attempting to establish Being (God-
likeness) through knowing (good and evil), describes Paul's frustrated 
pursuit in which two principles or laws are waging war within him (Rom. 
7:23).126 In the deception the law is a means of establishing the self, 
but it is precisely the self that has become the sight of a destructive 
desire.127 The deception produces an inverted economy of exchange. 
The 'promised life' is death, which in the serpent's lie is the special 
knowledge enacted (the dynamic he puts into play does not end in 
Gen.4 or beyond).128 The attempt of the 'I' to possess the 
commandment, turned back on the subject and sin possessed 
(Aa{300aa) 'I'. Where sin lies dead in verse 8 apart from the law, under 
124 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Volume I, 248. In lizek's 
theory this is the superego supplement to the law: 'This is the Lacanian opposition 
between the symbolic Law and the obscene call of the superego at its purest: all the 
negations are powerless, and turn into mere denegations, so that what remains is the 
obscene intrusive reverberation of "Kill! Killl"' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 105) 
125 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Volume I, 248. 
126 See Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 100. 
127 C. E. B. Cranfield lays out the three step process of the deception in Eden 
and draws the parallel with the Law of Israel: the serpent distorts the divine command 
and sin distorts the law 'imposing a false image of it on his understanding'; the 
distortion serves to negate the positive gift of life with the tree of life and it denied 
death, while with the law, fulfilling it was seen 'to put God under an obligation to 
himself; and using the commandment the serpent insinuated doubts about God's 
good will and suggested 'the possibility of man's asserting himself in opposition to 
God' (C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans: Introduction and Commentary on Romans I-VIII, Vol. 1 (IntI Critical 
Commentary) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 352-353). 
128 As L i ~ e k k describes it the choice is one of 'life in death' as in the pursuit of 
survival 'what we ultimately lose is life itself (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 94). 
226 
the law the 'I' lies dead in verse 9 and sin becomes an animate force in 
the exchange.129 
The imagery is not of possessing (though to embody or possess 
the law may describe the desire) but of being possessed by a force that 
kills (cirrtKTtIVtV) and deceives (i{fJITC1TfJotv).13o Paul describes the 
process as one of being reduced to a cadaver as this alien force found 
an opportunity or opening (cicpoPJl17v), and 'came upon me' (Aa{300oa) 
and reduced me to a site of production (KaTtlpyaoaro) for desire and 
death. The law of sin has colonized 'my members' (7:23), and 'I' is at 
war with himself in a losing battle. 'Sin came alive' as an animate force 
displacing the 'I' and 'I died'. 
The 'law of sin and death' then, speaks of the law under the 
auspices of a deception in which possession of the v 6 J l o ~ ~ is presumed 
to provide life. Life though is given over to the animate force of sin so 
that Paul can declare 'I am no longer the one doing it, but sin which 
dwells in me' (Rom. 7:20). The 'I' colonized by sin takes a passive 
position toward the force of sin, which Paul makes clear is also the 'I' 
doing the very thing 'I' hate. The self-antagonism is such that the two 
'I"s are in a struggle that gives rise to two competing laws. 'I joyfully 
concur with the law of God' and yet, 'I see a different law in the 
members of my body' (Rom. 7:23). These two laws with their 
129 Keck notes this symmetry between verse 8 and 9. See Keck, Romans, 
183. 
130 Lacan calls this desire which is a force for death jouissance. Ones 
orientation to death, which may manifest itself in several key ways, is the role of 
jouissance or Lacan's notion of finding a pleasure that exceeds the bounds of the 
pleasure principle in painful pleasure or a pleasurable suffering (Seminar VII, 184). 
Jouissance names the desire to break through the pleasure principle towards the 
Thing that holds out an excess of pleasure. Thus Lacan links it directly to the death 
drive and 'the path towards death' (Seminar XVI/, 17). 
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conjoined 'I"s are in a battle to the death: 'I see a different law in the 
members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and 
making me a prisoner of the law of sin which is in my members' (Rom. 
7:23). As Bertone notes, Paul's object here is not to demarcate one 
form of v 6 J l o ~ ~ from the other: The point is that this system represented 
something that simply did not produce life'.131 This constitutes the self 
a 'body of death' requiring divine rescue. 'Wretched man that I am! 
Who will set me free from the body of this death?' 
Paul's sinful deception and lizek's fundamental fantasy are 
potentially, mutually enlightening, in accounting for the Subject or the 
'I'. The Subject structured like a lie, grounded in the negation of death 
(the real), is not a concept open to easy explanation, and neither are 
the various biblical formulas (body of death, body of sin, dead in sin) 
which express a similar idea. It may not be obvious why the Bible 
aligns sin, death, and deception as constituting an identity outside of 
Christ. Where deception is given the specific content of Romans 7: 1 0-
11 (and by extension Genesis 3:4ff), something on the order of lizek's 
death drive offers a parallel explanation. Death denied, in this light, 
amounts to an exchange of life for death as a form of life. The 
supposed truth (the symbolic or life through the law) is undermined by 
its foundation in the negation of the lie. The lie of sin is not simply a 
problem of the heart (though it is that); it poses itself as an alternative 
epistemology or means of gaining life and truth through knowing. The 
lie of sin undermines truth; even God's truth as given in the oracles of 
131 Bertone, The Law of the Spirit, 180. 
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the law (Rom. 3:3) is subject to the deceit of sin. What truth can stand 
the distortion of the lie? This distortion is inclusive of the truth of the 'I' 
or iyw; the most intimate truth, that of human identity. The human 
project is set upon saving the self, but the deception obscures access 
even to what a self might be. The notion that I have immediate access 
to myself cannot stand in light of Paul's picture of the deluded '1'. 
The perverse position of presuming to know and be controlled 
by full exposure to the Other/law (in which God or the law is assumed 
to be perverse (Reader, 119), accords with Paul's picture of sin as an 
animate force under whose influence what " am doing, , do not 
understand; for I am not practicing what I would like to do, but I am 
doing the very thing I hate' (7:15). 'No wonder, then, that the 
fundamental fantasy is passive, "masochistic", reducing me to an 
object acted on by others: it is as if only the experience of the utmost 
pain can guarantee the subject access to Being' (Reader, 119). As in 
Paul's description, sin becomes an animate force of suffering in the 
agonistic war within the self. 'I' can no longer translate thought into 
action or understand what the iyw is doing as sin has taken over as 
agent (7:20) and the 'I' is passive or dead. The perverse position of 
presuming to know and be passively controlled by full exposure to the 
Other accentuates or exposes the 'fundamental fantasy' or primordial 
lie which is at the ground of the human project (Reader, 119). The 
human Subject has created its agency out of a presumed access to 
Being or life through the law. Desire borne by death accounts for each 
component of the structure as the death drive is the force of death 
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taken up into the 'I' through the symbolic or law through the lie's 
negated death (Seminar I, 149). The agency of the Subject (the ability 
to obey the law or carry thought over into action) is dead. The three 
registers of Lacan approximate Paul's categories (law/symbolic, 
iyw/ego, death negatedlreal) constituting a work of death or Paul's 
'body of death'.132 
The primary difference between Paul's sinful deception and 
Lizek's fundamental fantasy is that for Paul the lie negates not just 
death but life as coming from God. The immortal death drive is the 
primary form of life for Lizek, so nothing is lost and everything is gained 
through the fundamental fantasy and death drive. For Paul the lie of 
sin, in denying death, also denies life and God as the giver of life. 
Death denied is the staging ground for an autonomous knowledge, 
which must presume for itself some form of innate immortality so as to 
obtain God-like status. Death drive comes close to describing the 
reality of the living death of this 'innate immortality'; what it misses is 
that death is the result of the refusal of life. To state it differently, while 
death is prime reality for Zizek, for Paul divine life is primary. 
In regard to language or law, the symbolic is necessarily a death 
dealing fiction for Lizek, while for Paul the word of man has the 
potential to find correspondence with the word of God. The law holds 
out this possibility as a holy and just word from God (7:12) as it is freed 
from the distortion of sin. Where Lizek's symbolic and law have no 
ground other than within the dynamic interplay of the subject, Paul's 
132 Death alone is silent, but death borne along by life describes this 
orientation in which 'the aim of all life is death' (The Ego and the Id, 38). 
230 
law is spiritual (7: 14) and is part of God's salvation plan (8:2). The 
original lie may have subverted the reality of human speech (Rom. 
3:10-19), but the word of God is 'near you, in your mouth and in your 
heart' (10:8) and it is the power of salvation (10:9). 
Paul's description of 'the body of death' or its parallel in 6:6 'the 
body of sin' is described as being put to death in Christ for those who 
have died in Christian baptism. The next section examines how death 
and sin are constituted as part of the 'body' so that in the following 
section it might be determined what it means to die to sin in Christ. 
The Meaning of 'body of death' or the 'body of sin' 
As Lizek describes, the symbolic or the soul 'has to be paid for 
by the death, murder even, of its empirical bearer', the body (The Liiek 
Reader, vii). The antagonistic dialectic between the imaginary and 
symbolic (or the ego and superego) takes place through the 
displacement of the physical body (Organs without Bodies, 93). The 
argument of this section is that this claim corresponds to Paul's 
formulae 'body of sin' (awJlG T ; j ~ ~ a J l G P T i a ~ ) ) (Rom. 6:6) and 'body of 
death' ( a w J l a T O ~ ~ TOO BavaTOu) (7:24). Zizek's concept of the death 
drive arising through the real of the body and Paul's concept of 'body of 
death' or 'body of sin' both describe a subject engaged in a struggle for 
life which kills. For Paul seems to not be referring to only the physical 
body but to the subject, with sin and death describing the orientation or 
existential reality of the subject. Examining these phrases will also 
enable us to discover what Paul means when he says that 'the body of 
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sin might be brought to nothing' in being crucified with Christ in 
baptism. 
A number of commentators hold that Paul means the same thing 
by 'body of sin' in 6:6 and the 'body of death' in 7:24.133 Fitzmyer 
defines the meaning as 'the whole person considered as earth-
oriented, not open to God or his Spirit and prone to sin' .134 Dunn cites 
mortal body and 6:12 (8V'7T(jJ UJ.1WV aWJ.1aTl) which is a reordering of the 
same words at 7:24 ( a W J . 1 a r o ~ ~ TOO 8avCJrou). His understanding is that 
aWJ.1G denotes not only the physical body but the full reality which 
comes with embodiment: 
It is man embodied in a particular environment, the body 
being that which constitutes him a social being, a being who 
relates to and communicates with his environment. It is as an 
embodied entity that he can act upon and be acted upon by 
his environment.135 
So aWJ.1G is a permeable identity within an environment so that its 
capacity to act and be acted upon constitutes its basic nature. 'It is the 
means of living in, of experiencing the environment.'136 What needs to 
be added to Dunn's description is that this capacity involves the ability 
133 The two terms seem to be parallel, and as Cranfield puts it in regards to 
7:24, 'Paul means the body or human nature which through sin and law has fallen 
under the dominion of death' (Cranfield, The Epistle to the Romans, 151. Stendahl, 
in attempting to expunge 7:24 of any reference to a possible psychological element 
separates the two metaphors ('body of sin' in 6:6 and 'body of death' in 7:24), 
maintaining that the 'body of sin' might refer to a 'subjective conscience struggle', 
whereas the 'body of death' references a specific theological concern with 'a positive 
solution available here and now by the Holy Spirit about which he speaks in chapter 
8' (Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles, 94). 
134 Fitzmyer, Romans, 436. 
135 Dunn, Romans, 320. 
136 Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle, 285. 
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to disrupt itself so that it is not just a permeable exchange with the 
environment. 
In his explanation of the Pauline use of the term aWjJG, 
Bultmann employs language that is at times freighted with a 
philosophical/psychological weight, which nonetheless sheds light on 
the crisis Paul is describing. Bultmann emphasizes that what is 
included in the term aWjJG, in addition to the body, is a capacity to 
objectify or spilt the self (to reflect on the self), 137 witnessed most often 
(particularly in its negative or fallen state) in the capacity for self-
estrangement or self alienation.138 He describes the resulting self 
relation as an experience between the 'I' and the 'not-I' and this 
dynamic of alienation constitutes the aWjJG. 139 As Paul states it, 'it is 
no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me' (Rom. 7:20).140 
This 'body of sin' or 'body of death' (Romans 7:24) may be perceived 
137 It is also from this apparent duality that the 'na'ive' or Gnostic 
understanding can be accounted for, as the physical body is assigned the role of 'not-
I' (Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament: Volume I, 199). 
138 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Volume I, 199. 
139 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, Volume 1,199. Stendhal's 
critique (evaluated above) of Bultmann is that this understanding presumes that a 
troubled conscience is at the centre of Pauline theology (Stendahl, Paul Among Jews 
and Gentiles, 87-88). Yet if Bultmann's description is an accurate description of the 
alienation inherent in 'the law of sin and death' the focus is no longer on human 
consciousness or conscience (Paul is not describing a condition of which he was 
conscious but precisely one which entered consciousness only when he became a 
Christian). Stendahl, in rejecting any notion 'that Paul here is involved in an 
argument ... about man' or his own cloven ego or predicament', ends with a dualistic 
view of the ego and sin with the ego fully acquitted and sin as an alien rather than an 
alienating force (Stendahl, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles, 92-93). The ego and 
Sin/Flesh become two ontological forces in Stendahl giving rise to a real dualism 
rather than the apparent dualism of Bultmann. Hans Conzelmann, who follows 
Bultmann, clarifies that, 'Pauline anthropology is not dualistic. The place where God 
meets me is not the soul, but the body.' Conzelmann goes on to explain that the 
capacity of the subject though is that which gives rise to a seeming dualism. 'awJ,Ja 
designates the "I" (I Cor. 13:3; 7:4) in so far as it can be grasped by itself and others 
as the possible object of action through others and through itself: The way in which 
to reconcile the monistic and the seemingly dualistic anthropology is to recognize 'the 
demand for self-domination is based on the statement that I am alienated from myself 
in the world' {Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament, 
trans. J. S. Bowden (London: SCM-Canterbury Press Ltd., 1974) 177). 
140 English Standard Version. 
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or experienced as the physical body getting 'out of hand' or out of 
control, but Bultmann's point is that it is the self in its experience of the 
self that is out of control. 141 The notion that one has a aWJ1a rather 
than that one is a aWJ1a is itself an occurrence within the parameters of 
self-reflective identity provided for in Paul's use of the term.142 
The corrective 143 that Kasemann brings to Bultmann's 
understanding is to suggest that aWJ1a is non-isolable; that is, the 
capacity to turn on one's self or to feed back into the environment of 
the self is limited.144 The communication of the self with the self is 
rendered possible by an already existing communication with the 
environment. Schweizer would equate communication and service and 
seems to primarily have service of God and man in mind but does not 
mention service to evil or service to the law.145 
141Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament: Volume 1,197. 
142 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament: Volume I, 194. 
143 Kasemann sees his understanding as against Bultmann but as it is worked 
out here the two might be made to complement one another. 
144 He defines awpa as 'man as a non-isolable existence, i.e., in his need and 
real capacity for communication as friend or foe - man as a being who finds himself 
in and is aware of an already existing world, and is conscious of his dependency on 
certain forces and powers' (Ernst Kasemann, 'The Theological Problem Presented by 
the Motif of the Body of Christ', in Perspectives on Paul (London: SCM Press Ltd, 
1971), 114). JOrgen Becker counters Kasemann and argues that 'Paul's concern is 
not communication in general; rather his theme is the status of the individual person 
before God' (J. Becker, Paul Apostle to the Gentiles (Louisville: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1993), 385). Eduard Schweizer accounts for both of these positions in 
his conclusion that 'awlJo means man in his confrontation with God or sin or fellow-
man' (Eduard Schweizer, 'awlJo, t a W I J O T I K 6 ~ , , t a u a a w l J o ~ ' ' in Theological Dictionary 
of the New Testament Volume VII, Ed. Gerhard Friedrich, Trans., Ed. Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1971), 1066). 
Perhaps the three positions are not so much opposed as different facets of a capacity 
that sets man simultaneously into communication and confrontation with himself 
(Bultmann), others (Kasemann), and God (Becker). 
14 As Schweizer states it, 'awlJo is the place where faith lives and where 
man surrenders to God's lordship. It is thus the sphere in which man serves. Paul 
has no interest whatsoever in appea'rance, abilities, or character, but only in the work 
of the body, in what takes place with it' (Schweizer, 'awlJo, t aWlJoTlK6C;, t 
auaawIJ0c;',1066). He concludes that Bultmann 'thinks that aWlJo denotes man in so 
far as he has a relation to himself and that this leads to a Greek view of man. 
Schweizer seems to miss the point that Bultmann does not allow for the reality of 
such a division between soul and body but only its appearance. While it may be the 
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In conclusion, aWlla is inclusive of a capacity that sets man 
simultaneously into communication and confrontation with himself, 
others, and God, and aWlla means the subject in her self-reflective 
ability to objectify the self. It is the last of these capacities emphasized 
in lizek's understanding of the inherent self-alienation of the three 
registers. lizek describes the process as giving rise to two bodies. 
That body which one might think can be reduced to the biological 
dimension is refused: the 'subject turns away from her biological body 
in disgust, unable to accept that she "is" her body' (Organs without 
Bodies, 93). As Zizek describes it, the original sacrificial relation is 
established within the Subject (with passage through the mirror stage) 
between the imaginary (the ego or '1') and the symbolic (the superego) 
which establishes the alienated distance from the real of the body. The 
passage is from being a body to establishing a symbolic distance from 
the body (and having a body): 'the body exists in the order of having-/ 
am not my body, / have it' (Organs without Bodies, 121). 
The inadequacy of Lacan's and lizek's understanding, and 
where it does not accord with the above description, is that neither has 
a positive notion of communicative depth. To communicate with others 
case that Bultmann sees 'man as a self-enclosed individual' a proper understanding 
of how one arrives at the 'I' and self-reflection through socialization would allow 
coordination of his position with Schweizer's. Bultmann allows for both good and evil 
done in the body and his theory would fit into Schweizer'S schema as an explanation 
of how that which is meant to serve the good comes to serve evil by severing self 
from God, man, and self. If Bultmann's theory is inadequate to describe the positive 
realm of community its strength is in picturing the failure of this communal realm as 
the subject alienates himself from God, others, and self. The insight which 2 : i ~ e k k will 
bring is a coordination of all three points of view. In 2:izekian theory an understanding 
like that of Bultmann will have to be coordinated with that of Kasemann in the same 
way that the human Subject coordinates himself with the community. Even if 
Bultmann's theory is inadequate in describing the full range of human community his 
understanding brings insight to the failure of that community. 
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and God, or to not give due honor to God, is not a possibility raised in 
their theory. Lacan sees religion as the attempt to avoid the lack of 
being and the attempt to do away with any gap between the signifier 
and signified (SeminarVII, 130). Where religion would flood the world 
with meaning he would pose the disruption of the real, which gives rise 
to a continual pursuit of meaning (Seminar VII, 31). 
lizek's and Lacan's focus is on the turn of communicative 
capacity against the self in an antagonistic self-relation. The qualifiers 
added to body such as sin (awpa T q ~ ~ a p a p T i a ~ ) ) or death ( a c i J p a T O ~ ~ TOO 
eavaTou) identify their understanding as it overlaps with Paul's. Rather 
than being in relationship with God, the subject in these modes has a 
primary relationship to sin and death (or to law, which is in the end 
definitive of the Zizekian Subject). The failure of the Subject in its self-
antagonism and dis-community is a corporeal failure. In the Lacanian 
formula 'there is no sexual relationship' (Seminar 20, 17) as the 
register of the symbolic cannot be coordinated with the real of the 
body.146 The 'body of death' is a failure of communication and a failure 
to achieve corporate or corporeal identity. 
If aWJ.1a is the Subject with the qualifiers of death and sin 
describing the orientation of the Subject, to crucify awpa T 1 7 ~ ~ a p a p T i a ~ ~
so that it is suspended or brought to nothing (KarapYfJBfj) describes the 
profound reorientation of baptism. But the question is if this 'dying to 
sin' is a metaphor, which describes an existential change imitating 
146 As Stuhlmacher phrases it 'Paul speaks of the "body" of the person when 
it is a matter of the circumstances involved in one's communication, in a good or evil 
sense, that is, when it is a matter of that which a person does and accomplishes 
toward others' (Stuhlmacher, Paul's Letter to the Romans, 92). 
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Christ's death, or if this reorientation is on the basis of an ontological 
change. This leads to the next section, which focuses on Romans 6.2 
and 6.10 in order to examine what it might mean to 'die to sin'. Having 
so far mainly shown an affinity between :Lizek and Paul, in this next 
section I argue against :Lizek, that 'death to sin' is an ontological 
participation in the death of Christ and not simply symbolic or 
subjective destitution as it involves being 'joined to' Christ. 
Christ's Death to Sin and the Christian's Death to Sin in Baptism 
We have seen that sin in Romans is a corporate problem (as 
well as an individual problem) which exercises its power through TO 
awpa T i 7 ~ ~ a p a p T i a ~ ~ because of the environment constituted by Adam. 
Where sin is understood as a power that rules in the human condition 
due to Adam, to die to sin for Christians (6:2) and for Christ (6:10) need 
not be read in a different sense. The meaning of the Christian's 'dying 
to sin' (6:2) will depend upon the proximate relationship it has to 
Christ's 'dying to sin' (6: 1 0), and it is the understanding of the nature of 
this 'likeness' (6:5) that determines this proximity. This section argues 
that baptism (dying to sin) is a participation in the death of Christ in 
which there is a fusion with Christ through the Spirit. Paul's picture in 
Romans 5 is that Adam instituted the age in which sin and death rule 
and Christ is inaugurating a new age. To die to sin (for the Christian) is 
to break the rule and power of sin and to enter into the reign of Christ. 
If Christ's death to sin is in some way inherently different from the 
Christian's death to sin these two verses cannot be read together. It is 
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this latter consideration that is first taken up, and then the proximate 
relationship of 'dying to sin' for Christ and the Christian is examined. 
Jesus completely shares in the human condition and this 
accounts for his death and for his being in a condition in which he can 
overcome death and break the power that it exercises through despair 
and fear. For this reason, Dunn concludes that the two verses (6:2 & 
10) should not be taken in a different sense.147 Moo assigns the same 
meaning to the death to sin in verse 2 and 10, with the understanding 
that 'Paul is continuing to speak of sin as a "ruling power"' and Christ 
was subject to this ruling power (without sinning) which he defeated in 
his death.148 'When these salvation-historical perspectives are given 
their due place, we are able to give 'die to sin' the same meaning here 
as it had in v. 2: a separation or freedom from the rule of sin.'149 The 
reign or rule of sin as it existed in Adam is undone by Christ's death 
and the Christian enters into this freedom.1so Reading the two verses 
together clarifies Paul's description in 6:5 of having 'become united 
with Him in the likeness of His death'. His death was a 'dying to sin' 
and to the degree the Christian shares in his death he shares this 
'dying to sin'. 
147 As Dunn states it, 'What is in view In both cases is the effective power of 
sin over human life as demonstrated most emphatically in the death which none 
escape. Jesus, in his oneness with those who belong to this age, shared in that 
subordination to the power of sin in death. It is because he shared the human 
condition to the full that his overcoming the death which all die can effectively break 
the despair and fear of death, and so already break its grip on human life' (Dunn, 
Romans, 323). 
148 Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 379. 
149 Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 379. 
150 Schreiner advances a similar argument, also tying verse 2 and 10 
together. In his explanation verse 10 explains why verse 2 is the case. 'The only 
way that Christ could defeat the tyranny of death ... was by overcoming the power of 
sin. Thus verse 10 explains that Jesus overcame the mastery of death because 
when he died he broke the power of sin "once for all"' (Schreiner, Romans, 320). 
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The key issue in deciding how the death of Christ relates to the 
Christian's death to sin, or the relation between the two verses 6:2 and 
6:10 has to do with how verse 5 is understood and in particular the 
phrase E:i yap aupqJuTOI y£y6vap£v T(jJ opOIWpaTl TOO eavaTOu and the 
key words opoJ(iJpaTland aupqJuTOl, Dunn defines the meaning of the 
latter as 'knit together' with the sense of 'to make to grow together, 
unite (a wound)' or to 'plant along with/together',151 The word is 
unambiguous, but Dunn has as the object of 'knit together' the 
'likeness' so that his translation reads 'knit together with his 
likeness' ,152 
The critical question which Joseph Fitzmyer brings to this 
understanding is whether one 'can one grow together with a 
likeness?'153 He goes on to explain, 'For Paul, the Christian is 
normally thought to be united with Christ himself or "his body," but not 
with an "image" of the salvation-event' ,154 His question poses not 
only the dilemma of the status of baptism but along with baptism the 
nature of the Christian's relationship to the death of Christ. 155 Is the 
historical death of Christ, like any other historical event, available only 
151 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 316. 
152 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 316. 
153 Fitzmyer, Romans, 435. 
154 Fitzmyer, Romans, 435. 
155 The primary interpretations of Romans 6:5 are in contention over the 
status of this 'likeness' and in turn are divided in the manner in which 'we have been 
united with the likeness of his death' in baptism. The meaning of oJJofwJJa can be 
taken as either a 'corresponding reality' (which would make baptism a likeness once 
removed from the original and the death an imitation), or a form of the original (which 
would mean baptism is not a reduplicated dying but a participation in the singular 
death of Christ). Beasley Murray lays out the two arguments and groups various 
commentators on both sides of the argument as does Sorin Sabou in a more recent 
work. See G.R. Beasley Murray, Baptism in the New Testament (Grand Rapids, 
Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1977) 130ft and Sorin Sabou, 
Between Horror and Hope: Paul's Metaphorical Language of 'Death' in Romans 6:1-
11 (Milton Keynes, United Kingdom: Paternoster, 2005) 70-78. 
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indirectly through a 're-enactment' or through the 'similitude' of a sign 
such as baptism.156 Fitzmyer comes to an alternative understanding: 
'It is not just that they are to imitate Christ (because he has died to 
sin, so you too); Christians are also to arm themselves with the 
mentality that they are dead to sin; for that is what happened to them 
in the baptismal experience' .157 As Fitzmyer explains, 'The noun 
homoioma denotes not merely the abstract idea of "likeness," but the 
concrete image that is made to conform to something else,.158 The 
thought is not that of being conformed to the likeness of baptism or to 
the image of Christ's death as it is reflected in baptism.159 'For Paul, 
156 This similitude is sometimes pictured as an image of an inward event. 
Dunn writes, 'The thought is not of integration with Christ's death as such, as though 
believers could actually participate in a historical event that took place twenty to 
twenty-five years earlier' (Dunn, Romans 1-8, 330). The question is then, what is the 
status of any event, as all are removed by the passage of time? Is Christ only 
available on the same terms as other events? The search for the historical Jesus in 
modemit¥ rested on this sort of metaphysical understanding. 
1 7 Fitzmyer, Romans, 438. Fitzmyer explains his exegetical move in contrast 
to Dunn: 'The expression is probably elliptical and the dat. is better taken as a dat. of 
instrument. referring to baptismal washing as the means of growing together; that 
means is baptism, a likeness to Christ's death' (Fitzmyer, Romans ,435). 
158 Fitzmyer, Romans, 435. 
159 In Dunn's description it is clear that there is a gap between the imaging 
subject and its archetype or object. He illustrates this understanding with an appeal 
to Plato in Parmenides in which 'finite things are oJJo(wJJara' in which the heavenly 
ideas are expressed' Plato, Parmenides 1320 and Phaedrus 250 B quoted in Dunn, 
1988,317. As Dunn works this out in regard to baptism the question arises as to how 
one can ever overcome the gap between subject and object. Just as the likeness of 
the earthly and physical is a representation of the eternal form, so Christ's death is 
the transcendent reality or eternal form, while the individuals conversion is a concrete 
expression of this form. Dunn, 1988, 317 & 331. Though he is using the word 'form' 
here he apparently does not have in mind a partiCipatory form but an imitation once 
removed from the original. As he further illustrates and explains, this 'likeness' is that 
of the idol, 'intended to give concrete representation to spiritual and transcendent 
realities' Dunn, 1988, 317. He likens the relationship of the believer to Christ's death, 
to a 'mirror image and actual outworking of Christ's own death to sin within the 
present age' (James D. G. Dunn, 'Paul's Understanding of the Death of Jesus as 
Sacrifice', in S. W. Sykes, ed., Sacrifice and Redemption: Durham Essays in 
Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 37, quoted in Sabou, 
Between Horror and Hope, 71). 
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the Christian is normally thought to be united with Christ himself or 
"his body," but not with an "image" of the salvation-event.'16o 
In Douglas Moo's understanding, the point is not to eliminate 
the mediating role of baptism: 'Homoi6ma, while not differentiating the 
death to which we are joined from Christ's, nevertheless qualifies it in 
its particular redemptive-historical "form"',161 In the same vein R.e. 
Tannehill points to the parallel use of 'form' in Philippians 2:7 to 
suggest that the 'form' of self-emptying is one which is made available 
in baptism. Paul uses the term 'form' in Romans 6:5 
... because the death and resurrection are connected with 
the two 'forms of Christ's existence, the earthly existence of 
the one who was subject to the powers and the heavenly 
existence of the exalted Lord. The use of 61J0iwIJo in Rom. 
6:5 reflects this idea of conformation to Christ (Phil. 3:21; 
3: 10). It adds to the thought of this verse in that it suggests 
that Christ's death and resurrection are continuing aspects of 
the 'form' of Christ and that the death and resurrection of 
160 Fitzmyer, Romans, 435. N.T. Wright notes that this 'likeness' (ojJoiwjJa) 
is the same as that of Philippians 2:7 in which God sent the Son 'in the likeness of 
sinful flesh' (Wright, 'The Letter to the Romans', 579). The incarnation is not a 
second order image of humanity but is the 'thing itself'. Wright implies that the 
tendency to introduce a gap between Christ's humanity and divinity is of the same 
order as the tendency to introduce a gap between the image of Christ made 
available in baptism and the reality of Christ. Wright connects the integration of the 
Christian's dying in baptism with Christ with the solidarity between Christ and his 
body the Church. There is no gap or notion of a hybrid. 'The theology of baptism, 
both in terms of the "new Exodus" and in terms of the dying and rising of the 
Messiah, prohibits such a thing' (Wright, 'The Letter to the Romans', 547). The 
Exodus from sin is not accomplished in stages. rather the power of sin is defeated 
and there is a liberation from sin and one is enslaved to righteousness (Wright, 'The 
Letter to the Romans', 545). He emphasizes that the struggle of the Christian life is 
not to be thought of in terms of a hybrid of one 'half in Adam and half in Christ' in 
which the attempt is to achieve conformity to Christ from the position of one who is 
still in Adam (Wright, 'The Letter to the Romans', 547). The identity of Adam is 
traded for the identity of Christ through baptism. 
161 Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 370. 
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Christ are present to the believers in transforming power, so 
that the believers take on the same 'form' .162 
The likeness or form of Christ in his incarnation is itself one that 
mediates or makes possible a joining to and conformity with his death. 
Just as 'we have been joined to the "form" of Christ's death' so too is 
there the possibility of 'constantly being (and need to be) "conformed" 
to it' .163 So this understanding of oJ.loiwJ.la 'is not simply as a 
corresponding reality, nor is it a sacramental understanding devoid of 
hearing and conforming to the Gospel.164 While there is a 'redemptive-
historical association' with his death in and through its 'form', it is not a 
repetition of the crucifixion.165 As Kasemann puts it, the form of 
Christ's death is 'both a historical and an eschatological event' and so it 
'cannot be fixed to a single time alone but concerns the whole world' .166 
While the 'cross is actualized in baptism' it is 'not made its 
repetition' .167 There is not the presumption of foregoing time and 
history, as something new is unfolding from the original event.168 
162 R. C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline Theology 
(Serlin: Verlag Alfred Topelmann, 1967) 39, quoted in Sabou, 2005, 74. 
163 Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 370. 
164 Moo suggests that the sacramental understanding is on the right track but 
he concludes that baptism 'mediates our union with Christ - it does not contain 
it'.Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 370. 
165 Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 370. 
166 Kasemann, Commentary on Romans, 168. 
167Kasemann, Commentary on Romans, 168. 
168 If the language of repetition applies it might be the distinction between 
repetition with a difference and repetition of the same. Christ's death and 
resurrection are an original event and not simply a mimetic imaging on the same 
order as that which preceded it. As John Milbank formulates it, 'he imbued his human 
mimesis with an absolutely original creative power able to hold together without any 
interval between sense and occurrence' (John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology 
and Pardon (London: Routledge, 2003), 95). Sense or meaning and its occurrence or 
effectiveness are brought together in Christ and in baptism into him through the 
power of the Spirit (Rom. 8:2). The meaning is not one without effect and the effect 
flows out of the power of the meaning generating 'the event of reconciliation' 
(Milbank, Being Reconciled, 95). 
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To die with Christ in baptism is to be joined to a form which will 
itself bring about a conformity - ultimately to his resurrection (Rom. 6:5; 
Philippians 3:10-11,21 ).169 The form of the subject in Christ displaces 
the form of the subject under the law. 'For the law of the Spirit of life in 
Christ Jesus has set you free from the law of sin and of death' (8:2). 
There is a suspension of the law and a reorientation to death: 
'Therefore there is now no condemnation for those who are in Christ 
Jesus' (8:1). Paul's victory cry proclaims victory over the forces of evil 
as they work through the force of law in human Iife.170 The 
'condemnation' (KGrGKplJ.lG) , or the curse (Rom. 5: 16-18; Gal. 3: 10; 
Deut. 27:26) of the Law is suspended.171 In Christ the relationship with 
God is no longer based on an alienating death. The 'animate force of 
sin' has been displaced by 'life in the Spirit'. Through the Spirit there is 
resurrection life and conformity to Christ (Rom. 6:4), rather than the 
compulsion of sin oriented to death. 
Paul pictures baptism and the lifestyle it institutes as freeing one 
from this life of slavery: 'But thanks be to God that though you were 
slaves of sin, you became obedient from the heart to that form of 
teaching to which you were committed, and having been freed from sin, 
you became slaves of righteousness' (Rom. 6:17-18). He describes 
the passage through baptism as a transition from life to death so that 
its Subjects are to present themselves to God as 'those alive from the 
dead' (Rom. 6:13). Baptism into Christ displaces the primordial 
169Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 370. 
170 Fitzmyer, Romans, 481. 
171 Fitzmyer seems to equate the problem with the law and the answer with a 
doing away with the law, though his explanation of the law is usually nuanced so as 
to explain that it is sin that is the problem. 
deception (connected with the lure of desire and the Law - death) with 
the ontological reality of the death and resurrection of Christ. As 
Fitzmyer writes, 'Ontologically united with Christ through faith and 
baptism, Christians must deepen their faith continually to become more 
and more psychologically aware of that union.'172 Baptism is an 
ontological alternative to the 'body of death', as there is a joining 
(aUJJ(pUTOI) to his body as a new Subject. The 'Subject' of death has 
joined herself to death while the Subject of Christ has been joined to 
the ontological reality of God in Christ. The psychological realization 
builds on the ontological ground it presumes. 
'We know that our old self was crucified with him in order that 
the body of sin might be brought to nothing' (Rom. 6:6).173 The voiding 
or suspension ('brought to nothing') that takes place in verse 6 
(Karapylw) and which is repeated in 7:2 and 6 speaks of a transferral 
from one sort of Subject to another.174 The body of sin (TO aW/la T f J ~ ~
a J l a p T l a ~ ) ) has been entombed by means of baptism into death 
(auv£TarpfJJl£V ouv aUTlfJ ola TOU f 3 a T T T l a J l a T O ~ ~ £ i ~ ~ TOV 8avaTov), but this 
death is not simply anyone's or even one's own as the entombing or 
burial involves a joining of two bodies in death (auvenlcpfJJlev). 
According to Graham Ward, the suspension of the Law does not create 
an absolute void or a mere absence, rather it creates a liminal 
condition where bodies can merge and where gender and materiality 
172 Fitzmyer, Romans, 438. 
173 English Standard Version. 
174 Not only do we not die alone, but the death of Christ opens a space for 
community. 
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are no longer the stable defining factor.175 We were buried together 
then to him (i/3aTTriaelJJ.1£v ouv aurcp) through immersion to the 
particular death that he died ( £ i ~ ~ rov eavaTOv -into the death). The 
'likeness' is a real participation in his death while at the same time 
calling for the participation of the Subject: 'So you also must consider 
yourselves dead to sin and alive to God in Christ Jesus' (Rom. 6: 11 ).176 
There is a physical/corporeal/spiritual relationship with Christ which 
defies Lacan's notion that the real of the body cannot be coordinated 
with a relationship of love (Seminar 20,58). Being joined to Christ is to 
pass into an incarnate relationship with one's own body and the 
material cosmos (the subject taken up in the examination of Romans 8 
below). Where Lizek's theory has no means of recovering the body or 
the material universe Paul pictures the Christian as fully incarnate in 
both. 
Lizek's understanding of dying with Christ was dealt with most 
extensively in his exposition of Romans 7: 1-6, which is Paul's summary 
illustration of dying to sin in Roman's 6, and as Wright says, it can only 
be understood in light of chapter 6.177 It is also easier to understand in 
light of the rest of Romans 7. To bring the discussion on chapter 6 to 
bear on Lizek's theory his exposition is compared to Paul's - in light of 
175 Graham Ward, 'The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ', in Radical 
Orthodoxy: A New Theology, Eds. John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham 
Ward (London & New York: Routledge, 1999) 164. Ward states that. 'Patristic 
theologies of both the incarnation and the circumcision emphasize the instability of 
Jesus' gendered corporeality.' So this gendered Iiminality of his death points to the 
condition in which bodies can merge. 
176 English Standard Version 
177 Wright. Romans, 559. 
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chapter 6 but also what he does in chapter 7 - all of which prepares for 
chapter 8. 
In Zizek's reading of Paul's illustration of the woman whose 
husband has died (7: 1-4), the death is understood as a reorientation to 
the law. 'Release (KGTf]pyi]ef1JJ£v in 7:6) from the law' is the manner in 
which Paul describes the significance of his illustration, and Lizek 
works within this understanding, shifting the orientation of the Subject 
in relation to the law being his primary goal. Within his theory, the 
imaginary and law have to remain in dynamic tension, even in the 
feminine orientation, as it is in this tension or gap that the Subject is 
constituted and sustained. Even the possibility that she would love 
another arises, in Lizek's description, as an experience requiring the 
law. Her notion that she is loved by her consort is, in turn, to imagine 
that deep within her is 'some precious treasure that can only be loved, 
and cannot be submitted to the rule of Law' (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 117). This precious treasure is, according to Lacan, nothing 
other than the ego. 'It is one's own ego that one loves in love, one's 
own ego made real on the imaginary level' (Seminar I, 142). 
What Lizek misses in chapter 6 is that Paul has here 
determined the content of dying to the law (7:4) as it is illustrated in 
7:1-4. The identity of the dead husband of 7:1-4 can be understood on 
the basis of who dies in chapter 6 and who the dead 'I' is in 7:7ff. The 
'old self was crucified with him in order that the body of sin might be 
brought to nothing' (6:6). The 'body of sin' (6:6) which was identified 
with the 'body of death' (7:24) is the summing up of the dynamiC of the 
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'I' in 7:7ff. This 'I' will not survive into chapter 8. :lizek is attempting to 
save the ego or 'I'; while for Paul the 'I' does not survive the death it 
dies in Christ. In terms of the wife and her dead husband, in verse 4 
the 'you' in the first half of the verse locates the readers with the dead 
husband: 'you have died to the law through the body of Christ' (7:4a). 
In the second half of the verse the readers are the wife who has died, 
remarried, and expecting: 'so that you may belong to another, to him 
who has been raised from the dead, in order that we may bear fruit for 
God' (7:4b ).178 :lizek's characterization of 'this strangely sexualized 
comparison of the believer delivered from the Law with an adulteress' 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 273), does not push the strangeness far 
enough. Paul's illustration disrupts each of the categories which are 
the stable, unchanging necessities in the :lizekian universe. The two 
'incompatible dimensions' of the real and the symbolic create the gap 
which is constitutive of the Subject (The Monstrosity of Christ, 274-
275), yet the woman has passed beyond both the real and the 
symbolic (death and the law). The cardinal rule in the Lacanian 
universe is here broken: there is a sexual relationship; it is possible to 
obliterate the dynamic of sin, in which the law and the real of the body 
cannot be coordinated. The believer knows Christ, not in the sense of 
the knowledge of good and evil, but in the bodily sense - the full-
bodied change of baptism. In :lizek's 'dying to sin', the encounter with 
the death drive is a 'limit-experience' which in traversing the fantasy 
opens up the possibility of starting again at the origin. Traversing the 
178 As Wright puts it, 'Once we link the law with sin ... 'you died to the law' can 
only have one meaning. "You" in the first half of 7:4 is the "former husband"; "you· in 
the second half is the "wife'" (Wright, Romans, 559). 
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fantasy, with its subjective destitution and opening up to symbolic 
death, means the subject is only momentarily unconstrained by law or 
ideology. 
As a result, in Zizek's understanding of dying to sin, there can 
be no change in the formal structure or dynamics of the subject, so that 
the couplets law/sin and law/love, applied to the woman (adulteress or 
not) whose husband has died, are indistinguishable. The ambiguity is 
the same as that which the 'I' experiences when faced with 'forbidden 
desire' or 'life in the law', the structure and dynamic which gives rise to 
the desire for the self is precisely the dynamic necessary for 
Subjectivity to occur. The impossibility of the desire is the necessary 
structuring principle against which desire Uouissance) forms. Paul has 
already addressed the ambiguity that arises between law and sin in 
chapter 6. While in 7:7ff he seems to be demonstrating, in a manner 
similar to Zizek that the 'I' arises with this forbidden desire, in chapter 6 
he presumes that this desire (the deceptive desire which makes law 
sin), along with the 'I' is dead. In 6:1 it is no longer sin and law that are 
in danger of confusion, but sin and grace: 'Are we to continue in sin 
that grace may abound?' The two can be delineated because 'we who 
died to sin' cannot live in sin. The Subject of sin has been laid to rest 
so that 'we too might walk in newness of life' (6:4). Where in chapter 7 
'coveting of every kind' (7:8) has colonized the body and its members 
(7:23) in chapter 6 the expectation is that since the body is no longer 
infested with desire the Subject is able to control its members: 'Let not 
sin therefore reign in your mortal body, to make you obey its passions. 
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Do not present your members to sin as instruments for 
unrighteousness but present yourselves to God ... and your members 
to God' (6:12-13). The ambiguity of chapter 7 is displaced with 
perspicuity, and the incapacity of the will, with control. 
Chapter 6 also clarifies the nature of KaTfJPYrJef1J.J£v or the 
suspension of 7:6, as it is not merely Lizek's obscene superego that is 
suspended but the 'body of sin' (of 6:6). The voiding or suspension or 
Karapytw of the'body of sin' and the 'body of death' is the demise of 
the dynamic of the 'I' or the Pauline version of the ego. Where Lizek 
would suspend the superego and save the ego, Paul pictures baptism 
as entombing a cadaver (a subject ready to be buried). The body of 
sin (TO aWJ.la T f J ~ ~ a J . l a p T l a ~ ) ) has been entombed by means of baptism 
into death (auveracpfJJ.lev ouv aUT4J ola TOU f 3 a T T T l a J . l a T O ~ ~ £ i ~ ~ TOV 
eavaTOv). As with Paul's metaphor in 7: 1-4 what happens in the tomb 
is a fusion or joining of two bodies (auv£TaCPfJJ.I£v). 'You also have died' 
not just any death but 'through the body of Christ' that you might 
'belong to another' (7:4). As long as the 'I' is present, death and law 
and the dynamic of the law are working, but where that which 
constitutes the 'I' is voided (suspended) it is not simply an absence or 
potential which remains. Agamben's de-energizing of the law does not 
go far enough as there is new life under a different principle - 'we 
serve in the new way of the Spirit (7:6) - 'the law of the Spirit of life' 
(8:2). As Wright indicates, it is the person and not the law that is 
released.179 Lizek's law, the law of sin and death, with its condemning 
179 Wright, Romans, 560. 
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circumstance of sin under the reign of death is finished. For Paul, 
death is not an origin or ground but is a permeable category. Christ's 
death and resurrection work to expose the emptiness of the grave and 
renders death and sin second class powers. 
Zizek as a commentator on Paul knows primarily the Paul of 
Romans 7, which it has been argued is the non-Christian Paul. 
Though Zizek examines portions of Romans 6, as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, he grounds his theory in Romans 7 and does not 
seem to venture at all into Romans 8. Romans 8, it is argued below, 
stands in marked contrast to Romans 7 as it counters and displaces 
the dynamic of the non-Christian Subject with the one who is 'in Christ'. 
The Paul of Romans 8 will account for his previous identity under the 
law of sin and death (chapter 7) with categories which are absent in 
Romans 7 presumably because they are not available outside of 
Christ. The dialogue between Zizek and Paul has its origin then as a 
dialogue between the non-Christian Paul of Romans 7 and the Paul of 
chapter 8 who lives by the law of life in the Spirit. The categories of 
chapter 8 account for the form (the law) of chapter 7, but fill this form 
with an entirely new content. This concluding section likewise will 
presume to account for Lizek's categories with a theological 
understanding which exceeds the possibilities of his atheistic 
materialism. 
The Law of Sin and Death versus the Law of Life In the Spirit -
Paul in Dialogue with Ziiek 
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Chapter 8 of Romans marks the transition in Paul's argument to 
the description of an alternative understanding of the human Subject. 
Where chapter 7:7ff is focused primarily on the isolated individual 
before the law (with its repeated reference to 'I' or 'myself), chapter 8 
speaks of a corporate identity in the Holy Spirit which has cosmic 
implications (,those in Christ Jesus' vs. 8: 1; 'The creation waits in eager 
expectation for the sons of God to be revealed' (8:19». The Holy Spirit 
does not appear in chapter 7 but is the theme of chapter 8 (mentioned 
19 times explicitly and the main subject of each section of the 
chapter).18o Where chapter 7 focused on describing the dynamics of 
the body of death (7:24) (approximating Lizek's death drive), chapter 8 
counters each of the Pauline categories (and their near parallel in 
Zizek) constituting the Subject addressed in chapter 7 with the work of 
the Spirit: Paul's 'I' (tyw) (analogous to life in the imaginary in Zizekian 
terminology) becomes a life of hope (focused not on the seen or the 
image in the mirror, but on the unseen (vs. 24), which brings about a 
conformity to the image of the Son (vs. 29) and a reconstitution of the 
Subject; the work of the law (or the Zizekian near equivalent of the 
symbolic) is displaced by the law of the Spirit of life (vs. 2) which 
results in freedom from slavery to fear and relationship to God as 
'Abba, Father' (vs. 15) reconstituting the Subject a child of God; the 
Pauline 'body of sin' (6:6) or 'body of death' (7:24) (analogous to the 
Zizekian real) is displaced in the resurrection life of the Spirit (8:10-11) 
180 Fitzmyer, Romans, 480. Adapting Fitzmyer's divisions these sections 
could be schematized in the following manner: (a) 8:1-13: Christian life empowered 
by the Spirit: (b) 8:14-17: the Christian adopted as a child and destined for glory 
through the Spirit: (c) 8:18-27: the cosmic hope in the Spirit: (d) 8:26-39: the fulfilled 
reality of life in the Spirit. This fits closely with the unfolding logic below. 
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which is not a departure from the material body or material reality but 
the beginning of cosmic redemption ('the redemption of our bodies' 
(8:23) and the redemption of the cosmos (8:21)). Thus Paul, in chapter 
8, addresses each of the categories laid out in chapter 7 which :lizek 
links to the three Lacanian registers, so chapter 8 can be read over and 
against :lizek as a Pauline counter to and resolution of the dynamics of 
the death drive. 
This reading though is not only against :lizek but with him, 
particularly in his description of the problem as he relates it to Romans 
7 and even as he recognizes what a Christian solution would entail. 
:lizek, in describing the inherent bind within the dynamic of the 
Lacanian registers is also describing the structure within which any 
solution he offers will have to function. His notion that the fall is 
salvation and that crucifixion is resurrection describes his theoretical 
procedure, in that for him the problem is the answer or at least contains 
the answer.181 In turn, his proposed answer (traversing the fantasy, the 
act) is a repetition of the founding moment or entry into the symbolic, 
which, though it may result in 'an intervention in ... which the agent's 
identity itself is radically changed' (On Belie', 85), in the attempt to start 
the relation with the law over again, it reinstitutes the problem (Enjoy 
Your Symptom, 77).182 The moment of the act is the only moment of 
freedom as a glimpse is had into the real and into the forced choice of 
181 As Kay points out, it is sometimes unclear whether : 2 : i ~ e k k is writing in the 
role of analyst, patient, or both simultaneously. It certainly raises the question of the 
therapeutic value of the act (Kay, Zizek, 155). 
182 See Kay, Zizek, 111. She notes that in the act, in Lacan's formula, 'we 
can "treat the real by means of the symbolic' and that as : 2 : i ~ e k k understands it, the act 
will also 'treat the symbolic by means of the real' - it will 'allow us to reboot in the real 
so as to start up our relationship with the symbolic afresh (Kay, Zizek, 155). 
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entering into the symbolic (Enjoy Your Symptom, 77).183 According to 
Lacan, the only act which is enduringly successful is suicide, as this is 
the only point at which the conscious assumption of the desire of the 
unconscious (death drive) is complete (Television, 66-67).184 As Lizek 
indicates psychoanalysis does not and cannot look to an enduring and 
complete resolution of the real, which in 'Christian terms ... can never 
be redeemed-delivered, laid to rest, pacified/gentrified" (The Fragile 
Absolute, 98).185 He does not believe in Christian salvation or in the 
dissolution of the real but he recognizes that for a Christian this is 
precisely what it would mean to be 'redeemed-delivered'. The sections 
below follow his logic to an end which he indicates but which he himself 
cannot embrace as the point of Romans in Lizekian terms, it will be 
claimed, is precisely the dissolution of the real. With the displacement 
of desire with hope and the overcoming of symbolic alienation through 
adoption by God, these are the requisites for an account of Christian 
redemption that will meet the human predicament as Lizek and Paul 
183 See The Plague of Fantasies, chapter 1. 
184 His descriptions of the act in film describe coming up against the forced 
choice of a situation and choosing the impossible or suicidal act: in Speed, the hero 
(Keanu Reeves) confronting the terrorist blackmailer holding his partner at gunpoint 
shoots his partner in the leg; in Ransom the media tycoon (Mel Gibson) answers the 
kidnappers of his son with a refusal of ransom and the offer of reward to whoever will 
turn them in; and in The Usual Suspects Keyser Soeze shoots his own wife and child 
held by a rival mob so as to be free to take full revenge (The Fragile Absolute, 149-
150). 
185 In each of these solutions he is dealing with the trauma of the real which is 
made inaccessible by the fact that it is the centre around which the symbolic and the 
imaginary orbit. As he states it in the full text referenced in the following sentence, 
'one must draw the unavoidable conclusion the psychoanalysis, far from being a 
confessionary mode of discourse, entails the acceptance and admission that all our 
discursive formations are forever haunted by some "indivisible remainder", by some 
traumatic spectral "rest" that resists "confession", that is integration into the symbolic 
universe - or, in Christian terms, that can never be redeemed-delivered, laid to rest, 
pacified/gentrified' (The Fragile Absolute, 98). In straightforward terms he is not a 
Christian and does not believe in Christian salvation, so Christian redemption and 
deliverance are not viable possibilities for him. 
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differently describe it. In so dOing one goes beyond what lizek thinks 
possible. 
So while the reading below takes up dialogue with lizek, the 
point is to appreciate the depth of difference between the dynamics of 
life under the law and life in Christ as spelled out in chapters 7 and 8 
and in accomplishing this, to spell out what Paul's redemption would 
entail in lizekian terms (which will of course, in part, entail countering 
lizek). The dialectic between lizek and Paul can be read as an 
extension then, of the dialectical difference worked out in chapters 7 
and 8. lizek's description of the dynamics of life under the law (the 
death drive) acts as a commentary not only on chapter 7 but also 
serves to accentuate the difference between the subject of sin (the '1') 
in chapter 7 and the saved subject of chapter 8.186 
lizek, of course would be the first to agree that 7:7ff is about 
the normal Christian life - as the normal Christian life, like every other, 
is controlled by the dynamic of the death drive. lizek sees Romans 7 
as a passage from perversion to hysteria and this hysteric questioning 
constitutes a traversing of the fantasy but not a dispelling of the fantasy 
or a departure from the clutches of the death drive (Ticklish Subject, 
148). For Zizek there is no alternative to the dynamics of Romans 7, 
rather one can only manipulate the Lacanian registers under the power 
186 Douglas Moo spells out the theological framework in which this 
understanding might be disputed and sets out the arguments for and against the 
passage referring to normal Christian life. See Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 
443ft. Fitzmyer lists Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Althaus, Barth, 
Giese, Nygren, Cranfield, Packer and Dunn among those who have held to the 
position (that Romans 7 is normative of the Christian life) in one form or another. See 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 464. 
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of the real and death drive.187 Yet Romans 7 read as the life of the 
unregenerate functions not only as a negative contrast to Romans 8 
but it marks the point of departure or difference which is to be had in 
and through the dynamics of life in the Spirit.188 It is not only the Holy 
Spirit that is absent in chapter 7 and present in chapter 8 but life and 
peace (8:6), adoption as children (8:15-17), glory (8:18), cosmic 
redemption (8:21) and Christian love (8:35ff.) are all themes which can 
be read as alternatives which displace the frustration and agonistic self 
relation under the law in chapter 7. In turn the tyw and the dynamics 
of deception worked out in chapter 7 are not simply absent in chapter 8 
but rather they seem to have been displaced in the corporate identity 
'in Christ,.189 
New Life in the Spirit through Christ by the Father 
The Spirit can be equated with life (8:2, 10-11) and with the 
introduction of the Spirit in 8:2 Paul's question of 7:24 is definitively 
answered. 'For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set you 
free from the law of sin and of death' (8:2). The argument of this 
section is that Christ's death defeated death and founded a new human 
187 He does incorporate categories such as conversion (the act) or 'assuming 
desire' in regard to the law, but as will be shown below his theology falls short of 
embracing the realities of Romans 8. While his theory parallels the sections 
describing 'hope' and 'adoption by God' (assuming desire), the concluding section on 
the real is without parallel within the realm of his theory as it proposes the dissolution 
of the real. This is impossible within the realm of his theory but it marks the primary 
difference between remaining within the realm of possibility he allows for and 
b e c o m i n ~ ~ a Christian. 
1 8 The dynamiC of the real is the closest thing in 2 : i ~ e k ' s s system to a spiritual 
or miraculous force: 'For Lacan, miracles happen and that's the Lacanian Real. The 
Real is impossible only in the sense that you cannot symbolize or accept it' 
(Conversations with tizek, 165). 
189 Schreiner, Romans, 416, maintains that the Christ of 8:1 denotes the 
corporate Christ with whom believers are united. 
255 
Subject grounded in life in the Spirit and the communion of the Trinity. 
The fear and slavery under the law of sin and death, with its work 
through deceptive desire aroused by the law, became 'another law' 
(irepov v6J.1ov), but this law is now voided and with it all of its various 
machinations. The punishing effects of the law of sin and death can no 
longer condemn as God has condemned the law of sin through the 
death of Christ (8:1-3) who ushers in the law of life in the Spirit. Where 
7:7ff described the characteristics of this living death, chapter 8 
describes life in the Spirit, which sums up the difference God's 
righteousness makes. The body is dead due to unrighteousness but 
the Spirit is life and this is God's righteousness (8:10).190 Christ's 
death exposes and reverses the lie of sin and chapter 8 describes how 
the identity of death in sin is displaced in an identity of life in the Spirit. 
The work of the Trinity is revealed most clearly in the work of founding 
a new form of humanity as described in Romans 8. The whole action 
comes from God sending his Son and destroying sin and bringing life in 
the Spirit through him.191 
In the opening verses of the chapter, Paul explains how Christ 
defeats and exposes the lie of sin in the particular death he died. The 
punishing effects of the law of sin and death are finished so that there 
is no condemnation in Christ (8:1). The judgment passed on sin 
brought condemnation, so that death reigned from the time of Adam 
(5:16-17) but now God has 'condemned sin in the flesh of Christ' 
( G J l a p r i a ~ ~ KartKplvev Tl7V GJ.1apriav tv rn aapKI) (8:3) so that it can no 
190 See Wright. Romans, 584. 
191 This opening section sets the parameters which the following sections will 
fill out in more detail. See Wright, Romans, 579. 
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longer deal out death by deception. 192 In chapter 7 Paul locates the 
law of sin 'in my members' (7:23), in the flesh (7:25), or as 'sin that 
dwells within me, that is, in my flesh' (7:18). The place from which sin 
works death is the flesh. As Wright explains, the reason there is now 
no condemnation is 'because God has dealt with sin in the flesh, and 
provided new life for the body' ,193 Those in Christ experience the death 
to sin and the new life which he provides. The sentence of death is 
passed on sin in the one who was in the true 'likeness of sinful flesh' 
(0J.10IliJJ.1aTI a a p K O ~ ~ a J l a p T i a ~ ) ) (8:3) so those who are found in his 
likeness through baptism (6:5) will also experience this death to sin 
rather than death by sin. 
Paul adds to his description in (8:3) 'and as a sin-offering' (Kai 
m:pi a J l a p T i a ~ ) . . The sin offering, according to Wright, was for the 
ignorant or unwilling sin, which answers the problem of sin of the 'I' 
(7:15) who does not 'know' and does not 'will' what he does.194 Christ 
does not die for a general wrongdoing but to address the particular 
192 According to Dunn the condemnation is that of death pronounced in 5: 16. 
The condemnation 'includes the carrying out of the sentence ... death as a 
consequence of the belonging to epoch inaugurated by Adam' (Dunn, Romans 1-8, 
280). According to the TDNT, 'One cannot seek a single historical fact in which 
the condemnation is pronounced and executed. Paul is obviously thinking of the 
totality of what God has done, and does, through His Son. He has in mind the whole 
movement from the incarnation to the impartation of the Spirit to believers, v. 4. The 
obedience of the Son to the death of the cross (Phil. 2:8) is obviously part of this 
KaTEKplvEV T ~ V V olJapTiav tv Tn oapKi. But in R. PaUl's concern is with the whole of 
God's saving action in the Son, not with details' (Vol. 3: Theological dictionary of the 
New Testament. 1964- (G. Kittel, G. W. Bromiley & G. Friedrich, Ed.), 951-952). 
193 Wright, Romans, 575. He goes on to explain that the condemnation is not 
of Jesus but of sin. 'It is not merely about a judicial exchange ... It is about sentence 
of death being passed on "sin" itself, sin as a force or power capable of deceiving 
human beings, taking up residence within them, and so causing their death (7:7-25)' 
(Wright, Romans, 578). 
194 Wright, Romans, 579. 
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work of sin as it appears in chapter 7.195 This sin which works through 
deception and ignorance brings about disobedience unto death, and 
the one who was obedient even unto death makes obedience possible 
(5: 18-20). The disobedience unto death describes an orientation 
founded in deception (it cannot obey God) and obedience unto death 
recognizes death but obeys in light of the resurrection life by which it is 
empowered (8:11-12). 
The body is dead because of sin but the Spirit is a counter 
power of life (8:10). The Spirit now gives the righteousness of God or 
the promise of life indicated in the law and the law's 'righteous decree' 
of life has been fulfilled. 196 This then will result in the capacity to 'walk 
not according to the flesh but according to the Spirit' (8:4). This walk is 
characterized in all of its phases by the power of life which enables the 
mindset and hope of the Subject in Christ. 
The key difference between the living death of 7:7ff and life in the 
Spirit of chapter 8, or another way of describing the difference between 
life and death, is that the death of the 'I' divides and alienates while life 
in the Spirit is a communion founded by the Father who has sent his 
Son (8:3) who leads by his Spirit (8:14). The Father is the primary 
agent who subjected creation in hope (8:20) who makes all things work 
to the good for those who love him (8:28) who has foreknown and 
predestined those he called (8:29) and these he has justified and 
glorified (8:31). This communion is 'in Christ Jesus' who was sent to 
free from the law of sin and death (8:2, 3) by condemning sin in the 
195 See N.T. Wright, The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in 
Pauline Theology (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1991). 
196 Wright, Romans, 580. 
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flesh (8:3) and who gives his Spirit of life (8:9) so that those who suffer 
with him will be glorified together with him (8:17) as he died and was 
raised and intercedes so that nothing can separate from the love of 
God (8:34-35). The Spirit is the source of life (8:2) who empowers the 
walk and mindset of those in the Spirit and in whom the Spirit dwells 
(8:9) as the Spirit is God's righteousness (8:10) whose resurrection 
power will 'give life to your mortal bodies' (8:11) as by his life 'you put 
to death the deeds of the body' (8:13) and through the Spirit adoption 
as sons enables his sons to cry 'Abba'(8:15) and who helps in 
weakness and prayer by interceding for the saints (8:26-27). The 
Trinity is a communion in which and through which the new humanity 
walks (8:4) has their mindset (8:5-8) sonship (8:15) endurance of 
suffering (8: 17) and saving hope (8:20, 24). Leonardo Boff has 
described this hope as set 'on a life no longer threatened by death, on 
a process of self-realization that is continually renewed in line with the 
future' .197 The following sections argue that salvation from sin and 
death and the new life in Christ can be identified in the different 
Subjects which appear in chapter 7 (with Lizek's similar categories) 
and 8. 
Life in the Imaginary versus the Spirit of Hope 
As Freud describes it, the ego is the 'seat of anxiety' as it faces 
possible annihilation from the super-ego (The Ego and the Id, 59-60). 
The fear arises with the split between the superego and the ego. On 
197 leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. Paul Burns (Wellwood, UK: 
Burns & Oates, 1988), 126-127. 
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one side the ego rejects any prohibition, and on the other and in the 
same instant, he takes over the fear of that danger as a symptom in an 
attempt to get rid of the fear (Splitting of the Ego, 373). In Lacan's 
commentary on Freud, the spectral relation of the self to the self which 
gives rise to the imaginary is alienation from the self: 'Alienation is the 
imaginary as such' (Seminar III, 146). The ego as bodily or object ego 
is a misrecognition of the self that Lacan describes as "frustration in its 
essence" (Ecrits: Selection, 46). According to Zizek, 'Ego itself is, as to 
its essence, is a symptom, a compromise formation' (Reader, 281). In 
a similar way, in Paul's depiction the split 'I' demonstrates how the law 
holds out a fullness of being - promising life (wholeness or 
completeness as the object cause of desire) but ending only in an 
agonistic struggle to the death (7:16_20}.198 Paul describes life in the 
flesh as a life of slavery to fear (8:15).199 Lacan describes it as a drive 
toward unity or oneness with the self through the Other. 'Love is 
impotent, though mutual, because it is not aware that it is but the desire 
to be One, which leads us to the impossibility of establishing the 
198 The psychological depth implicit in Paul's description points to the first 
person nature of the experience. Dodd notes the instances in which he uses 'I'. In 
each instance the shift to this mode of discourse has a distinctive purpose. I Cor. 
8:13 in talking about eating meat Paul is commending his practice as an example to 
follow if not a law to be obeyed. In I Cor. 13 and 9 in regard to spiritual gifts he again 
gives himself as an example. Gal. 2:19-21 and Phil. 3:7-14 are personal confessions 
of Paul. Dodd concludes, 'It will in fact be found on examination that Paul rarely, if 
ever, says 'I' unless he is really speaking of himself personally, even if he means to 
generalize from the particular instance' (Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 
1 2 4 - 1 2 5 ~ . .
99 The suffering of the 'I' in chapter 7 is a suffering implicit in the use of the 
word. The suffering of this 'I' is what Vanhoozer refers to as middle voice. It is at 
once active in that it is the cause of the suffering and passive in that it is the object of 
this suffering. See Kevin Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology: Divine Action, 
Passion, and Authorship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 426ff. 
Paul's 'I' appears as part of a text (Rom. 7:7ff) that is a reflection on two other texts 
(Genesis and Exodus), one of which records the first 'I' so that while he may be 
describing a first person experience it is also the history of this 'I' with which the word 
is weighted. 
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relationship between "them two'" (Seminar XX, 6).200 Paul describes 
this desire as working through a split in the iyw (as worked out above), 
and it is misdirected in that it presumes the law contains wholeness 
and life and as a result it is simply a work of death (Rom. 7:7, 10).201 
Paul's resolution to the fear and frustration of the iyw is life in 
the Spirit (8:2) which he describes in a series of categories which are 
absent in chapter 7 and which Zizek partly describes and recognizes 
but which are not real alternatives within the confines of his theory. 
The first of these, which directly counters the spectral self relation of 
the imaginary or the fleshly iyw, is Christian hope. 'For in this hope we 
were saved. But hope that is seen is not hope at all' (8:24). If the 
object of hope is within sight then it ceases to be hope.202 Hope, by 
definition, falls outside the static spectral relation (the bodily image or 
the image in the mirror) as it reaches forward to that which does not 
appear.203 Where the superego/ego split focuses on fulfilling or finding 
the self in and through a self relation (the bodily image of self or 
others-Seminar /1, 306), hope is focused on the prospect of conformity 
to the unseen image of Christ (8:29) and it does not misrecognize the 
mortal body (on the order of Lacan's notion that the ego is a 
200 Lacan's reference here is to the impossibility of sexual relationship 
between male and female but the origin of this alienation is the split interior of the ego 
which would also fuse the one with the other. It is the lack of self or the inability to 
obtain the reflected image, or as Lacan states it, it is the relation to the other but the 
other isn't an other at all 'since it is essentially coupled with the ego, in a relationship 
which is always reflexive, interchangeable' (Seminar II, 321). 
201 In Graham Ward's assessment of the Lacanian real he assumes it is 
simply a reversal of modem notions of presence. While he is concerned to make the 
point that theology has always had a more nuanced understanding of presence than 
is allowed for in modem readings of the tradition, sinful notions of full presence are 
not the unique domain of the modem. See Graham Ward, Cities of God (London & 
New York: Routledge, 2000), 169. 
202 Fitzmyer, Romans, 515. 
203 Fitzmyer, Romans, 516. 
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misrecognition) but it presumes that through the Spirit the body is 
resurrected (8:11). 
The Subject of hope and the Subject of desire constitute the two 
alternatives held out in chapter 7 (with its similarities to the Lizekian 
Subject) and chapter 8. The Subject of deception or of forbidden 
desire makes the law a means of achieving the self and so enacts a 
loss in which the 'I' observes or sees ({3Atrrw) himself or his body 
(7:23) and finds there an alien force (another law) inducing evil works 
(7:20-21 ). 
Where desire arises through lack (lack of self), the ground of hope 
is life in the Spirit, which has as its goal 'conformity to the image' of 
Christ (8:29). His image is not an object of sight (ego) so achieving his 
likeness is a dynamic process of walking as he did (8:4), of setting the 
mind on things of the Spirit (8:5), of active submission (8:7,13), and 
patience (8:25). The hope of resurrection (8:11) displaces the static 
orientation to death (the negation of death or the real) in the 
acceptance of the mortal body (8: 11) without slavery to fear of the 
punishing effects of the law (8:15) (or the punishing superego), for 
through the Spirit of sonship a direct relation to God has been opened 
(8:15). Put simply the one is the Subject of life and the other is the 
Subject of death. 
For Lacan and Lizek the impetus of the death drive is to secure 
the ego (imaginary) in the manner of an object and the ego as object 
refuses the dynamics of temporality and change. The Subject knows 
itself as a unity but it is a virtual unity (that of the object in the mirror) 
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threatened by the dynamics of time and change (life) (Seminar II, 50). 
The ego of the imaginary 'turns the I into that apparatus for which every 
instinctual thrust constitutes a danger, even though it should 
correspond to a natural maturation' (Ecrits: Selection, 6). The 
movement and maturation that are a natural part of life threaten to 
expose the imago to a change which would constitute its demise. On 
the other hand, hope, in Moltmann's description, 'has the chance of a 
meaningful existence only when reality itself is in a state of historic flux 
and when historic reality has room for open possibilities ahead'.204 
Paul's description of hope allows for a full engagement with the 
vicissitudes of suffering as this suffering and even death are no longer 
definitive or determinative of life in light of the hope of certain glory. 
The 'present sufferings are not worth comparing with the glory that will 
be revealed in us' (8:18) as neither 'death nor life' can separate from 
the love of God (8:38-39). Hope embraces the dynamics of change as 
it is focused on certain future fulfilment of a promise which cannot be 
obtained 'within the framework of the possibilities inherent in the 
present'.205 In Moltmann's description it becomes possible to 
experience the dynamic change of history, not as a threat to the static 
reality of the Self as object, but as a means of fulfilling hope.206 
In Fitzmyer's explanation of 8:20ff this hope directly counters the 
'lie' or futility of sin: 'matiotes connotes what psuedos, "lie," meant in 
204 JOrgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications 
of Christian Eschatology, trans. James W. Leitch (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993) 
92. 
205 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 103. 
206 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 103. 
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1 :25' but here the subjection to frustration is in hope.207 The hopeless 
futility of chapter 7 and of Genesis 3 is answered for the first time, 
according to Cranfield, in Romans 8:20 which echoes and resolves an 
original futility.208 The original lie of the serpent produced a cosmic 
futility the seat of which was to be found in humanity, but now freedom 
from the lie or 'the powers of sin, death and corruption' is proleptically 
realized in hope.209 As Moltmann describes it, the law of sin and death 
is an immanent law and for this reason contains no hope, but the law of 
life in the Spirit subsumes this futility into a transcendent hope.21o 
The imaginary or iyw prevents entry into life. The ego is not 
subject to growth and change as it is an object fixed as part of a formal 
structure: 'I am nothing of what happens to me' (Ecrits: Selection, 22). 
Everything that one is lies within the static object relation to the self. 
The agonistic self-relation of the 'I' to itself is an obstacle to life and a 
kind of living death (Rom. 7:24). Paul, in contrast, pictures not only the 
Subject but all of creation as undergoing a redemptive rebirth. There is 
'groaning as in the pains of childbirth' (8:22) as 'we hope for what we 
do not yet have' (8:24). There is not an abolition of the present world 
so that heaven might take its place but a transformation on the order of 
birth, in which the pangs of suffering are fulfilling a purpose.211 With 
the 'adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies' (8:23) the purpose 
of creation's suffering will have appeared and hope's longing fulfilled. 
207Fitzmyer, Romans, 507. 
208 Cranfield, Romans, 414. 
209Fitzmyer, Romans, 509. 
210 See Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 1 02ff and James C. Livingston, Francis 
Schussler Fiorenze, Modem Christian Thought: The Twentieth Century (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2006) 277. 
211 See Wright, Romans, 597. 
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Lacan likens the course of life to that of the slave 'whose response to 
the frustration of his labour is a desire for death' (Ecrits: Selection, 46). 
Where the labour of hope is a life of redemption, the labour of the tyw 
is the work of death (7:24). 
The Assurance of Christian Hope amidst Futility versus the Artifice of 
Therapy 
This section compares the practical orientation of Christian hope 
that is on the order of, but exceeds the potential, of psychotherapy. 
The case is argued that psychotherapy has incorporated Christian 
hope but has emptied it of its power to heal. 
The law of the superego or symbolic, like the law of sin and 
death, is deterministic and unchangeable and the point of therapy is to 
introduce a future perspective into this past determination (opening the 
subject up to the trauma of the real and reorientation to the symbolic). 
Lacan is originally working with the Heideggerian notion of 
'Augenblick', which in Marcus Pound's account translates as 'the 
moment of vision' or 'the glance of an eye' in which 'the past is 
illuminated by the future coming towards us in the present' or 'the point 
at which we encounter how things look differently in the light of the 
future possibilities, revealing the potentiality of our past,.212 Pound 
notes that the concept is the equivalent of the theological notion of 
hope, which Heidegger, and by extension Lacan, inherit from 
212 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 144. Pound references 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(Southhampton: Blackwell, 1962),387. 
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Kierkegaard.213 Whereas Christian hope, in Pound's description, is in 
the specific hope of the intervention of Christ into the real (see below), 
the analytic parody of that theological category cannot create a stable 
identity that will resist the oppressive futility of the real and death 
drive.214 The futility or frustration that exists within the ego is one that 
Zizek maintains, constitutes human reality. The goal of therapy, 
therefore, is not to overcome the futility or frustration but to conceive it 
in its 'becoming' so as to overcome neurotic defences (Parallax, 6). 
The neurotic defences that arise against the frustrating lack of control 
of the body and the world thwart the attempt to realize thought in action 
and therapy seeks to account for the past prior to its having already 
determined the present and future.215 Bringing the future to bear on 
past defences (the future anterior perspective) can sometime break 
through what amounts to a refusal of the future in the present. Ziiek, 
however, describes the impossibility of accounting for the real as it is 
the event or ground which founds a structure and the real of the 
original event cannot be accounted for in the structure.216 Zizek 
213 Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 150-153. Lizek engages 
Kierkegaard on the topic of repetition in Enjoy Your Symptom, 79-80. 
214 The point above and worked out below in regard to the real. 2:ifek is 
working out Kierkegaard's theology in light of therapy in Enjoy Your Symptom, 79-80. 
It is Pound's notion that therapy is a parody of theology. See Pound, Theology, 
Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 142ft. On the fragility and temporary nature of the act 
see The Fragile Absolute, 98, and Enjoy Your Symptom, 77ft. 
215 Pound gives a detailed description of the therapeutic process's attempt to 
account for the past from a 'future anterior' point of view that he calls Christian hope. 
He may be correct in reading this as a preliminary step in assuming ones desire and 
recognizing lack and thus becoming open to God's plenitude. See Pound, Theology, 
Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 75, 142ft. 
216 So in the relation between time and eternity the real falls on the side of 
eternity and is unapproachable from time apart from some trauma that disturbs the 
fixed order so that trauma or the act is the means of remaking the order (The Fragile 
Absolute,92ft.). According to Lizek, Christianity, like therapy, is able to intervene in 
this system: 'Without the Divine act of Grace, our destiny would remain immovable, 
forever fixed by this eternal act of choice; the 'good news' of Christianity, however is 
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concludes that as a consequence this entails 'the acceptance of the 
very fact that our lives involve a traumatic kernel beyond redemption, 
that there is a dimension of our being which forever resists redemption-
deliverance' (The Fragile Absolute, 98). 
Paul acknowledges the emptiness or 'futility' which arises with 
the Fall but directly counters it with an ontology of hope in which the 
futility is accounted for and allowed by God due to his hope: 'For the 
creation was subjected to futility, not of its own choice but through the 
choice of the one who subjected it in hope' (8:20).'217 The hope here 
is not human hope but God's,218 which accounts for the futile ontology 
of Romans 7 (and Zizek's theory of the Subject) from an ontological 
ground which resolves this futility. While Paul allows for openness (the 
vicissitudes of suffering) he also brings a God's eye view to the 
perspective of history in 8:29-30 and from this perspective all of history 
falls between the call and accomplishment of his purposes in those 
whom he has hope (or whom he has predestined). As Dunn puts it, 
'Paul deliberately sets the whole process of cosmic and human history 
between its two poles, pretemporal purpose and final glorification as 
the completion of that purpose', 219 Hope has at its centre a certainty 
based on the shared perspective provided in the finished work of Christ 
'that God's will stands over all, in control of all, and that his purpose to 
that in a genuine Conversion, one can 're-create' oneself, that is, repeat this act, and 
thus change (undo the effects of) eternity itself (The Fragile Absolute, 97). The 
problem for ~ i i e k k is that each of the registers arises through the other as a pure 
construct devoid of and incapable of contact with an ontological ground outside itself 
as it is its own ground so that eternity has no ground or stability. 
217 This is Schreiner's translation: Schreiner, Romans, 433. 
218 Fitzmyer, Romans, 508. 
219 Dunn, Romans, 486. 
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bring his creation and creatures to their full intended potential is 
undefeatable,.22o Lizek, in his notion of the death of Christ as the death 
of God, relinquishes the certainty of hope from a fixed future anterior 
view. In contrast, the hope which Paul is describing embraces all 
things as it transcends the futility of the material creation and the futility 
of the lyw. The creation groans in hope for the revealing of the sons of 
God (8:19). This hope is not merely anticipation, rather it is a new 
beginning (rebirth in baptism) with Christ through the Spirit with the 
Father: it is the hope of God given as 'the firstfruits of the Spirit' (8:23) 
so as to conform the sons of God into the likeness of Christ (8:29). 
The Unendurable Suffering of Desire versus Suffering in Hope with 
Christ 
The question of orientation to suffering is inherent in the 
discussion of desire and hope. Desire, in Paul's description in chapter 
7 and in Lizek's theory, breeds its own suffering which is ultimately 
unendurable, as indicated in Paul's cry, 'Wretched man that I am! Who 
will rescue me from this body of death?' (7:24).221 The Subject of 
Romans 7 is engaged in a death dealing agony, an agony reflected as 
well in Lizek's thematic engagement with personalities that would bring 
down the world in 'not giving way on desire' (The Ticklish Subject, 
153).222 People sacrifice their lives for virtuality and view suffering in 
the world as a support for (or relief from) abstract (symbolic) suffering 
220 Dunn, Romans, 495. 
221 New Revised Standard Version. 
222 This constitutes Zizek's key ethical principle taken up below. 
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(The Puppet and the Dwarf, 155).223 There is, in the words of Henri 
Bergson contemplating a certain uncanny relief with the outbreak of 
World War " 'a feeling of admiration for the facility of the passage from 
the abstract to the concrete' (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 159).224 In 
chapter 7, Paul is focused on the struggle and sacrifice of life within the 
'I' in which 'evil lies close and hand' (7:22); an evil he has earlier 
described as murderous and death dealing (3: 10-15). The battle within 
the 'I' is self destructive and potentially violent - should '" give way to 
the ever present possibility of evil. The forbidden desire of 7:7 is at the 
origin of human suffering, which in Genesis is linked not only to the 
shame of the first couple but the murder of the second son by the first. 
Suffering and sacrifice are inscribed into the economy of desire as part 
of the agonistic struggle constituting 'the body of death'.225 In light of 
the glory of God, however, suffering becomes something which arises 
in the tangible realms of 'hardship or persecution or famine or 
nakedness or danger or sword' (8:35) and given God's glory, death is 
not denied or refused: 'For your sake we face death all day long (8:36). 
In Dunn's translation, Paul declares 'the settled conviction that 
223 Zifek describes this unbalanced view as it existed in Heidegger. 'Is it 
possible to claim, in a nonobscene way, that the Holocaust is nothing in comparison 
with the catastrophe of the forgetting of being?' Zifek is commenting on a quote from 
Heidegger which begins, The most violent "catastrophes" in nature and in the 
cosmos are nothing in the order of Unheimlickeit in comparison with that 
Unheimlickeit which man is in himself. .. (Martin Heidegger, 'Holderlin's Hymne "Der 
Ister"', Gesamtausgabe 53 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984), 130). 
224 Zifek is quoting Henri Bergson, Oeuvres (Paris: PU F, 1991) 1110 - 1111. 
225 Zifek's depiction of perverse suffering recognizes that masochism can 
only find relief in suffering. 'No wonder, then, that the fundamental fantasy is passive, 
"masochistic", reducing me to an object acted on by others: it is as if only the 
experience of the utmost pain can guarantee the subject access to Being' (Reader, 
119). In the perverse structure, giving oneself over to passive, puppet like acts of 
perverse suffering taps into Being. The perverse structure posits an excess of 
pleasure that can only be obtained beyond the symbolic in acts of masochism or 
sadomasochism. The problem is that hysteria, his alternative position in regard to the 
law, does not seem to ease the interior suffering but only removes the pleasure. 
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sufferings of this present time are not of like value to the coming glory 
to be revealed to us' (8:18).226 The suffering of desire pervades 
everything and is built in to Zizek's universe, but the suffering of 
chapter 8 is temporal and limited to the present age and points to a 
coming age of glory.227 It is a suffering that follows the course of 
Christ's suffering in that it gives way to resurrection, and more than this 
it is a sharing in Christ's suffering as a mark of adoption and a sign that 
'we may also be glorified with him' (8: 17). It is still futile suffering228 but 
it is a futility taken account of from the perspective of hope. 
The Subject reconstituted in Christ is marked by the suffering he 
shares with Christ, which indicates a passage from the sort of suffering 
depicted in 7:7ff which does not and cannot share in Christ's suffering. 
This latter suffering is isolating and antagonistic (hostile to God 7:6) as 
it is constituted in the refusal of shared life and is an orientation to 
death. The suffering shared with Christ, by the very fact that it is 
shared and engaged with the world through Christ, is not oriented to 
death in the lie of death denial but accepts suffering and death as 
Christ did, in the assurance of resurrection. Where forbidden desire 
(7:7) is understood to be impossible desire, the link between suffering 
and desire can be understood to be an identity of frustration. 'I"s 
226 Dunn, Romans, 468. 
227 See Dunn, Romans, 468. 
228 Is there any other kind? It may be that to assign suffering a purpose 
(purposeful suffering) is to miss the point that in the New Testament suffering seems 
to have significance only in conjunction with obedience. Against Barth and Warfield 
who conclude that Jesus was active in his suffering, P. T. Forsyth maintains, 'The 
perfection of the Son and the perfecting of his holy work lay, not in his suffering but in 
his obedience. And, as he was eternal son, it meant an eternal obedience' (P. T. 
Forsyth, Marriage: Its Ethics and Religion (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1912), 70. 
Quoted in Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 429. Perhaps suffering can signify 
but does not bear the weight of being inherently significant. 
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suffering desire is definitive of the dynamic in which he is constituted a 
Subject. 
The Subject 'in Christ' suffers as he did, as there is now a 
capacity to take up the suffering of the world and to bear it in the joint 
suffering of redemption. The groaning and anxious longing of creation 
are a suffering on the order of child-birth; it is a suffering which will bear 
fruit (8:23). 
Do Not Give Way on Desire versus the Ethic of Following Christ in 
Hope 
Though L:izek recognizes a destructive form of desire his account 
of desire and his reading of Pauline desire is that it plays a primary and 
necessary role in the Subject. 229 The key departure in Zizek's reading 
from Paul's account of desire, is his Lacanian understanding that 
desire is itself the 'life force' of the Subject. 230 As Zizek describes it, 
there is a singular ethic and goal in Lacanian psychoanalysis: 'don't 
compromise, don't give way on your desire' as 'it is fidelity to one's 
229 Lacan and 2iiek distinguish between jouissance and the desire 
constitutive of the subject, but the case argued above is that this distinction does not 
hold. It is clear that what Lacan calls jouissance Paul calls 'covetous desire' (7:8). 
This jouissance or desire is, then, the pure substance of the death drive, which Lacan 
identifies with evil: 'we cannot avoid the formula thatjouissance is evil' (Seminar VII, 
184-1851- What is unclear is how jouissance is ultimately distinguishable from desire. 
30 As Evan's notes, 'the very centre of Lacan's thought ... is the concept of 
desire'. Lacan argues that 'desire is the essence of man' (Seminar XI, 275), and the 
goal of therapy is to articulate and recognise the nature of desire (Seminar I, 183). 
Lacan's three registers (the real, the symbolic and the imaginary) intersect with and 
emerge from his symbol for desire - objet petit a (Seminar XX, 87) and the conscious 
and unconscious dialectic occurs in and around the medium of desire (Seminar II, 
228). Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 36. 
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desire itself that is elevated to the level of ethical duty' (The Ticklish 
Subject, 153).231 
In chapter 7 Paul pictures desire or covetousness as the root of 
sin. As I argued above, Paul may be referring simultaneously to the 
desire of Genesis 3 or to the desire which arises in conjunction with the 
10th commandment. The sinful desire that arises with the law is, in 
both instances, a means of establishing the self and in some way to 
manoeuvre God so as to obtain what he has. Both the prohibition of 
Eden and that of the Mosaic Law serve as the site for the agency of sin 
in distorting or disorienting the Subject's relationship to God, which 
entails a deception and disorientation in the self-relation. The 
prohibition and the Law serve in this distorted (deceived) 
understanding, as a 'mechanism' or instrument of accessing God on 
one's own terms.232 In chapter 8 Paul counters this distortion of the 
law through desire with a description of a counter force which might be 
termed Spiritual drive.233 He contrasts the mindset of the flesh (8:5-7) 
231 It is unclear as to what sort of desire one is not to give ground on and 
which sort is to be relinquished. See Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ, 123. In 
Lacan's definition, desire is always desire for something else (Ecrits, 167) or the 
desire of the Other, with the double meaning that desire imitates the desire of the 
neighbour/Other and it seeks to be recognized by the neighbour/Other (Ecrits, 312). 
See Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 38. 
232 See the argument above. The ivroA;, or command meant to preserve life 
through a covenant relationship with God only produces death where sin distorts the 
command and displaces God (7:10). 
233 iTTl6uJlla (desire) does not appear in chapter 8 but in its place Paul 
describes the construct which seems to constitute the covetous sort of desire in 
chapter 7. 01 yap Kara uapKa c 5 V T E : ~ ~ ra r t 7 ~ ~ u a p K 6 ~ ~ rpPOVOOUIV, 016t Kara TTVE:0Jla ra 
roO T T V E : U J l a r o ~ ~ (8:5); rendered in the English Standard Version as, 'For those who live 
according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live 
according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit'. The mind set on 
(rpPOVOOUIV), whether Kara uapKa or Kara TTVE:OJla, describes a construct in which 
intent is not under the control of the Subject. Thus in verse 6 rpp6v'7Jla, the noun 
'mindset' describes the settled positions of either death or life and peace which is 
'under the control' of either the flesh or the Spirit. Dunn connects it to the phrase 'to 
be of another's mind or to belong to another's party' and concludes, 'The sense is 
appropriate here where Paul's thought is of an opposition or warfare between flesh 
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which arises from a gap or obstacle in the self (the incapacity to obey 
the law in 8:7), and which is synonymous with hostility toward God 
(8:7), with the mind set on the things of the Spirit (8:5). The first 
mind set (pointing to the construct of desire in chapter 7)234 is set on the 
flesh and is death, while the second, which is of the Spirit, is life and 
peace (8:6). As I argued above, the alienating gap of the iyw 
(producing the dynamic of desire) constitutes the 'body of death' and it 
is the orientation which makes the lyw a 'slave to the law of sin' (7:24-
25). Lizek's imaginary is constituted in an agonistic desire and even in 
the therapeutic cure the notion of a final peace is not the goal, as 
peace would indicate an end of the dynamic constituting the self 
(death). 
Paul's peace, in a Lizekian context, would amount to a 
relinquishing of the struggle of 'life'. So for Lizek the struggle of 
Romans 7, in its questioning of the law and its traversing the 
fundamental fantasy of desire, though it depicts anything but peace, is 
the equivalent of salvation. For Paul life in the Spirit resolves the 
struggle constituting the 'I' and the Subject in Christ has peace, in the 
sense that the conflict is halted, but also the positive peace of the 
Spirit,235 
and Spirit' (Dunn, Romans, 425-426). The term 'Spiritual drive' gets at the notion of a 
2nd party or agency that is determinative of the construct. 
234 The NIV rendering (Those who live according to the sinful nature have 
their minds set on what that nature desires') is less true to the original vocabulary but 
is perhafs drawing the link to Paul's description of desire (cTT/9uJjla) in chapter 7. 
23 This peace is an inward peace which accounts for futility and struggle but is 
not defined by it. Paul, in depicting a life of futility in 7:7ff takes account of the futility 
of the lie (1 :25) (inherent in desire) and even goes so far as to locate this futility in 
creation (8:20). 
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The Symbolic versus the Law of Life in the Spirit 
The contrast between Romans 7 and 8 has similarities to the 
contrast between Zizek and Paul, and in regards to the contrast 
between the function of the law or the symbolic might be characterized 
as the difference between the attempt to be one's own father and being 
a child of God. The attempt to gain life through the law (7:7ff) or to 
become the father (God) is a necessary passage in Zizek and Lacan 
while for Paul it is a rejection of God as father and entails hostility 
toward God (8:7).236 For Zizek and Lacan the human Subject's entry 
into the symbolic or subjection to the law (passage through the 
Oedipus conflict) is identical to the founding moment of the dynamic of 
being a Subject. 'It is in the name of the father that we must recognize 
the support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, 
has identified his person with the figure of the law' (Ecrits: Selection, 
74). Lacan recognizes the structure he is posing is the equivalent of 
sin, though he offers no resolution to this sin but instead sees it as 
sustaining the Subject.237 'The father, the name-of-the-father, sustains 
the structure of the law' (Seminar XI, 34).238 The Subject arises from 
the self-negating activity of sacrifice (castration or passage through the 
Oedipus complex) and sacrifice is a guarantee that 'the Other exists': 
that there is an Other who can be appeased by means of the sacrifice' 
236 Paul's concept of sin does not consider that sin might be tamed or 
normalized, so that while psychoanalytic hostility to the father may be overcome in 
therapy, hostility toward God requires repentance. 
237 See chapter one of this thesis for the fuller explanation of the symbolic. 
238 Lacan connects his position to Kierkegaard's definition of sin (Seminar XI, 
34). 
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(Enjoy Your Symptom, 56).239 In other words, there is an inherent 
hostility toward the Other of the law (the symbolic or superego) as this 
Other demands continual service and sacrifice.24o 
Paul pictures the law as not only impotent but as an oppressive 
force (due to sin) over against the individual. The law (in the sinful 
understanding) simultaneously entices and condemns as it holds out 
the promise of a transgressive knowledge apart from God and life on 
the basis of works of righteousness. 241 
Paul's resolution to the alienation of the Subject of the law is to 
become a child of God. Where the sinful mind is by definition 'hostile 
to God' the one adopted as a child by the Spirit has overcome this 
hostility enacted against the law (8:7). As in Ezekiel's prophecy the 
heart of stone will be replaced with a heart of flesh and God's Spirit will 
indwell his people and enable them to keep the law (Ezekiel 36:26-27). 
The move from law as alienating and oppressive to the law written on 
the heart (Jer. 31 :33) seems to be duplicated in chapters 7_8.242 Paul's 
cry at the end of Romans 7 'Who will rescue me from this body of 
death?' (7:24) is followed in chapter 8 by a cry of joy, 'And by him we 
cry, "Abba, Father"' (8:15). The God who is law giver in chapter 7 is 
239 Ultimately death or nothingness is the ontological reality over which the 
Lacanian registers are constructed and which is the motive force behind the sacrifices 
in the name of the law. The ontological reality of nothing or the real and its effects in 
the register of the symbolic sometimes seem to constitute two separate entities in 
Z i ~ e k . . Kafka's story, The Trial, oft repeated by Z i ~ e k , , illustrates that the Law is a 
reality constituted by the individual and has no essence apart from this constitution. 
See The L.izek Reader, 20-21, 38-39, 44-49. 
240 The death drive arises through 'the phantasmic construction by means of 
which we endeavour to conceal the inconsistency of the symbolic order in which we 
dwell' (Indivisible Remainder, 1). 
241 See the section above explaining this understanding. See Dunn, Romans, 
491. 
242 Fitzmyer provides an extensive Jewish background to this understanding. 
See Fitzmyer, Romans, 517). 
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'Abba' in chapter 8 and this difference is wrought through 'The Spirit 
himself who 'testifies with our spirit that we are God's children' (8:15). 
Christ, as the firstborn son of this new family (8:29), provides the 
perspective of the successful outcome of a justification or 
righteousness (oIKGlOaUVfJ) already received. The corporate or familial 
nature of righteousness is, according to Dunn, implicit in the term. 
'Righteousness is not something which an individual has on his or her 
own, independently of anyone else; it is something one has precisely in 
one's relationships as a social being.'243 God's covenant faithfulness to 
his people is the fulfilment of his righteousness, and in turn the 
faithfulness of his children to this relationship is their righteousness.244 
Righteousness is being brought into a right relationship with God and 
overcoming the alienation and hostility toward God and this resolves 
the alienating conflict with the self and others. God is fulfilling and has 
fulfilled this righteousness in those he has called in Christ (8:30). The 
calling or summons to relationship and its accomplishment, as with 
every word which God speaks, is certain so that the relationship is also 
certain.245 This certainty of being a child of God and being able to 
depend on his love stands in contrast to the oppressive demands of the 
law and the obscene father of the superego. 
The correspondence between the life of slavery (8:15), whether 
the literal slavery in Egypt or slavery to the law, is not an exact parallel 
to life under the superego, but the two have their correspondences. 
Sin or the Fall, is for Lizek, the necessary condition of the Subject as 
243 Dunn, Romans, 40-41. 
244 See Dunn, Romans, 41. 
245 See Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 535. 
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the Subject contains his own ground or is his own father (in the 
resolution of the Oedipal conflict): 'the most concise definition of the 
subject: the subject is an effect that entirely posits its own cause' 
(Metastases of Enjoyment, 37).246 The alienation from the father is at 
once the reality and necessity of Zizek's symbolic order.247 There is 
the possibility of passing beyond perversion, in which there is an 
imagined pre-Oedipal father (the obscene father of Freud's Totem and 
Taboo), to the oedipal father and the death of the Other in which the 
substance of the symbolic is questioned.248 It is, however, the very gap 
which separates/integrates the symbolic and the real in which they 
'exist' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 274). The disappearance of the gap 
between the two domains (or the collapse of their presumed separate 
existence), or the resolution of their incongruence, would entail the 
246 In his work on Schelling Zizek links the 'primordial lie', in which absolutely 
nothing transforms itself into the Creator God, to the origin of every Subject. God, 
like every Subject, has his origins in himself. Zizek (with Paul) links the dynamic of 
Romans 7 to the Fall but he connects this futility of Sin, the Fall and death drive to the 
foundation and possibility of subjectivity, as it is in and through the fall into the death 
drive that 'Nothingness is counted as Something' which gives rise to the Subject 
(Ticklish Subject, 157). Accordingly, 'it is not that the Fall is followed by Redemption; 
the Fall is identicafto Redemption, it is 'in itself already Redemption' (The 
Monstrosity of Christ, 273). So too the alienation and failure before the law as laid 
out in Romans 7 is a necessary stage on the way to the realization that law and love 
are synonymous (The Monstrosity of Christ, 273). 
24 For Paul there is the possibility of a Subject and law apart from sin. This 
means that for Paul, death, the law, and the Subject are entities that are separable 
and not interdependent, while for Zizek it is impossible to posit anyone of the three 
registers apart from the others. Though the real (as the energetic interplay between 
the symbolic and the imaginary) is privileged in Zizek's understanding, it exercises 
this primacy only in relationship to the symbolic and the imaginary. For Paul the 
subject precedes and exceeds the possibility of death and the constraints of the 'I' or 
tyw, though the status of the law is privileged in that it is determinative of the role of 
the iyw in its relationship to death. Zizek claims, 'The fundamental idea around 
which everything turns is that reality itself is already based on some exclusion or 
inconsistency -reality is not-all' (Conversations with lizek, 102). This not-all status is 
the p r i v i l e ~ e d d position of the real. 
24 As Zizek explains the goal of Pauline theology, 'what the Pauline 
emergency suspends is not so much the explicit Law regulating our daily life, but, 
precisely, its obscene unwritten underside' 50 'we should suspend the obscene 
libidinal investment in the Law, the investment on account of which the Law 
generates/solicits its own transgression (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 113). See 
chapter 2 of this thesis for a complete discussion of this transition. 
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disappearance of the two domains themselves: 'when our psyche can 
directly act upon external physical reality, we not only no longer have a 
soul, we also lose a body as "our own," as separate from external 
objects' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 276). 
Paul's equation of hostility toward God and incapacity to obey 
the law seems to point to a similar dynamic. Alienation from God, and 
either a perverse or hysteric attempt to obtain life from the law fits (as 
described above) with Romans 7 but also fits with the slavery to fear 
abolished by spiritual adoption in chapter 8. 'For you did not receive a 
spirit that makes you a slave again to fear, but you received the Spirit 
of sonship' (8:15). Lizek recognizes a theological resolution to the 
problem of the symbolic in Pauline love: 
What we find in Paul is a commitment, an engaged position of 
struggle, an uncanny 'interpellation' beyond ideological 
interpellation, an interpellation which suspends the 
performative force of the 'normal' ideological interpellation 
that compels us to accept our determinate place within the 
sociosymbolic edifice. (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 112). 
Paul says, 'obey the laws as if you are not obeying them' (The Puppet 
and the Dwarf, 112).249 What Zizek does not acknowledge is that the 
basis of this 'uncanny interpellation' is on the basis of a renewed 
relationship to God as Father. Zizek's resolution of fear and incapacity 
249 L:izek recognizes a theological resolution to the problem of the symbolic in 
Pauline love but the question is if his theory holds together in light of the 
recommendation of Pauline love he is making. To end alienation would seem to 
threaten the Lacanian registers in their support of the subject. As worked out below, 
it is clear that L:izek cannot accept the position of sonship to God (within his present 
theory) as the basis of this love and uncanny interpellation. See The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 112ft. 
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to keep the law is the death of God the Father (The Puppet and the 
Dwarf, 126). It is notable that, in a similar way there is no God the 
Father in Romans 7 and certainly no intimate cry to Abba'; rather there 
is an acknowledgement of the goodness of the law and a simultaneous 
acknowledgement of an incapacity to keep the law (7:13). The 
'wretched man' (7:24) who is a 'prisoner of the law' (7:23) can 
recognize the goodness of the law and yet he is still oriented to and 
controlled by death (7:24-25) 
In chapter 8 Paul links the capacity behind the cry 'Abba' to an 
ontological shift in regard to the law. This shift manifests itself in the 
move from a previous incapacity to obey the law to the capacity to now 
meet the righteous requirements of the law (8:4-11). As Schreiner 
maintains, this is not simply a forensic shift or imputed righteousness, 
as Paul proceeds to explain how the previous incapacity has now 
become not only a possibility but an obligation (8:12).250 The obligation 
is not to the law but to God and it is an obligation that arises with the 
reception of 'the Spirit of sonship' (8:15). In Zizek's theory the 
alienation from the father and the incapacity before the law are 
synonymous,251 while Paul's explanation assigns the capacity to obey 
the law specifically to a renewed relation with the Father: 'The Spirit 
himself testifies with our spirit that we are God's children' (8:16). The 
Father of the universe and the Father of the Son, the one who has 
created the category and reality of familial paternity, is Father through 
250 Schreiner, Romans, 410. 
251 The Oedipal father of the death drive demands what cannot be given. The 
speaking subject imagines some Other which underlies and posits his being as it is 
expressed in language, when the reality is a complete absence or lack, covered by 
the symbolic substance (Seminar /, 194). 
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his action of adoption (8: 15). The size of the inheritance is indicative of 
the ontological shift from being one's own father to being a child of 
God. The former inherits alienation and death while the latter will be 
glorified with Christ (8:17). The former is a slave serving the law of sin 
while the latter is enabled to please God (8:8). This status of being the 
sons of God means that 'you put to death the deeds of the body' (8:13). 
Pleasing God, and not simply serving the demands of the law, is the 
goal but this is an impossible goal apart from the shift described in 
chapter 8: 'And those who are in the flesh are not able to please God. 
But you are not in the flesh but in the Spirit, provided the Spirit of God 
dwells in you' (8:8-9). As Schreiner states it, 'This is manifestly the 
language of ontology' and is not simply forensic.252 The specific way in 
which this ontological shift manifests itself, as would be expected from 
the displacement of the law of sin and death by the law of the Spirit of 
life (8:2), is in 'life and peace' and an end of hostility toward God (8:6). 
The NASB rightly opens chapter 8 under the heading 
'Deliverance from Bondage'. Chapter 7 (with its similarities to L:izek) 
demonstrates how the force of the law and the dynamic of sin is 
inherently a punishing (KaraKplvwv in 8:1) bondage while chapter 8 
explains how this dynamic is displaced and now 'there is no 
condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus' (8:1 ).253 In L:izekian 
terms there is not only a passage beyond the Oedipus complex but 
exposure and displacement of the obscene superego in its connection 
252 Schreiner, Romans, 410. He notes that Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 
518-19, and Fitzmyer. Romans, 488, agree with this assessment. 
253 Fitzmyer, Romans, 481, notes that '"Condemnation" is no longer leveled 
by the law against those not observing its specific prescriptions; nor is there 
condemnation resulting from sin (5:16, 18) that came through Adam'. 
280 
to the symbolic.254 It is not a deliverance from the law per se or simply 
a deliverance from God's punishment but it is deliverance from the 
bondage to the sin and futility inherent in the symbolic.255 For Paul the 
law can be extracted from the dynamic of sin and death so that the 
deliverance of chapter 8 is not deliverance from law but from the sinful 
orientation toward the law.256 Zizek sets a similar goal in seeking to 
extract the symbolic or law from the perverse superego supplement but 
it is by way of sin or the superego supplement that this process is to be 
engineered and in the end the attempt to find love through the law 
simply repeats the original gesture of interpellation (The Puppet and 
the Dwarf, 114). For Zizek each of the registers, the symbolic, the real 
and the imaginary are interdependent but Paul argues that the fusion of 
the law with the energetic of death is the result of sin (7:11). Through 
the Spirit an alternative orientation to the law and a departure from the 
dynamic of the symbolic is had through a relation to God as Father and 
as a result the bondage or slavery to the law is overcome.257 
The child of God relates directly to God, through the Spirit with 
the image of the Son before him. Where the law is made primary, as in 
forbidden desire or the notion that life is in the letter of the law, the 
relationship is to an object and the image it holds out is one of lack, 
and deceptive death dealing desire overtakes the will in compulsive 
254 A distinction is presumed between language, law and the symbolic as the 
symbolic is part of the sinful dynamic while language and law are in and of 
themselves neutral. 
255 See Schreiner, Romans, 404. 
256 With Schreiner Romans, 404, but in distinction from Fitzmyer, Romans, 
481, who, in spite of his recognition of the role of sin can still speak of being 'freed 
from the law'. 
257 According to Dunn. the power of the Spirit to accomplish righteousness 
within God's people. rather than a forensic or Greek notion of righteousness stands 
behind Paul's understanding. Dunn. Romans. 40-41. 
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repetition to overcome the obstacle of absence and death. The trinity 
of law, absence or loss ('I'), and desire, define the Subject of sin. 
Through the work of the Trinity relation with the Father is no longer 
mediated through the law but through the Son, and the Spirit is the 
enabling power of righteousness (8:10). The law marked a covenantal 
relationship fulfilled in Christ who makes it possible to keep the 
covenant relationship with God. 
The Real versus Unspeakable Glory 
This section argues that the passage in Paul from the 'body of 
death' (7:24) to resurrection life (8:10) is, in Lizekian terms, a 
dissolution of the real.258 The real is at once the centre of Lizek's 
theory, constituting as it does the obstacle or absence which stands at 
the centre of the Subject, and yet the real amounts to loss, negation 
and death drive.259 As described above, the passage into the real is 
from being a body to establishing a symbolic distance from the body 
(and having a body): 'the body exists in the order of having -I am not 
my body, I have it' (Organs without Bodies, 121). ~ i z e k ' s s description of 
the depth of alienation in the real parallels and utilizes Paul's 
description of the progress of alienation as it turns on the 'I' in Romans 
7. In Pauline terms the 'body of death' pits 'the members of my body' 
258 Which of course is impossible for ~ i ~ e k k as the real is the center of his 
entire theory, yet in many ways the real, even in his own estimation, seems to be the 
least real or an inability to connect with material reality. 
259 Both Lacan and ~ i ~ e k k equate the real with sin and evil and yet maintain 
that therapy must work in and through the real. Marcus Pound, in perhaps the most 
interesting engagement with ~ i ~ e k k and Lacan to date, in aSSigning Christian salvation 
a parallel course to therapy does not seem to take this completely into account. See 
Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma. 
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against 'the law of my mind' and this makes 'me a prisoner of the law of 
sin at work within my members' (7:23-24). The body of death does its 
work as the body itself, with its members, stands outside the law of the 
mind or the symbolic and this constitutes the work of the real or death 
drive. As Zizek describes it, the antagonistic dialectic between the 
imaginary and symbolic (or the ego and superego) takes place through 
the displacement of the physical body (Organs without Bodies, 93). 
There is no sexual relationship as the real of the body cannot be 
coordinated with the symbolic of relationship (Seminar XX, 128). 
Paul's 'body of death' seems to refer to the dynamic between the 'I' 
(similar to the imaginary), and the law (with its near equivalencies to 
the symbolic) which is the work of death (which is not unlike the 
negation of the real).26o The body per se is not the problem but the 
'flesh' becomes an antagonistic force within the divided '1': 'the 
members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind' results in 
the 'law of sin' (7:23). 
Paul's picture of baptism, described above, is a direct counter to 
the tendency to set part of the self against the other as body or flesh. 
Baptism intervenes in this self-alienation of the 'body of death', as there 
is a joining (aupqJuTOI) to Christ's body as a new Subject.261 The 
260 The 'body of death' as argued above refers to the entire dynamic of sin. 
Fitzmyer defines the meaning as 'the whole person considered as earth-oriented, not 
open to God or his Spirit and prone to sin (Fitzmyer, Romans, 436).' In reference to 
8:2 - 'the law of sin and death' which seems to be a parallel to 'the body of death' 
Dunn explains, 'The words here simply sum up these earlier descriptions of the 
interplay of sin, death, and the law in a single forceful phrase' (Dunn, Romans 1-8, 
419). This accords with the Lacanian registers which, as described above, are not 
descriptions of three different things but simply an account of the structure of a lie. 
261 As described above Dunn defines OUPCPUTOI as 'knit together' and has the 
meaning of 'make to grow together, unite (a wound)' or to 'plant along with/together' 
(Dunn, Romans 1-8, 316). 
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meaning of being 'baptized into his likeness' (6:5) is that the Christian 
is united with Christ himself or his body.262 Where the 'Subject' of 
death has joined herself to death, the Subject of Christ has been joined 
to the ontological reality of God in the body of Christ. Baptism into his 
death is a real participation in the body of Christ and it inaugurates 
resurrection life which is inclusive of a manner of life which presumes 
control over the body - as 'by the Spirit you are putting to death the 
deeds of the body' (8:13). 
According to Zizek, self-consciousness arises simultaneously 
with the realization and refusal of the body and its mortal contingencies 
(sexuality/castration) so that the Subject arises over and against the 
real of the body. The symbolic or the soul 'has to be paid for by the 
death, murder even, of its empirical bearer' (The lizek Reader, vii). 
The 'word made flesh' is impossible where the symbolic realm exists 
over and against the flesh. Though Lacan recognizes the goal of a 
word that is connected to action (full speech - connected to the future 
anterior of hope) the construct of the lie within which language 
functions would seem to be a barrier to speech which manifests itself in 
action. 263 
262 Fitzmyer, Romans, 435. 
263 One of the goals in Lacanian theory is the notion of 'full speech'. 'Full 
speech is speech which performs' that is it is speech manifest through action' (Pound, 
Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 124). Pound connects this with his 
injunction: 'Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you?' (Seminar VII, 
314). As Pound rightly points out, 'from Lacan's point of view .•. language was the 
condition of its own impossibility. It was the medium of truth, yet simultaneously 
undermined the truth process' (Pound, Theology, Psychoanalysis and Trauma, 123). 
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For Paul, the Spirit is the one who brings things into effect - he 
is the effective presence of God.264 In the words of Balthasar, 'the 
Spirit accompanies the entire work of incarnating the Son' so that 'in 
his humanity, can be the Father's word of love,.265 The Spirit's work of 
incarnation of the word into the flesh or the empirical realm of the body 
of Christ continues. It is precisely to the empirical realm which Paul 
turns as he describes the Christian's 'walk' in the Spirit (8:14). Those 
in Christ meet the requirements of the law by living according to the 
Spirit (8:4) and 'mortifying (BavaT6w-to kill) the work of the flesh' (8:13). 
The negation of the body is in its own turn negated in the work of Christ 
which is a work in and through the body. The body or the flesh is not 
suspended or, as Balthasar describes it, 'liquefied into spirit'.266 As 
Schweizer puts it, 'Paul has no interest whatsoever in appearance, 
abilities, or character, but only in the work of the body, in what takes 
place with it' ,267 He concludes that, 'OWIJO is the place where faith lives 
and where man surrenders to God's lordship. It is thus the sphere in 
which man serves.'268 Parallel to this, Paul's standard for authentic 
sonship and future glory is 'if indeed we share in his sufferings' (8: 17). 
Christ's likeness to sinful man (8:3) and the Christian likeness to Christ 
in baptism describe overlapping and shared realms in which the two 
become one, The degree of 'likeness' (olloiwlla) between Romans 8:3 
and 6:5 seems to be manifest in the degree to which 'we share in his 
264 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic, Vol. 3: The Spirit of Truth, trans. 
Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), 238. 
265 Balthasar, The Spirit of Truth, 238. 
266 See Balthasar, The Spirit of Truth, 244-245. 
267 Schweizer, 'owlJa, t O W l J a T I K 6 ~ , , t O U O O W I J O ~ ' , , 1066. 
268 Schweizer, 'owjJa, t o W l J a T l K 6 ~ , , t OUOOWIJOC;', 1066. 
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sufferings' (8:17).269 The believers bodily engagement with creation, 
including engagement with his own body in its present mode is itself 
part of the process of salvation; it is itself part of the experience of 
salvation as an experience of hope,.27o 
An Empty Word from Nowhere versus an Infinite Depth of 
Communication 
Lizek, in part, shares with Paul the emphasis on revelation, 
except that what is revealed in Christ's death is what Lacan called the 
nonexistence of the big Other, and it is only Christianity that opens up 
the space for thinking this nonexistence, insofar as it is the religion of a 
God who dies' (The Monstrosity of Christ, 287).271 The interior dialectic 
of chapter 7 within the 'I' (Lizek's symbolic and imaginary) is a false 
communication which therapy (traversing the fantasy or dying with 
Christ) is meant to expose and presumably silence or change. 'The 
impossibility of the Real refers to the failure of its symbolization: the 
Real is the virtual hard core around which these symbolizations 
fluctuate' and what revelation discloses is that 'the only 'certainty' is 
that of the void of the Real which they (symbolization) (presup)pose' 
(Living in the End Times, 107). Christ's death, in Lizek's theory, opens 
up this absence so that the ultimate communication is of no Word or no 
269 See N.T. Wright, 'The Letter to the Romans: Introduction, Commentary, 
and Reflections' in The New Interpreter's Bible, 579. 
270 I am following Dunn, Romans, 491. 
271 Milbank (The Monstrosity of Christ, 123ff) pictures ~ i f e k ' s s project as an 
ultimate disenchantment of the Universe. 
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Other and the only certainty is of the obstacle of the real.272 The 
parallel in Paul to this failed communication is the work of sin through 
the law in which the command not to covet produces what it forbids 
(7:7-8). The law approached through the sinful orientation of the 'I' (or 
the near equivalents of the ego or imaginary) produces death (or 
something like the negation of the real) which constitutes a counter to 
communion and communication. 
In contrast to chapter 7 and Zizek, Paul, in chapter 8, pictures 
creation and the Creator as containing an infinite depth of communion 
and communication. The communication of life in the Spirit through the 
Son resonates with all of creation as creation's 'groaning' (8:22) and 
the Christian's 'groaning' (8:23) is pictured as an inter-Trinitarian 
communion in which 'the Spirit himself intercedes for us with groanings 
too deep for words' (8:26). The unconscious structured like a language 
in Lacan contains only a deception or an empty word but for Paul the 
unconscious is not constituted through repression or deception but 
through a depth of communion. Where chapter 7 and Zitek picture the 
dialectic of human interiority as an antagonistic failure to communicate, 
in these verses Paul depicts the unconscious workings of the Christian 
heart as an open prayer in which 'He who searches the hearts knows 
what the mind of the Spirit is, because He intercedes for the saints 
according to the will of God' (8:27). The tacit knowledge of the heart 
participates in a prayerful dialectic within the Trinity as 'we do not know 
how to pray as we should, but the Spirit Himself intercedes for us' 
272 There is no Other to address as God Is dead and silence is presumably 
the goal. 
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(8:26).273 Just as Jesus' prayer in Gethsemane is the means by which 
he faces the suffering of the cross and remains true to his vocation, so 
too the believer obediently endures suffering by entry into this inter-
Trinitarian communication between the Spirit and the Father.274 'In the 
same way the Spirit also helps our weakness' (8:26) as incapacity 
(cia8tv£la) is the precise point that the capacity of the Spirit intercedes. 
Dunn connects prayer to humility and dependence on God and the 
counter to the primeval pride which was a grab for knowledge apart 
from God.275 'It is', he writes, 'the expression of human helplessness, 
ignorance and inarticulateness, especially for man who sacrificed his 
relation to God for the fruit of knowledge ... since it is that which 
makes it possible for God to reclaim man for himself.276 As Paul says 
elsewhere, 'for when I am weak, then I am strong' (II Cor. 12:10). 
Prayer is absent from chapter 7 and is absent from Lizek's theory, but 
there is no end of prayer for Paul as it provides the depth and 
continuity of all communication.277 
Prayerful human knowing is linked to an understanding which 
exceeds finite knowledge and connects it to the ground of Truth. The 
communication of the Spirit through the Son is not only an opening to 
knowing God but it also means being known by Him. This 
273 The dialectic within the 'I' is here replaced with an inter-Trinitarian 
communication. According to Balthasar, in Jesus relationship with the Father both 
renounce being a mere 'I' without a 'thou' (The Spirit of Truth, 226). 
274 Vanhoozer notes that, 'As he prays, he is Min an agony" (Luke. 22:44), 
"sorrowful, even to death" (Mt. 26:38), "greatly distressed and troubled" (Mk. 14:33). 
Clearly, Jesus is already suffering, yet the temptation is precisely to avoid an even 
greater suffering. Significantly, it is Jesus' communicative activity - praying - that 
enables him to remain committed to his vocation' (Remythologizing Theology, 431). 
275 Dunn, Romans, 493. 
276 Dunn, Romans, 493. 
277 As I Thessalonians puts it 'pray without ceasing' (I Thess. 5: 17). 
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communication, as with any true communication, is multi-directional 
and thus communal rather than unidirectional (a word from nowhere 
directed to no one). Communication in the Spirit is a full communion 
with God in which knowing has its support in being foreknown by God 
and in which understanding is conformed to the purposes of God 
(8:29). Vanhoozer maintains that 'God's being is in communicating,278 
and that the purpose of God's communicating is communion or sharing 
the 'love the Father has for the Son in the Spirit'.279 Paul pictures 
believers as those who are caught up in this communicating activity of 
the love of God, as the culmination of the work of the Spirit is that in 
loving God 'all things work together for good'(8:28) and in being loved 
by Him there is no obstacle which can obstruct this love (8:39). 
Though Zizek appreciates Paul's depiction of love, as Milbank points 
out, 'reciprocity in love is impossible within [his] disenchanted cosmos' 
(The Monstrosity of Christ, 123).280 
The Fundamental Fantasy versus Truth 
If Trinitarian love is grounded in communication it can be 
understood how a primordial lie would constitute the counter system 
of sin. At the head of Paul's description of sin is the deception which 
278 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 245. 
279 Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology, 280. 
280 Lizek claims to embrace Pauline love, yet the form of this love in his 
theory expresses itself primarily in and through the power of negation: Christ dies to 
bring the Other to nothing and the suspension of the symbolic or the death of God 
suspends the obscene superego supplement to the law (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 
113ff). Paul posits an inter-subjective relationship for those constrained by the Law of 
Love in the body of Christ, while Lizek speaks of love and freedom primarily in terms 
of the negation of the constraints of the symbolic and the opening of new possibility. 
Love suspends the normative force of ideological interpellation, yet Lizek offers no 
positive definition (which would itself perhaps be an impossibility as this too would fall 
back into ideology) of love (see The Puppet and the Dwarf, 112ff). 
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it works in understanding, action, and will, in regard to apprehending 
and doing the law.281 In :lizek's theory and in his reading of Paul the 
deception or the primordial lie is a necessary part of the structure of 
the three registers.282 It is through the primordial lie or in the Fall itself 
that 'the human animal contracted the excess of Life' and departs 
from the level of animal instincts and enters the realm of thought 
(understanding) (On Belief, 105). Sin is what pushed the original 
humans out of the Garden and it is what continues to drive them 
(action) (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 22). The alienated Subject, 
precisely because of the distance and separation taken up within 
itself, is able to enter into language. 'Original Sin itself, the abyssal 
disturbance of primeval Peace' creates a wound or cut in nature 
which constitutes human subjectivity (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 24). 
The primordial lie poses a choice and all who are aware of the choice 
have already made it: 'fantasy in its most basic dimension, implies the 
choice of thought at the expense of being (Tarrying With The 
Negative, 64).283 Entry into thought entails the departure into the 
fiction of the symbolic as 'in fantasy, I find myself reduced to the 
evanescent point of a thought contemplating the course of events 
during my absence' (Tarrying With The Negative, 64). Human will or 
281 To demonstrate the first element or step in the deception, Paul shifts to 
first person discourse (the 'I' against the '1'), and what he demonstrates in this mode 
is a loss of agency or the inability to get a control on the self through comprehension 
or understanding ('For what I am doing, I do not understand' - 7: 15), or through right 
action(,for I am not practicing what I would like to do, but I am doing the very thing I 
hate'), or through the will ('for the willing is present in me, but the doing of the good is 
not' -7:18} 
28 The main point of chapter one of this thesis. For an example see They 
Know Not 197. 
283 It is not the noumenal Real that harbours danger for the subject; it is the 
exposure of this fundamental fantasy that threatens the consistency of the existence 
of the subject (Reader, 119). 
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agency is relinquished as the price of entry into the symbolic. 'Dying 
to sin' or traversing the fantasy, at most, exposes the false condition 
but does not dispel the lie or restore the will but simply manipulates 
the structuring principle of the Zizekian universe. Resolution of the 
obstacle or gap of the real within the symbolic is not through its 
abolition but through its full admission (The Monstrosity of Christ, 
274). Symbolic destitution brings about the realization of 7:11 that sin 
worked through the law (the symbolic, or Other) to deceive and bring 
about a death dealing desire.284 While the goal of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is to open up a relationship 'somewhere beyond the 
Law' (The Ticklish Subject, 153) this 'somewhere' remains to be 
developed. Psychoanalysis does not presume to synthesize or posit 
a 'new harmony' or 'a new Truth-Event' but 'merely wipes the slate 
clean for one' (Ticklish Subject, 153). 
Paul on the other hand, as explained above, sees dying and 
rising with Christ in Baptism as an ontological alternative to the 'body 
of death', as there is a joining (auJ.JfPUTo/) to his body as a new 
Subject. The 'Subject' of death has joined herself to death while the 
Subject 'in Christ' has been joined to the ontological reality of God in 
Christ.285 Chapter 8 describes this joining as being 'in Christ' (8: 1), 
living in the power of the Spirit (8:5), belonging to Christ through the 
284 The Ticklish Subject, 152-153. As : 2 : i ~ e k k puts it, 'The crucial thing here is . 
. . for lacan, there is "a way of discovering the relationship to das Ding somewhere 
beyond the law" - the whole point of the ethics of psychoanalysis is to formulate the 
possibility of a relationship that avoids the pitfalls of the superego inculpation that 
accounts for the "morbid" enjoyment of sin' (The Ticklish Subject, 153). 
285 The Christian, by definition does not 'live in the flesh' (8:5, 8-9), which 
according to Moo is a 'positional' (or ontological) rather than a 'behavioral' concept. 
Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 486. This does not entail alienation or departure 
from the body but full engagement with and a control over the body as 'by the Spirit 
you put to death the misdeeds of the body, you will live' (8:13). 
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Spirit (8:9), living now and in the future in the resurrection power of 
the Spirit (8:10-11), being adopted as a child of God (8:15), and being 
joined to the love of God (8:37-39). Where the lie of sin is understood 
as the engine of death, being joined to God and entering into 
communion with God through the Spirit is simultaneously the 
reception of truth and life. The truth in this instance is not an 
abstraction or a philosophical truth but is a life giving truth which 
specifically counters the death dealing lie. The lie takes up suffering 
and death (alienation) as primary,286 but Paul dismisses the power of 
death in light of God's love: 'Who will separate us from the love of 
Christ? Will tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or 
nakedness, or peril, or sword?' (8:35).287 Where death or something 
like death drive is the orienting factor in chapter 7, Paul sets out in 
chapter 8 that which trumps death: the love of God in Christ by the 
Spirit. 
286 That is the real of death is at the foundation of the Subject, and the 
suffering of the Subject is its masochistic economy (sacrifice of the ego to the 
superego or law). 
287 The suffering in 8:35 is not the middle voice suffering of the 'I' but rather is 
a suffering which arises from someone else or some other place. The point is no 
longer the suffering Subject but the Subject of love. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ZIZEK FOR THEOLOGY 
Employing the work of Slavoj Lizek, Jacques Lacan, and 
Sigmund Freud, the first chapter of this thesis argued that the 
psychoanalytic understanding of human subjectivity is that it is 
grounded and structured around a primordial lie. The second chapter 
connected this primordial lie to the biblical understanding of sin through 
an analysis of Lizek's reading of Romans 7, and chapter 3 compared 
Lizek's reading with Paul's understanding of sin and salvation (in 
Romans 6-8) and demonstrated that Lizek's theory is analogous to 
Paul's understanding of sin but Paul sees salvation as a reconstituted 
Subject.1 This concluding section will further draw out the significance 
of Lizek's theory for Christian hamartiology and soteriology, suggesting 
that Paul's understanding of sin and salvation is to be found in the 
identifiable shift from the Subject of the death dealing lie (Rom. 7:7ff) to 
the Subject 'in Christ' living by the Spirit (Rom. 8). One of the 
implications of rethinking sin and salvation in light of the argument 
above regarding Lizek and Paul, assuming my argument has merit, is 
that rather than understanding salvation in terms of the law, the primary 
focus of hamartiology should be on identifying the work of sin as a 
death dealing lie and soteriology should be understood in large part as 
1 With the indwelling of the Spirit and the adoption into God's family through 
Christ there is a different dynamic within the self and in relationship to God and others 
which amounts to a reconstituted Subject. 
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the displacement of the dynamics of the lie with the reconstituted 
Subject in Christ. In order to consider the wider implications of this 
thesis, it will help to review the argument so far. 
Summary of Chapters 1-3 
The first chapter demonstrated that psychoanalysis has taken 
up a task (the diagnosis of human suffering and even called 'sin' by 
Lacan and Zizek) which is the proper realm of theology. The specific 
overlap of the two disciplines lies in the psychoanalytic understanding 
that the human subject or the psyche is structured in three registers, 
the symbolic, the imaginary and the real, which function like a lie 
analogous to the deception of sin. The historical development of this 
understanding from Freud, through Lacan to Zizek (recounted in 
chapter 1), demonstrated the 'discovery' of the importance of the 
unconscious as it relates to human consciousness as these realms 
are founded in an inner antagonism which Freud dubs the 'death 
drive'. The key shift which Lacan introduces into his reinterpretation 
of Freud is to read what Freud took to be biological or cosmic, as 
having its origins and explanation within the realm of language, 
making it possible to explain the working of human interiority utilizing, 
in part, the resouces of linguistics. The symbolic as the medium of 
human reality, by its very nature, fictionalizes or displaces the 
physical reality of things with their symbolic representation, which 
means that the physical body and its mortal condition are only 
realized as a gap or the negative force of an absence (the register of 
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the real) or disturbance (the work of the death drive arising from the 
real) in the symbolic realm which knows neither death nor mortality. 
Freud's ego or Lacan's imaginary is assailed on every side by the 
other registers (by the oppressive superego or its Lacanian equivalent 
the symbolic, acting on behalf of the id or the Lacanian real) so that 
the ego is constituted by pure frustration and fear.2 
The unique vantage which Zizek brings to Freud and Lacan is 
that his theory fuses Lacanian theory with German Idealism and 
particularly the thought of Hegel, and from this perspective the 
problems of the psyche and its identity become the solutions. The 
frustration, negation and alienation inherent to the Freudian/Lacanian 
picture of subjectivity are subsumed into a larger picture in which the 
gaps and absences are taken as the formative ground of the Subject. 
The goal is not to overcome the gaps but to conceive them as the 
origin of the Subject. As in the example of Cartesian philosophy, the 
failure of the cogito to account for the subject and the object of the 
sentence accounts for the rise of the Subject. The passage into 
subjectivity involves the necessity of withdrawal, madness, and failure 
that opens up the space for its symbolic reconstitution (The Abyss of 
Freedom, 8-9). The fundamental fantasy names this capacity to 
transform the problem and reify it into the solution because, in Zizek's 
analysis, it is clearly a deception or lie but it is a necessary lie as it 
allows for the formation of the Subject. 
2 Both Lacan and l i ~ e k k continue to use the Freudian names of the registers 
(i.e., ego, superego, and id) as near parallels to the Lacanian registers (i.e., 
imaginary, symbolic, and real). 
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The second chapter shows how lizek reads Romans 7 and how 
he sees his theory as a development of a Pauline understanding of the 
Subject. lizek locates the fundamental fantasy in Paul's depiction of 
the deception of sin (Rom. 7:11) and he recognizes that the Lacanian 
focus on desire as primary is matched by Paul's picture of 
covetousness as giving rise to the sinful Subject (Rom. 7:7). lizek 
reads Romans 7 as exposing the problem of the pervert, who would 
fuse the law (which Zizek understands as the equivalent of the 
symbolic) with sin (breaking or transgressing the law). So the perverse 
understanding the law (as in the forbidden desire of Romans 7:7) is 
synonymous with and gives rise to sin. Where the pervert does not 
question the status of the law, the hysteric questions this perverse 
understanding and in questioning it has already moved beyond it. 
Paul, according to lizek, provides the question and answer of the 
hysteric which amounts to a questioning and displacement of the 
perverse approach to the law: 'Is the law sin? Certainly not!' (Rom. 
7:7).3 Hence there is the possibility of reorienting the Subject (from the 
pervert to the hysteric) through their becoming aware of the 
fundamental lie (there is life in the law or in the symbolic). Only in 
'traversing the fantasy' or in 'dying with Christ' (which Lizek takes as 
the Pauline equivalent of traversing the fantasy) does one arrive at the 
limit experience of destitution where the contradiction of the law is 
exposed (promoting what it forbids), opening the possibility for a new 
orientation. Those who 'were made dead to the law through the body 
3 Where Paul would completely separate the law and sin L : i ~ e k ' s s hysteric can 
only raise the question of a difference. The Subject can question the fundamental 
fantasy and the reality of the symbolic but he cannot survive their dissolution. 
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of Christ' no longer serve the letter of the law. That is, they no longer 
serve the obscene superego supplement to the law (the negative force 
of sin attached to the law) which causes the law to be equated with sin. 
The claim in Zizek's reading of Paul, that the Zizekian and 
Pauline understandings of the Subject are largely the same, was tested 
in the third chapter. The two readings, Zizek's and Paul's (as 
interpreted by New Testament scholars) were compared and I 
concluded that the diagnosis of the human subject Lizek finds in his 
reading of Paul is analogous to the problem of sin Paul describes in 
Romans 7. In Paul's description, the deceit of sin, like Lizek's 
fundamental fantasy, deludes the Subject to imagine that following 
desire is the source of life and this desire becomes the animate force of 
sin. This alienating force is expressed as a split within the self and as 
alienation from the body indistinguishable from the real/symbolic divide. 
This dynamic is summed up in Paul's phrase 'the body of death' which 
is analogous to Lizek's notion of the dynamic of death drive. A key 
difference is that Lizek sees this alienation from the body (along with 
the death drive) as necessary to human subjectivity where Paul views 
this form of subjectivity as an aberration. 
I showed that Lizek's attempt to find his theory of a solution to 
the problem of sin in Romans 6 is inadequate and that Paul's solution 
would displace the Lizekian registers. Paul's picture of the death to sin 
in baptism is not simply one of symbolic or subjective destitution since 
it involves being 'joined to' Christ and is an ontological participation in 
the death of Christ. By being joined to the body of Christ, the Lizekian 
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real or the Pauline 'body of sin' (6:6) or 'body of death' (7:24) is 
displaced in the resurrection life of the Spirit (8: 10-11). Paul's 
resolution of the alienation of the Subject of the law is to become a 
child of God through the power of the Spirit. The iyw or imaginary is 
crucified or dies with Christ and the life in the imaginary or Paul's 'I' 
(iyw) is displaced by the corporate identity in the body of Christ. Paul's 
resolution to the fear and frustration of the iyw is life in the Spirit (8:2) 
experienced and conjoined to the categories of hope, adoption as 
God's children, and participation in the Trinity. Zizek's work, though an 
inadequate understanding of salvation, supports and accentuates the 
contrast between Romans 7 and 8 in which Paul is demonstrating how 
Christ overcomes and displaces sin. 
The development of sin and salvation set forth above suggests 
a different focus than is sometimes found in a theology influenced by 
the peculiar emphasis on the individual, such as that which Gregory 
Schufreider describes as developing with Anselm of Canterbury's 
adjustments to a basic Augustinian theology.4 As Derek Nelson 
4 Gregory Shufreider claims the key figure in the transition from an 
Augustinian understanding of interiority to Descartes' cogito, the one who in fact 
lays the necessary ground for the transition and transformation of Augustinian 
thought, is Anselm of Canterbury. Anselm's adjustments to a basic Augustinian 
theology created a new emphasis in the doctrine of sin and salvation and in how 
knowledge of God is appropriated. but all of this flows out of the particular 
emphasis he puts on human reflexivity (see Gregory Schufreider, Confessions of 
a Rational Mystic: Anselm's Early Writings (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue 
University Press, 1994), 18ft. See also Giorgio Agamben, language and Death: 
The Place of Negativity, Translators Karen Pinkus and Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 25ft). Augustine, employing 
Platonic categories, but fusing them with the Johannine Logos and Light and the 
biblical Trinity, would locate the Platonic truth, not in the forms or transcendent 
universals but within the self. He directs us toward a radical interiority: 'Do not go 
outward, return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth.' Plato had 
employed visionary imagery, but Augustine will tum this imagery on itself to 
examine the very possibility of seeing. Where Plato would presume to find the 
'highest principle' in what is seen, Augustine will focus on what enables us to see 
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argues, hamarfiology and soteriology have tended to either focus on 
individual salvation or on the social and structural notions of sin, with 
two different understandings of the function of the law and of human 
nature.5 The claim I would make for the present work is that due to the 
focus on sin as a lie distorting the law it accounts for the role of the 
individual and the law as well as the structural and social aspects of 
sin.6 If the analysis of Paul and Zizek above has any value then, at the 
least, we need to reckon with the explicability or the systematic nature 
of sin as it is exists in society and the individual, and to think of 
atonement less as the repayment of a debt and more as a 
transformation of the Subject. Also, because of the social nature of the 
Subject, neither individual nor social emphases in the doctrine of sin 
should be prioritised but we should attend to the dynamics which 
underlie both. The suggestion made below is that part of what it 
means to overcome sin is to dispel the mystery which is accounted for 
by its deception and that this dispelling of the mystery opens the 
possibility of examining the depth and seriousness of sin in both its 
social and individual aspects. 
in the first place (Augustine, De vera Religione, XXXIX. 72, Quoted in Charles 
Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), 129). 
5 Derek Nelson traces the shift from Augustine's doctrine of Original Sin to a 
Lutheran notion that sin is against God's word as either law or Gospel to 
Schleiermacher's exclusive focus on human interiority. He then examines the 
strengths and weaknesses of several liberation theologies as examples of the most 
developed and best of corporate notions of sin and salvation (Derek R. Nelson, 
What's Wrong With Sin: Sin in Individual and Social Perspective from Schleiermacher 
to Theologies of Liberation (London: T & T Clark, 2009). 
6 Z i ~ e k ' s s theory, as with the argument above, in positing the Other and the 
symbolic as part of human interiority does not abolish a distinction between the 
individual and the social realm but explains how they overlap and are necessary to 
one another. See Adrian Johnston, Badiou, Zitek, and Political Transformations: The 
Cadence of Change (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestem University Press, 2009), 85-91. 
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Accounting for the Mystery of Sin through Salvation 
Some theologians have made the origins of sin inexplicable. 
For example, early in his Christian life Augustine encountered and 
absorbed the understanding that concerning 'The Ancient Sin: nothing 
is more obviously part of our preaching of Christianity; yet nothing is 
more impenetrable to the understanding'. 7 As Peter Brown explains, 
Augustine does not dispel the mystery with his doctrine of Original Sin 
but in place of explanation offers historical origins.8 Total depravity is 
attributed to all the children of Adam 'in whom all sinned' (in quo omnes 
peccaverunt, as Augustine read Romans 5: 12 in his Vulgate Latin 
Bible) but the exact nature of how sin is propagated or how all 
participate in Adam's original act is not entirely clear.9 This uncertainty 
as to how sin is propagated is evident in Calvin's explanation of 
Augustine's doctrine, in that he will attribute the propagation of sin to 
either divine ordinance or natural inheritance (as James McClendon 
notes, 'Calvin wavers between these') with corruption somehow spread 
to the whole human race.10 The result, according to McClendon, is that 
sin is not subject to explanation (in light of salvation) but becomes the 
lens through which salvation is interpreted. 11 As is evident in the 
theology and explanation of G. C. Berkouwer the doctrine of Original 
Sin is such that it does not permit deeper insight: 
7 de mor. eccl. cath. (I), xxii, 40. Quoted in Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: 
A Biogra,phy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 390. 
Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 390. 
9 James McClendon, Systematic Theology: Doctrine (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1994), 125. McClendon maintains that the doctrine of Original Sin is based 
upon Augustine's misreading of Romans 5:12, in which the origin of sin has no place 
(McClendon, Doctrine, 126) (see De pecc. orig, 11,35). 
10 McClendon, Doctrine, 126. See John Calvin, Institutes (2:1, 4,5,8). 
11 McClendon, Doctrine, 126. 
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· .. there is a riddle that can be dispelled and that can make 
way for a new and deeper understanding. But the riddle of 
sin is not of this sort and lies on an entirely different plane. It 
can never permit a greater or deeper insight into the nature 
and origin of sin.12 
The implication of this thesis is that sin is not a mystery or riddle 
in this sense and that the nature and origin of sin or the working of the 
dynamic of sin is reducible to a system.13 The perception that sin is 
impenetrable may give it the appearance of being transcendent, 
containing a meaning which is in competition with the transcendence of 
God. The fascination with evil and the temptation of sin is that it offers 
'something more' (a more abundant life or extremes of pleasure) which 
is 'divine' in the 'knowing' it imparts. Could it be the case that the 
mystery of sin is part of the lie and where the mystery remains there is 
a failure to grasp the truth of sin? Perhaps where sin is mystified or 
reified the danger is that the formulation of the problem of sin binds 
itself to a perception which is part of the problem.14 Salvation 
understood as the overcoming of sin means sin is known and exposed 
in this light. 
As noted in chapter 3 above, a primordial lie constituting sin 
makes sense in light of a Trinitarian love grounded in communication. 
12 G. C. Berkouwer, Sin (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
C o m p a n ~ . . 1971). 131. 
3 To say that sin makes no sense does not mean that no sense can be made 
of sin and it seems to be these two ideas that are sometimes confused (e.g .• in 
Berkouwer above). See Ted Peters, Sin: Radical Evil in Soul and Society (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994),9-10. 
14 2 : i : ~ e k ' s s theory requires the reification of the symbolic, though traversing the 
fantasy, is an exposure but not a dissolution of the fiction of the symbolic and the 
'substantial' nature of the Subject. 
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If the word of God is the ultimate ground of reality and the means and 
mode of creation and recreation, sin as a lie distorts access to this 
ultimate reality.15 That is, the false mystery and false transcendence of 
the lie displaces the transcendence and mystery of God. In turn, the 
truth of Christ is the truth which counters and displaces the lie of sin. 
One implication of the argument of this thesis is that, as in the deeply 
rooted Christian tradition reaching from Irenaeus to Barth, revelation is 
part of the work of salvation as it exposes and dispels the lie of sin.16 
Another way of saying that revelation is part of salvation is that, 
as in my account of revelation which innovates on the tradition which 
tends to see revelation as addressed primarily to the rational soul or 
rational Subject, revelation is addressed, in part, to exposing the 
unconscious, as the conscious work of sin is dependent on what it 
negates. The specific content of the lie or deception exposed by Christ 
(as argued in chapters two and three above) is the orientation to death 
analogous to the death drive of the fundamental fantasy at the 
foundation of the human project of establishing the self in 
psychoanalytic theory. As Zizek notes, the unconscious is not primarily 
15 Paul begins to explicitly compare and contrast two modes of subjectivity in 
chapter 3 when he describes the advantage of the Jew as consisting in his having 
been entrusted with the oracles of God and those who are unrighteous as embracing 
a death dealing lie (3:2, 10ft). 'What advantage, then, is there in being a Jew, or what 
value in circumcision? Much in every way! First of all, they have been entrusted with 
the very words (oracles) of God' (Rom. 3:2). Those who have turned away from 
God's word are practitioners of deceit and violence (3:1 Off). As Richard Hays puts it, 
for Paul, Scripture is 'a living voice speaking directly to the community' (Richard B. 
Hays The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel's Scripture 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005) 97). 
16 As a counter-example, Jack Cottrell in separating redemption and 
revelation pictures revelation as a subsequent word of explanation while the acts of 
redemption (incarnation, dying for our sins, departing from the tomb) somehow 
exceed or fall outside the parameters of his definition of revelation. See Jack Cottrell, 
Solid: The Authority of God's Word (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2002). 
302 
the drives; rather it is the 'fantasmatic foundation of his or her being' 
(The Fragile Absolute, 70). That which is by definition unconscious 
consists of the basic 'human project' or the 'founding gesture' of the 
conscious subject. For Paul, the truth of Christ (found in facing the 
reality of death in resurrection faith as in Rom. 4) stands over and 
against the lie of sin (the resistance to death of the fundamental 
fantasy and the impenetrable mystery of the real). Christ exposes the 
lie of sin (death as life at the foundation of subjectivity) in his 
acceptance of death and reverses the orientation of sin (slavery to the 
fear of death) in which the denial is absolute. Christ relegates death 
and the law of sin and death to a secondary category and displaces 
them with the truth (resurrection life). The depth of the mystery of the 
truth of Christ displaces the unconscious structured as a lie; that is, sin 
as a false mystery is displaced by the true mystery and transcendence 
of Christ at work beyond human consciousness (the reconstituted 
unconscious). So, on this account, the truth of salvation necessarily 
addresses the Subject at both a conscious and unconscious level as 
the work of sin is exposed as an identity grounded in the dynamiCS of a 
specific deception and orientation to death. 
The Primacy of Relation to God over Relation to Law 
The implication of my argument regarding Romans 6-8 that 
Christ did not die, primarily, to meet a requirement of the law but to 
displace a deception which involved the law, is that it is not the law 
which provides insight into his death, but sin as it is oriented to the law. 
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This section will suggest the implication this has for theories which 
make the law primary in understanding sin and salvation. 
The thought of :lizek and Paul converge in the notion that 
relationship to the law is of prime importance in understanding the 
orientation of the Subject.17 One key difference between Paul's and 
:lizek's understanding is that Paul does not see the law, outside the 
'law of Christ', as primary for the Christian, or the mediator of 
relationship in Christ, while for :lizek law or the symbolic is the medium 
of relationship. As a result, salvation, for Lizek, is primarily a 
reorientation to the law through a suspension of the obscene superego 
supplement by means of a total identification with the law. This 
suspension of the obscene superego though requires that there be an 
obscene superego to suspend, and on this basis the supplemental 
ground for love is provided. The supplement is necessary to establish 
the ground for the excess of love (The Puppet and the Dwarf, 114). In 
other words, the law in a perverse orientation is necessary as a 
background to hysteria, but it is still necessary even in the hysterical 
Subject to have passed through this earlier stage and to have this 
perverse background. 
Paul introduces an economy in salvation which can account for 
the law but which is not mediated by law. Salvation, in his 
understanding, is not gauged in terms of the law but as a counter to sin 
and the establishment of an alternative identity and an alternative 
17 As I argued in chapter three there is a convergence between 2 : i ~ e k k and 
Paul's understanding of the law with a key difference being the significance of Paul's 
explanation of the fusing of sin and the law in 7:7ff, an understanding which for Zitek 
constitutes deliverance from the perverse to the hysteric position, but which for Paul 
does not in itself constitute salvation. 
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economy in Christ.18 The law, for Paul, mediates and governs the 
economy of sin, but law is secondary in the economy of salvation 
ushered in through Christ.19 The law could not deliver life but God has 
done what the law could not do by sending his Son, and Christ has 
ushered in the life promised by the law (Rom. 8:3). The way God did 
this was to condemn sin, not Jesus, though it was in the flesh of Jesus 
that sin was put to death. 'By sending his own Son in the likeness of 
sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh' (8:3). As Wright 
puts it, 'this is some way from saying, as many have, that God desired 
to punish someone and decided to punish Jesus on everyone else's 
behalf. 20 
Seen in this way Paul's view seems in contrast to the tradition of 
atonement as satisfaction, of which Anselm is a leading representative. 
In Anselm's doctrine of 'divine satisfaction' law is not only determinative 
of what constitutes sin or disobedience (as with Paul)21 but it is also 
determinative of the meaning and method of the atonement.22 
18 In L i ~ e k ' s s Hegelian logic negation and death are the power out of which the 
subject is born. Jesus touches upon these two economies in describing two salvation 
systems. "For whoever wants to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for 
me and for the gospel will save it" (Mk. 8:35). The contrast is between a system of 
self-salvation in which the attempt to save life ends in losing it and the salvation of 
Christ in which losing this sort of life is part of salvation. 
19 Moo maintains the 'Jaw of the Spirit' cannot refer to the Mosaic law: 
'Throughout his letters, and not least in Romans, Paul pictures the Mosaic law as 
ranged on the opposite side of the Spirit, righteousness, and life. God's 
righteousness has come "apart from the law" (3:21; cf. Gal. 2:15-3:14); the promise 
can be attained only through faith and not through the law (4:12-15 cf. Gal. 3:15-18; 
the believer must be "released from" the law through union with Christ In order to 
produce fruit pleasing to God (7:4-6; cf. Gal. 2:19-20) (Moo, The Epistle to the 
Romans 474). 
20 See Wright, Romans, 578. 
21 See Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 3. 
22 Paul's understanding of the law, as I have argued, is that it functions as the 
orienting factor in sin from Adam, and L i ~ e k k follows Paul in the understanding that the 
law plays this orienting role. Anselm's theory coincides with the understanding that 
the law is determinative of sin but he would take the law further than Paul in 
describing it as the determinative parameter under which salvation is accomplished. 
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Throughout the book Cur Deus Homo, Anselm describes the 
atonement in terms of repaying to God the honour taken from him by 
sin, which makes Christ's death necessary to pay back to God that 
debt. What Anselm is building toward in Book One of Why God 
Became Man is the necessity of Christ's death based on the rational 
necessity of a limited whole or what he calls a 'regulated' system of 
forgiveness. 23 For Anselm sin and salvation work within a 'regulated' 
economy in which sin and forgiveness are tracked, and in which 
righteousness and reason reinforce one another as God must of 
'necessity' not 'allow anything in his kingdom to slip by unregulated,.24 
Anselm assumes there is only so much space in heaven (created by 
the fallen angels) and a measurable amount of honour (even if the 
measure is infinite), so that what one possesses, whether the self 
(having robbed God's honour through denying God possession of the 
self) or a place in heaven, it is given up by another, and this limited or 
measurable amount in an economy of exchange creates the value.25 
The manner of gaining admission to heaven is through paying a price 
greater than the debt owed to God's honour 'considering the contempt 
23 In this system humans have taken themselves from God, which has 
created their incapacity to repay God what is owed and this incapaCity is synonymous 
with human guilt (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 11). 
24 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 11. As Anselm argues, the rational nature was 
created so that it might judge and choose the righteous and spurn and hate what is 
bad. It does this to attain the highest good the purpose for which it was created 
(Anselm Cur Deus Homo, 11). 
25 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 19. The format of Anselm's argument may 
determine the outcome. Why God Became Man (Cur Deus Homo) seeks to do for 
the atonement what the Mon%gion and Pros/ogion did for God's existence (and all 
that it entails). Anselm is going to set forth the 'reason' why God became man and 
died on the cross in such a way that a nonbeliever, the role of Boso, would be 
convinced of its truth. So he will not appeal to the authority of Scripture, but will use 
pure reason to answer the question, 'By what logic or necessity did God become 
man, and by his death, as we believe and profess, restore life to the world?' (Anselm, 
Cur Deus Homo, 1). 
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offered'.26 The only one capable of rendering that debt is the God-
Man, Jesus Christ. Christ does not owe God a debt other than the 
obligation incumbent on humans before sin, so his death is voluntary 
(he offered himself as payment) and of infinite value, and hence his 
death can be meritorious; though this was also the ultimate debt 
incurred (by those who killed him), but the manner in which this created 
a surplus value was that those that killed him were ignorant of Christ's 
true identity.27 Opponents of Anselm's theory of divine satisfaction 
argue that salvation depends upon sin in this understanding as the 
requirements of the law are met through a sinful act (the killing of 
Christ); infinite satisfaction is obtained in the act of killing Christ.28 For 
Anselm, Christ's death works according to the logic of law in that the 
satisfaction demanded by the law is rendered by Christ (but the 
economy itself is not disturbed or displaced). Anselm is arguing 
without direct appeal to Scripture (though Scripture is assumed 
throughout his argument) but the power of his argument is such that it 
will affect future biblical understanding of the atonement. In William 
Frazier's description, the act itself (of killing Christ) and the death itself, 
to say nothing of the life of Christ, are often disengaged from any 
immediate or practical effect in the world.29 The exchange between 
Christ and God is complete in and of itself as a legal exchange.3o 
26 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 11. 
27 Anselm, Cur Deus Homo, 11, 15. 
28 See for example, Brad Jersak, 'Nonviolent Identification and the Victroy of 
Christ' in Brad Jersak and Michael Hardin eds., Stricken by God: Nonviolent 
Identification and the Victory of Christ (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
P u b l i s h i n ~ ~ Company, 2007), 18ft. 
2 See William B. Frazier, 'Where Mission Begins: A Foundational Probe' in 
International Bulletin of Missionary Research. Anselm sees sin as a gap in the will 
and the death of Christ enables man to will rightly, and the definition of willing 
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Paul's understanding of the law introduces a series of categories 
in chapter 6 and 8 which demonstrate that the law mediates sin but, in 
contrast to Anselm's understanding, for Paul the law does not mediate 
salvation (so law has a narrower sense for Paul than it does for 
Anselm). Salvation destroys the law of sin and death and introduces 
the economy of life, in which there is no end of resources. Anselm's 
'divine satisfaction' works within a closed economy of law and Christ 
meets the demand of the system. There is, however, no relief from the 
system of exchange and payment but only a meeting of the demands 
of the law. In Anselm's system the purpose of the law plays a primary 
and enduring role so that even in Christ it is the economy of exchange 
that is determinative. 
In Paul's picture of an alternative economy, as argued in this 
thesis, the promise of the law is fulfilled (the promise of life which it 
could not deliver), and the law itself has taken on its correct place as 
secondary to what God has done in Christ to bring life and restore 
relationship to God by dispelling the lie of sin with the truth of life in the 
Son. The law only has an enduring role in condemning sin in sinful 
rightly is to rightly remember the self (in the manner that God rightly remembers 
himself). 'To strive to give, therefore, expression to this impressed image; to 
strive to actualize, by an act of will, this, nature's potential such above all, is, In 
consequence the debt that rational creation owes its Creator'(Mon%gion, 68). 
The foundational nature of Anselm's theology is apparent in his attempt to ground 
it in rationality, in the self, and in ethics or law. What each of these realms has in 
common is that they ultimately are grounded in a self-authorizing tautology. The 
tautology of self (I am me) and the tautology of ethics (the will to justice is justice), 
give rise in Anselm's theology to the need for what might be called the tautologous 
performance of the law. The need for a continual performance Oudging) of a 
self authorizing rationality in order to attain to the entity of the self, as a mode of 
s a l v a t i ~ ~ , , "necessarily" places his theology in the realm of law. 
Anselm describes sinning as 'violently' taking from God what was his and 
the implied recourse on the part of God is to take it back (Anselm, Cur Deus Homo 1, 
14). Christ's death does not serve to critique or displace this violence but simply 
workS according to the inherent logic of the system. 
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man (Rom. 8:4). The alienation (between the law and the 'I' (iyw) or 
the individual) produced by a misperception of the law is overcome in 
the understanding that the proper role of the law is to point to life in 
Christ.31 Participation in Christ inaugurates resurrection life which is 
inclusive of a manner of life which presumes control over the body and 
an end of alienation (the 'I' against the law) - as 'by the Spirit you are 
putting to death the deeds of the body' (8:13). The split between the 
individual and the social or between the iyw and the law can be viewed 
as part of the problem from within the 'body of Christ' which denotes 
individual and social coherence and unity. 
As I have demonstrated, salvation may be seen primarily in 
terms of this unity in the body of Christ which stands in contrast to the 
sinful Subject who in his inner alienation and his alienation from God 
and others is 'grounded' in a destructive lie. The theological 
significance of Zizek is his demonstration of the pervasive and 
systemic nature of this lie against which the truth of Christ can be 
understood in its specifiC and yet universal significance. The truth of 
Christ exposes the death dealing nature and deceit of the law of sin 
and death which is the means by which the sinful Subject would obtain 
life. Dying with Christ can be understood as the death or end to 
investing life in this death dealing and alienating lie (the defeat of the 
31 Perhaps the tendency to focus on a radical individualism or social 
structures within hamartiology is accounted for with the understanding. worked out by 
L i ~ e k k that these two realms must appear in this manner in his theory. L i ~ e k ' s s reading 
of Paul's understanding of the perverse or sinful orientation to the law (the law is the 
reified symbolic structure through which the sinful Subject is constituted) is at the 
least an indication of how intra-subjective dynamics (i.e., the functioning of the 
individual heart or mind) and inter-subjective dynamics (Le., the functioning of groups 
within socio-symbolic orders) appear as if they are autonomous realms when they are 
necessarily interdependent (see Johnson, 8adiou, tiiek and Political 
Transformations, 85). 
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law of sin and death) and the beginning of a new kind of life in 
communion with Christ and his body by means of the Spirit of Life (the 
law of life in the Spirit). Salvation is the means by which the Subject of 
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